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Abstract 
In the reconstruction of war-tom societies, the successful reintegration of combatants 
into the post-conflict environment is recognised to be a vital component in the 
peacebuilding effort. In order to achieve and sustain such reintegration Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes are implemented. DDR 
literature advocates the importance of economic reintegration due to the fact it provides 
a focus for ex-combatants and thus the possibility of a secure environment. However, 
as DDR is studied in greater detail, the limitations of such a narrow focus are becoming 
apparent. Moreover, the identified need for the effective social reintegration of ex-
combatants is becoming an increasingly more salient issue; particularly when 
considering the reconciliation of war-affected communities. Nevertheless, whilst the 
importance of social reintegration may have been recognised, understanding as to the 
ways in which ex-combatants socially reintegrate, and the effects such reintegration 
may have on the reconciliation process and the general peacebuilding effort, is in its 
relevant infancy. 
This research, through fieldwork involving the life history analysis of 50 ex-combatants 
and 22 civilians, along with ethnographic studies of four rural communities and 26 elite 
interviews with policy makers/implementers, sought to investigate this hiatus within the 
context of Rwanda. Specifically, it examined the obstacles faced by ex-combatants in 
their social reintegration and the mechanisms through which ex-combatants are 
successful in their endeavours. It then progressed to an elaborate consideration of the 
effects of the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants on the reconciliation 
process within the peacebuilding environment. It does this by applying the c~ncept of 
social capital as a bridge between ex-combatant social reintegration and reconciliation. 
The findings from this research identify a number of significant elements that are 
crucial to the social reintegration of ex-combatants. Additionally, the thesis delineates 
the importance of such reintegration for the reconciliation and peacebuilding process 
and thus signifies the need for a significant reconsideration of the way in which DDR 
programmes are designed and implemented. 
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Preface 
Pl. Defining the Problem 
The central aim of this research is to examine how the successful social reintegration of 
ex-combatants can promote reconciliation in a Post-Conflict Environment (peE) 
through the renewal, and strengthening of social capital. As Paris (2004) highlights, the 
nature of conflict has changed from that of interstate conflict (that which involves two 
or more states) to civil conflict (that which involves two or more factions within the 
same state), with a simultaneous shift in the significant majority of conflict victims from 
combatants to non-combatants who endure a strategy of warfare based on atrocities such 
as wanton destruction of property, hostage-taking, mass executions, systematic rape and 
sexual slavery, ethnic cleansing and genocide. This has had the effect of dramatically 
increasing the volume of forced displacement and the devastation of social structures. 
In conjunction with this, the spillover effects of intrastate conflict have ensured a 
regional element to some conflicts that has contributed to insecurity as armed groups 
from one country threaten the security of those in another. 
The complexity of the conflict dynamics and the way in which conflicts are fought has 
significant implications for the reconstruction of war-tom societies. The PCE -
characterised by high levels of poverty, displacement, physical, economic and social 
destruction, and drastically diminished social cohesion - represents a melting pot of 
simmering hatreds, resentments and fears in which the reconciliation of previously 
conflicting social identity groups presents one of the most vital but difficult 
achievements in the peacebuilding process. Indeed, "the typical country reaching the 
end of a civil war faces around a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five 
years" (Collier et aI, 2003:83), in part due to the unsuccessful resolution of the causes of 
the conflict and the subsequent inability to reconcile. In spite of this, however, the state 
of knowledge about reconciliation has received considerably less attention than that of 
conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, 2000). 
It is into the PCE and the embryonic reconciliation process that the demobilisation of 
ex-combatants occurs and in order for an effective transition from war to peace it is 
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argued that the reintegration of ex-combatants is essential (Colletta et aI, 1996). It is 
often posited that this group can be critical to the achieving of sustainable peace due to 
the potential security threat they represent (Colletta et aI, 1996; Kingma, 1997; Dercin 
& Ayalew, 1998; Mokalobe, 1999: 23; Ozerdem, 2002). Additionally, it is also 
recognised that the reintegration of ex-combatants has the potential to contribute in a 
positive way to conflict transformation and peacebuilding (Nubler, 1997; Kingma, 
2002; Ginifer, 2003). However, despite the acknowledgment that the reintegration of 
ex-combatants can make positive contributions to the peacebuilding process, little is 
known as to how this may materialise. Indeed, as Gomes Porto et al state, 
Recog'!ising this important point (that in the immediate post-war 
setting, societies may seldom have the ability to effect sustainable 
reconciliation) points us in the direction of long term reintegration 
as a critical component of processes of social reconciliation - and 
the need therefore to conduct deeper research into the underlying 
and subtle process by which identities affect and are affected by the 
reintegration process. 
(2007: 147) 
Given our inchoate understandings of both reconciliation and the positive contributions 
to peacebuilding of ex-combatant reintegration, in theory and practice, this thesis seeks 
to investigate the relationship between the two, utilising the concept of social capital, in 
order to develop our understanding of both these individual concepts (reconciliation and 
social reintegration) and the way in which they may interact. 
P2 The Scope of the Study and the Research Question 
Critically, this thesis set out to investigate the main parameters related to the research: 
reconciliation; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); and social 
capital, in the context of post-genocidal Rwanda. Specifically then, it seeks to establish 
the impact genocidal conflicts have on social capital, in particular bonding, bridging and 
vertical social capital, and the implications this may have for reconciliation. It is 
anticipated that an understanding of the ways in which such conflicts impact on social 
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capital will facilitate a more comprehensive consideration of how DDR programmes 
may promote the rebuilding of social capital and the ways in which such programmes 
may contribute to enhanced reconciliation. In tum such an understanding may augment 
our understanding as to how DDR policy can best be designed and implemented in 
order to achieve effective reconciliation. 
The concept of social capital is utilised within this research rather than other concepts or 
theories for a number of reasons. The key tenets of social capital, those of 
communication, cooperation, coordination and trustl, coalesce in various ways so as to 
explain the ways in which groups within communities, groups between communities 
and the community and the state interrelate. As such the use of social capital is 
particularly expedient as the linking concept between social reintegration and 
reconciliation. Although other concepts such as kinship systems or clientelism could 
have been utilised, it was felt that social capital went beyond what other concepts could 
offer, providing an ideal way through which we can better understand social 
reintegration itself, and the links it has with reconciliation. Social reintegration, and for 
that matter reconciliation, entails far more than the patronage relationships between 
those in power and those not, or kinship networks between nuclear or extended families. 
The successful social reintegration of ex-combatants relies on more than just those in 
power or the family, although these are both important, and this is where social capital 
can provide a more focussed lens through which we can observe social reintegration. 
Not only does the concept introduce indicators for measurement, thus making it more 
practical for use, it also crucially enables an understanding of the various interactions 
that have an impact on social reintegration. Understanding how communities 
collectively function at all levels, and how they establish social cohesion, is important in 
explaining the detrimental effects of violent conflict and how such effects can be 
ameliorated, in this case through the social reintegration of ex-combatants. For these 
reasons social capital is the concept of choice in this research. 
The successes of DDR programmes to date have generally been evaluated in terms of 
economic reintegration with indicators such as levels of employ .lent or enrolment on 
training courses. This research is critical of such an approach, as it does not place a 
high enough emphasis on the issue of social reintegration, which is, arguably, vital for 
I These issues will be addressed fully in chapter three. 
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effective reconciliation and, therefore, sustainable peace. Consequently, this research 
aims to offer an alternative perspective from which to view the process of reintegration 
that addresses the impact of genocidal conflict on social capital, and considers the ways 
in which DDR policy may create and develop social capital and promote effective 
reconciliation, rather than focusing on conventional commitments to economic 
indicators. It will therefore offer policy recommendations that aim to maximise the 
potential and effectiveness of reintegration policy, with specific focus on social 
reintegration. 
As a result of the above, this thesis is based on the answering of the following research 
question: 
In what ways can the successful social reintegration 0/ ex-combatants promote 
enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment, and what are the 
implications o/such a promotion/or reconciliation? 
P3 Aim and Objectives of the Research 
The aim of this research. is to offer an alternative perspective from which to view the 
process of ex-combatant reintegration that relies less on conventional measures of 
reintegration such as economic indicators, instead assessing the impact of conflict on 
social capital and exploring ways in which the effective social reintegration of ex-
combatants may facilitate the restoration of stocks and quality of social capital damaged 
throughout the course of the conflict, and promote the achievement of sustainable 
reconciliation. Thus, this research aims to develop our understanding of social capital 
dynamics and propose recommendations for the effective design and implementation of 
DDR programmes that fully respond to the changing dynamics of social capital as a 
result of conflict, and generate functional conclusions that develop our understanding of 
the reconciliation process and how this process can be augmented. 
The objectives of this research are thus: 
1. To investigate ways in which genocidal conflict transforms social capital and 
how the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants may restore stocks and 
quality of social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment. 
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2. To identify and utilise concepts through an extensive literature review that 
enables the development of a theoretical framework, through which we can 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of the linkages between conflict, 
social capital, social reintegration and reconciliation. 
3. To develop an effective methodology for the understanding of social capital 
transformations in a conflict and post-conflict environment, the social 
reintegration of ex-combatants and the attainment of reconciliation, along with 
the way in which these three issues interrelate. 
4. To explore the linkages between the three concepts through the analysis of data 
gained from the Rwanda case study and compare them to linkages identified 
within the literature, thus testing the theoretical framework developed. 
P4 Research Methodology 
The issues central to this research are of a very complex and dynamic nature and as such 
it utilises a 'composite approach' (Barakat et aI, 2002) in order to enable an in-depth 
and focused understanding of the key issues and the factors affecting social capital, 
social reintegration and reconciliation. By employing a range of different research 
techniques, based around ethnographical methods, it was possible to not only generate a 
richer understanding of the various concepts and their interactions, but also to 
triangulate the results thus increasing their credibility. 
Three main research methods were engaged within the study: 1) an extensive literature 
review, 2) fieldwork in Rwanda, and 3) conferences, training courses and workshops. 
The reasoning for an extensive literature review lay behind the need to further develop 
personal understanding of the central issues within this research - conflict, 
reconciliation, DDR, social capital, the Rwandan context and relevant research 
methodologies, the emphasis being to enable the formulation of a theoretical framework 
that could provide a structure through which it was possible to answer the research 
question. 
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The fieldwork in Rwanda represented the central aspect of the practical research in this 
study. Despite the various limitations encountered in the fieldwork phase, as discussed 
in chapter five, the flexibility afforded to me through the composite nature of the data 
collection methods, and my approach to the research, ensured results both rich in detail 
and highly relevant to the research question and the theoretical framework. 
During the course of the PhD I attended conferences, training courses and workshops 
related to the research in order to augment my understanding of the key Issues. 
Preliminary findings have been presented at an ISS (Institute for Security Study) 
International Conference on Peace and Security in Africa in Addis Ababa (Bowd, 
2008). I undertook courses at the University of York in Post-war Recovery and was a 
participant and syndicate leader at the African Disarmament, Demobilisation & 
Reintegration (DDR) course, a pan-African training course on DDR in the African 
context run by GTZ in Rwanda. These were all useful in developing my knowledge of 
these issues and assisted in the development of the research project. 
P5 Thesis Structure 
The research commences in Chapter 1, which addresses the literature associated with 
the concept of reconciliation. Starting by providing a contextualisation of the peE, 
which is crucial to the effective understanding of the challenges that face the 
reconciliation effort, the chapter then progresses to examine the meaning of 
reconciliation. Processes of reconciliation have been evident for centuries; however, 
with the changing nature of conflict so, too, have these processes changed. It is 
therefore important to consider these changes, particularly in the context of conflict 
transformation and peacebuilding, as it is these areas the thesis is concerned with. 
Essentially this entails an appreciation of the more contentious questions associated 
with the concept, namely whether or not reconciliation is desirable or indeed, 
achievable. A detailed examination of these issues augments a richer understanding of 
the concept as a whole and therefore enables a more accurate understanding of the ways 
in which reconciliation may be achievable. Having established a robust consideration 
of reconciliation, the chapter then advances to examine how such an endeavour may be 
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achieved. This begins by appraIsmg conventional techniques before gomg on to 
consider indigenous methods utilised in the pursuit of reconciliation. 
Having examined the issues of reconciliation in the context of peacebuilding, Chapter 
2 is concerned with assessing the potential for the reintegration of ex-combatants to 
contribute to reconciliation. Thus the chapter begins by constructing an understanding 
of what DDR policy is, what it aims to do and what it consists of. It then examines in 
greater detail the reintegration component and its constituent parts: economic, political 
and social reintegration, with particular focus on social reintegration. This primarily 
concerns itself with an understanding of the reconciliatory benefits of social 
reintegration and the difficulties associated with achieving this. Chapter two is 
particularly important as it indicates how the social reintegration of ex-combatants can 
have positive implication for reconciliation and thus underlines the potential of this 
thesis of going some way to fill the identified knowledge gap. 
Chapter 3 introduces the final concept to be utilised in this research, that of social 
capital. Beginning by developing a comprehension of what social capital is and where 
it originated from, this section considers the different approaches to the understanding 
of social capital so as to provide a clear picture of this theory. The chapter then moves 
on to an analysis of the transformation of social capital through violent conflict. This 
part of the chapter is particularly significant as it essentially offers a technique through 
which we can better conduct a conflict analysis, which potentially could translate into 
more effective policy. Once an understanding of how violent conflict transforms social 
capital has been established, it is then necessary to consider ways in which social capital 
that is decimated through conflict can be restored through the rebuilding of social ties. 
This, in effect, expands our understanding as to how social development may occur in a 
PCE and, although explicit linkages are not created at this time, alludes to the 
connections between the three concepts. The final section of this chapter is concerned 
with the way in which social capital is measured. Due to the contestation surrounding 
the definition of social capital issues of measurement are also the subject of debate, 
much more so when we attempt to apply the concept in the context of the developing 
world. 
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Having examined the three relevant concepts through relevant literature in the previous 
three chapters, chapter 4 builds on this knowledge by developing a theoretical 
framework that explains the ways in which the successful social reintegration of ex-
combatants may promote enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal contlict 
environment and the implications such a promotion may have for reconciliation. 
Essentially this theoretical framework consists of an analysis by the author that 
develops our understanding of the three concepts and the way in which they interrelate. 
The chapter then progresses to a discussion of the ontological and epistemological 
positions taken in the context of this research and then provides a detailed consideration 
and justification of the methodology adopted with this in mind. The next section of this 
chapter will be concerned with the logistics of the study. It will examine fieldwork 
phases, sampling, translations, data recording and any other such issues. The final 
section of this chapter will address the methodological problems encountered 
throughout the study. 
The final review of literature is found in chapter 5, which presents a conflict analysis of 
the Rwandan case, necessary in order to fully comprehend what happened in Rwanda, 
and the subsequent effects of these events, in order to be in a more advantageous 
position from which to understand what can be done. The chapter initially presents a 
historical overview of the Rwandan conflict from the point of colonialisation then 
addressing the key causes of the conflict concentrating firstly on the external influences 
then on domestic factors before concluding with psychosocial aspects. The next section 
provides an in-depth analysis of the Rwandan Genocide through the application of 
Stanton's (1998) 'The Eight Stages of Genocide' model. The final substantive section 
of this chapter introduces primary data into the thesis for the first time by charting the 
transformation of social capital through the conflict in Rwanda considering two distinct 
phases: the pre 1990 civil war period and the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide period. 
Chapter 6 presents the first substantial analysis of the data from fieldwork conducted as 
part of this research. The primary function of this chapter is to develop our 
understanding of social reintegration and provide a foundation from which it will be 
possible to appreciate the impact social reintegration may have on the restoration of 
social capital and reconciliation. The chapter is divided into two main parts: the first 
builds a picture of the environment faced by ex-combatants when they return to their 
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communities as it is necessary to comprehend this in order to understand how ex-
combatants socially reintegrate; the second part examines what is necessary for the 
successful social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda. It is subdivided into three 
categories: macro level elements, meso level elements and micro level elements. 
Building on the analysis in the previous chapter, chapter 7 assesses the contribution of 
ex-combatant social reintegration to social capital renewal and reconciliation. In this 
sense this chapter provides the analysis that is crucial to the answering of the research 
question. The chapter begins with a consideration of the general position of 
reconciliation in Rwanda so as to set the scene for understanding how ex-combatant 
reintegration has influenced this process. Moving on to a consideration of the effects of 
ex~combatant reintegration on social capital the chapter first considers the 
transformation of social capital in the post-genocide period before examining vertical, 
bonding and bridging social capital and the interrelatedness of the three within the 
context of ex-combatant reintegration. After identifying these effects, the chapter 
moves on to an analysis of ex-combatant social reintegration and its effects on 
reconciliation. In this part of the chapter, reconciliation is divided into political and 
social reconciliation. 
Having detailed how ex-combatants successfully socially reintegrate in chapter 6 and 
the impacts this has on social capital and reconciliation in chapter 7, chapter 8 seeks to 
provide a conclusion to the thesis and is therefore separated into two parts. The first 
part draws together the argument running through the thesis and, relating the results 
back to the theories discussed in the literature review chapters (chapters 1-3) and the 
theoretical framework (chapter 4), provides an answer the research question. The 
second part concerns itself with the thesis outputs that result from the overall research 
project. This begins by outlining theoretical advancements as a result of the research 
(DDR, social capital and reconciliation), before moving on to examine potential 
improvements for methodological aspects of conducting research in a PCE. The chapter 
then makes recommendations for the design and implementation of future DDR 
programmes that maximise the potential for effective social reintegration of ex-
combatants and the creation and development of social capital in PCE in order to 
augment the reconciliation process. The final section of the chapter identifies potential 
future research areas arising from this research. 
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Chapter One: 
Reconciliation in the Post-conflict Environment (PC E) 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the issue of reconciliation in the post-conflict 
environment. Reconciliation is a particularly significant concept as it represents 
something of a paradox within post-conflict reconstruction. At the end of violent 
conflict, reconciliation represents one of the key goals or objectives of the overall 
reconstruction effort. So too, however, does it represent the greatest of challenges in 
this effort. The building of a peaceful, cohesive society in which previously conflicting 
factions co-exist in harmony and the initial causes of conflict are eliminated is, on the 
one hand, the point at which one can claim success. On the other hand, however, is the 
difficulty in following a process of reconciliation as will become apparent. 
In order to u~derstand the process of reconciliation it is vital that one has an accurate 
comprehension of challenges such a process faces. For this reason the chapter begins 
by examining the immediate post-conflict environment. The chapter then moves on to 
consider reconciliation as a contested concept with different approaches and 
perspectives. It is here that the chapter introduces a number of these into a discussion of 
the definition of reconciliation. This provides the basis from which the development of 
our understanding of reconciliation and its role in conflict transformation and 
peacebuilding can take place. The next section considers the more contentious 
questions that the pursuit of reconciliation may give rise to, specifically examining 
whether or not reconciliation is a desirable and/or possible achievement. This is 
important as it enhances our understanding of the process as a whole. After deliberating 
on what reconciliation is, the chapter then turns its attention to how it can be achic\ed. 
This discussion begins by firstly considering conventional approaches to reconciliation 
such as truth commission, tribunals and reparations. It then moves on to contemplate 
indigenous approaches to reconciliation. 
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1.2 Imagining the Post-conflict Environment 
Prior to the end of colonialism in the 1950s and 60s, the twentieth century was 
characterised by interstate conflict. However, in the 1960s, intrastate conflict 
outnumbered interstate conflict by more than 2-to-l, with this ratio rising to 5-to-l by 
1990 (Long & Brecke, 2003). The post-Colonial and post-Cold war era, along with the 
collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia, has become synonymous with a period of 
increased intrastate conflict and tension, in which traditional diplomatic and 
reconciliatory activities have found themselves lacking. Indeed, between 1989 and 
2006 there were 122 armed conflicts in the world, of which 115 were intrastate conflicts 
(Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007). As a result of these conflicts the problem of refugees 
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has also grown with an estimated 16m refugees 
and 26m IDPs around the world in 2007 (UNHCR, 2008). This compounds the 
problems faced by those engaging in reconstruction efforts, as these groups must also 
be addressed. With the changing nature of conflict has come the increased need to 
address these conflicts, and the consequential situations, in a more robust and dynamic 
fashion taking account of the vast difference between intrastate and interstate conflicts 
in terms of their effects. Indeed, as Charles W. Kegley Jr. states when paraphrasing 
John F. Kennedy, "the end o/the Cold war competition changes all the answers and all 
the questions" (1993: 141). The design and implementation of reconstruction activities 
in the PCE is therefore heavily dependent on an accurate understanding of the 
challenges facing that environment and for that reason it is necessary to develop such an 
understanding. 
To begin, what then is the cause of intrastate conflict? Intrastate conflicts emerge due 
to a complex variety of reasons. At a theoretical level social change of some sort occurs 
and leads to the emergence of conflict. Conflict is, however, ,not necessarily a negative 
phenomena and what is important here is the way in which the society responds to the 
emerging conflict. Should the society be defined by dominant or coercive relationships 
the likelihood exists that structural conflict would emerge 2• If polarisation and/or 
violent political mobilisation are evident violent conflict would result. Where these 
emerging conflicts can be accommodated society would be a mix of conflict and 
1 Structural conflict arises due to Structural violence, a tenn Galtung utilised to refer to the violence 
caused by unregulated societal structures which effectively allow the strong to victimise the weak who are 
unable to protect themselves (Galtung, 1969). 
2 
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cooperation with underlying or latent tensions and, in the case that emerging conflicts 
can undergo transformation, peaceful change can ensue. This can be seen in the 
diagram below developed. 
Social 
change 
Dominant! coercive 
relationships 
Polaris ation/violent 
/ political mobilisation 
Emergent 
--... fl' con lct 
Accommodation 
Transformation 
Social 
capacity 
Figure 1 - Four Paths for Conflict: Miall (2007: 13) 
Structural 
• conflict 
Violent 
• conflict 
• 
Mixed conflict! 
cooperation 
Peaceful 
• change 
What will determine the result of the social change and emergent conflict is a 
combination of societal capacity and conflict triggers. If society has the capacity to 
manage the conflict then at least a situation of cooperation amidst latent tension can 
arise and, if societal capacity is greater and conflict management can lead to conflict 
transformation3 then an environment of peace is possible. However, should societal 
capacity not be adequate to at least manage the conflict and various conflict triggers are 
discharged then violent conflict will materialise. ConflIct triggers are those 
characteristics of conflict that light the touch paper resulting in the descent into violent 
conflict. Such triggers are highly context specific and an accurate understanding of any 
violent conflict must be preceded by a comprehensive conflict analysis of the given 
3 Conflict transfonnation refers to the "deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that 
reproduce violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves and their relationships" (Ramsbotham et 
ai, 2005: 29). It therefore represents "a change in the goals, structure, parties, or context of the conflict, 
which removes or changes the contradiction or incompatibility at its heart' (Miall, 2007: 14). Conflict 
transfonnation goes further than conflict containment, management and resolution to include the 
structural and cultural elements of the peace building process. For further reading on conflict 
transfonnationsee, among others, Galtung (1969 & 1996), Lederach (1995), Wallensteen (2007). 
3 
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conflict. Nevertheless, there are several prominent characteristics contributing to the 
outbreak of intrastate conflict that are shared by most cases. These are: 
• Ethnic groups seeking greater autonomy or striving to create an 
independent state for themselves 
• Internal battles fought to gain control of an existing state 
• HF ailed States" where the authority of a national government has 
collapsed and armed struggle has broken out between the competing 
ethnic militias, warlords or criminal organisations seeking to obtain 
power and establish control of the state 
• Impoverished states where there exists a situation of individual hardship 
or severe dissatisfaction with one's situation and the absence of any non-
violent means for change (Walter, 2004) 
(Kegley & Wittkopf, 2005: 420) 
Understanding the specific causes behind a given intrastate conflict is crucial to the 
effective reconstruction of the post-conflict environment. So too however, is an 
appreciation of said environment, that is, the impacts of the conflict on the society in 
question. Indeed, it is only though an accurate comprehension of the challenges that 
face the reconstruction effort, and the threats to such efforts, that any durable restoration 
can take place. As with the causes of contlict, the impacts of conflict are context 
specific; however comparisons can be drawn from a consideration of intrastate 
contlicts. 
Violent contlict of any nature results in explicit material and human costs to a society 
and this is certainly the case in intrastate contlicts. In terms of physical infrastructure 
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals and administrative buildings are destroyed and very 
often mines are laid making it difficult to engage in infrastructural reconstruction. 
Resources such as diamonds, gold, oil and other minerals, along with cash crops and 
land are destroyed or appropriated by contlicting factions to enable the continuation of 
their war efforts, thus reducing the prospects for economic revival in the post-contlict 
period. Watercourses and wells may be poisoned or polluted, either deliberately or as a 
consequence of dead bodies, mass migrations of people or military discharge, resulting 
in mid to long-term water supply and associated developmental problems. The physical 
devastation of conflict has disastrous effects on economic development through reduced 
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production, falling exports, increased debt and decreased social expenditure (Stewart & 
Fitzgerald, 2001). In fact, "the typical civil war puts development into reverse, 
reducing pre-war incomes in directly affected countries by 15 percent on average, and 
reducing growth in neighbouring countries on average by 0.5 percent per annum" 
(Ramsbotham et aI, 2005: 73 citing Collier et aI, 2003: 2). Although both infrastructure 
and economy are shattered by conflict it is the human and social costs of conflict that 
are so devastating, both directly and indirectly. 
As the nature of conflict has changed from interstate to intrastate so too has its toll on 
human life. Throughout the 20th Century the World has been witness to increasing 
proportions of civilian deaths in conflict with approximately 90 percent of war victims 
being soldiers at the beginning of the 20th Century compared to 90 percent of conflict 
casualties being civilians in the 1990s (Cairns, 1997). In addition to this "attacks and 
atrocities against non-combatants became widely employed as deliberate strategies of 
warfare - including such tactics as systematic rape, mass executions, ethnic cleansing, 
and even genocide" (Paris, 2004: 1). The human and social cost of conflict does not 
end here. Mass migrations within and between countries reduce human security 
through environmental degradation, inadequate sanitation, increased health problems, 
lack of access to food and physical insecurity, thus giving rise to further humanitarian 
emergencies. The physical costs of war contribute to human and social costs through 
damage to hospitals, schools, roads and bridges, vital in the provision of necessary 
services and access to markets (if they are functioning), which make reconstruction 
efforts all the more complex. The destruction and mining of farmland and roads reduce 
the chances for economic revival, presenting further challenges to the survivors of the 
conflict who cannot resurrect a sustainable livelihood and the lingering threat to 
physical security reduces the changes for those who can. 
The direct and indirect results of intrastate conflict leave a complex lasting legacy that 
is difficult to erase. Economies need to be stabilised and developed, infrastructure 
needs to be rebuild and institutional renewal or replacement needs to take place. 
However, arguably the greatest challenge in the removal of the legacy of violent 
conflict and the reconstruction of the country is the re-establishment of society. Indeed, 
Societies emerging from war face a range of urgent, interconnected 
problems on all fronts, not too dissimilar to situations of natural 
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disasters. However, it is the destruction of relationships, including 
the loss of trust, dignity, confidence and faith in others that proves 
the most far reaching, potent and destructive problem and the most 
difficult to address. It has the potential to undermine possible 
solutions to a wide range of other issues. 
(Barakat, 2005: 10) 
Education systems are adversely affected by the war, health systems are unable to cope 
with increasing demands and social institutions become dilapidated or non-existent. 
However, the challenge of rebuilding these institutions and systems beset by extreme 
destruction becomes all the more daunting when one takes into account that "intimate 
exposure to brutality and subsequent displacement and civil disorder leave individuals 
psychologically scarred and the intricate network of social interaction deeply torn" 
(McDonald, 2002: 4). As trust is diminished, cooperation and communication reduce 
and fear increases resulting in the stagnation of societal activity and development. In 
the absence of communication further fractionalisation of society first becomes possible 
and is then exacerbated as when such division is "linked with acute social uncertainty, a 
history of conflict and, indeed, fear of what the future may bring; it emerges as one of 
the major fault lines along which [society] fractures" (Newland, 1993:191). It is 
dialogue that is necessary to stabilise and sustain societal relations as "dialogue is the 
first step in providing a sense of belonging, for by communication and listening we take 
the first step toward recognizirzg our own commonality" (Aboulmagd et aI, 2001: 37) 
however constructive dialogue in such an environment is difficult to achieve. 
The impact of intrastate conflict on social interactions and systems is evident with 
community dislocation across many levels being the result. Individual suffering is 
significant and this has intrinsic implications for the survival of the family, which 
represents the nucleus of the community. Individuals struggle to rebuild their lives and 
communities whilst faced with the uncertainty of the future and fear of the past. With 
everything around them broken, and the causes of the conflict very often remaining, 
albeit in a latent form, the potential for societal renewal is depleted. Weak social 
capacity to manage social change and emergent conflict (as evident by the fact that 
violent conflict broke out) is further undermined and the society's capacity to manage 
future conflicts in a peaceful way is lessened (Miall, 2001). The result of this is a 
reduced ability to recover from intrastate conflict and an increased probability of 
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conflict renewal. This creates an altogether problematic paradox when one considers 
the words of Sultan Barakat, "post-war reconstruction begins in the hearts and minds of 
those who suffer the horrors of war and want to change societies so that there is no 
return to mass violence" (2005: 1). How then do war-tom communities with reduced 
capacity set about their reconstruction? The reconciliation of conflicting factions 
evidently is necessary, not only in its own right as a outcome of post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts, but also as a means of achieving other outcomes in such efforts. 
It is, therefore, necessary to examine in more depth the concept of reconciliation, which 
will then enable a consideration of the ways in which the reconciliation process may 
impact on coriflicttransformation and peacebuilding4. 
1.3 Reconciliation Examined 
The notion of reconciliation has been one that has received interest since ancient times 
and has, it can be argued, been pivotal to the survival of human society. From the 
ancient Greeks and Romans to Medieval English literature and beyond, the concept of 
reconciliation has been applied in attempts to comprehend human behaviour and 
develop coping systems for conflict. Indeed, the Old Testament of the Bible bears 
witness to struggles of reconciliation. However, one could claim that prior to the 1950s 
and 60s our understanding of reconciliation was very much in its infancy as it was not 
until the end of colonialism (and later, the end of the Cold War) that the need for 
reconciliation was so vital. 
Despite the notion of reconciliation being a concept of increasing importance and 
interest there is, at present, no clear consensus as to its definition. A very simple 
definition is provided by Ramsbotham et al who state that, "reconciliation - restoring 
broken relationships and learning to live non-violently with radical differences - can be 
seen as the ultimate goal of conflict resolution" (Ramsbotham et aI, 2005: 231). 
Although this classification does not present a comprehensive understanding of 
reconciliation, and indeed one could not expect the term to be defined in such a short 
4 Peacebuilding is the term used to define the actions taken at the end of a civil conflict that have the aim 
of consolidating the peace in order to ensure it is sustainable and a reoccurrence of the violence will not 
eventuate. In the words ofKofi Annan, the aim of peace building is "to create the conditions necessary/or 
sustainable peace that would endure long after the departure of the peacebuilders themselves" (Annan, 
1999: para. 101). For further discussion on peacebuilding see, among others, Lederach (1997), Maiese 
(2003), Paris (2004) and Richmond (2005). 
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statement, it does pave the way for a deeper understanding. The assertion made by 
Ramsbotham et al introduces the issue of reconciliation as being a goal and certainly 
simplistic understanding of reconciliation may also tend towards this view. However 
reconciliation is in fact both a goal, that is, something to achieve, and a process, that is, 
a way of achieving that goal (Bloomfield et aI, 2003). 
On viewing reconciliation as a goal one may claim that it is an aspiration for the future; 
an ideal state to which conflicting factions should seek in which disparate groups are 
bound together into a genuine society. When considering what such an ideal state may 
resemble, Whittaker advocates "a reconciled community assimilates rather than 
discriminates, promulgates humane and legal rights, does its best to dissolve alienation 
and fear, encourages people to share values and develop congenial relationships, and 
promotes a hope that material benefits will accrue as a product of peaceful transactions 
and independence" (1999: 8). It is however relatively clear that in order to arrive at 
such an ideal it is necessary to engage in a process of reconciliation and it is this 
process that most authors concentrate on. For Bloomfield et al (2003), 
Reconciliation is an over-arching process, which involves the search 
for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and so on. At its simplest it 
means finding a way to live alongside former enemies - not 
necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any 
way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation 
necessary to share our society with them, so that we will all have 
better lives together than we had separately. 
(2003: 12) 
The above quote reiterates the procedural nature of reconciliation. At its base level 
reconciliation entails the acceptance of what is not an ideal outcome and takes place at 
all levels of difference and throughout the conflict spectrum - difference, contradiction, 
polarisation, violence, war, ceasefire, agreement, normalisation, reconciliation S • 
Pursuing reconciliation is, however, most difficult after violent conflict as during the 
process of conflict "too much has happened, too many relations have been severed, too 
many norms violated, too many identities distorted, too many traumas endured. To 
reach the transformation levels of bridging differences and restoring trust requires a 
5 For an analysis of the conflict spectrum see Figures 1.2 & 1.3 Ramsbotham et ai, 200S: 11/12. 
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capacity for innovation and creative renewal likely to be beyond the capacity of many 
societies in the aftermath of violence" (Ramsbotham et aI, 2005: 233). When we 
consider the societal effects of violent conflict, as asserted here and in the previous 
section, it is evident that the process of reconciliation will be a long and arduous 
journey. Violent conflict exacerbates previously existent social cleavages but it also 
adds an emotional element to the situation, which further intensifies division between 
groups. 
Reconciliation can therefore be seen as ''part of a process of forgiveness, transforming 
certain emotions (moving from anger to affinity) and transcending certain beliefs about 
oneself and the other, that opens the possibility of new, beneficial relations" (Long & 
Brecke, 2003: 23). The course of forgiveness however does not run smoothly. 
Forgiveness, particularly between collectivities, takes time and effort to consummate 
and is a highly complex process. There is no guarantee that all members of opposing 
sides will be willing to actively engage in a process of forgiveness. It is because of this 
that Whittaker asserts "the further stage of securing an integrated community rather 
than a fractured one depends on individual and group preparedness to make 
concessions for the sake of tolerance and civilised behaviour" (1999: 7). The issue of 
forgiveness is inextricable with the pursuit of reconciliation; however Rigby makes an 
important distinction between the two: forgiveness relates to forgiving the past whereas 
reconciliation is concerned with building the future. That said however, forgiveness 
and a willingness to accept and engage in a shared future are necessities for successful 
reconciliation to take place (Rigby, 2001). 
When considering the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation it is important to 
make clear distinctions in the transformation from conflict to peace, in particular, 
notions of negative and positive peace, as this will, invariably, dictate the nature of the 
reconciliation process pursued. Negative peace can be seen as the absence of war and 
has been the conventional pursuit of those operating in traditional diplomatic activities. 
According to this view peace is therefore found whenever war or other direct forms of 
conflict and violence are not present. However, due to the causes attributed to recent 
intrastate conflicts, the ferocity of these conflicts, and the impact they have on an 
increasingly globalised world, the desire for what has been termed positive peace has 
been prevalent. In the words of Betty Reardon, "the concept of positive peace emerges 
from the belief that mere intervals between outbreaks of warfare do not constitute the 
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true opposite of war or violence, and that a second, more permanent approach to peace 
is therefore essentiaf' (1990:4). 
The positive peace premise rests on the principle that "peace is more than the mere 
absence of war or even the absence of interstate violence" (Barash & Webel, 2002: 6); 
this due to the recognition that of the existence of three types of violence: direct 
violence, structural violence and cultural violence (Galtung, 1985, Brand-Jacobsen, 
2002). Direct violence is exemplified by physical acts of violence that may occur 
during violent conflict. Structural violence is "violence built into the very social, 
political and economic systems that govern societies, states and the world. It is the 
different allocation of goods, resources, opportunities, between different groups, classes, 
genders, .. nationalities, etc., because of the structure governing their relationship" 
(Brand-Jacobsen, 2002: 17). Cultural violence can be expressed on two levels: first, the 
way in which a culture may legitimise or accept violence as an acceptable means 
through which to deal with conflict. Second, the way in which communities or 
individuals "view themselves in relation to themselves, to 'others', to their community, 
to the world, and how this may affect out responses to conflict" (Brand-Jacobsen, 2002: 
18). 
Taking into account these three forms of violence it becomes apparent that 'true' peace 
cannot be. only the absence of physical violence and thus positive peace should be 
pursued. Such positive peace is sought through the promotion of social justice, 
economic development, and participatory political processes and as such, ''positive 
peace focuses on peace building, the establishment of non exploitative social structures" 
and a determination to work towards that goal even when war is not ongoing or 
imminent" which calls for "cooperation, harmony, equity, justice and love" (Barash & 
Webel, 2002: 8/9). One can claim then, that the process of reconciliation encompasses 
the transition from negative to positive peace as the development of an inclusive, 
equitable, just and harmonious society after a violent conflict must entail the process of 
reconciliation to some degree. 
The final classification of reconciliation I consider comes from the eminent John Paul 
Lederach whose seminal publication Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in 
Divided Societies breaks new ground in our understanding of reconciliation. Lederach 
introduces the concept of reconciliation as both a process and a place which he argues, 
10 
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enables a more innovative approach that is needed when applied to contemporary 
intrastate conflict (Lederach, 1997). This is particularly the case because: 
The nature of contemporary settings of armed conflict - where 
neighbour fears neighbour and sometimes family member fears 
family member, and where each shed blood - makes the emotive, 
perceptual, social-psychological, and spiritual dimensions core, not 
peripheral, concerns. The immediacy of hatred and prejudice, of 
racism and xenophobia, as primary factors and motivators of the 
conflict means that its transformation must be rooted in social-
psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been 
seen as either irrelevant or outside the competency of international 
diplomacy. Reconciliation, seen as a process of encounter and social 
space, points us in that direction. 
(Lederach, 1997: 29) 
The notion of reconciliation as a process and a place that Lederach presents comes from 
a Spanish translation of Psalm 85 in which it reads, "Truth and mercy have meet 
together, peace andjustice have kissed,,6. This represents the place in which conflicting 
groups come together and work through the process of reconciliation. That process 
includes: truth which can be seen as the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, pain and 
suffering; mercy which is the need for acceptance, forgiveness and the search for a new 
beginning; justice which represents individual and group rights, social restructuring and 
restitution; and peace which emphasises the need for interdependence, well-being and 
security (Lederach, 1997). The place called reconciliation in which this process takes, 
place is exemplified in the following diagram. 
'Psalm 8S: 10 cited in Lederach, 1997: 28. 
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Figure 2 - The Place Called Reconciliation: Lederach (1997: 30) 
Lederach's model of reconciliation offers something new to the field as it brings 
emphasis to the specific challenges of reconciliation after contemporary, intrastate 
conflict; however it also complements other theorists who advocate the need for similar 
outcomes of the reconciliation process as considered above. Having examined the 
concept of reconciliation further how then does it facilitate conflict transformation and 
the peacebuilding process? 
1.4 Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: What Role for Reconciliation? 
When considering reconciliation many questions arIse as to the benefits of certain 
aspects of the reconciliation process. For instance, is there a trade off between making 
peace and pursuing justice? Does the truth heal? Is a reconciled society possible or 
de irable after divisive conflict? In e ploring these questions, and others, it become 
appar nt as to how the pursuit of reconciliation aids conflict transformation and 
building and ind ed i an integral part of it. At the very least it eng nd rs a 
p r und ding of the compl iti and challenge po ed by the reconciliation 
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A recurrent problem faced by scholars and practitioners of reconciliation is the potential 
for a perceived trade off between peace and justice. This comes to pass due to the 
apparent need to forgo some degree of justice in order to achieve peace. As Baker 
states: 
Should peace be sought at any price to end the bloodshed, even if 
power-sharing arrangements fail to uphold basic human rights and 
democratic principles? Or should the objective be a democratic 
peace that respects human rights, a goal that might prolong the 
fighting and risk more atrocities in the time that it takes to reach a 
negotiated solution? 
(1996: 564) 
The dilemma with this conundrum lays not so much in the moral or ethical questions 
that may arise out of the situation but in the pragmatic veracity that if a political 
settlement is considered unjust it will not be supported. Therefore, if the pursuit of 
justice is considered by the perpetrators to be too dogmatic there may be little incentive 
for them to enter or remain in negotiations. Conversely, if the victims deem the degree 
of justice sought insufficient their ability to accept the settlement will diminish. Is it 
possible for individual and communities to engage in collective amnesia? Is it a realistic 
assumption that individuals and community can forgo the natural desire for vengeance? 
Addressing the later question Shriver Jr. places emphasis on the need for the restoration 
of civil society in order to break the cycle of revenge; "When murder is massive, as in 
state-sponsored violence, the case against revenge hinges on strategies for the rescue of 
civil society. Nothing eats away at the 'glue' of civic order so surely as cycles of 
escalating revenge and counterrevenge. The question often is: Which side will take a 
first step to interrupt the cycle?" (1999: 212). Whilst the strengthening of civil society 
is indeed important in order to break the cycle of revenge and counterrevenge it is 
arguable that this is not a sufficient condition. Individuals and communities may be 
able to quell their desire for vengeance but can they be expected not to seek justice? 
Smith argues that retributive justice, that is, justice that is based on retaliation for the 
crime, is in effect another form of vengeance and that there is a distinct need for 
restorative justice which, "in contrast to conventional forms of retaliation or retributive 
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justice, seeks to rectify not only violations of law perpetrated by offenders against their 
victims, but also the larger social relations that are impaired by such violations" (Smith, 
2005: 35). The importance of restorative justice is also accentuated by Shriver Jr. when 
he argues that a balance must be struck between the punishment of perpetrators and, "a 
justice that promises a new measure of peace" (2001: 31). 
Restorative justice appears to offer a balance between seeking a dogmatic, retributive 
justice and allowing perpetrators to 'get away with' their crimes that will be more likely 
to lead to a mutually acceptable political and social settlement that will engage both 
sides of the conflict. A vital component of this settlement is the process of truth telling 
and, as such, the issue of amnesia becomes redundant, as this is incongruent to 
restorative justice. However, although it is apparent that truth is instrumental to the 
establishment of justice, it is not as apparent that truth actually heals. In fact, "in the 
process of national reconciliation it is those who have suffered most, the victims, who 
are usually asked to make the greatest efforts to reconcile. It is their forgiveness that 
puts the past to rest. Victims are asked to exchange the recognition of their pain, and 
its origins, for their rights to justice" (Humphrey, 2002: 107/8)7. 
While some claim that 'revealing is healing' and that the process of truth-telling 
throughout the judicial procedure does as much for the victims in terms of their 
individual healing process as it does for the establishment of justice (Rigby, 2001; 
Ramsbotham et aI, 2005) the contrary argument highlights the fact that the process of 
truth-telling is inherently painful and problematic. As Hayes states; "Just revealing is 
not just healing. It depends on how we reveal, the context of the revealing, and what it 
is we are revealing" (1998: 43). There is therefore, a need to contextualise the process 
of truth-telling within the social, political and cultural environments in which the 
conflict took place but also in which the reconciliation process is situated (Hamber, 
2001). 
The issues highlighted above are such to focus our attention to the intrinsic difficulties 
in achieving reconciliation in that they challenge the notion of reconciliation being 
beneficial. The third question which asked, 'Is a reconciled society possible or 
desirable after divisive conflict?' shall be addressed after the following section which 
will state the case for reconciliation. 
7 This quotation is taken from Humphrey who is paraphrasing Jacobs (2007) and Minow (2000). 
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One can argue that reconciliation is both necessary and possible for a simple reason; 
without some degree of reconciliation the human race cannot survive and prosper. 
Within social groups contlict is inevitable; however it is the ability to forgive and the 
process of reconciliation that enables us to explicate ourselves from this recurrent 
dilemma. Without such mechanisms "our capacity to act would as it were, be confined 
to one single deed [contlict] from which we would never recover; we would remain the 
victims of its consequences for ever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the 
magic formula to break the speir' (Arendt, 1989: 237). By pursuing an agenda of 
reconciliation and peace the likelihood of future violence diminishes _and social 
development can be facilitated. Herein lies the role reconciliation plays in the conflict 
transformation process. 
Reconciliation brings with it several forms of peace: individual peace, community peace, 
national peace and regional peace. Although, as highlighted above, the telling of truths 
can be severely distressing and traumatic for the victims of contlict, "such reflection on 
the past is as necessary as it is painful because a divided society can only build its 
shared future out of its divided past" (Bloomfield et aI, 2003: 15). Therefore if 
community peace is to be restored it is necessary for individuals to engage in the 
process of truth-telling and if this process is managed effectively, taking into account 
the social, political and cultural context, it can provide an avenue through which 
individuals can establish peace within themselves. Having a platform from which one 
can engage in the truth-telling process can "help to make victims whole again, both 
individually and as a group, and give them a sense of personal vindication" 
(Bloomfield et aI, 2003: 126). In effect, therefore, activities aimed at facilitating 
reconciliation contribute significantly to the deconstruction of the institutions, structures 
and discourses that promote division and incompatibility and replacing them with 
conventions and dialogue that encourage tolerance, interdependence and affinity, thus 
transforming the contlict and paving the way for peacebuilding measures. 
With the establishment of individual and community peace, the conditions for regional 
peace are more favourable, which is particularly significant considering contemporary 
conflict has increasingly taken a regional dimension. Taking the case of Africa, the 
Great Lakes region has seen conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (ORC), Burundi, 
Uganda and Rwanda, all of which have been linked and have had significant negative 
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effects for the security and development of the area. Similarly in southern Africa 
conflict has arisen in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. In 
West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Cote D'Ivoire have all experienced 
conflict in the post-independence period. In EastIHorn of Africa conflict has been 
waged in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia and Kenya. North Africa has experienced conflict 
in Sudan, Chad, Niger and Algeria. Barely any country in Africa has been free from 
conflict, either through active participation or the ensuing security and refugee problems, 
and the importance of effective reconciliation has never been more important. The need 
for reconciliation in these areas is, and has been, great not only due to the scale of the 
conflict but also their complexities. Reconciliatory measures are, and have been, 
essential to the successful transformations of these conflicts and the prevention of 
further escalation, along with the building of peace in individual, war-tom countries and 
the regions of which they are a part. 
A further significant argument for the benefit of reconciliation is the importance it has 
in establishing democracy and good governance. This is because "reconciliation 
underpins democracy by developing working relationships necessary for its successful 
implementation" (Bloomfield et aI, 2003: 11). Without reconciliation after a conflict it 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to build an effective democracy as the 
proclivity for social cleavages to translate into exclusionary policies would be increased. 
Similarly, for good governance to be in existence it is particularly necessary for formal 
and informal institutions to be cultivated (Leftwich, 2004). The norms, values and 
beliefs that underpin fonnal and informal institutions need to be shared in principal if 
those institutions are to be successful; they also need to be 'positive' if such institutions 
are to be beneficial for societal development. The reconciliation process provides an 
avenue through which past differences can be resolved or at least dealt with in a 
constructive way and through this process there is opportunity to generate shared norms, 
values and beliefs that can aid democracy and good governance. In the PCE this 
represents the peacebuilding process in which the necessary conditions for 
consolidating sustainable peace can be developed. 
Reconciliation therefore epitomises a fundamental aspect of the PQst-conflict 
reconstruction process and it can be argued that the goal of reconciliation should be 
sought through the process of reconciliation. However, in thinking about the difficulty 
in achieving reconciliation we will always return to the same question: Is a reconciled 
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society possible or desirable after divisive conflict? When considering Northern Ireland, 
Porter reflects on obstacles the peace process has had to face and poses the following: 
"Perhaps, then, since the quest for peace is hard enough and apparently cannot be won 
without concessions from all sides, the more exacting requirements of reconciliation 
should be set aside for another time, if not dropped altogether. Perhaps to insist upon 
them is to unduly burden the peace process" (2003: 39). This, Porter argues, is the case 
for a number of reasons but three in particular: indifference, fear and bitterness. 
Indifference may arise when political apathy is apparent in conjunction with proportions 
of the popUlation experiencing relatively limited affects of the conflict. This may lead 
to a cost-benefit analysis in which it is believed that "peace, minimally dejinecf, is to be 
valued if for no other reason than that violence and the security measures necessary to 
counteract it are irritating inconveniencies; but reconciliation has no comparable value 
since, if taken seriously, it promises only unwelcome intrusions into more or less settled 
lifestyles" (Porter, 2003: 40). Fear, on the other hand, promotes political engagement as 
it represents deep commitment to a way of life that is deemed to be under threat. "Fear 
oflosing one's identity through too many concessions being granted to one's opponents, 
perhaps fear of losing power, influence and position of dominance" (Porter, 2003: 41) 
encourages opposition to the reconciliation process and acts as a barrier to a harmonious 
future. Bitterness is perhaps the most enduring obstacle the reconciliation process faces 
as reconciliation requires forgiveness and this is often perceived as being "too exacting 
as it demands more than the emotional and moral resources many victims are capable 
of mustering and because it seems to set an impossibly high standard of virtue" (Porter, 
2003: 43). 
The argument put forward by Porter is an important one as it highlights the key 
impasses encountered in the planning for, and process of, reconciliation. Without a 
doubt reconciliation is problematic: it is faced with 'spoilers' 9; it is painful; it is 
protracted; it is infinitely complex; and it is fragile. However, it is necessary. Unless a 
society experiencing conflict can be effectively partitioned1o, then the citizens of that 
8 That is the absence of violent conflict, or presence of negative peace. 
9 'Spoilers' are those individuals or groups who engage in spoiling behaviour that obstruct or undennine 
conflict settlements and peacebuilding efforts for whatever reasons. For more on this see Newman & 
Richmond (Eds) (2006). 
10 Effective participation after civil war can be extremely problematic either if any of the conflicting 
parties does not agree with the partition or the underlying causes of the conflict are not addressed. 
Partitioning may result in renewed conflict over tenitory or take on an increased international dimension 
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society face two options: find a way to co-exist and eventually reconcile their 
differences or continue in violent conflict until one side dominates. Throughout the 
analysis of reconciliation it is increasingly evident that the process is a highly complex, 
problematic and arduous one. It requires enormous commitment, willingness and 
sacrifice from all sides and there can be no guarantees the process will be successful. 
However, peace without reconciliation represents negative peace and with it an 
acceptance to live within a divided society. It is for this reason that the process of full 
reconciliation should be pursued despite its inherent difficulties. The subsequent 
section of this chapter examines the tools available for the pursuit of reconciliation 
whilst taking into account the problems identified with this process and addresses the 
measures taken to resolve these issues. 
1.5 Reconciliation Tools 
1.5.1 Conventional Reconciliation Techniques 
When examining the process of reconciliation it is useful to consider the four 
dimensions of reconciliation described by Ramsbotham et al. Essentially reconciliation 
begins through acquiescence of what is not yet an ideal outcome - 'I am reconciled to 
my fate'. It then moves into the reconciling of accounts, the comparison and correlation 
of stories to the point where they are no longer fatally incompatible. The third is 
'reconciling opposites' or bridging differences, enabling the possibility of mutual 
change in order for mutual benefit. The final type is 'reconciliation between former 
en~mies' where past antagonisms are set aside and new relationships are forged within 
the resultant emotional space (Ramsbotham et aI, 2005). This is a linear process; it is 
not possible to get to the fourth stage without passing through each of the three previous 
stages despite them not constituting full reconciliation. "For reconciliation to be 
possible there usually needs to be sufficient acceptance by former enemies of the 
legitimacy of post-war rule of law, sufficient correlation of accounts to allow truth 
commissions and trials to diffuse issues of rectificatory justice, and sufficient bridging 
of differences through compensation, reparation or structural adjustments to deliver 
as each faction seeks support from sympathetic states. Examples of this can be seen in Israel-Palestine, 
Kosovo-Serbia, Northern Ireland, and more recently Georgia-South Ossetia. 
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adequate prospects of improved distributive justice in future" (Ramsbotham et aI, 2005: 
236). These dimensions are captured in the following table. 
Aspects of Reconciliation Stages of Conflict De-escalation 
1. Accepting the status quo Ending violence 
2. Correlating accounts Overcoming polarisation 
3. Bridging opposites Managing contradiction 
4. Reconstituting relations Celebrating difference 
Table 1-The Four Dimensions of Reconciliation: Ramsbotham et al (2005: 232) 
· The process of reconciliation put forward by Ramsbotham et al is also supported to 
some extent by Bloomfield et al (2003) who demarcates three stages of reconciliation. 
The first stage is the replacing of fear with non-violent coexistence representing an 
initial step away from hostility and requiring, at a minimum, a search for alternatives to 
revenge. "The move towards such coexistence requires first of all that victims and 
perpetrators be freed from the paralysing isolation and all-consuming self-pity in which 
they often live. This involves the building or renewal of communication inside the 
communities of victims and offenders and between them" (Bloomfield et aI, 2003: 20). 
When coexistence is established the second stage of reconciliation can be entered in 
which fear no longer rules and confidence and trust can be fostered. In order to achieve 
this each party needs to develop a renewed confidence in himlherself and the 'other' and 
acknowledge their respective humanity. Part of this stage is the individualisation of 
guilt so that whole communities are not held responsible. The final stage is the 
movement towards empathy, which "comes with the victims' willingness to listen to the 
reasons for the hatred of those who caused their pain and with the offenders' 
l:Inderstanding of the anger and bitterness of those who suffered' (Bloomfield et aI, 
2003: 21). By creating an understanding of each other's suffering it is possible to share 
a common identity. 
Within the processes proposed by both Ramsbotham et al and Bloomfield et aI, for 
effective reconciliation to occur there is a need to acknowledge the past and deal with it 
so as to prepare the ground for the building of a shared future (Lederach, 1997). 
Societies therefore, will be situated at some point on the spectrum of amnesia ranging 
from a policy of 'forgive and forget' to the pursuit of vengeance; truth commissions and 
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public trials lie in between these two. The path a society takes is dependant on its 
ability to forgive. Ramsbotham et al (2005) offer six policy choices a society may take 
in order to achieve reconciliation, which also correspond with much of Bloomfield et 
al. 's (2003) writing: 
1) Official Amnesia - 'letting go of the past'. 
Various conflicts ended with a collective commitment to leave the past in the past, for 
example, the Spanish civil war and Cambodia. However, as previously observed, a 
policy of forgetting can be problematic to follow and can impede true reconciliation. 
2) Truth Commissions - 'honouring the past'. 
Truth commISSIOns lie somewhere between the 'Nuremberg [trials] and national 
amnesia' (Tutu, 1999). The aim of a truth commission is to enable societal 
reconciliation through avoiding calls for vengeance on one hand and disregard for 
wrongdoing and suffering on the other. Public disclosure of atrocities and attempts to 
harmonise conflicting versions of the past, in addition to generating acknowledgement 
of responsibility and regret, can enable the creation of emotional space in which 
forgiveness, accommodation and assimilation can take place. In this sense the truth 
commission facilitates truth telling and provides historical justice. Although they do 
not guarantee retributive justice they provide a public platform for victims to establish 
the truth regarding the past and promote accountability of atrocities. This helps to 
promote individual healing and social reconciliation whilst also consolidating a 
democratic transition (Bloomfield et aI, 2003). Truth commissions can however foster 
and promote unrealistic expectations among victims, which may result in frustrations 
and further distress and antagonisms. In particular, it is vital that truth commissioners 
remain unbiased otherwise the ability for commission to make an objective and 
complete account of the past would be fatally flawed. 
3) Trials - 'bringing the past before the tribunal of the present'. 
Some view national or international tribunals as an alternative to truth commissions, 
however they can also be highly complementary (Ramsbotham et aI, 2005) as "without 
establishing a culture or law and order, and without satisfying the very deep need of 
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victims for acknowledgement and retribution, there is little hope of escaping future 
cyclical outbreaks of violence" (Goldstone, 1997: 107). Justice is significant for the 
reconciliation process and can be sought on several levels. Retributive justice based on 
prosecution of perpetrators may satisfy the victim's desire for atonement and it certainly 
has a place in the reconciliation process, usually in the form of national and 
international tribunals. There are critics to such tribunals, namely those indicated or 
supporters of those indicated who claim tribunals to be a political tool of their enemies. 
Despite such resistance it appears evident that criminal tribunals have their place in the 
reconciliation process as exemplified in the Balkans (the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia - ICTy) and Rwanda (the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda - ICTR). The success of retributive justice in facilitating 
reconciliation is, however, difficult in cases such as Rwanda II and it is in such 
situations that only the most serious perpetrators are tried before national and 
international tribunals. Restorative justice, which seeks to place the victim at the centre 
of importance and to restore community relations, is often pursued through mediation 
and is increasingly used as a tool for grassroots reconciliation within close-knit 
communities. 
4) Reparations - juture compensation for the past'. 
Compensation offered to survivors and families of victims is widely recognised as a 
form of justice and has constituted a part of truth commissions. Although in theory the 
idea of compensation seems commendable, in practice victims rarely receive much and 
the distribution of compensation appears to be conducted in an arbitrary fashion. 
Reparations are used as a means of redressing past wrongs and follow a number of 
guises. Restitution is the re-establishment of the situation prior to wrongdoing and has 
traditionally been the favoured form of reparation "as it relates to essential 
'belongings', such as the return of property, the restoration of liberty, citizenship and 
other legal rights, the return to place of residence and the restoration of employment' 
(Bloomfield et aI, 2003: 145). Compensation is the payment of money in recognition of 
past wrongdoing. Rehabilitation is the restoration of one's physical and psychological 
health, which very often involves a state sponsored medical and psychological 
programme. Satisfaction applies to those methods of redress that do not address 
II This is because of the large number of genocide perpetrators, known and unknown, which make it very 
difficult to pursue retributive justice with each. 
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individual losses or harm, for example, the verification of the facts and disclosure of the 
truth, an apology, sanctions against wrongdoers and commemorations and tributes to 
victims (Bloomfield et aI, 2003). Although reparations may not appear significantly 
beneficial to the reconciliation process they do signal an important commitment on the 
part of the State to uphold the rule of law and guarantee individual rights. By 
demonstrating an acknowledgement of the suffering of victims, and making attempts to 
redress such suffering, through reparations it is possible for individuals and 
communities to move on from the past. 
5) Ritual healing - 'exorcising the pas t '. 
The role of traditional healers and lineage leaders as a method of reconciliation has 
been acknowledged with increasing respect in the social reconstruction of countries 
such as Mozambique and Somaliland and is regarded as a significant contribution to 
grassroots peacebuilding. In many countries violence is attributed to being possessed 
by bad spirits and as such reconciliation can be facilitated through public cleansing 
ceremonies. Indigenous techniques such as these have enormous potential to reconcile 
communities at the gras'sroots level at which the deepest suffering has been experienced 
(Gastrow, 1995). 
6) Retaliation - 'cleaning the slate by avenging the past'. 
Counter to the previous five policy opportunities a policy of retaliation perpetuates the 
violence for at least another cycle and carries the danger of protracted conflict. Some 
societies are characterised by clan-based reprisal and vendetta, for example the Balkans, 
in which conflicts can only be resolved and relations reformed when the balance of 
justice is restored through reprisal. Such beliefs centre on an approach along the lines 
of 'an eye for an eye' and are seen by many as the only way in which conflicts can be 
resolved. This, of course, goes against the grain of conflict resolution theory and the 
pursuit of reconciliation but in instances in which hatred and bitterness is so great it 
seems unlikely that reconciliation may be possible. 
While Ramsbotham et al delineate six methods through which reconciliation can be 
sought, the way in which Bloomfield et al propose war-tom communities can foster 
reconciliation (through healing, truth-telling, justice and reparation) has one important 
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difference. Bloomfield et al place a more explicit emphasis on healing, identifying it as 
a crucial reconciliation tool that has its own focus but is also part of all other tools. The 
need for healing results from the trauma that is experienced throughout the conflict and 
in order for such healing to take place the process needs time and space but also needs 
to address the underlying causes of the conflict. "In its essence, trauma is the 
destruction of individual and/or collective structures of a society. In this sense, it is not 
only important to help people deal with the impact of the conflict on them - to help them 
through, for example, a grieving process in a constructive way - it is also essential to 
deal with the cause of the distress and the symptoms" (Bloomfield et aI, 2003: 78). The 
healing process that is so important to reconciliation is extremely complex and difficult 
to achieve. The final aspect of this section on conventi~nal reconciliation tools 
examines how healing can be accomplished through forgiveness. 
The 'Forgiveness Model', presented by Long & Brecke (2003), is a further method of 
achieving reconciliation in which it is apparent that ''forgiveness and reconciliation 
have a clear social function - restoring a neutral or more positive relationship after a 
transgression and re-establishing membership or affiliation in a larger society - that 
could occur between individuals, between an individual and a group and between 
groups" (Long & Brecke, 2003: 29). The Forgiveness Model incorporates four phases: 
first, parties to a conflict need to recognise and acknowledge the effects of the conflict 
on other, for example, shame, anger, injustice and injury. "Forgiveness does not 
remove the fact or event of wrongdoing but relies12 upon the recognition of wrong 
having been committed in order for the process of forgiveness to be made possible" 
(North, 1998: 17). 
Second, there must be a changed understanding of oneself and the 'other' because anger 
is closely correlated with both the desire for vengeance and the acknowledgement of the 
pain of the injury, that is, emotions such as sadness, fear, and damage to one's self-
esteem or identity (Fitzgibbons, 1998). Forgiveness is therefore a process of 
transformation in which the party sees itself as something other than a victim and 
accomplishes a more complete and balanced identity. An important aspect of 
forgiveness is that it involves the reconstruction of a new identity of the 'other', the 
enemy. Through reframing the other there is a separation of the "wrongdoer from the 
wrong which has been commined ... reframing does not do away with the wrong itself, 
12 Author's emphasis. 
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nor does it deny the wrongdoer's responsibility for it but it allows us to regard the 
wrongdoer in a more complete, more detailed, more rounded way" (North, 1998: 26). 
Third, all parties must undertake not to attempt to extract revenge, however natural this 
desire may be. This does not indicate the need to abandon versions of punishment or 
methods to rectify wrongdoing and realise justice, only a willingness to break the cycle 
of injury and counter injury (Shriver Jr., 1995). 
Finally, there must be a credible call for a new relationship made by one or more parties 
that results in contact between conflicting groups and a public expression of forgiveness 
such as a reconciliation event that re-establishes mutual affiliation, coexistence, and 
mutual tolerance or respect' at a minimum. However, this does not mean that future 
relationships are beneficial but that they are based on mutual respect in order to 
maintain stability. 
Although there exists no generic reconciliation model that can be applied to all cases it 
seems apparent that, at a minimum, reconciliation efforts must include the following: a 
clear commitment to refrain from violence; an acknowledgment of past wrongs and the 
effects of those wrongs by all parties; the pursuit of a justice acceptable to the situation; 
a changed understanding oneself and the 'other'; and a commitment to the creation of a 
new relationship. It is however, imperative to state that the reconciliation model applied 
in any given case must take into account the social, political and cultural context into 
which it is to be applied during its design and implementation. 
I.S.2 Indigenous Approaches to Reconciliation 
The reconciliation methods analysed above can be said to be primarily of a Western 
design and perspective and thus it can be argued that they are both ethnocentric in their 
design and state-centric in their application (Jackson, 2001). Western-centric 
conceptualisations of reconciliation tend to be of a top-down nature and certainly have 
their place in the reconciliation apparatus. However, the grassroots nature of indigenous 
methods of reconciliation represents a bottom-up approach which is particularly 
important given the different effects conflict may have at the national, and community 
level. As van der Merwe argues, "National political conflicts give rise to localised 
conflict dynamics that can take on a life of their own and that have repercussions for 
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the local political culture. In these situations, national political solutions and 
reconciliation processes are likely to have only a limited impact on local 
reconciliation" (2001: 85). It therefore seems highly logical for societies emerging 
from violent conflict to engage in indigenous grassroots reconciliation processes in 
tandem with national processes. Moreover, it can be argued that such a policy should 
be actively promoted in order for community to take ownership of the reconciliation of 
their environment. 
Indigenous reconciliation processes prioritise the reconstruction of local social networks 
for which an understanding of the specific local dynamics and interpersonal 
relationships is paramount. This is converse to the top-down approach, which sees 
national reconciliation processes as vital to community reconciliation as it provides fast 
results and a broad impact. Those most affected by the reconciliation process, that is 
community members seem to favour grassroots reconciliation as illustrated by van der 
Merwe through interviews with ex-combatants and community leaders in South Africa. 
"The TRC failed to reach real victims. Reconciliation is not about important 
individuals, but the common people need to reconcile .. . People themselves will prescribe 
theformulafor their own reconciliation" (Community leader, Duduza, 1997, in van der 
Merwe, 2001: 98/99). This was explained by an ex-combatant who stated, "the 
reconciliation process must be regional or local. A process that is national creates 
problems: There is a lack of sufficient interest in the local events. Local people do not 
think their stories are seen as relevant" (Ex-combatant, Katorus, 1997 in van der 
Merwe, 2001: 98). 
Further support for the argument that conflict affected societies very often favour a 
grassroots approach can be seen from an analysis of indigenous institutions in which it 
is apparent that, throughout history, institutions in Africa were build in order to manage 
and resolve conflict within communities and based on the community. "Such 
institutions and procedures were set out by Africans because they placed great 
emphasis on peaceful resolution of disputes which was always aimed at restoring social 
harmony; while at the same time, upholding the principles offairness, equity andjustice 
as engraved in their customs and traditions .... Emphasis was not on punishment but on 
reconciliation and restoration of social harmony among the parties in conflict' 
(Nwolise, 2004: 59/60). The remainder of this sub-section shall consider different 
indigenous approaches to reconciliation. 
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1.5.2.1 Tribal or Indigenous Law 
At a grassroots level indigenous law has an important role to play in the reconciliation 
process. Indigenous law, practiced at the village level, has for centuries been used to 
arbitrate disputes on various issues at a micro level of conflict. What makes indigenous 
law so influential in the reconciliation process is a combination of village involvement 
in settlements (Richland, 2005) and the fact it is predicated on traditional custom 
(Stewart, 1987). 
Within tribally based society there has typically existed a process of dispute settlement 
conducted by elders or accepted influential 'big men' who manage the process of 
arbitration and negotiation with an emphasis on conciliation (Cotran, 1969). Such 
systems are often still pervasive in today's society working in parallel with systems put 
in place by colonial overlords or amalgamating the two to create a hybrid legal system. 
A particular benefit of such 'tribal' courts regarding reconciliation is their public nature 
as Schapera notes when writing on the Ngwato, "all trials are held in public, and any 
member of the tribe has the right to attend and take part in the proceedings, no matter 
in what court they are held ... the judge then throws the matter open for general 
discussion, and the merits of the case are publicly argued by those wishing to do so" 
(1962: 64). In conducting public trials or settlements a communal focus is given to the 
process thus facilitating the reconciliation process as, in cases involving the community, 
such involvement can enable the community to heal together. The use of such courts in 
a PCE·may represent a way in which reconciliation can be aided. 
The predication of 'tribal' courts on traditional custom is also a benefit. This is 
particularly the case because the political and social institutions - the rules of the game 
- that are so crucial in reducing uncertainty (Leftwich, 2004) have invariably been 
decimated throughout the course of violent conflict (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). The 
employ of 'tribal' courts therefore, provides an opportunity for such traditions and 
customs to be reaffirmed within society and thus represents a reinforcing of political 
and social institutions. A return to the norms and values of pre-conflict society may be 
desirable and as Vicenti states, "the real battle for the preservation of traditional ways 
of life will be fought for the bold promontory of guiding human values. It is in this 
battle that tribal courts will become indispensable" (1995: 137). Indeed, in the 
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aftermath of conflict the reconciliation process holds instrumental influence in the 
return to the guiding values of society. Tradition and custom therefore have their own 
role to play in the reconciliation process and in this the role of 'tribal' courts can be 
critical to the reinstatement of such norms and values. 
In terms of the benefits for reconciliation it then follows that a re-establishment of 
societal rules, norms and values via 'tribal' courts provides an avenue through which 
the reconciliation process can build a foundation. As Connolly states, "particularly in a 
post-conflict environment, the formal state system may be entirely incapacitated, either 
in terms of infrastructure or lack of personnel, or both" (2005: 240) and therefore 
indigenous systems that share "similar characteristics: voluntary participation, reliance 
on social pressure to ensure attendance and participation, informal process, basis in 
restorative justice, decisions based in compromise rather than rule of law, and the 
central role of the disputants and community in the process" (2005: 241) may be most 
effective in "restoring social cohesion within the community by promoting 
reconciliation between conflicting parties" (Penal Reform International, 2000: 9). The 
very fact such traditional courts are based on restorative, rather than retributive justice 
serves to aid the post-conflict reconciliation process. Indeed, as Allot importantly 
asserts, "at the heart of [traditional] African adjudication lies the notion of 
reconciliation or the restoration of harmony. The job of a court or an arbitrator is less 
to find the facts, state the rules of law, and apply them to the facts than to set right a 
wrong in such a way as to restore harmony within the disturbed community" (1968: 
145). 
The use of 'tribal' or traditional courts in PCEs is not widely practiced despite the 
potential benefits for reconciliation, particularly at the community level. However, 
arguably the most well known of traditional or community courts in a PCE are the 
Gacaca13 14 courts of Rwanda. The Gacaca court represents a traditional, informal legal 
system in which local, participatory restorative justice is sought within the process of 
reconciliation (Fullerton, 2003; Oomen, 2005) and therefore offers a potential solution 
to the legal problems faced by Rwanda. Although the traditional Gacaca courts have 
13 Gacaca translates from Kinyarwanda, the Rwandan language, to 'justice on the grass'. 
14 For a more detailed discussion of the Gacaca court system than is possible here see, among others, 
Gourevitch (2000), Moussalli (2000), Longman (2001), Fullerton (2003), Corey & Joireman (2004), Des 
Forges & Longman (2004), Karakezi et al (2004), Longman et al (2004), Molenaar (2004), Zorbas 
(2004), Oomen (2005), Bowd (2008). 
27 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
been adapted to accommodate the demands of trying perpetrators of the genocide, it 
maintains its community focus through being based on local participation with full 
access to anyone in the community and thus it is hoped that the Gacaca can offer a 
significant tool through which the process of reconciliation can be facilitated. Indeed, 
as Molenaar states, 
Gacaca, as a blend between tradition and modernity, takes away 
justice from the hands of professionals in courtrooms and gives it to 
the communities that have experienced the violence and must live 
with its consequences. Gacaca offers the people at the grassroots 
level a mechanism to deal with this legacy themselves, without much 
interference from outsiders. In this way, a new chapter in thinking 
about conflict resolution is being written. 
(2004: 99) 
The Gacaca system is not without its criticS15• However, given the situation faced by 
Rwanda it not only provides a way in which pressure on the national prison system can 
be relieved but also presents an opportunity to pursue a reconciliation agenda. As 
Fullerton importantly highlights, "Gacaca is presented to the Rwandan population as a 
mechanism for justice and reconciliation; to meet its expectations, it must have 
concerted and sincere participation by Rwandan people" (2003: 8). In stating this, 
Fullerton not only draws to our attention that for the Gacaca system to be effective and 
meet its objectives it needs to be 'owned' by the Rwandan popUlation, that is, the 
proclivity for reconciliation is in the hands of Rwandans and not something that can be 
imposed by the inte~ational community, but also to the fact that indigenous legal 
systems have potential to play a significant role in the recovery of communities 
shattered by violent conflict. 
1.5.2.2 Ritual 
Another significant contribution made by indigenous approaches to reconciliation is 
that of ritual and almost certainly this area deserves greater cognisance within academic 
endeavour than it presently enjoys. Ritual, particularly in African society, has been 
used for a multitude of different issues including: to resolve the emotional conflict of 
15 ibid 
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death (Malinowski, 1954), to reaffirm key social values and relationships (Radcliffe-
Brown, 1939, 1945), to cure illness and related social conflict (Horton, 1967) and to 
enable community members to behave in normally prohibited ways in order to maintain 
longer term social stability (Gluckman, 1956). Although the various uses of ritual may 
not be directly linked to conflict many serve as an important function in conflict 
resolution and reconciliation. In many African societies there is the widely held 
recognition that the use of ritual could "ensure transparency in people's dealings with 
one another, ensure that people live in accordance with customs and tradition, and to 
promote confidence building between and within groups and individuals" and therefore 
"ritual treaties were used to remove fear and mistrust, bind families and villages, and 
avoid war" (Nwolise, 2004: 68). 
The use of ritual as a reconciliation tool very often involved a form of exchange. One 
such example of this is the Kpelle moot in Liberia in which debate is instigated with the 
aim of achieving conciliation. An important aspect of the Kpelle moot is its 
underpinnings in ritual. The conflict in Liberia has generated a need for reconciliation 
and this is, to an extent, achieved through conciliatory ritual in which gestures of 
supplication, forgiveness and incorporation are offered such as "holding the foot", ritual 
purifications or a collective meal (Richards et aI, 2005). Such an exchange-based ritual 
provides an avenue to pursue cooperative action and lays the foundations for a deeper, 
societal reconciliation. Similarly, among the Igbo of Nigeria, the process of 
reconciliation after conflict is practised through exchange in which "the designated 
elders from both parties met, killed a goat or cow, mixed the meat with blood got from 
their (elders) veins, cooked with the meat and ate. A tree is planted for remembering 
the event" (Nwolise, 2004: 68). Such a ritual offers an environment conducive to 
mutual exchange and cooperation. Moreover, the planting of a tree provides a symbolic 
account of the process, which serves to reinforce it. 
A further way in which ritual can facilitate reconciliation after micro-level conflict is 
through healing processes. As Schmidt states, "arguably, looking at healing of 
memories of violence which led to death is crucial, specific cases are a lens which 
focuses the more general trauma of war through an apparently clear distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate violence" (1997: 303). In Zimbabwe there exists a 
widely held belief that the Ngozi, the aggravated spirit of a person who was murdered or 
not buried properly, can afflict and even possess members of the lineage of the person 
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responsible. The only way the Ngozi can be appeased is through the appropriate healing 
ritual. Traditionally such healing may take place through the identification of the guilty 
party and the drawing out of the spirit through a system of spiralling movement of 
drawing circles. However, the nature of the guerrilla war of liberation in Zimbabwe 
meant that all members of the community were involved and as such the appeasing of 
Ngozi became altogether more complex. Although combatants' violence in war was not 
as a result of Ngozi, the cleansing of the entire community is required and as such a 
mass exorCIsm of Ngozi through negotiation between the living and the dead is 
necessary. 
Ritual healing in this sense lays the foundations for a re-ordering of society after violent 
conflict and enables "the reconciliation of different experiences and memories and a 
process of re-establishing collectivity. This important meaning of healing in the 
aftermath of war is reflected in its special social practice. More generally, spiritual 
healing provides an arena in which local histories are made, at time subverting the 
national grand narrative" (Schmidt, 1997: 310). Reconciliation then, can be facilitated 
through ritual healing after conflict and offers a valuable tool for such a process, 
particularly at the village or community level. 
The role of ritual in the reconciliation process is thus clearly significant and in 
communities in which such rituals are practiced should be promoted. It is however, 
important to highlight the need for such rituals or ceremonies to be conducted in public 
with full participation in order to enable community wide reconciliation. Also key is 
that "internal crisis whether political or religious must be managed with a minimum 
application of force so as to make reconciliation and early return to peace possible" 
(Oguntomisin, 2002: 90). Indigenous approaches to reconciliation, therefore, have an 
invaluable role to play in grass roots reconciliation and, as a result, to national 
reconciliation also, as reconciliation at the community level provide the foundations 
from which to build national reconciliation. The study of indigenous approaches to 
reconciliation is however, limited and as such I would advocate the necessity for further 
research in this area. 
30 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
1.6 Conclusion 
The concept of reconciliation offers an alternative lens through which we can observe 
the post-conflict reconstruction effort. Rather than concerning itself with short-tenn 
approaches or those that yield tangible results, the pursuit of reconciliation is akin to the 
wider goals of conflict transformation and peacebuilding; the securing of positive 
peace. The need for reconciliatory activities has never been greater over the last 40 
years with the changing nature of conflict; however, with the change in the way in 
which conflict is waged (from interstate to intrastate) so too have we been witness to 
change in the emphasis and methodology of reconciliation; rather than reconciling two 
or more states at the cessation of hostilities, reconciliation today is required to contend 
with numerous different identity groups in the same territorial area. The challenge of 
reconciliation has thus become more intense and with it the need to enhance our 
understanding of the process has increased. 
One way in which it is possible to augment our understanding is to engage in a 
thorough conflict analysis as it is only through a full comprehension of how the conflict 
emerged, that is, what broke in society, that we can expect to be able to design and 
implement effective reconciliation initiatives, that is, how we fix it. When we approach 
a conflict in a holistic manner, acknowledging the multifaceted complexity of this social 
phenomenon, it is then possible to identify solutions. The importance, then, of context 
cannot be understated. Whilst appreciating the lessons learned from previous conflicts 
and solutions to these conflicts, it is necessary to recognise the inimitable identity of 
individual conflicts in order to ascertain the most suitable response to it. 
That said, however, the nature of the majority of violent conflict in today's. world 
indicates the need for an evolution in the way in which reconciliation is approached. 
Much of our understanding of reconciliation originates from the West and thus the 
policies that are utilised to achieve reconciliation have their genesis in such an 
understanding. Such Western centric, State centric approaches do not necessarily 
capitalise on the positive attributes other approaches can bring to the table, nor do they 
always result in the most positive outcomes, indeed they can actually be detrimental. 
By considering indigenous approaches to reconciliation, both in terms of definition and 
methodology, we can develop our understanding of the process, thus making it more 
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possible to design and implement reconciliation initiatives that translate into more 
meaningful outcomes. 
This chapter offers a problematisation of the post-conflict environment and the way in 
which, at a theoretical level, the pursuit of reconciliation is instrumental in the 
transforming of conflict and the building of peace. In doing this not only is it apparent 
that reconciliation is a pivotal aspect of post-conflict reconstruction but that also it is an 
achievement that is difficult to attain, in part due to the shortcomings of the various 
approaches to reconciliation and its limited focus given in post-conflict reconstruction 
programmes. The next chapter introduces the issues of ex-combatants and examines 
how their social reintegration into society, through DDR programmes, may contribute to 
the reconciliation process in a meaningful way. In doing this the subsequent chapter 
will develop a more elaborate understanding of the social reintegration of ex-
combatants through the construction of the implicit linkages between social 
reintegration and reconciliation. 
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Chapter Two: 
The Contribution of Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) to Reconciliation in PCEs 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the concept of DDR and examines the potential way in which 
the social reintegration of ex-combatants can facilitate the reconciliation process 
through conflict transformation and peacebuilding. As is apparent from the previous 
chapter, the challenge of reconciling the post-conflict environment is great and there are 
weaknesses in the way reconciliation is currently pursued, at least at the macro level 
and in terms of funding. As ex-combatants constitute an influence on whether or not 
the transformation of the conflict, and the construction of a positive peace, will be 
possible it is necessary to consider them within this picture. With that in mind this 
chapter seeks to introduce the concept of DDR in more general terms before focusing 
on the social reintegration of ex-combatants and how such reintegration can contribute 
to the reconciliation process and peacebuilding as a whole. 
The chapter begins by providing a conceptual and contextual understanding of DDR, 
which defines the component parts of DDR and explicates their function. By first 
analysing the technical aspects of DDR it is easier to comprehend the ways in which 
DDR impacts on other aspects of society. The chapter then moves on to consider how 
disarmament and demobilisation influence reintegration. In doing this the complexity 
of DDR, and its interrelatedness, is better understood and this enables a fuller 
appreciation of the reintegration component of DDR. The section then leads on a 
discussion of reintegration addressing the key concerns of this component. This 
includes the three types of reintegration: economic, political and social. Because social 
reintegration is the focus of this research the next three sections are particularly 
important. Section 2.5 consists of an in-depth analysis of the social reintegration 
component of DDR while section 2.6 considers the challenges of social reintegration 
faced by vulnerable groups. Section 2.7 examines the reconciliatory benefits of social 
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reintegration. Sections 2.5and 2.7 in particular provide a key contribution to the 
structure of this research as they situate the issue of DDR within the aspect of the 
challenges of reconciliation discussed in the previous chapter. 
2.2 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR): A Conceptual and 
Contextual Understanding 
DDR programmes have, over the past few decades, been utilised to an increasing degree 
in attempts to secure sustainable peace following violent conflict. DDR programmes 
typically designed in the later stages of resolution negotiations provide a pathway for 
the transformation of combatants to civilians and are seen as vital as part of the war-to-
peace transition (Colletta et aI, 1996). 
The anatomy of a DDR programme is essentially the same for each conflict with 
combatants progressing through stages of disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration, however conceptual and sequential differences may exist. For example, 
demobilisation may be thought to occur prior to disarmament and reintegration may be 
termed reinsertion or rehabilitation. For this study however, the term DDR will refer to 
the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and these terms 
shall now be explored. 
Utilising definitions provided by United Nations Integrated Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) (2006) disarmament can be seen 
as "the collection, documentation, control and the disposal of small arms, ammunition, 
explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian 
population" while demobilisation is "the formal and controlled discharge of active 
combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization 
may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the 
massing of troops in camps designatedfor this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, 
assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the 
support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion" (UN, 2006: 
2). As is evident the processes of disarmament and demobilisation are characterised by 
tangible results and follow a relatively clearly defined path; combatants surrender their 
weapons and engage in a process of discharge from military life. 
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The reintegration component of DDR programmes is however more complex and less 
tangible results are achieved. Indeed, as Thusi and Meek state "technically speaking, 
the first two components of the process (demobilisation and disarmament) are finite, 
while reintegration is ongoing, complex and its success dependant on a number of 
interconnected issues that go beyond the formal end of the war" (2003: 23). The 
reintegration of ex-combatants is increasingly viewed as the most important aspect of 
DDR programmes (McGovern, 2005) and can be defined as "the process by which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. 
Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, 
primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general 
development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term 
external assistance" (UN, 2006: 2). 
The design and implementation of DDR programmes is conducted by a host of different 
bodies however it is generally the case that the government of the country in question 
will have some influence in this process. Indeed in some cases it may be the 
government itself that designs and implements the DDR programme as exemplified in 
Ethiopia through the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of Former Army 
and Disabled War Veterans in 1991 (Dercon & Ayalew, 1998). In other cases an 
International Organisation (10) such as the United Nations (UN) or World Bank (WB) 
may be responsible for the DDR programme as in the case of Afghanistan, Nicaragua, 
EI Salvador and Congo (all UN) or Rwanda, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and Uganda (all WB). Intergovernmental organisations also contribute to DDR 
programmes with the International Organisation for Migration (10M) involved in the 
Kosovo DDR programme. 
The immediate short-term goal of a DDR programme is to identify the section of the 
combatant population who is to progress through the DDR process. Traditionally, a 
proportion of ex-combatants remains in the peacetime military force or is incorporated 
into a newly created national army. Those who are in the population to be demobilised 
are usually taken to an assembly area at which point they are disarmed and have their 
details recorded in order to facilitate official demobilisation and enable the effective 
design of the reintegration component of the programme. They then undergo a post-
conflict/pre-civilian life briefing, perhaps with some training and various livelihood 
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provisory measures before being reinserted in civilian life and entering the reintegration 
stage. The reintegration of the newly disarmed and demobilised combatants is the final 
section of the DDR programme, and perhaps the most important as the success of the 
entire DDR programme, and thus peace itself, is determined by the degree to which ex-
combatants truly become ex-combatants. Taken together the three aspects of DDR 
programmes - disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - are seen as a key 
component of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and "could potentially 
create significant opportunities for sustainable peace and human development" 
(Kingma, 2002: 181). This statement by Kingma partially explains the importance of 
DDR programmes in the PCE however if we look more closely at the objectives of 
DDR programmes the importance of these programmes becomes evident to a much 
greater degree. 
The aims or objectives of DDR programmes differ according to the underpinning 
philosophy of the programme which "can be viewed on a continuum: from a minimalist 
(improving security) to a maximalist (as an opportunity for development and 
reconstruction) perspective" (Muggah, 2004: 27) and each DDR programme is vitally 
important in its own right. From a minimalist perspective DDR programmes are 
particularly important as ''frustrated ex-combatants may jeopardize the peace and 
development process" (Kingma, 1997: 151) and therefore ''for every country that 
embarks on a demobilisation and reintegration process, the foremost aim is to avoid or 
minimise the security threat posed by ex-combatants" (Mokalobe, 1999: 23), a view 
which is echoed by many writers such as Colletta et al (1996), Ozerdem (2002) and 
Dercon & Ayalew (1998). Farther along the spectrum exists the general view that "in 
the aftermath of a civil war, the "soundness" of policies can be ascertained only in the 
light of the political economy of the peace process" (Boyce, 1995 :2069). In this sense 
"the ultimate objective of all demobilisation and reintegration efforts should be to 
improve the welfare of people" (Nubler, 1997:3). A more maximalist view would be 
along the lines of the DDR programme operating in Sierra Leone in which the aim has 
been "to support social acceptance through information dissemination measures; social 
reconciliation, and sensitisation processes" (Ginifer, 2003: 41). It can, however, be 
argued that those DDR programmes situated nearer the maximalist position on the 
spectrum will be more influential in terms of facilitating reconciliation. 
36 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
With the importance of DDR programmes evident it is necessary to consider what a 
successful DDR programme may look like. Colletta describes a successful DDR 
programme as: 
several integrated actions: (a) classifying ex-combatants according 
to need, skill level, and their desired mode of subsistence, (b) offering 
a basic transitional assistance package (safety net), (c) finding a way 
to deliver assistance simply, minimising transaction costs while 
maximising benefits to ex-combatants, (d) sensitising communities 
and building on existing social capital, (e) coordinating centrally yet 
decentralising implementation authorities to districts and (f) 
connecting the DRP16to ongoing development efforts by retargeting 
and restructuring existing portfolios. 
(1996: XV) 
The above definition of a successful DDR programme seems comprehensive and does 
indeed address many of the issues that arise in discussions surrounding DDR 
programmes. Each stage of the process is vital, however, as previously noted the 
disarmament and demobilisation components of the process are finite and produce 
tangible outcomes (Thusi & Meek, 2003) while the reintegration component is 
altogether more complex and can be viewed as the most difficult aspect of a DDR 
programme (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2004). 
2.3 Disarmament and Demobilisation: Precursors to Reintegration 
Whilst I have made the argument that reintegration is the most important aspect of a 
DDR programme, an argument I shall expand on in greater depth, both disarmament 
and demobilisation also have a crucial role to play and, despite the tangible and less 
complex outcomes, should not be underestimated as they provide the critical 
foundations from which reintegration is made possible. OOR has its genesis in hostile 
environments characterised by tension and distrust, indeed disarmament and 
demobilisation within a OOR context is part of the transition from war to peace rather 
than a peacetime activity and in effect "does not enjoy the luxury of a crisis-free 
16 DRP equals Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. 
37 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
environment and takes a more urgent approach, symptomatic with emergency relief 
operations" (Ngoma, 2004: 82). Do to its precarious origins it is important to consider 
the D & D elements of DDR impact on the R. 
2.3.1 Disarmament 
The process of disarmament is of vital importance to DDR programmes but also in the 
conflict transformation and peacebuilding process. Within the conflict and post-conflict 
environments the proliferation of small arms is significant and has deep implications for 
peace. Not only do the ready availability of small arms represent tangible threats to the 
newly secured peace, but with it there is the indication of a culture of violence in which 
"it is becoming more common for people to think of guns as the first solution to 
problems" (Janz, 2000: 39). Effective disarmament is necessary therefore to not only 
remove the tangible threat or method of conflict but to also engender trust between 
previously competing factions and within civilians. The absence of a disarmament 
process contributes to increasing levels of organised crime and banditry, drug and arms 
trafficking and mercenary engagement whilst simultaneously reducing border control, 
and domestic and regional stability, thus severely curtailing the prospects for 
reconciliation and development (Potgieter, 1999; Kingma, 1997). Disarmament 
therefore serves as a crucial confidence building measure that provides the foundations 
for the effective transition for war to peace. 
The disarmament process can take several forms but generally follows a path similar to 
that of the programme in Sierra Leone run by the National Committee for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) in which combatants moved through a 
five-phase programme. 
1) Assembly: Organising the arrival of combatants, and their orientation to the 
disarmament process. 
2) Interview: The collection of personal identification, information, registration, 
and the verification of weapons or ordnance delivered by the ex-combatants. 
3) Weapons collection: The tagging of all weapons or ordnance, and temporary 
disabling and storing of the weapons prior to their transportation to the final 
storage and disposal centres. 
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4) Eligibility certification: Verification and authorisation of the ex-combatants by 
the UN Observers for their inclusion as beneficiaries of the DDR programme. 
5) Transportation: The assembly and organisation of screened and disarmed 
combatants and finally their transportation to demobilisation centres. 
(Thusi & Meek, 2003: 2617) 
Each of these stages represents a key aspect of a successful disarmament element of the 
DDR programme. Assembling combatants enables the swifter processing of 
combatants through the DDR, which is important as "this diminishes possible security 
risks and prompts the immediate start o/reintegration measures" (Koth, 2005: 30). The 
gathering of combatant information permits those conducting DDR design to plan more 
effectively and it also reduces the prospects for fraudulent claims of combatant status in 
order to benefit from the DDR programme. It also provides an opportunity to collate a 
more accurate breakdown of numbers of weapons and ordnance although, as Kingma 
notes, it is conceivable that combatants have more than one weapon and may cache 
additional weapons and armaments thus presenting the potential for future security 
concerns (Kingma, 1997). The collection, tagging, storage and disabling of weapons 
represent the crucial element of the disarmament process. It is particularly important 
that transparency is forthcoming within this stage in order to build trust among 
previously conflicting factions and between combatants and civilians. It is for this 
reason that observers are very often used and weapons are stored in areas separate to the 
combatants (Kingma & Sayers, 1995). 
The phase of eligibility certification links into that of information gathering and in some 
DDR programmes may represent just one stage. It is however a vital stage as it ensures 
all those registered on the DDR programme are indeed combatants. It also enables 
programme implementers to accurately enforce the criteria that combatants must fulfil 
in order to register on the DDR programme. This is particularly important as the 
criteria for combatant status determines the size of the caseload. If the criteria is too 
rigid it will exclude particular groups, if it is too lenient the caseload will be larger than 
first expected. This will then have consequences for the demobilisation and 
reintegration phases as ex-combatants not included in the programme may be aggrieved 
and more likely to pick up arms whilst an excessive caseload poses numerous logistical 
and resource complications. The final stage of transportation is important as it 
completes the process of disarmament and enables the demobilisation process to begin. 
39 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
The way in which surplus weapons are dealt with may differ according to the individual 
DDR programme, as there are a number of options open to the designers of DDR 
programmes. Suppliers may buy back the weapons in a weapon buy-back programme 
which is an attractive option as it rids society of surplus weapons and generates much 
needed capital from the sale. There is however the possibility of such weapons being 
re-sold in other conflicts and supplier willingness to engage in such a scheme is limited 
(Kingma, 1997). Decommissioned weapons may have a civilian use, in particular, the 
use of small arms for policing or removing weapons mounted on trucks or jeeps and 
using these vehicles for relief or other transportation (Kingma & Sayers, 1995). 
Potentially, this method is useful in utilising weapons and ordnance in a more 
productive manner, however the transfer of weaponry to police services carries a risk if 
such services are not efficient and corruption-free (Preston, 1997). 
Very often weapons are scrapped in a public destruction ceremony. This is a 
particularly advantageous method as it facilitates the development of trust between 
stakeholders (Janz, 2000) however it can be costly to conduct and wastes the 
opportunity for capital generation through weapons buy-back schemes. One alternative 
to scrapping weapons is mothballing them; however, as with weapons scrapping, this 
can be costly plus there is the very real threat of re-circulation of these weapons and 
"given the low capacity, lenient discipline and low salaries of police and soldiers, it is 
not surprising" (Janz, 2000: 42). This presents not only a significant security .risk as 
these re-circulated weapons end up in the hands of disillusioned ex-combatants and 
organised crime rings but also serves to heighten civilian concern and reinforce the 
culture of the gun. For these reasons, many argue that for disarmament to be successful 
it must involve the public destruction of weapons. A further option for DDR designers 
is to take away the weapons to decay and rust away and this is very often the case due to 
limited resources in the DDR programme. However, this is not a desirable solution as 
not only does it waste resources and have negative environmental implications, but it 
also presents the danger of these weapons being stolen and re-circulated, either within 
the country or into other conflicts. As is evident each method utilised to deal with 
surplus weapons has its pros and its cons. I would argue that, despite the relative 
costliness, the most effective method would be a public destruction of all surplus 
weapons as this has the potential to go a long way in the restoration of trust after 
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conflict. Therefore, the costs of such an endeavour should factor into the design of the 
DDR programme. 
2.3.2 Demobilisation 
Demobilisation, the release of combatants from military duty and their return to society, 
can be seen as a temporary process including regular soldiers serving in the military, 
paramilitary members, and combatants from irregular forces such as guerrilla or militia 
movements. Demobilisation is a vital component of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
has significant implications for the reintegration of ex-combatants. If the 
demobilisation is not well planned not only will the reintegration of ex-combatants face 
greater challenges in terms of adequate design and implementation, but it may also 
trigger a return to arms which, given the possibility of ex-combatants caching arms, 
represents a credible and serious threat to security. For these reasons the effective 
planning of the demobilisation process, taking into account time, resource and logistical 
limitations, is critical to the success of not only the demobilisation element of DDR but 
also the reintegration process as effective planning enables the design of a reintegration 
component that will sufficiently address the needs of the combatants from a given 
conflict (Kingma & Sayers, 1995; Mehreteab, 2002; Alden, 2002). 
The first phase of the demobilisation stage typically leads on from the last stage of 
disarmament in that combatants are transported to a demobilisation centre 17. In these 
centres ex-combatants receive basic necessities and are ''prepared to enter civilian life 
through the implementation of orientation activities such as trauma healing and psycho-
social counselling, information and sensitisation seminars, and civic education" (Thusi 
& Meek, 2003: 27). In this way demobilisation provides a key link to community 
reintegration. It is however, vitally important that the resources in these demobilisation 
centres are adequate, providing ex-combatants with what they immediately need, for 
example sufficient food, shelter, medical care etcetera. They must also afford 
satisfactory security for all groups of disarmed combatants along with observers to 
ensure no groups or individuals are marginalised and that the results of trauma to 
individuals as a result of the conflict are minimised as far as possible. Demobilisation 
centres should only be in existence for as long as necessary however it is important that 
17 'Demobilisation centres' are synonymous with 'encampment sites" 'cantonment sites" 'discharge 
sites" 'transition areas" and ' assembly areas'. See DPKO (1996: 6). 
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due care is taken in the decision to resettle ex-combatants into the civilian population. 
If combatants remain in the centres for too long there is the risk they m~y become 
frustrated and feel imprisoned thus potentially presenting a danger for future security. 
This is particularly the case if resources in the sites are inadequate (Kingma & Sayers, 
1995). However, should combatants not remain in demobilisation sites for the 
necessary amount of time there is the risk that they will not have received sufficient 
levels of trauma counselling, sensitisation and civic education thus rendering the 
prospect of a successful reintegration less likely. The degree of time spent in the 
demobilisation centres will of course be dependant on a number of factors, some of 
which will be examined now. 
Instrumental to a successful demobilisation is, as previously mentioned, planning. 
Therefore, when ex-combatants arrive at a demobilisation centre they undergo a process 
of registration thus enabling an effective needs assessment that is invaluable for the 
reintegration process. The registration process makes possible the collection of a 
number of demographic variables regarding the ex-combatants such as age structure, 
gender structure, marital status, number of dependants, area of residence, length of 
military service, educational level, and level of professional or vocational training 
(Ozerdem, 2003). The knowledge of such variables, and others, enables DDR planners 
to more effectively design the reintegration phase of the DDR, as they are able to 
conduct a needs assessment that will inform the level of provision ex-combatants 
require in order to effectively make the transition from combatant to civilian. 
The key function the registration and needs assessment process serves is that it provides 
DDR planners with the necessary information to design demobilisation packages 18. 
Such packages provide ex-combatants with a package of benefits aimed at ameliorating 
the process of transformation from combatant to civilian. Initially, at the point of 
reinsertion into the community, ex-combatants may lack provision of basic necessities 
such as food, shelter and clothing. Demobilisation packages may therefore include 
access to food rations for a specified period of time as in Ethiopia, civilian clothing as in 
Mozambique or iron sheets for roofing as in Uganda (Kingma & Sayaers, 1995). 
Different DDR programmes will provide a different set of benefits in accordance to the 
resources available and the requirements of the combatants passing through p.rograrn . 
• 1 Demobilisation packages are also referred to as resettlement or reinsertion packages. 
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Basic provisions for immediate reinsertion are vital however such provisions are finite 
in their longevity; for this reason other measures are also taken to enable a smoother 
reintegration process. Frequently cash payments or monthly subsidies are made, the 
amount often determined by military rank and length of service, in order to provide a 
safety net for ex-combatants for a limited time, and to dissuade a return to arms as a 
basic level of living could be achieved. In addition to a financial element of 
demobilisation packages they may also include household effects (Mehreteab, 2002) or, 
as in the case of Mozambique, agricultural kits to enable ex-combatants to return to 
rural agricultural communities (Alden, 2002). A further reason for providing ex-
combatants with demobilisation packages is that it is believed that reintegration and 
reconciliation will be more difficult if ex-combatants return to their communities empty 
handed (Ngoma, 2004). 
Prior to transportation to their communities or chosen places of residence if they choose 
to start again somewhere else, ex-combatants undergo a discharge orientation designed 
to ameliorate the immediate difficulties associated with a return from conflict. This 
may include trauma counselling, sensitisation tech~iques, health screening, basic 
education and other services. As Kingma notes when talking of Uganda, "ex-soldiers 
and their dependants went through pre-discharge briefings, providing them details on 
how to open a bank account, how to start income generating activities, environmental 
and legal issues, family planning and AIDS prevention" (1997: 154). This serves to 
endow ex-combatants with some of the skills necessary to complete the transition from 
combatant to civilian.. Once combatants have passed through the registration process 
and have been allocated demobilisation packages and received a discharge briefing or 
orientation they are then transported to their community or to the location they have 
decided to reside in. They then enter the arduous process of reintegration into these 
communities. This shall now be discussed. 
2.4 Reintegration: The Ultimate Goal 
The way reintegration of ex-combatants is viewed will depend to a great degree on the 
philosophy underpinning the DDR programme and this will, to some extent, influence 
the way in which they are designed as well as the perceived success of such 
programmes. Essentially reintegration can be seen as "the process whereby former 
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combatants and their families and other displaced persons are assimilated into the 
social and economic life of (civilian) communities" (Ozerdem, 2002: 962). In order to 
achieve such reintegration the DDR programme must identify the most effective 
portfolio of activities with which to address the needs of the society. There will 
generally be some overlap with the demobilisation phase of the DDR programme in that 
the registration and needs assessment process during demobilisation will inform 
reintegration planning. Additionally, the 'reorientation' or 'reinsertion' package 
administered during demobilisation will be of significant value in the reintegration stage, 
together with a form of counselling and job referral service that is very often put in 
place to facilitate reintegration. Counselling and job referral services may include as 
varying array of services. For example, in Mozambique ex-combatants were provided 
with access to health care, training and social activities (Kingma & Sayers, 1995) while 
in Ukraine (re )educational programmes and language tuition was provided to 
reintegrating combatants (Heinemann-Gruder, 2002). The range of activities or services 
built into each DDR programme differs in each case however, as Kingma notes, there 
exists a clear distinction between the different components of ex-combatants 
reintegration: economic, political and social (Kingma, 2002). 
2.4.1 Economic Reintegration 
Economic reintegration is seen as a way in which "to equip former fighters with 
productive skills and employment so that they can return to civilian life" (Ginifer, 2003: 
43) and is viewed as important for the short, medium and long-term objectives of the 
DDR process (Ozerdem, 2003). Returning combatants have a primary need to provide 
for themselves and their dependants and as such DDR programmes must address this 
need in order to reduce the incentive for ex-combatants to return to arms (Last et aI, 
1997). 
Taking the case of Kosovo the importance of the effective economic reintegration of ex-
combatants is evident as the 25,723 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) combatants who 
registered for the 10M administered DDR programme supported over 200,000 
dependants of which 35,424 were children and 164,803 were other dependants 
(Ozerdem, 2003). If we consider that ex-combatants need to support dependants in 
other conflicts also we can envisage the encompassing effects a DDR programme has. 
For example, the programme in Ethiopia saw the DDR of almost 500,000 combatants, 
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which, if we take the Kosovo average of each combatant having around 8 dependants, 
would indicate a dependant total of around four million. This is of course a speculative 
figure but it is indicative of the importance of effective economic reintegration. This is 
the case not only because ex-combatants have these basic human security needs but 
they very often also need to feel recognised and recompensed for their sacrifices and 
achievements (Preston, 1997). A further rationale for the importance of successful 
economic reintegration is that ex-combatants who are actively contributing to the 
community are more readily accepted into that community (Ginifer, 2003 & Ngoma, 
2004). 
Economic reintegration is facilitated in a number of ways. In terms of immediate needs 
the demobilisation package ex-combatants receive includes a number of measures to aid 
economic reintegration in the short term from food rations or cash allowances to 
agricultural kits. However, for long-term economic reintegration this is not sufficient 
and so other measures need to be put into place. Generally, most DDR programmes 
will include a form of financial benefit. In some cases this may be a lump sum issued 
after demobilisation; however the danger with this is that ex-combatants may, for 
various reasons, spend the money very quickly and not use it for education or income 
generating activities etcetera (Kingma & Sayaers, 1995). In order to counter the risk of 
this and to provide ex-combatants with a safety net, DDR programmes increasingly 
provide a monthly subsidy for a set period of time. An important reason for this is that 
it, 
Would presumably both keep former combatants from being seen by 
host communities as parasites and allow sufficient time for the 
establishment (or re-establishment) of social networks that might 
provide employment networks. At the same time, it was felt that 
requiring ex-combatants to claim their subsidy payment at a 
particular bank would enhance reintegration by encouraging (though 
not obligating) them to establish a fIXed domicile within a given 
community. 
(Alden, 2002: 344) 
The amount and length of subsidy is decided on during the planning stage and is 
frequently linked to the military rank of the ex-combatants along with their length of 
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service. This is due to these factors often being perceived as influencing the ease with 
which ex-combatants can reintegrate with middle rank officers and those with long 
service being seen as the most problematic in terms of reintegration and posing a 
security threat (Kingma & Sayers, 1995). 
A further method - and arguably one with greater potential for long-term gain - through 
which economic reintegration can be facilitated is the provision of information, 
counselling, training and referral services. Ex-combatants returning to civilian life 
often suffer from a lack of information regarding the real economic situation that will 
confront them when they return to their community (Ngoma, 2004) and as such require 
the necessary information and counselling. In terms of economic reintegration 
however, the most critical element of the DDR is provision of training and referral 
which aims at "endowing ex-combatants with relevant skills, knowledge and 
information so that they will be able to find productive employment or start and manage 
successfully a micro-enterprise or a small farm" (Nubler, 1997: 17). In order for such 
training to be effectively designed it is therefore necessary to identify through rigorous 
methodological enquiry, the existing portfolio of skills, qualifications and capabilities 
ex-combatants hold and distinguish within these between vocational/technical, 
managerial and entrepreneurial skills and competencies (Nubler, 1997). This will 
enable a clearer understanding of the present position of ex-combatants but will also 
facilitate the identification of educational and training needs of ex-combatants 
attempting to enter formal sector employment (Koth, 2005). Therefore, with an 
identification of ex-combatants capabilities and needs is also the necessity on the part of 
DDR planners to effectively comprehend the emerging needs of the labour market 
(Ginifer, 2003). The services that are then developed from this knowledge may include 
the establishment of vocational training courses in areas such as mechanics, electrical 
installation, plumbing and others, as was the case in the Information Counselling and 
Referral Service (lCRS) in Kosovo or in areas such as agriculture and cons~ction as in 
Namibia. The type of training programs designed will depend on four primary criteria: 
(1) the funding available within the DDR programme; (2) the needs of the ex-
combatants; (3) the requirements the community, and (4) the degree to which the DDR 
programme is a minimalist or maximalist endeavour. 
Whilst the need for, and importance of, economic reintegration is evident the process is 
not without its problems. As previously observed the economic reintegration of ex-
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combatants may involve a 'reorientation' or 'reinsertion' package, educational and 
vocational training and/or a job referral service. This presents a potential problem of 
providing preferential treatment for ex-combatants. Writers such as Last (1999) 
advocate the need to target ex-combatants as a special group and to design programmes 
accordingly. The reasoning for this is manifold: firstly, if ex-combatants have no 
productive role in the post-war society, or no perceived productive role, there is an 
increased likelihood of them turning to crime or a return to arms, thus posing a clear 
threat to security and stability within the society and potentially within the region as a 
whole as has been the case in the DRC. Secondly, ex-combatants can be seen as a 
vulnerable group that experience great difficulty in coping in the post-war economy and 
society due, for example, to poor educational levels or war trauma. Thirdly, bringing 
their constituents into the peace process can be a timely, costly and risky endeavour for 
military leaders and as such a targeted DDR programme can be seen as political 
payback for these efforts. Finally, the productive potential of ex-combatants can be 
harnessed through targeted programmes thus acting as an investment into the 
reconstruction effort. 
On the other side of this coin is the premise that "the targeting of former combatants 
may be considered special treatment by other war-affected communities, causing 
destabilising resentment" (Ozerdem, 2002: 968). Within the PCE fall several categories 
of populations. Ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, refugees and those who 
remained throughout the conflict all coexist in the same environment and face similar 
challenges as each other. By privileging one group above another, resentment can 
develop with the potential of the exacerbation of social cleavages and, ultimately, 
conflict. It is this dilemma that policy makers face and striking the right balance is a 
challenge of all DDR programmes. 
2.4.2 Political Reintegration 
The political reintegration of ex-combatants is also significant as "the presence of a 
functioning state and legal system is one of the central requirements for peacebuilding" 
and as such "the strengthening of state capacity and law and order, and the 
development of processes of democratic decision making and non-violent conflict 
resolution, are therefore necessary to prevent slipping back into war and the 
demobilisationfalling apart" (Kingma, 2002: 188). Political reintegration, "the process 
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through which the ex-combatant and his or her family become a full part of dec is ion-
making processes" (Kingma, 2000: 28), thus forms an important component of the 
reintegration and peacebuilding process. Ex-combatants very often become involved 
with a military group because they identify with the politics of that group and oppose 
the politics of the government (Gomes Porto et aI, 2007). Their effective political 
reintegration in the PCE is therefore instrumental in the stability and security of that 
environment, as such reintegration should ensure they do not become a marginalised 
group and thus feel the need to return to arms. 
Political reintegration can be facilitated through various practices. Following a process 
of SSR will aid the political reintegration of ex-combatants through the creation of an 
environment which is conducive to peaceful conflict transformation. By effectively 
establishing a professional military with those combatants not entering the DDR 
process, and placing this military institution under civilian control the possibility of 
maintaining national security is greatly increased. It is however important to note that 
the creation of a professional military, involving the assimilation of previously 
antagonistic forces and with a passive political role within a civil society and 
accountable to a civilian and democratically-elected government, is a daunting task to 
say the least and will not be possible without strong political commitment and the 
realisation of military personnel at all levels of their role within society (Last et aI, 
1997). Coupled to the creation of a professional military is the formation of a 
functioning, effective and corrupt-free police force. "Like armies, police are committed 
to the maintenance of stability .... since the purpose of police forces is crime prevention 
and the maintenance of law and order, effective policing, more than effective military 
operations, assumes good day-to-day relationships with the communities they serve" 
(Preston, 1997: 461) and as such political reintegration in this manner can be seen to 
have positive impacts on peacebuilding. 
The development of democratic, accountable systems at all levels of the political system 
can also help facilitate political reintegration. Democratic institutions shaped according 
to the individual contexts and needs of the countries themselves are more able to 
undertake peacebuilding and reconciliatory measures that will more readily adapt to the 
demands faced by post-conflict societies. The incorporation of ex-combatants into 
these institutions according to the same criteria as any other civilian is vital in 
symbolising the inclusiveness of the government and maintaining security. As Hartzell 
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& Hoddie note, "former combatants require assurances that no single group will be 
able to use the power of the state to secure what they failed to win on the battlefield, 
and perhaps threaten the very survival of rivals" (2003: 319). In this sense then, the 
inclusion of ex-combatants in the political system does much to allay these fears 
providing such inclusion is genuine. It would be expected that at the cessation of 
conflict and the instillation of a transitional government based on the outcome of a 
peace negotiation, a number of government positions would be taken up by previous 
military leaders as agreed during negotiations. The concern at this point, however, is 
that "soldiers have a tendency to militarise the social environment, and this generally 
does not contribute to self-reliance, sustainability and peacebuilding" (Kingma, 2002: 
195). Successful political reintegration of ex-combatants therefore not only includes 
the premise that they are free to participate in political life as both voters and 
representatives, but also that they do not overwhelm the political landscape. 
Intrinsic to the development of democratic institutions is the establishment and 
preservation of human rights. Violent conflict very often brings with it a violation of 
human rights and for societies emerging from conflict it is necessary to address this 
issue by safeguarding human rights and effectively confronting past violations. This 
can be achieved in part through the police force and the newly emerging democratic 
institutions but must involve the participation of civil society (Last et aI, 1997 & 
Kingma,2002). The successful political reintegration of ex-combatants therefore relies 
on the creation of a strong civil society and the role of education in this cannot be 
overstated. "Education needs to specifically focus on social responsibility, ethics and 
government accountability. The free development of associations must be encouraged, 
institutions which preserve, uphold and defend democratic principles must be nurtured: 
trade unions; commercial associations; a free and impartial media; youth and 
community organisations" (Last et aI, 1997: 40). The creation of a strong civil society 
enables governments to be held accountable and provides a pathway through which 
post-conflict societies can progress forward towards a state of peace. Ex-combatants 
should be encouraged, and certainly not obstructed, to enter civil society in a 
meaningful manner. By engaging with civil society and becoming a part of the 
peacebuilding process in the peE, ex-combatants can be seen as positively contributing 
to conflict transformation and represents a form of political reintegration. Political 
reintegration does not only consist of participation in political life through voting and 
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representing, but also through working with government through other mediums, that is, 
civil society. 
Evidently both the economic and political reintegration of ex-combatants is vital to the 
success of DDR programmes and the facilitation of post-conflict reconstruction. 
However, the third component of reintegration, that of social reintegration, is perhaps of 
greater significance to the long-term success of the DDR effort and for this reason the 
issue of social reintegration shall be addressed in the subsequent section. 
2.5 Social Reintegration 
Effective social reintegration of ex-combatants is so vital to the success of DDR 
programmes and the greater post-conflict reconstruction effort for a multitude of 
reasons. Upon returning to their home communities, ex-combatants are faced with a 
dramatically changed and changing social landscape, one defined by violence and 
destruction, and it is in this environment that their reintegration takes place. This issue 
is ever more salient for ex-combatants creating homes in new communities. When 
writing on Mozambique, Nordstrom provides a cultural definition of violence as being 
"the destruction of home and humanity, of hope and future, of valued traditions and the 
integrity of the community" (1997: 123). Such an environment presents a hostile picture 
and it is clear of the need for the social reintegration of ex-combatants. 
The need for effective social reintegration becomes increasingly more apparent when 
one considers the fact that the identity of the ex-combatants and the community in 
relation to each other has undergone a transformation as a result of the conflict (Veale 
and Stavrou, 2003). Tensions between the conflict-generated identities of ex-
combatants and civilian identities of the community very often serve to retard the 
enabling of successful social reintegration (Gear, 2002a). Ginifer further demonstrates 
this issue, 
A major challenge has been to repair relations between ex-
combatants and their communities. Ex-combatants have frequently 
had to overcome the resentment of communities recalling crimes 
commined during the war, and this has undermined efforts at social 
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reconciliation. Furthermore ... the provision of targeted assistance to 
ex-combatants has often been perceived as rewarding the 
perpetrators of the violence, and not as investment of peace and 
security 
(2003: 42) 
Ex-combatants find it hard to adjust their attitudes and expectations (Kingma, 1997) and 
very often suffer from psychosocial problems as a result of the conflict which 
negatively impact on their ability to operate in civilian life. Even when former 
combatants can find work they often find the top-down approach to military 
organisational management frustrates their attempts to reintegrate into civilian 
economic life. 
Ex-combatants frequently describe community perceptions of them as negative and 
indeed may experience stigmatisation. In studies of ex-combatants in South Africa, 
Gear (2002b) draws attention to how ex-combatants experience ongoing stigmatisation 
and stereotyping in their post-military lives. These experiences make it increasingly 
more difficult for ex-combatants to successful socially reintegrate into the community 
and this is further exacerbated by the feelings of betrayal ex-combatants often face. 
Former combatants commonly express anger towards the government, former military 
superiors, community leaders and the community in general, and, in some cases, their 
own families. These feelings arise due to the perception of inadequate provision for ex-
combatants returning home, resentment at having been 'sold down the river' by former 
military superiors and political bodies and a general feeling of being "discarded 
neglected and forgotten by those for whom they fought" (Gear, 2002b: 16). 
Fundamentally these perceptions serve to marginalise ex-combatants from the 
community and produce a volatile, angry and frustrated, socially excluded population 
who pose a credible threat to the immediate security of society and must be regarded as 
of paramount importance to the success of the post-conflict reconstruction effort and 
integral to any ambitions of a successful transformation of conflict to a reconciled 
society. 
Despite the evident importance of, and explicit need for, the successful social 
reintegration of ex-combatants there seems to be a limited appreciation of this within 
the design and implementation of DDR programmes. It is apparent that the primary aim 
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of the reintegration component of DDR programmes is to assimilate ex-combatants into 
the economy and facilitate their role into productive civilian life. While this aim is 
indeed important and necessary, placing such an emphasis on this may lead to the 
dangerous position of neglecting the social reintegration of ex-combatants and this is 
reflected in DDR design. DDR programmes across the world accentuate a focus on the 
tangible benefits of economic reintegration, often to the detriment of social reintegration. 
This is also demonstrated in evaluations of DDR programmes by policy makers and 
academics. Such a focus is arguably problematic at best and dangerous at worst: 
Despite the relative lack of attention placed on the social reintegration of ex-combatants 
in DDR programmes there is evidence in some writings that there do exist methods 
through which successful social reintegration can be achieved. 
Of particular importance to the success of social reintegration is the degree to which 
receiving communities are willing and able to accept ex-combatants and the efforts they 
expend in making this a realistic possibility. Community sensitisation exercises can be 
influential in preparing a community for reintegration and should be promoted. 
Education and support at this stage is vital to the development and fostering of trust 
between communities and ex-combatants (Ginifer, 2003). Herein lies a problem: ex-
combatants returning to a changed environment require community efforts to facilitate 
their reintegration however; communities may be intrinsically and understandably 
fearful, resentful and apprehensive of ex-combatants. One way to combat this dilemma 
has been demonstrated by the NCnDR in Sierra Leone who disseminated "the message 
to communities that they will benefit, directly and indirectly, from the fact that ex-
combatants· are engaged in rehabilitating damaged societies, and that they will become 
independent and less likely to commit acts less inimical to society" (Ginifer, 2003: 47). 
A . further way this may be facilitated is the promotion of community development in 
which the community is united in order to define their needs and problems and mobilise 
the necessary resources to address these issues (Veale & Stavrou, 2003). A similar 
system to this has been in operation in Rwanda in which ex-combatants work together 
with non-combatants on community development issues. This provides a combination 
of economic and social reintegration and facilitates a wider understanding and 
acceptance of,ex-combatants (Verwimp & Verpoorten, 2004). 
In order for the above techniques to be successful ex-combatants need to engage in the 
process also. Within the DDR process in Sierra Leone ex-combatants have been 
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encouraged to participate in projects that are beneficial to the community "such as civil 
works, street cleaning, and helping rehabilitate shelter. It has also supported adult 
education programmes, civic and peace education, music, sports groups, and other 
projects that help to rebuild social capitaf' (Ginifer, 2003: 46). Ex-combatants have 
also been encouraged to realise that wrongful acts were committed during the course of 
the conflict and to show remorse for these (Ginifer, 2003). When ex-combatants make a 
concerted effort to socially reintegrate, such an eventuality is more likely and if other 
factors are in place, such as accommodating local leaders, measures aimed at promoting 
collaborative working relationship between ex-combatants and civilians, and general 
reconstruction in the community, then the changes of a successful ex-combatant social 
reintegration are increased. 
2.6 Social Reintegration and Vulnerable Groups 
The social reintegration of ex-combatants can thus be considered as critical to the post-
conflict reconstruction effort; however there are a number of groups of ex-combatants 
within society that are particularly vulnerable within this process and who face specific 
challenges in their social reintegration. These are: female ex-combatants, child soldiers 
and disabled veterans. The following examines the respective ordeals each group face 
and the measures put in place to reduce this as much as possible. 
2.6.1 Female Ex-Combatants 
Social reintegration, by its very nature, implies a need to reconcile all members of the 
society however it is frequently the case that reintegration planning for female 
combatants is at best inadequate and at worst non-existent (Mazurana, 2004). However, 
the reintegration needs of female combatants differ, sometimes considerably, to those of 
male combatants and it is argued that DDR programmes should reflect this need in their 
design (Bouta, 2005). Planning is often limited for the reintegration of female because, 
as a group they generally constitute a much lower proportion of combatants than men 
(Kingma & Sayers, 1995). Moreover, even when female combatants do comprise a 
larger proportion of total combatants it has been the case that, 
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One of the main obstacles for women's and girl's participation in 
DDR is that national and international male policy makers and 
officials too often do not recognise women and girls as integral 
members of fighting forces ... Women and girls associated with 
fighting forces are frequently categorised as 'camp followers' and 
'dependants' by military, government and aid official, who would 
rather not be responsible for them. 
(Makurana, 2004: 61/2) 
A further reason female fighters do not receive adequate reintegration support is the 
expectation that, with the conclusion of the conflict, women should return to their 
traditional roles within the family (Kingma, 2001). This expectation presents serious 
difficulties for women for a number of reasons: first, female fighters have developed 
new skills during conflict and very often wish to apply these in the labour market and 
contribute to the family income; however the expectation to return to traditional roles 
can cause tensions within the household. Second, marriages that women return to, or 
marriages that were borne out of the conflict may become fractious due to the radically 
changed environment into which they return. Pressures to return to their traditional way 
of life often culminate in divorce or separation with 18.3% of female combatants being 
divorced compared with 3.2% of men, and 8.50/0 separated compared to 0.6% in Eritrea 
(Bruchhaus & Mehreteab, 2000). Third, female fighters often face stigmatisation and 
are ostracised and marginalised by society due to their involvement in what is perceived 
as masculine activity, that is: war (Farr, 2002). 
The multifarious problems female combatants face when attempting to reintegrate into 
society are manifest within economic reintegration but, perhaps more importantly, also 
in social reintegration. In particular, the demands placed on female combatants by the 
community regarding traditional behaviour give rise to an increased need for effective 
psychoso,cial healing which has been identified as "a priority for a number of 
women ... This included coping with a loss of identity and lost years of education and 
alternative career development. For those women in armed opposition groups 
preparing to disarm, there were also concerns about rejection and stigma within their 
communities since women had broken traditional gender barriers by becoming 
members of an armed group" (Mazurana, 2004: 67). More specifically, female 
combatants are faced with higher unemployment than their male counterparts and this, 
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in conjunction with strained family relationships and the non-acceptance of host 
communities, demonstrates the significant need for DDR programme design to 
acknowledge female combatants as a vulnerable group and reflect the distinct needs that 
such a group has when undergoing reintegration and in particular, social reintegration 
(Veale, 2003). 
2.6.2 Child Soldiers 
Child soldiers are widely used in many conflicts and also represent a vulnerable group 
within DDR programmes. In many African conflicts such as Mozambique, Sierra 
Leone, Uganda and Sudan, along with countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia and 
Cambodia, the use of child soldiers is prevalent and in some cases, forced. Child 
soldiers, defined as "any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited 
or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, but not limited to children, 
boys, and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual 
purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taken or has taken a direct part in 
hostilities" (Paris Principles, 2007: 7), are particularly vulnerable due to the fact they 
face an altogether different environment than other combatants upon the conclusion of 
conflict. The impact of conflict ~n child soldiers can be claimed to be of more 
~ignificance because it is against the backdrop of often-brutal conflict that child 
soldiers' social and emotional development takes place (Kingma, 2002: 193). Child 
soldiers, particularly those recruited at ages below 10, are socialised into a military 
environment and become traumatised by "the brutal experiences they have undergone 
and the violent acts they themselves have committed ... /f their reintegration fails they 
may well contribute to 'new cycles of violence '" (Kingma, 2001: 36). This makes social 
reintegration highly problematic, as child soldiers need to relearn, or indeed learn for 
the first time, the social values, norms and practices of civil society (Nubler, 2000). 
A further issue faced by child soldiers is the degree to w~ich the receiving community is 
able and/or willing to accept them. Communities decimated by conflict lack the 
provision of services such as education and healthcare thus making the reintegration 
process difficult for all those returning to the community. Child soldiers however, are 
faced with the very real prospect of having to be self-reliant as a legacy of conflict is an 
increased number of orphans. Social reintegration therefore becomes all the more 
important as the community may take on an increased role in the care of ex-child 
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soldiers. F or this reason community-based approaches to reintegration are viewed as 
critical as they "strengthen the communities that absorb former underage soldiers" 
(Chrobok, 2005: 34). Linked to this is the issue of whether communities are willing to 
accept former child soldiers. In some communities such acceptance is not forthcoming 
and it can be extremely difficult for child soldiers to carve out some form of existence. 
In other societies the performance of public cleansing rituals provides a crucial process 
through which former child soldiers can pass and receive acceptance into the 
community (Veale & Stavrou, 2003; Zack-Williams, 2006). Additionally, the use of 
psychosocial counselling can be beneficial in helping former child soldiers relearn 
social and cultural value, norms and traditions and are important in "re-orienting the 
child's mind" (Interview quotation in Veale & Stavrou, 2003: 39). 
It is thus evident that former child soldiers constitute an extremely vulnerable group 
within the reintegration process and special consideration must take place in the design 
of DDR programmes to reflect this fact. The failure to successfully reintegrate former 
child soldiers potentially poses a more significant threat to the fragile peace that is 
established at the conclusion of violent conflict. Not only is there a greater risk of these 
militarily socialised and war traumatised combatants returning to arms if they feel they 
have no other purpose but, without the necessary guidance and care from the 
community, it will be very difficult for such combatants to successfully recover from 
the legacy of their conflict and develop into productive members of society. With those 
aged under 15 in many African societies constituting more than 40% in 2005, the 
highest of any region in the world (UN, 2004), the importance in harnessing this 
potential for future development is evident. 
6.2.3 Disabled Veterans 
The final group I shall consider is that of disabled veterans as they represent a 
vulnerable group but in a very different way from female ex-combatants and fonner 
child soldiers in that, dependant on the degree of their disability, they are reliant on the 
community for their survival but do not constitute as serious a security threat as the 
other two groups. The issue of disabled veterans is so significant partially due to the 
prevalence of landmines used in conflict' and in terms of proportions; figures of 10% of 
ex-combatants being disabled seem common (Preston, 1997; Koth, 2005). The degree 
of assistance required by disabled veterans is dependant on the severity of their 
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disability and this will dictate the relative ease with which they are able to reintegrate. 
The DDR programme in Ethiopia used three categories of disability and the assistance 
received from each group differed accordingly. Less severely disabled veterans (20,000) 
received the necessary medical and paramedical rehabilitation and then entered the 
mainstream reintegration programme. Moderately disabled veterans (15,208) received 
medical care, vocational training and materials to establish their own self-supporting 
activities along with pension allocations. Severely disabled veterans (2328) received 
initial institutional care and then were repatriated to their families and received the same 
benefits as those in the moderate group (Ayalew & Dercon, 2000). 
Another important factor in the successful social reintegration of disabled veterans is the 
provision of psychosocial counselling. Disabled veterans face similar problems as 
mainstream ex-combatants however they also may require help in overcoming high 
levels of mental stress and disorder associated with their injuries (Preston, 1997). 
Whilst they may for a short period of time be hailed as "a hero who has sacrificed 
fitness for the cause" (Preston, 1997: 468), this is very soon forgotten and they are faced 
with life thereafter as a disabled person but with the scars of war that able-bodied 
veterans also have. While these veterans can look to the future and focus on re-building 
their lives the future for disabled veterans is altogether bleaker. For this group therefore, 
the adequate provision of aid packages is more pertinent. Pensions, training and more 
practical products such as prostheses become vital, not only for the survival of these 
veterans, but also for their ability to reintegrate socially as they afford them· the ability 
to'remain mobile and thus avoid social exclusion. In cases where such needs were not 
met, disabled veterans faced the daunting prospects of a life in relative isolation or 
living in converted former demobilisation centres with other disabled veterans away 
from their families and communities. In response to such predicaments it is not 
uncommon for disabled veterans to demonstrate in an effort to draw attention to their 
specific needs and problems (Lundin et aI, 2000). 
Disabled veterans constitute a vulnerable ex-combatants group who require care and 
attention from their community. Although they may not pose as serious a potential 
security threat as female ex-combatants and former child soldiers, they have made 
sacrifices for the conflict and do represent a probable burden on society. It therefore 
seems plausible that this group should receive specifically tailored training and 
assistance programmes in order to ensure their financial independence as far as is 
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possible and to provide them with a role in society and reduce the prospects of social 
exclusion. 
2.7 The Reconciliatory Benefits of Social Reintegration 
Reintegration has been shown to be a critical factor in the transition from war to peace 
and, within the component of reintegration, social reintegration is arguably the most 
important. This section will examine the reconciliatory benefits of social reintegration 
thus further demonstrating its importance. 
During the conflict period combatants construct a military identity through their training 
and experience (Fischer, 2005; Gear, 2002a). This identity can be particularly 
problematic as it leads to the tendency for the social environment to be militarised by 
ex-combatants and can be pervasive for a considerable period of time (Kingma, 2002). 
Indeed, "only if and when a veteran is successful in establishing an independent civilian 
identity will the distinction between 'veteran' and 'civilian' vanish" (Colletta et aI, 1996: 
277). Even in the case where employment is forthcoming such a military identity can 
retard full reintegration. Research indicates that social reintegration can facilitate the 
reconstruction of identity from combatant to civilian as this involves "reinsertion in the 
family and community, and the mental elimination of the perception of being (member 
of) a specific group [that is, a combatant]" (Brito & Mussanhane, 1997: 3). Effective 
social reintegration therefore indicates towards the forgiveness and acceptance of ex-
combatants on the part of the community, and the mechanisms utilised to ~chieve this 
enable ex-combatants to "overcome his acquired identity as 'a killing machine' and 
regain a civilian identity after which he 'becomes a person again'" (Lundin, 1998: 112). 
In the process of conflict transformation and peacebuilding such an identity cannot be 
understated, as it is this very transformation of identity that allows reconciliation to take 
place. However, the way in which social reintegration is achieved, and the benefits that 
can be accrued, are not fully understood as yet. It is therefore important to examine this 
phenomenon in greater detail, particularly in the context of reconciliation and 
peacebuilding; something this research seeks to do. 
A further potential benefit of social reintegration is the way in which it can ameliorate 
the effects of war trauma. During conflict, numerous atrocities occur leaving both 
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combatants and communities suffering from the debilitating effects of war trauma and 
this is arguably the gravest of legacies in the post-conflict society; roads and bridges can 
be rebuilt but hearts and minds possibly cannot. Measures to promote social 
reintegration, such as psychosocial counselling and indigenous healing techniques can 
aid in the transition from a socialised military identity (combatant), through a transition 
phase between conflict and peace (ex-combatant) to that of a civilian. Generally 
psychosocial counselling is provided by the DDR programme or by other provisions put 
in place by NGOs and will only include the former combatant and perhaps his or her 
family. Such counselling can be particularly useful in enabling ex-combatants to 
relearn patterns of thought and emotion synonymous with being a civilian and can 
provide mechanisms through which ex-combatants can cope with the trauma of conflict 
such as violent rages, nightmares, low self-esteem and confidence, depression and 
reliance on alcohol or drugs. However, although this is limited to the individual and 
perhaps his or her family it can contribute to community reconciliation due to knock-on 
effects. 
Conversely, indigenous healing techniques offer an invaluable healing process for both 
ex-combatants and the communities they return to and they are generally public 
ceremonies or rituals and engage the whole community. Lundin, writing about 
Mozambique, states, 
Rituals of (re)integration in the various places where ex-soldiers 
chose to settle were conducted by the communities as part of the 
reception extended to these individuals. These rituals sought to 
reconcile the individual in three stages: first, with himlherselj, to 
purge the spirit of war and aggression from the heart and soul of the 
ex-soldier, a kind of exorcism to reorient the former combatants 
socially and psychologically; second, with the community and 
community life; and third, with hislher former enemies. 
(1998: 107) 
One particular cleansing ritual that ex-combatants underwent on their return to the 
communities after the contlict in Mozambique is as follows: the ritual, conducted by the 
community in public, begins with a reorientation of identity from combatant to civilian 
through a cleansing ceremony involving a steam bath and washing in water fortified 
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with herbs. The process then advances to a second stage in which the ex-combatant is 
reconciled with the community through the appeasement of the spirits. This involves 
announcing to dead relatives that the 'lost sheep' is back home and giving thanks for his 
safe return. The final stage of the ritual reconciles the ex-combatant with the spirits of 
the dead killed by him. In this stage forgiveness is requested and remorse is shown 
through token compensation. In some cases a communal meal may be served in which 
the community eats together as a symbol of reconciliation (Lundin, 1998). 
The cleansing rituals passed through by ex-combatants, and particularly their collective 
nature, pr~vide a crucial reconciliation tool due to the way in which they sustain the 
social order of the communities in which they are carried out and are particularly 
powerful due to their public tradition: ex-combatants go through a public process of 
absolution and acceptance and the community unites in the collective to enable such a 
process to take place. Indeed, such rituals can have further implications for general 
reconciliation as in Uganda where "the assumption is that all clans and sub-clans are 
both victims and perpetrators, thus acknowledging it is not just individual returnees 
that have to be reintegrated within the community, but relations between families, sub-
clans and clans are integrally tied up in the reintegration and reconciliation process" 
(Veale & Stavrou, 2003: 44); the collective nature of indigenous healing rituals can 
facilitate the re-forging of such relations. Because not only the ex-combatant but also 
the community are engaged in these rituals, their role becomes critical in "sustaining 
the social order of rural communities where people live in close proximity and in 
relations of dependence on the spiritual worlcl' (Lundin, 1998: 112). When social 
order, which may have been damaged during the conflict, is restored and community 
relations are reaffirmed the process of reconciliation takes root and ex-combatants can 
be influential in this process through their social reintegration into society. 
Effective social reintegration has further benefits for reconciliation when considering 
economic reintegration. Pervasive within most reintegration processes is the 
importance placed on economic reintegration. Whilst economic reintegration is indeed 
an essential aspect of normalisation after conflict it can be argued that the likelihood of 
successful economic reintegration is lower if ex-combatants are not successfully 
socially reintegrated into the community. This is partially because social reintegration 
enables the re-establishment of social networks and the "assistance provided by a well-
connected relative may be the only alternative to breaking into the formal sector (public 
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or private)" (Lundin, 1998: 110). Additionally, effective social reintegration facilitates 
the fostering and development of trust within communities as "trust arises when a 
community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create expectations of 
regular and honest behaviour" (Fukuyama, 1995: 153). Acceptance back into the 
community - social reintegration - implies the existence of a set of shared values, at 
least in some degree, and therefore trust is developed. Trust is vital for economic 
prosperity and therefore it is evident effective social reintegration can have beneficial 
effects for economic reintegration. Indeed, it is possible to go so far as to claim the 
prospects for economic reintegration and economic prosperity would be severely 
depreciated in the absence of social reintegration. This demonstrates not only the 
importance of social reintegration for economic reintegration, but also the way in which 
both contribute to the rebuilding of trust and other measures associated with 
reconciliation. 
Linked to the above line of reasoning is the fact that ex-combatants may have, or 
develop during the course of the conflict, skills and capabilities that are transferable to 
civilian life and would be valuable for the post-conflict reconstruction effort (Nubler, 
1997). However, if social reintegration is not forthcoming the ability for communities 
to work together effectively is diminished and the capabilities of ex-combatants are not 
fully realised, thus representing a loss of developmental potential. If ex-combatants 
successfully reintegrate socially then the subsequent fostering of trust and strengthening 
of social cohesion enables an environment in which the community can more effectively 
work together thus harnessing the potential of ex-combatants and further strengthening 
social reintegration and social cohesion as the community experience the benefits of 
accepting the ex-combatants back into the community (Ginifer, 2003). Evidence of this 
point comes from Rwanda where former combatants and non-combatants have worked 
together on public works projects which has facilitated social reintegration and 
demonstrated the benefits of combining economic activity with social r~.integration 
(Verwimp & Verpoorten, 2004). Thus the effective social reintegration of ex-
combatants has significant potential not only for social cohesion but also for economic 
prosperity in a number of ways. Moreover, ex-combatants can, through the skills they 
develop during their contlict experience, become positive catalysts for peacebuilding 
through their own actions, which provide a role model for the community. Indeed, ex-
combatants have shown themselves to be instrumental in the social and economic 
development of their communities, in enswing security and crime reduction and support 
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for conflict mediation process. As NiZA importantly assert, "a commitment to social 
justice, transformation and economic rights that motivates people to join armed 
formations can also drive efforts to promote social change ... ex-combatants are far 
more than simply fighters; they are often social activists with a strong understanding of 
the nature and causes of social injustice. They are often the carriers of a social memory 
of struggle, taking on the role of preserving the history of the struggle against injustice" 
(2006: 14/15). 
One of the most widely cited advantages of the reintegration of ex-combatants is the 
reduced internal security threat 19. Immediately after conflict there exists a fragile 
climate of peace in which there is a deep-rooted state of insecurity and mistrust within 
the psyche of both ex-combatants and civilians. This situation can be exacerbated if ex-
combatants are not effectively reintegrated and may culminate in a return to violent 
conflict with ex-combatants taking up arms. Indeed, in the case of Namibia there was 
no reintegration planning after the demobilisation stage as it was believed combatants 
would just return to their former lives (Preston, 1997). This lack of foresight proved to 
be costly as the hastily constructed Development Brigades Corporation (DBC) - a 
government attempt to pacify ex-combatants and provide them with vocational training 
- resulted in reinforcing "the military structure of the war by reassembling large groups 
of former fighters and placing them in centres that were diffiCUlt to manage and even 
more difficult to disband. This contributed to instability, as many of the protests about 
reintegration grew out of these centres" (McMullin, 2005: 196). 
Similarly, ineffective reintegration attempts in Haiti have left ex-combatants on the 
periphery of society with the need for psychological adjustment being disregarded, "the 
result of which ten years later has been the existence of groups calling them selves the 
armedforces of Haiti and acting as law enforcement agents, powerbrokers and political 
actors" (Mobekk, 2005: 221). The case of Haiti also highlights the fact that, even when 
employed as part of the new police force, ex-combatants may still pose a threat to 
security and stability. Thus marginalised ex-combatants represent a significant security 
threat even if they have found employment; those who do not find employment and are 
also marginalised are potentially even more dangerous. This, taken in conjunction with 
the previous argument of the importance of social reintegration for economic 
reintegration serves to reinforce the significance of social reintegration. The successful 
19 This is also relevant for regional security. 
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social reintegration of ex-combatants may alleviate such a security threat as not only is 
the prospect of economic reintegration more probable, but the likelihood of ex-
combatants becoming marginalised is diminished and the social safety net that is 
developed enables ex-combatant to better cope with war trauma and feelings of 
frustration (Lundin, 1998). 
Perhaps the overarching reason why the social reintegration of ex-combatants is so 
important is the fact that economic reintegration by itself can be said to be the 
achievement of negative peace while a combination of economic, political and social 
reintegration represents positive peace. The conventional reintegration measurements 
utilised by the international community, that of the employment of ex-combatants and 
the maintenance of internal security, are in their own right important however, 
"reintegration from this perspective [is] akin to achieving 'negative peace' or the 
absence of outright conflict" whereas the outlook of community leaders in war-tom 
Mozambique "reflected a deeper understanding of the meaning of reintegration, one 
which embraced the normative requirements of 'social peace' as well as concerns for 
political representativity and stability. The obvious point to be made is that the 
achievement of these aims can only be realised through long-term development" (Alden, 
2002:351). This represents two significant problems associated with current attitudes 
towards the way in DDR programmes are planned and implemented: first, the 
divergence between how the international community and community leaders view ex-
combatant reintegration represents a differing of agendas between the two groups which 
may translate into a loss of, or a disregard of, indigenous knowledge, and a limited 
working relationship between the two. Second, the clear commitment to, and 
appreciation of, the need for effective social reintegration of ex-combatants by 
community leaders is not fully capitalised on thus allowing the potential loss of 
programme impact which could result negatively on the depth of conflict transformation. 
The above argument is particularly important as it emphasises a significant disjuncture 
in what DDR programmes attempt to achieve, the way in which they are designed and 
implemented, and the result they could have. As demonstrated, the social reintegration 
of ex-combatants can potentially have significant effects not only in the attainment of 
negative peace, but can also contribute greatly to conflict transformation in the peE 
through the reconciliatory nature of the process. The social reintegration of ex-
combatants can supplement the repairing of social cleavages thus reducing the potential 
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for future conflict and establishing an environment for development through the renewal 
or strengthening of social cohesion. Current approaches to DDR do not adequately 
exploit the potential reconciliatory benefits of social reintegration, instead concentrating 
on economic reintegration. The effect of this is the creation of a space between what 
does occur and what could occur, which this research seeks to contribute toward filling. 
Specifically, it aims to develop our understanding of the social reintegration process on 
the principle that this will enrich our appreciation of the implications the social 
reintegration of ex-combatants has for reconciliation and peacebuilding. 
2.8 Conclusion 
As IS evident DDR programmes have the potential to play a vital role in the 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction effort. The first two components of 
DDR programmes, those of disarmament and demobilisation, produce tangible results 
which make important contributions to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants 
through performing the role of a confidence building measure and enabling the 
gathering of information of ex-combatants that is so vital for the effective planning of 
the reintegration phase. 
It is, however, in the reintegration stage that current approaches to DDR are left wanting. 
Both economic and political reintegration make significant contributions to the overall 
reintegration of ex-combatants and cannot be ignored. However, the aspect of social 
reintegration is often neglected, with DDR programmes focusing primarily on economic 
reintegration. Current design and implementation of DDR programmes, and the way in 
which they are evaluated, follow a generally minimalist philosophy and does not place 
enough consideration on the importance of social reintegration, thus failing to capitalise 
on the full potential of such programmes to contribute to conflict transformation and 
peacebuilding processes through their positive impacts on reconciliation. 
By focusing on social reintegration this research hopes to further our comprehension of 
this aspect of DDR and how it functions within the mechanism of DDR as a whole. 
This then enables us to develop an understanding of the implications DDR has for other 
aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. In doing so DDR itself evolves from being the 
stand-alone ad hoc policy that it began as, to the design and implementation of 
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programmes that significantly contribute to conflict transformation and peacebuilding 
and therefore impact even more on the reconciliation process. To this end then we 
consider the ultimate goal of reintegration from a maximalist perspective, arriving at the 
conclusion that not only can we only truly claim reintegration has been successful when 
ex-combatants are socially reintegrated, but also that such social reintegration has 
beneficial consequences for other aspects of the post-conflict reconstruction process as 
discussed in the chapter. 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an analysis of DDR literature that not only 
charts the development of DDR programmes but that also draws attention to their 
weaknesses as it is only scrutinising such weakness that we can develop programmes 
that can maximise their potential. By developing a more elaborate understanding of 
social reintegration it is possible to progress our understanding of DDR as a complete 
process and therefore enable improvements in DDR design and implementation; 
improvements that can have impacts in the transformation of conflict and the 
peacebuilding process. 
The following chapter introduces the concept of social capital in order to provide an 
alternative lens through which to view the DDR challenge as delineated in this chapter. 
In doing this I attempt to draw together DDR and social capital in such a way that DDR 
programmes can better respond to the reconciliation challenges faced by societies 
emerging from violent conflict. 
65 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
Chapter Three: 
Social Capital: The Link between DDR and Reconciliation? 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter three introduces the final concept utilised within this research, that of social 
capital. Social capital is critical to the construction of the theoretical framework that is 
used within this study and serves to link the latter part of the previous chapter regarding 
social reintegration with the challenges associated with achieving reconciliation. 
Although the connections between social reintegration and social capital are not made 
explicit ip this chapter, they are implicit and combine to deliver a platform from which 
we can engage with the other two concepts of reconciliation and social reintegration 
through the theoretical framework. 
The chapter begins by examining social capital literature which is essentially broken 
down to consist of the origins of the term social capital, the key components and 
definitions of social capital and ways in which social capital is derived. This section 
presents a conceptualisation of social capital, which serves as a basis from which to 
further develop our understanding. The chapter then moves on to analyse the 
transformation of social capital through violent conflict. This is a crucial aspect of this 
research as it enables a greater understanding of the environment into which ex-
combatants return when they are demobilised, and thus the challenges associated with 
social reintegration and reconciliation. Additionally, by examining this issue we 
develop the way in which we approach conflict analysis by adding a further dimension 
from which we can view conflict and its effects. The next section of the chapter 
considers the ways in which the social fabric that is so badly damaged through violent 
conflict can be restored through the rebuilding of social ties. Essentially then, this 
section concerns itself with developing a deeper understanding of social capital that 
goes beyond explaining what social capital is and how it can be damaged by violent 
conflict, to explicating how social capital trauma can be reversed and the social fabric 
strengthened; a key component of the conflict transformation process and peace building 
effort. 
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Having examined the concept of social capital and how it is affected, both negatively 
and positively, by human behaviour, it is important to investigate the ways in which 
social capital is measured. This is so important for a number of reasons: first, whilst 
social capital may be a theory it also has distinct empirical implications and, due its 
relative infancy, the system through which this theory can effectively be observed is 
essentially a work in progress. Therefore, this research, and other research engaging 
with social capital can potentially contribute to this system. Second, the application of 
social capital has, to date, been very much confined to the West and is only relatively 
recently extending to the developing world. The methods used to observe social capital 
in the Western context may not be transferable to the developing world context. 
Because this research is concerned with a PCE context it is necessary to examine 
methods of observing social capital in more detail. 
3.2 Social Capital: A Conceptualisation 
The term 'Social Capital' has been in existence for almost 100 years however it has not 
been until the last three decades that it has been the subject of increasing academic 
research and has developed as a concept. Writing in 1916, L. 1. Hanifan, the state 
supervisor for rural schools in West Virginia, applied the term to explain the importance 
of community involvement for successful schools. According to Hanifan social capital 
IS, 
Those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of 
people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and soci"l 
intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social 
unit... The individual is helpless socially, if left to himself... If he 
comes into contact with his neighbour, and they with other 
neighbours, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which 
may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a 
social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living 
conditions in the whole community. The community as a whole will 
benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will 
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find in his associations the advantages of the help, sympathy, and the 
fellowship of his neighbours. 
(1916: 130) 
Subsequent to Hanifan's writings on social capital the term seemingly received 
marginal attention and it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that it began to be 
researched and conceptualised on any significant scale. The debate following the 
1970/80s was centred primarily on its definition and has included interpretation from 
the economic, sociological, political and anthropological fields. However, in recent 
years the concept has grown in importance and is increasingly utilised across these 
fields. 
Perhaps the most well known academic writing on social capital is Robert D. Putnam 
who, in his seminal work defines social capital as consisting of "the features of social 
organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit" (1993a: 36). Throughout his work Putnam essentially 
argues that social interaction enables the formation of civic networks that facilitate and 
reinforce social norms of reciprocity and thus construct an environment of trust. It is 
through this environment of trust, embedded in social norms of reciprocity, that 
effective cooperation and coordination is expedited leading to economic prosperity, 
political stability and social cohesion (Putnam, 1993a, 1993b, 2000, 2002). Although 
this argument may seem simplistic and general it is in fact the product of a highly 
complex analysis of the multifarious aspects of social organisation presented in a cogent 
manner to which most academics concur. The work of Putnam provides an 'umbrella' 
understanding of social capital which is used by many academics as the foundation from 
which to base their studies and advances into our understanding of social capital. 
~ndeed, a contemporary analysis of social capital could not be considere~ complete 
without an examination of Putnam's work although this is not to say that other authors 
do not provide value-added to the debate. 
One scholar whose work has been highly influential to our understanding of social 
capital is Mark S. Granovetter (1973) who, although not explicitly writing on the 
concept of social capital, provides a fundamental element of social capital theory 
through his analysis of social ties in his paper The Strength of Weak Ties. For 
Granovetter, understanding interpersonal ties is crucial for our appreciation of 
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sociological macro phenomena such as diffusion, social mobility, political organisation 
and social cohesion (Granovetter, 1973). Essentially interpersonal ties exist between 
family, friends and associates and can be roughly categorised as strong, weak or absent. 
The strength of an interpersonal tie is a "(probably linear) combination of the amount of 
time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal 
services which characterise the tie" (1973: 1361). According to this definition of the 
strength of a tie it is evident that more frequent and protracted interaction between 
individuals will result in a stronger friendship (Homans, 1950). 
Interpersonal ties are developed between various individuals and with varying strengths. 
Those ties that are strong create dense networks with familiarity, reciprocity and trust 
permeating between members of the networks. Such networks ''form the primary 
bUilding blocks of society, uniting nuclear and extended family members and 
neighbours. These relations, predominately based on kinship, ethnicity, and religion, 
are largely protectionist, defence mechanisms that form a safety net for basic survivaf' 
(Colletta & Cullen, 2000: 6). Weak ties, in comparison, create less dense networks that 
are characterised by their networked and associational nature, for example, civic 
associations. 
It is Granovetter's premise that weak ties between individuals represent bridges between 
those dense networks that are characterised by strong ties. This is the case because two 
such networks can only be connected by an individual (A) within each network who has 
a weak tie to another individual (B) in the other network, the logic of this being that 
should A and B have a strong tie then the two networks would be bridged by other 
individuals within the networks due to familiarity, proximity and the amount of time 
spent with those with whom they have strong ties. Following this argument one can 
recognise the importance that weak ties have in providing bridges between networks 
and, as the process grows, between communities. 
Since the publication of Granovetter's 'The Strength of Weak Ties' his notion of weak 
and strong ties, and what such ties represent for the network of which they are a part, 
has been developed by various authors writing on social capital to enable a more 
sophisticated understanding of social organisation. The strong and weak ties developed 
by Granovetter have been reconstituted into what is known as bonding and bridging 
social capital. Bonding social capital is present within dense networks characterised by 
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strong ties, the ties that bind - kinship, ethnicity, religion and profession, among others 
- and is "by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive 
identities and homogenous groups" (Putnam, 2000: 22) while bridging social capital is 
characterised by weak ties - the bridges between networks, associations and 
communities (Narayan, 1999) - and is "outward looking and encompass [ es] people 
across diverse social cleavages". As such, "bonding social capital constitutes a kind of 
sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-
40" (Putnam, 2000: 23). Woolcock (1998) also makes the distinction between bonding 
and bridging social capital although the tenns he uses for each are different with intra-
community ties being classified as 'integration' (i.e. bonding) and extra-community 
networks as 'linkages' (i.e. bridging). 
The importance of both bonding and bridging social capital to the creation, development 
and sustainability of 'successful' society cannot be understated. Bonding social capital 
provides a social safety net that enables all those within the network to 'get by' while 
bridging social capital endows individuals to 'get ahead' and communities to 'get 
along'. Whilst their benefits are apparent bonding and bridging social capital can also 
present communities with problems. Where bonding social capital is particularly strong 
the powerful networks that ensue can restrict access to opportunities and individual 
freedoms and place excessive demands on successful community members whilst 
presenting possibilities for corruption and cronyism (Narayan, 1999). If in parallel 
bridging social capital is particularly weak, or absent, ties outside the primary network 
are ineffective or nonexistent which can limit opportunities for advancement and 
societal cohesion. 
Bonding and bridging social capital, so important for Putnam's analysis of social capital, 
can be said to reflect on the nature of horizontal relation; between individuals and 
between communities. Social capital however, is also represented through the vertical 
relations between state and civil society. The ways in which state and civil society 
offset and complement each other have important implications for the economic 
prosperity, political stability and social cohesion of a given society. In the writings of 
Woolcock (1998) and Woolcock & Narayan (2000) it is apparent that what they refer to 
as 'institutional integrity' has role to play in state-community interaction. 
Organisational integrity encapsulates state institutions and their effectiveness and ability 
to function, along with the legal environment and social nonns. The legal environment 
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in a given society, and social norms that characterise that society, potentially operate as 
an influential mechanism through which to achieve and maintain social control (Colletta 
& Cullen, 2000). The degree of organisational integrity a state demonstrates will have 
implications as to whether the actions of civil society are 'complementary' to those of 
the state, and indeed enhance such actions, or if they 'substitute' for state services and 
functions (Colletta & Cullen, 2000: 14). 
Woolcock & Narayan (2000) combine the principles of bonding and bridging social 
capital with complementarity and substitution into what they term as the 'synergy' view 
in which they recognise a number of factors: first, governments, firms and civil society 
all have a variable impact on the achieving of collective goals; second, neither states, 
firms or communities posses the necessary resources to promote sustainable 
development and therefore complementarities and forged partnerships within and across 
these sectors are required; and third, that the State's role in facilitating positive 
developmental outcomes is the most important and problematic as the State is the 
ultimate provider of public goods and the final arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law, as 
well as being the actor most able to facilitate enduring alliances across the boundaries of 
class, ethnicity, race, gender, politics, and religion. However, communities and firms 
also have an important role to play in creating the conditions that produce, recognise, 
and reward good governance (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000: 236). Essentially the 
synergy approach examines the ways in which leaders and government· institutions 
engage and interact with the community. 
The conceptual dimensions of social capital discussed above present us with a highly 
complex picture of social capital. In order to enable a more concise but comprehensive 
understanding of the notion of social capital Halpern (2005) introduces the following 
diagram from which it is possible to interconnect the three major cross-cutting 
dimensions of social capital that he identifies: components - networks, norms, sanctions; 
levels or domain of analysis - individual, group, community, nation etc.; character or 
function - bonding, bridging, linking. 
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Figure 3 - A Conceptual Map of Social Capital: Halpern (2005: 27) 
Halpern's conceptual map provides us with the necessary clarity when approaching a 
concept as capacious, multifarious and dynamic as that of social capital. 
Although it is now apparent what social capital is and what it comprises it is still 
necessary to examine in greater detail the sources of social capital. As previously stated, 
social capital consists of "the features of social organisation, such as networks, norms 
and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' (Putnam, 
1993: 36). While this statement may summarise what social capital is it does not 
provide any indication of how it is created. For Portes (1998) there are two sources of 
social capital: the 'consummatory' source in which social capital is derived from the 
socialisation processes attached to families, kinship networks, class and occupational 
groups and the 'instrumental' source which arises from purposive exchanges based on 
expectations of reciprocity. Adding to this discussion, Narayan makes the claim those 
consummatory sources of social capital can be seen as being associated with the 
'endowment' of social capital whilst instrumental sources are examples of the 
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'constructability' of social capital (1999). It would therefore follow that intra-
community ties, the ties that bind, enable the consummation or endowment of social 
capital between members of a dense network characterised by strong ties of kinship, 
ethnicity and religion whilst also facilitating the development of social capital through 
instrumental sources based on exchange and reciprocity. 
Uphoff goes further in explaining what social capital is and how it is created and 
accrued. "Social capital is an accumulation of various types of social, psychological, 
cultural, cognitive, institutional, and related assets that increase the amount (or 
probability) of mutually benefiCial cooperative behaviour [MBCA]" (Uphoff, 2000: 
216). In order to provide a more concise understanding of how social capital develops 
Uphoff distinguishes between two interrelated categories: cognitive and structural. 
"The cognitive category derives from mental processes and resulting ideas, reinforced 
by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs that contribute 
cooperative behaviour and MECA" (Uphoff, 2000: 218). Cognitive processes therefore 
enable the creation, fostering and development of MBCA, leading to social capital, as 
people predisposed to collective norms, values, attitudes and beliefs through their kin, 
culture, ideology or religion are more likely to accept these norms etc. as widely, shared, 
rational and acceptable. "The structural category is associated with various forms of 
social organisation, particularly roles, rules, precedents and procedures as well as a 
wide variety of networks that contribute to cooperation, and specifically to MECA" 
(Uphoff, 2000:218). In this way the structural elements of social organisation facilitate 
MBCA, and therefore social capital, through previously established patterns of 
interaction thus making the productive outcomes from cooperation more predictable and 
beneficial. 
Uphoffs thesis is potentially very influential to our understanding of social capital as he 
emphasises the fact that both the social and political environment shapes social 
interaction. This conceptualisation provides us with a stronger foundation from which 
to understand the idea of synergy presented by Woolcock & Narayan (2000) as it 
indicates that sources of social capital are derived from both the social and political 
environment and therefore both have a role to play in facilitating MBCA; synergy 
between society and the state will thus enable the cognitive aspects of norms, values, 
attitudes and beliefs to become embedded in society at every level through the 
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generation of structural forms of social organisation such as roles, rules, precedents, 
procedures and networks. 
!he final source of social capital I shall consider is that of trust which is elaborately 
examined by Fukuyama (1995) in his book Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation 
of Prosperity. 
Social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust 
in a society or in certain parts of it. It can be embodied in the 
smallest and most basic social group, the family, as well as the 
largest of all groups, the nation, and in all the other groups in 
between ... Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of 
regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly 
shared norms, on the part of other members of that community. 
Those norms can be about deep "value" questions like the nature of 
God or justice, but they also encompass secular norms like 
professional standards and codes of behaviour. 
(1995: 26) 
The proclivity for trust to be established between individuals, within social groups and 
across networks is embedded in the set of moral and ethical values those individuals, 
groups and networks share, and the acquisition and emanation of social virtues such as 
honesty, loyalty and dependability. In the absence of such shared virtues interaction can 
only take place within a system of formal rules and regulations. Not only is the process 
of constructing this system time-consuming and costly, it functions as a substitute for 
generalised trust based on communities of shared ethics. This may have implications 
for the effectiveness of the social group. Reciprocal trust, and with it social capital and 
a thriving civil society, can only develop unabated if such virtues are existent and 
nurtured. Uphofrs (2000) dichotomy of cognitive and structural elements of social 
capital, together with the synergy view presented by Woolcock & Narayan (2000), 
perhaps provide the ideal foundation from which social virtues may be fostered and 
cultivated in order to enable the culmination of a high trust society in which mutually 
beneficial collective action (MBCA) is the norm and the notion of social capital is 
firmly embedded deep within the structures of society. 
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3.3 Social Capital and Violent Conflict: A Transformative Relationship 
In the previous sub-section I have presented a conceptualisation of social capital based 
on current theoretical and empirical literature. When we apply this conceptualisation to 
the analysis of violent conflict essentially social capital can be seen to contribute to both 
the cause and emergence of violent conflict and to the restoration of peace. This sub-
section will examine, through the use of theoretical and empirical evidence, the 
transformation of social capital throughout violent conflict and highlight the role social 
capital may have in contributing to conflict in either positive or negative ways. 
Social capital has the potential to play a significant role in the emergence of violent 
conflict due to the way in which it contributes to the cohesiveness of society. As 
Berkman and Kawachi (2000) state, 
Social capital forms a subset of the notion of social cohesion. Social 
cohes ion refers to two broader intertwined features of society: (1) 
the absence of latent conflict whether in the form of income/wealth 
inequality, racial/ethnic tensions, disparities in political 
participation, or other forms of polarisation and (2) the presence of 
strong social bonds - measured by levels of trust and norms of 
reciprocity, the abundance of associations that bridge social 
divisions (civic society), and the presence of institutions of conflict 
management, e.g. responsive democracy, and independent judiciary, 
and an independent media 
(2000: 175) 
As is evident from the above statement bonding and bridging social capital perform a 
pivotal function in the creation, development and maintenance of social cohesion. The 
inward looking ties that bind - bonding social capital - provide the primary building 
blocks of society while the outward looking ties that link - bridging social capital -
provide cross-cutting relations across often disparate social groups. It is in the 
discussion of social cohesion that we may be reminded of Putnam's alluding to bonding 
social capital as 'sociological superglue' and bridging social capital as a 'sociological 
WD40'. However the appropriate balance between bonding and bridging social capital 
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is imperative when considering its impact on social cohesion. When bonding social 
capital is particularly strong it can be detrimental to other groups or communities within 
the society in terms of promoting inequality between, exclusion of and intolerance 
towards other groups (Putnam, 2000). 
Strong bonding social capital, despite being a necessity, is not sufficient for the 
breakdown of social cohesion and the descent into violent contlict; bridging social 
capital too plays its part. The absence of cross-cutting ties between groups and 
communities - bridging social capital - poses a greater threat to social cohesion than 
that strong bonding social capital as the lack of such ties can serve to magnify the 
strength of bonding social capital through limited interactions between groups as well as 
reducing the opportunity for societal contlict resolution mechanisms to evolve. "For 
societal well being or the collective good, a transition has to occur from exclusive 
loyalty to primary groups to networks of secondary associations whose most important 
characteristic is that they bring together people who in some ways are different from 
the self. Social relations underlie all societal institutions and in turn feed back and 
reinforce the organisation and functioning of a country's formal and informal 
institutions" (Narayan, 2000: 12). Taking this point further Narayan emphasises the 
importance of inter-ethnic networks as symbolising 'agents of peace' due to the role 
they play in building bridges, and managing tensions that arise, between communities. 
If these interconnections are nonexistent or ethereal the likelihood of ethnic violence is 
increased (Narayan, 2000). 
The above analysis of how bonding and bridging social capital may impact on social 
cohesion provides an account of the dynamics in the bonding-bridging balance within a 
'natural' environment, that is, one that has not been manipulated. However, when a 
society is characterised by very strong bonding social capital and very weak or absent 
bridging social capital the potential, and perhaps incentive, for the perversic!l of social 
capital in order to attenuate social cohesion and polarise society for individual and 
group gain can be significant (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). Putnam also touches on this 
observation in a slightly different way stating, "social capital is often most easily 
created in opposition10 to something or someone else. Fraternity2} is most natural 
20 Original emphasis. 
21 Fraternity was one of the three ideal of the French Revolution -liberty, equality and fraternity - and is 
another tenn for what Putnam identifies as social capital. 
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within socially homogenous groups .... Social divis iveness is the central normative issue 
raised by communitarianism. Does the exaltation of social capital and community 
solidarity lead inevitably to the murderous hatreds of Bosnia and Kosovo?" (Putnam, 
2000: 361). 
The recognition that social capital can indeed be manipulated and contribute to violent 
conflict gives emphasis to the need for a closer examination of what Woolcock & 
Narayan (2000) term synergy. When synergy is apparent between the state and 
community social capital can be developed in a positive manner leading to public 
benefit (Evans, 1996, Woolcock, 1998, Narayan, 1999; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). 
When synergy is absent however, the potential for the perversion of social capital is 
greater. If an authoritarian or totalitarian state penetrates society this not only has 
implications for civil society as the space necessary for healthy civic engagement is not 
available but, if the intentions of the state are malevolent, it can result in the distortion 
of bonding social. capital culminating in violent conflict if bridging social capital is not 
extant in order to offset it (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). 
When synergy is also absent the proclivity for such a breakdown in social cohesion may 
further increase. The state, within its role as the provider of public goods and arbiter 
and enforcer of law (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000), has the capability to discriminate 
against certain groups in favour of others and if it chooses to do so the absence of 
synergy between state and community will lead to civil society, in its limited form, to 
substitute for government. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) provide a diagram depicting 
what may happen in the absence of synergy and high levels of bridging social capital. 
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Figure 4 - Relationship between Bridging Social Capital and Governance: Woolcock & 
Narayan (2000: 237) 
Note: Complementarity refers to the optimal interaction of government and markets in 
civil society; substitution is the replacement by informal organizations (families, 
networks, and so on) of services ordinarily provided by governments and institutions. 
As we can see when levels of bridging social capital are low this leads to latent conflict 
when states are well functioning. This latent conflict then progresses into conflict if 
states are or become dysfunctional. In a diagram similar to this Colletta and Cullen 
(2000) include bonding social capital to demonstrate how social cohesion is affected by 
bonding and bridging social capital. 
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Bridging Social Capital: Colletta & Cullen (2000: 14) 
Combining both these diagrams it is evident that horizontal and vertical social capital 
and synergy between state and community have enormous potential to both contribute 
to and obviate the emergence of violent conflict. Where the emergence of violent 
conflict does occur it is highly probable that the society is characterised by high levels 
of bonding social capital, low' or nonexistent levels of bridging social capital, and a lack 
of synergy between state and community. A community, society or country in this 
situation could be found in the lower left quadrant in both Woolcock and Narayan 
(2000) and Colletta and Cullen's (2000) diagrams. 
A micro level examination of the above discussions of how social capital may 
contribute to the emergence of violent conflict can be conducted utilising Fukuyama's 
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notion of 'trust'. As stated above, a society with the proclivity for violent conflict is 
characterised by high levels of bonding social capital, low or nonexistent levels of 
bridging social capital, and a lack of synergy between state and community (weak 
vertical social capital). In such an environment trust is of paramount importance and 
has a high degree of influence as to whether that society will descend into violent 
conflict or not. When bonding social capital is high and bridging social capital low trust 
may be relatively high between members within the different homogenous groups 
whereas the level of trust between these homogenous groups may be relatively low. 
This in itself increases the propensity for violent conflict, as social cohesion is low and 
fragmentation high. However, when coupled with low levels of trust between state and 
society, a consequence of the lack of synergy, the potential for violent conflict is 
amplified. As Colletta and Cullen (2000) state, 
Vertical relations plagued by inequality and an unequal distribution 
of power and opportunity (often accompanied by exclusion and 
indignity) can instigate violent conflict. The absence of horizontal 
relations - of cross-cutting ties between unlike groups in a 
multicultural society - can erupt into hostilities if one group is seen 
as monopolising resources and power to the disadvantage of the 
others. And if, within these groups, high levels of bonding social 
capital link only like members, difference in access to resources and 
power may further aggravate relations and heighten tensions 
between those in control and those excluded. Thus, violent conflict 
is triggered by the presence of strong exclusionary bonds and 
disempowerment combined with a lack of horizontal and vertical 
linking social capital. 
(2000: 16) 
Trust therefore has a pivotal role to play in the emergence of violent conflict. However, 
trust is also a central concept when considering the effects of violent conflict on social 
capital. As Colletta & Cullen importantly emphasise, trust is "a grossly depleted 
commodity during warfare" (2000: 11). Trust becomes such a depleted commodity for 
a multitude of reasons. Within a conflict environment identity has a tendency to form 
along increasingly narrow lines based on units of identity such as clan, ethnicity, 
religion, and others, in order for those within these groups to maintain some degree of 
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security (Lederach, 1997). The cause of this fragmentation of identities is due to the 
"roots [of conflict] in long-standing distrust, fear, and paranoia, which are reinforced 
by the immediate experience of violence, division, and atrocities. This experience, in 
turn, further exacerbates the hatred and fear that are fuelling the conflict" (Lederach, 
1997: 13). 
The lack of trust that is endemic within the conflict environment enables the perversion 
of bonding social capital thus leading to the increased breakdown in social cohesion. 
"Where there is deep, long-term fear and direct experiences of violence that sustain an 
image of the enemy, people are extremely vulnerable and easily manipulated. Thefears 
in sub-group identities are often created, reinforced and used by leaders to solidify their 
position and the internal cohesion of the groups behind them. Deep polarisation and 
sharp divisions are, in fact, functional for increasing cohesion, reducing ambiguity, and 
decreasing internal criticisms of leaders" (Lederach, 1997: 15). The impact this has for 
the bonding-bridging dynamic is that bonding social capital within these sub-groups is 
strengthened and indeed polluted due to this fear and distrust whilst bridging social 
capital, necessary for social cohesion, is reduced thus furthering the strengthening of 
negative bonding social capital. The effect for the conflict is to create greater 
polarisation and deeper social cleavages, which conspire to reinforce sub-group identity 
and potentially turn hostilities into a protracted conflict. 
The development of distrust, fear, and paranoia illustrated by Lederach can be better-
understood using Uphoffs notion of cognitive and structural social capital. As 
previously stated, "cognitive [social capital] derives from mental processes and 
resulting ideas, reinforced by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, attitudes, 
and beliefs that contribute to cooperative behaviour and MBCA" (Uphoff, 2000: 218). 
Whilst this view may seem agreeable it can be argued that MBCA will only eventuate if 
the mental processes and resulting ideas are positive. In the event that the norms, 
values, attitudes and beliefs within a culture, community or group are those of distrust, 
fear, animosity and paranoia it is likely that the cognitive processes that are reinforced 
by such norms are also negative. Effectually this will serve to reinforce and rationalise 
the distrust and fear that is pervasive within the community and to fuel the conflict 
further leading to the potential for protracted conflict. Similarly, when the structural 
element of social capital is also embedded within notions of distrust and fear it increases 
the propensity for patterns of social interaction to be of a negative disposition. The 
81 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
roles, rules, precedents and procedures that direct interaction become based on widely 
shared and accepted negative assumptions and associations and thus represent the 
notion of distrust and fear. They reinforce the protectionist nature of bonding social 
capital while severing those crosscutting ties that are so crucial social cohesion. 
The above discussions have provided an analysis of the way in which violent conflict 
transforms social capital. As stated, both bonding and bridging social capital play 
significant roles in the emergence and continuation of contlict and are transformed 
throughout the contlict. That said however, social capital is also important for contlict 
transformation. As Colletta & Cullen note, "social capital can be constructive and 
support social cohesion and the mitigation of conflict" (2000: 16). This is particularly 
the case because as Putnam claims, social capital is "a resource whose supply increases 
rather than decreases through use and which (as contrasted to physical capital) 
becomes depleted if not used" (Putnam, I993b: 37/38). To this end it is important to 
fully consider the ways in which social capital can aid contlict transformation and the 
reconstruction of a PCE. 
3.4 Altering the state of Social Capital: The Rebuilding of Social Ties and the 
Process of Reconciliation 
As the previous sub-section demonstrates, social capital can play an important role in 
the emergence and continuation of violent contlict. However, it can also mitigate 
contlict and strengthen social cohesion. This sub-section examines the ways in which 
social capital can be affected in positive ways in order to rebuild social ties and 
reconcile social cleavages. 
Rotberg states, "the accumulation of reciprocal trust ... helps to build social capital and 
contributes to effective governmenf' (1999: 339) however as Colletta and Cullen 
observe, trust is "a grossly depleted commodity during warfare" (2000: 11). As I have 
previously argued, a conflict and/or post-conflict environment is one likely to be 
characterised by three interdependent factors: first, high levels of bonding social capital; 
second, low or non-existent levels of bridging social capital and; third, low or non-
existent levels of vertical social capital between the state and civilians. These combined 
will have implications for the level of trust pervasive within society. However, before 
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we can consider ways in which social capital can be altered to reach a state of social 
cohesion it is necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of each of 
these different forms of social capital in a conflict or post-conflict environment. 
Bonding social capital - the ties that bond - can be both beneficial and detrimental for 
social cohesion. During conflict it is usual for bonding social capital within groups to 
strengthen as hardened images of other political or ethnic groups are reinforced, 
encouraging an escalation of violence and hatred (Kostorova-Unkovska & Pankovska, 
1992). Such strong inward looking bonds can generate a 'them' and 'us' mentality in 
which distance is placed between conflicting groups. Trust between groups then 
reduces and this can be manipulated by 'ethnic' or 'conflict entrepreneurs' to further 
solidify the existing hatreds and social cleavages (Widner & Mundt, 1998; Goodhand et 
aI, 2000). However, strong bonding social capital within groups can facilitate their 
survival during conflict. In the case of the genocide in Rwanda it was strong bonding 
social capital among the Tutsi that proved so crucial to survival and indeed, in some 
instances, led to courageous attempts to save lives or rescue those in danger 
(Gourevitch, 2000; Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2001). Bonding social capital is thus 
strengthened, in its positive or negative form, throughout violent conflict however this 
is not always the case as "bonding social capital may represent a powerful social glue 
when there is a clearly defined enemy, but when conflict becomes protracted, the fault 
lines become less clear and bonding may break down" (Goodhand et aI, 2000: 402). 
This indicates that the longer a conflict runs, the greater the damage to social capital 
and thus the more difficult post-conflict social reconstruction will be. 
Bridging social capital, on the other hand, is generally always depleted during the 
course of violent conflict. The strengthening of bonding social capital and the onset of 
the 'us' and 'them' mentality can only occur if bridging social capital is weak, non-
existent or depleted (most likely by conflict entrepreneurs). This is the case because 
"where there are high levels of interpersonal trust across sub-group boundaries, 
information may flow more easily" (Widner & Mundt, 1998: 5) and thus the 
propagandistic methods of conflict entrepreneurs may be thwarted due to the presence 
of bridging social capital. As bonding social capital strengthens in a conflict 
environment it is in a negative correlation with bridging social capital and it is the 
weakening of bridging social capital more than anything that enables the continuance 
and escalation of the conflict. The survival of bridging social capital is seen as vital to 
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a harmonious society in general terms (putnam, 2000) and more so in cases of societal 
stresses such as violent contlict. It is only through the restoration and strengthening of 
cross-community links that contlict can be mitigated and social cohesion (re)established 
(Colletta & Cullen, 2000). 
Synergy, or vertical social capital, is also an important consideration for two main 
reasons: First, the absence of synergy enables, and perhaps indicates, the presence of 
contlict entrepreneurs who may manipulate underlying tensions for personal agendas. 
Second, the presence of synergy can mitigate contlict through the provision of societal 
contlict resolution methods. However synergy can occur between the state and various 
sections of society to the exclusion of others and this can be problematic. Indeed, it is 
unusual for no synergy to exist whatsoever, more likely is a lack of synergy between the 
state and particular groups in society while synergy exists, and may tlourish, between 
the state and certain factions in society. In such situations the likelihood of contlict is 
greater and thus the unbalanced nature of synergy is likely to increase further. This can 
be said to be the case (among others) in Rwanda where the Hutu political elite favoured 
the Hutu and in particular, those who ascribed to Hutu Power (Gourevitch, 2000), in Sri 
Lanka where the Sri Lankan government promoted the Sinhalese over the Tamil 
(Nithiyanandam, 2000), in Darfur where the Sudanese government have been accused 
of supporting the Arab-African militia, the Janjaweed, with state-sponsored against the 
black African farmers of Darfur (Patrick, 2005) and in Kosovo where the Serb 
government pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing against the ethnic Albanian inhabitants 
(Ogden, 2000). 
From the above discussions of bonding, bridging and vertical (synergy) social capital it 
is evident that the "relationship between conflict and social capital is a dialectical one, 
each having an influence on the other" (Goodhand et aI, 2000: 402). It is therefore 
important to examine the ways in which social capital can be restored in positive forms 
to aid the conflict transformation and peacebuilding processes. 
Going back to Uphoff's thesis on the sources of social capital we can see this is 
particularly useful when considering how social capital can be restored in a PCE. The 
cognitive processes that enable the creation, fostering and development of social capital 
- norms, values, attitudes and beliefs - are crucial to the ability of society to recover 
after violent conflict however such norms, values, attitudes and beliefs have often been 
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radically perverted by conflict entrepreneurs during the course of the conflict. 
Therefore action must be taken by a number of agents to re-socialise the war-
traumatised society. This may be through citizenship and human rights educational 
programmes (Ager et ai, 2005) or by increasing communication and creating shared 
interests among those from differing back ground through heterogeneous civic 
associations (Varshney, 2002). Essentially links need to be built between previously 
conflicting factions and between the civilian groups affected by the conflict. This will 
strengthen bridging social capital and mitigate for the overly strong bonding social 
capital that was extant during the conflict. The effort required to take on this 
formidable task will be colossal and a great deal of commitment will be required by all 
actors involved including the state, civil society, the donors but in particular, the 
community itself. Indeed, for development of the cognitive process Uphoff outlines, we 
owe a lot to our families and kinship networks (Portes, 1998). However there is no 
simple solution to this as civilians face a multitude of difficulties at the conclusion of a 
conflict. Speaking about Bosnia, Pickering highlights some of these, "Bosnians 
interested in forming bridging ties struggled with raw wartime memories, propaganda, 
impoverishment, an influx of rural Bosniaks, an outflow of intellectuals, and nationalist 
rule" (2006: 87). 
In order to aid the re-socialisation of society through cognitive processes and strengthen 
bridging social capital further it is important that the structural elements of society, that 
is, the rules, roles, precedents, procedures and networks that facilitate cooperation, also 
playa part (Uphoff, 2000). In this the state plays a key role, as it is responsible for the 
reform process. The state needs to embed within society institutions whose 
membership are diverse, that promote acquaintance-based ties rather than friend-based, 
and that allow for interethnic cooperation as well as ''promoting repeated, mutually 
dependant interaction between individuals from different groups (Pickering, 2006: 81). 
This not only provides an arena for the reconstruction of bridging social capital directly 
but also indirectly through creating an enabling environment for social capital formation 
Vertical social capital (synergy) is of particular importance in the restoration of 
bridging social capital as "more extensive and durable bridging social capital requires 
an interactive process in which grass roots initiatives build strength and compel 
domestic elites to support them, provide opportunity and develop institutions such as 
schools, a judiciary, and police that reward merit regardless of background" 
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(Pickering, 2006: 97). The link between civil society and the state can therefore prove 
to be crucial and it is important that efforts are made to restore or establish this link and 
to make it far reaching between the state and all factions of society so that no sections 
of civil society are excluded. 
In this endeavour the donor community can potentially playa role. Grootaert, from the 
World Bank, has identified five areas for action, which the donor community should 
acknowledge: first, Do Your Homework, Do No Harm, in which the dynamic of existing 
social capital within a country should be understood before policy development and as 
part of policy design. This would reduce the chances of programmes weakening 
existing positive social capital and recommend ways in which it could be strengthened. 
Second, Use Local-level Social Capital to Deliver Projects through existing 
associations and organisations in order to improve beneficiary targeting, reduce project 
costs, and increase 'ownership' and thus the projects sustainability. This also further 
strengthens social capital through local institutional involvement. Third, Create 
Enabling Environments that are characterised by: good governance, property rights, 
independent judiciary, a competent and transparent bureaucracy, and mechanisms to 
promote dialogue and resolve conflict. Four, Invest in Social Capital through direct 
support to existing and emerging organisations, which aids the enhancement of 
participatory processes at the local level. Five, Promote Research and Learning both in 
terms of social capital in general and specifically to the most appropriate stIategies for 
working with local organisations (Grootaert, 1998: 19). However, while these 
recommendations may seem useful it is important to note that donor polices can be 
damaging to social capital (Pickering, 2006) and so it is paramount that any donor 
involvement is heavily associated with local activity. 
A further avenue through which social capital can be restored after violent conflict is the 
workplace in whic~ it is "necessary, at least initially, to develop ideals of 
professionalism, which can then facilitate interethnic cooperation at work and even 
among colleagues in other social venues" (pickering, 2006: 92). The workplace is also 
~mportant because it is unavoidable. It is often the case after violent confli~t that those 
in the majority group do not have as strong an incentive for inter-ethnic cooperation 
(pickering, 2006) and therefore much of this effort may come from minority groups. 
However, in a PCE there is a need for employment among all sectors of the society and 
therefore an inability to avoid proximity with those from other groups. By promoting 
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mixed workplaces the government, civil society and the business community can 
support the restoration of bridging social capital. Indeed, while there is the danger of 
donor assistance to NGOs creating new 'haves' (local NGO employees) and 'have nots' 
(Mertus, 2001), local employment in donor funded NGOs may provide an ideal 
opportunity to foster an environment in which cooperation between different groups 
may occur thus strengthening bridging social capital. One such example of this can be 
found in Rwanda where ex-combatants and non-combatants worked together on public 
urban development projects (Verwimp & Verpoorten, 2004). The workplace thus 
presents an ideal arena in which the foundations of cross-community bridging social 
capital can be laid, with repeated interaction between those from different background 
consequently promoting mutual interdependence and leading to the potential for the 
development of these linkages through contact and activity outside of the workplace. 
The renewal of social capital in the PCE is crucial to the re-establishment of social 
cohesion and has a significant role to play in conflict transformation and reconciliation 
processes. The opportunities outlined above indicate some of the possibilities for social 
capital renewal however these are not exhaustive. The theoretical framework 
developed in the next chapter explicitly examines the ways in which DDR can facilitate 
the restoration of social capital. It is there that the three concepts introduced in the 
thesis thus far will combine to produce a framework that enhances our understanding of 
how the social reintegration of ex-combatants may contribute to reconciliation. 
However, before we move on to this section it is necessary to consider the way in which 
social capital is measured. 
3.5 Measuring Social Capital 
Social Capital is a relatively new phenomenon in terms of its acceptance and application 
by the academic and policy community. It is therefore in its infancy both in reaching a 
clear and agreeable definition of what social capital is and how it can and should be 
measured. As discussed in section 3.1 there is a lack of a clear definition of what social 
capital is and "this makes it inherently difficult to propose a list of indicators for social 
capital. They will have to evolve as the conceptual definition and, more important, the 
operational definition of social capital are developed' (Grootaert, 1998: 10). Other 
forms of capital - natural, physical and human - have, throughout their existence, 
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develo.ped a number o.f pro.xies and measurement to.o.ls, ho.wever such develo.pment has 
taken place o.ver a perio.d o.f time invo.lving years o.f educatio.n and wo.rk experience and 
have been rigo.ro.usly tested in their applicatio.n. At the present time there is no such 
co.nsensus o.n what co.nstitutes so.cial capital and ho.W it may be measured o.r what 
pro.xies can be used; the search for such a consensus continues (Gro.o.taert & Bastelaer, 
2001). 
Vario.us empirical studies into. so.cial capital have, o.ver the years, co.ntributed to the 
pletho.ra o.f different pro.xy indicato.rs o.f so.cial capital and with them the debate as to 
which pro.xies are mo.st effective and acceptable has raged. Altho.ugh it is important that 
the pro.xy indicato.rs utilised within empirical research are accurate and do in fact 
furnish us with info.rmatio.n pertaining to. the level o.f so.cial capital evident within a 
gro.up, co.mmunity, so.ciety o.r natio.n, it seems a futile exercise to. attempt to. achieve a 
generic list o.f indicato.rs that be applied to. empirical research into. so.cial capital. There 
are a number o.freaso.ns I make this claim. 
First, it is imperative to. ackno.wledge that indicato.rs o.f so.cial capital are pro.xy 
indicato.rs; they pro.vide us with a so.mewhat superficial alternative o.f the pheno.mena we 
are investigating. As Jackman and Miller assert, "trust is clearly not isomorphic with 
group membership" (1998: 62). In stating this Jackman and Miller are no.t negating the 
use o.f trust in understanding so.cial capital, rather they are drawing to. o.ur attentio.n that 
gro.up membership do.es no.t necessarily translate into. trust o.r vice versa. In terms o.f 
ho.W this impacts o.n o.ur understanding and measurement o.f so.cial capital it does no.t 
deno.te that the use o.f pro.xy indicato.rs is ineffective but that it is impo.rtant to. reco.gnise 
the fact that pro.xy indicato.rs pro.vide a tangible substitute fo.r what is a so.cial 
pheno.mena that is exceptio.nally difficult to. quantify. Furthermo.re that due to. this fact 
it is imperative that thro.ugho.ut o.ur empirical research into. so.cial capital we emplo.y 
triangulatio.n techniques wherever Po.ssible. As Putnam emphasises, "No single source 
of data is flawless, but the more numerous and diverse the sources, the less likely that 
they could all be influenced by the same flaw" (2000: 415). 
Seco.nd, the fact that so.cial capital indicato.rs are pro.xy measures is further highlighted 
when we co.nsider the type o.f so.cial capital we are investigating as this will direct the 
indicato.rs we identify. As I have established in sectio.n 3.2 there are vario.US different 
types cf sccial capital and these types will influence the measurement tco.l we seek to. 
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employ. Studies examining horizontal and vertical social capital will differ in their 
indicators according to their focus. Horizontal social capital may use a variety of 
indicators that are dependant on whether bonding or bridging social capital is being 
examined. In order to observe bonding social capital one may look at indicators such as 
levels of community trust; types of and reliance on community support systems; old-age 
dependency ratios; levels of crime; and kinship networks. Alternatively, proxies for 
bridging social capital may include the number and types of associations; membership 
of associations; ethnic homogeneity of membership; community ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation; and social mobility rates. Vertical social capital, the link between state 
and civil society, may be exemplified through trust in government; trade union 
membership; percentage of population facing political or economic discrimination; 
measure of political stability; voter turnout; and strength of democratic institutions?2 
Differences in the indicators chosen will also differ depending on whether 
cognitive/structural or consummatory/instrumental social capital is the focus of the 
research. One may, however, anticipate that cognitive and consummatory indicators 
would be similar to those employed when examining bonding social capital while 
structural and instrumental indicators would be similar to those used for bridging and 
vertical social capital. Although it is evident that the variety of proxy indicators is 
extensive it can be claimed that it is necessary for such a wide variety and it is the 
manifestation of social capital that will dictate those proxy variables utilised (Grootaert 
& Bastelaer, 2001). 
Third, the nature of the research phenomenon itself will influence the choice of proxies 
used. For example, economic research into social capital may include indicators such as 
percentage of household income from remittances, old-age dependency ratios, an index 
of intensity of economic discrimination and indicators of social mobility. A study into 
levels of social capital within education may comprise variables such as parental 
attendance at school meetings, Parent Teacher Association (PTA) membership and 
activity, level of cooperation between teachers and the interaction between school and 
state. The nature of the research phenomenon will direct the indicators employed in 
terms of those most applicable to and representative of social capital in the given area. 
When examining social capital within trading systems it would not be beneficial to 
~2 Various indicators used are taken from Grootaert (1998). See appendix 1. 
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incorporate variables such as homicide rates or illegitimacy rates however these 
variables may be of use in research into inner-city social capital. 
Finally, the indicators chosen for a study, as well as being dependant on the type of 
social capital being examined and the nature of the research phenomenon will be reliant 
on the geographical area. Research into social capital, in its present understanding, 
originated from the United States and as such the proxies used in these studies were of 
relevance to the society in which they were applied. However, the proxies used in the 
U.S. studies may not be applicable in other areas of the world even if the research is 
examining the same type of social capital or the same phenomenon. This is particularly 
true for countries in the developing world where the use of 'Western' proxies of social 
capital may result in quite different, and often inaccurate, research findings. As Krishna 
stresses, "even though the concept of outside an Italian setting23, its empirical referents 
will vary as different cultures manifest social capital differently" (2002: 56). It is 
therefore vital for the effectiveness and accuracy of social capital research to include 
proxies that pertain to the community, society or culture being investigated. 
Although, as I have demonstrated, the generation of a generic list of social capital 
indicators is not conducive to the accurate investigation of social capital, it is important 
that those indicators chosen do conform to standard guidelines in terms of how they are 
chosen. Grootaert has developed a list of properties social capital indicators should 
possess, which clearly calls for careful consideration to be made when generating social 
capital indicators. 
The following is a non-exhaustive list of properties that indicators should possess. 
Indicators must: 
• Be developed within an agreed conceptual and operational framework 
• Be clearly defined and easy to understand 
• Be subject to aggregation (from household to community, from community to 
nation) 
• Be objective (be independent from the data collector) 
• Have reasonable data requirements - either available data or data that can be 
collected at limited cost within the capacity of the country's statistical apparatus 
• Have "ownership" by users 
• Be limited in number 
• Reflect input, process, or outcome (or, as used in the environment literature, 
pressure, state, response). 
Box 1 - Desirable Properties of Social Capital Indicators: Grootaert, 1998: 1 0 
23 This is a reference to the fact that Putnam's original study into social capital in 1993 was an 
examination into civic traditions in Italy. 
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The measurement of social capital in the conflict context is clearly one such example of 
where careful consideration should be taken. Although the concept of social capital has 
been applied to the context of conflict much research has dealt with this subject in a 
superficial way only making reference to the fact conflict has an impact on social capital 
and vice versa with no real attempt to examine the dynamics between social capital and 
conflict. Arguably the most comprehensive research into social capital in the conflict 
context is the World Bank publication 'Violent Conflict and the Transformation of 
Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia' written by 
Colletta and Cullen (2000). As the title suggests, this study centres on the dynamic 
between conflict and social capital in four different conflict-affected countries. In each 
of these countries a different portfolio of social capital proxies are employed. These 
indicators are largely dependant of the definition of social capital used. 
In the Cambodia study the type of social capital examined was horizontal and vertical 
social capital along with structural and cognitive. The following five proxies were used 
to identify the level of existent social capital: community events, informal networks, 
associations, village leadership and links with external agencies. Within each of these 
five proxies certain variables were thought to best exemplify the proxy. Community 
events included those that increased feelings of solidarity, improved communication and 
promoted civic-mindedness and altruistic behaviour, among others. Informal networks 
examined informal exchanges of information and resource exchanges as well as what 
shapes these exchanges. When looking at associations the researchers looked at the 
structures, roles, and rules within associations and the ways in which they nurture self-
help, mutual help, solidarity and cooperation. Examinations into village leadership 
centred on looking at types of leadership and how leaders played key roles in political, 
social, religious and welfare activities and how they shaped networks within, and 
between communities. Finally, the external links investigated were external community 
links between the community and government, NGOs and the private sector (Colletta & 
Cullen, 2000). 
The proxies used in the Rwandan study were specifically related to the issue of trust and 
social cohesion. They included: 
• Channels and mechanisms for exchange of information 
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• 
• 
• 
Existence and nature of associations and the reason for their creation (whether 
based on shared interests or on prescribed commonality, such as familial 
relations) intermarriage and extended family relations 
Intercommunity relations and mechanisms for conflict resolution 
Functioning of infrastructure, types, nature, and organisation of exchange and 
interdependence 
• Nature and organisation of assistance, mutual aid, and cooperation (including 
sharing of basic necessities such as water, firewood and salt) 
• Social protection and welfare 
• Collective responsibility 
(Colletta & Cullen, 2000: 35) 
The analysis of social capital in Guatemala and Somalia was conducted by an Italian 
organisation called CERFE who established a single framework and methodology for 
both countries. Within these studies the aspect of social capital focused on was civil 
society's protective provision of basic survival needs and the creation of conditions for 
sustainable economic growth and development. For the study this was essentially 
divided into social responsibility and social initiative. Social responsibility was 
characterised by civil society's ability to provide "social protection or welfare in the 
face of threats such as health crises, illiteracy, unemployment, lack of access to higher 
education, geographic isolation and conflict". Social initiative was viewed as "civil 
society's engagement in efforts towards economic growth and developmenf' (Colletta & 
Cullen, 2000: 53/54). 
As is evident from the four countries in this one study the potential range of social 
capital proxies in the conflict context are numerous. In order to obtain the most 
accurate data it is important to select the variables that will best enable this. Thus in 
order to achieve this, following the approach laid out by Grootaert (1998) as seen in 
Box 1 would seem advisable. As with any study into social capital research into social 
capital in the conflict context requires a careful consideration of the possibilities. By 
following the method advocated by Grootaert it appears more likely that one will arrive 
at the variables most conducive to the effective study of social capital within a given 
context. 
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Throughout this section it has become apparent that social capital is indeed a complex 
concept but one of significant importance to a more elaborate understanding of so many 
spheres of social life; this is particularly applicable to understanding the dynamics of 
contlict. Although the concept is in its relative infancy it nevertheless offers enormous 
potential for academic endeavour. In the area of post-contlict reconstruction social 
capital has the capability to enable a far more comprehensive understanding of conflict 
and the process of reconstruction. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Despite being a relatively young concept social capital contributes an extremely 
important way of looking at violent conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. When we 
examine in detail the definitions of social capital and apply them within a contlict 
analysis it enables a richer understanding of how violent contlict can occur and its 
affect on social cohesion. The result of this is twofold: first, by enhancing our 
understanding of how violent contlict can occur we are more able to develop conflict 
prevention strategies and mechanisms that can not only diminish the likelihood of 
contlict advancing to violent conflict, but also utilise available networks and 
associations that promote social cohesion. Second, when we develop our understanding 
of the effect of violent contlict on social cohesion we are better able to design and 
implement post-contlict reconstruction endeavours that result in more meaningful 
impacts for those affected by the contlict. 
Although the concept of social capital was developed in the West it is evident that it 
holds applicability in the developing world. Indeed, should appropriate measurements 
of social capital in these contexts be developed, the concept of social capital could in 
fact explain society in these contexts better than in the Western context due to the 
communitarian nature of many of these environments. The importance then of a robust 
, consideration of the various methods that can be utilised for the measurement of social 
capital cannot be underestimated, for it is through such a consideration that we develop 
our ability to improve our knowledge of social capital. 
Throughout this discussion of social capital, and its application as a concept through 
which violent conflict can be better understood, implicit linkages have been made to the 
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reintegration of ex-combatants, in particular social reintegration. The notion of trust 
represents a central theme to both social reintegration and social capital, along with 
communication, cooperation and coordination, and it is through observing these themes 
from the differing perspectives of ex-combatant reintegration and social capital that we 
can develop our understanding of them in isolation and the way in which they may 
combine to contribute to the reconciliation and peacebuilding processes. The next 
chapter introduces the methodology employed within this research, beginning with the 
development of a theoretical framework which articulates the interaction between the 
three concepts that form the basis of this thesis, that of reconciliation, DDR and social 
capital. 
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Chapter Four: 
Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the methodological design, research strategy and implementation 
of this field study. It is divided into two main parts, the first being the theoretical 
framework and the second being the methodological component of the study. The 
theoretical framework draws together my understanding of the three main concepts and 
theories within this research - reconciliation, DDR and social capital- with the purpose 
of developing an analysis of the way in which these three concepts may interact and 
thus providing a testable theory. This main section concludes with the research 
question that this study attempts to answer. 
Moving into the methodological component of the chapter we begin with a 
methodological overview, outlining the main points of the methodology. Next comes a 
discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the research which in important in 
understanding certain methodological choices and identification of potential constraints 
and biases. The main part of this section is the qualitative research methods section, 
which justifies the choice of Rwanda as a case country and explains the reasons for the 
choice of sites within Rwanda. It then covers issues of the particular research 
techniques employed, sampling, and data collection and analysis. Within this part, 
justification is given for the use of particular methods and the benefits derived from 
these methods. The final section covers methodological issues and constraints and 
discusses the research context and problems associated with that, ethical considerations 
made and research biases, concluding with the identification of two techniques used to 
mitigate such constraints, namely reflexivity and triangulation. 
Overall the chapter examines the technical aspects associated with the way in which this 
research was conducted providing justifications for particular decisions made and 
documenting the challenges encountered. 
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4.2 Theoretical Framework 
This section provides a theoretical framework to guide this study. It is informed by a 
detailed examination of the relevant literature and includes my own analysis of how the 
three concepts of reconciliation, social reintegration and social capital interact with, and 
influence, each other in the sphere of post-conflict reconstruction. 
As identified by numerous authors, the interaction between violent conflict and social 
capital is highly complex and somewhat ambiguous. This research proposes that there 
exists a dynamic, dichotomous relationship between the two. Firstly, social capital can 
contribute to the outbreak and intensification of violent conflict. Secondly, violent 
conflict transforms social capital. It is this relationship that makes social capital such an 
important concept when examining the PCE and this is particularly true for the 
reintegration of ex-combatants. 
Social capital can contribute to the outbreak and intensification of violent conflict in 
three main forms: strong bonding social capital, weak/non-existent bridging social 
capital and weak/non-existent or discriminatory vertical social capital. Strong bonding 
social capital, in particular, excessively strong, within groups can contribute to the 
outbreak and intensification of violent conflict as the strong interpersonal ties that exist 
within groups can be of an exclusionary nature. Indeed, these ties that bond are inward 
looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities thus homogenising the ~oup; each 
member of the group has a strong bond with other members of the group and this bond, 
and the identity it represents, serves to set apart the members of one group from another. 
When these bonds are excessively strong there is a potential for intolerance towards 
other groups in society. The inward looking nature of these ties and networks provides 
a highly efficient social safety net that enables all those within the network to 'get by'. 
However, when these ties and networks are particularly strong and inward looking there 
is the possibility that an 'us and them' attitude may develop and exacerbate the 
inevitable dormant benign social cleavages between social groups. 
If we imagine the society in which we live, a significant characteristic of that society is 
difference; I am different to you and you are different to me. It is natural for me to form 
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bonds with people who are similar to me, for example, those who like the same football 
team or enjoy the same genre of music, and for you to fonn bonds with people similar 
to you24 • However, when such difference becomes significant, and is based around 
important identity distinguishers, and the strength of the bonds between 'us' and 'you' 
become excessive such differences are emphasised and amplified. If an antagonistic 
relationship between 'us' and 'you' develops, the strong bonds that exist within each 
groups reinforces the prospect of intolerance between 'us' and 'you'. This provides the 
foundation for the outbreak of violent conflict. 
However, even in an environment in which strong bonding social capital exists, the 
likelihood of an outbreak of violent conflict is highly dependant on the nature of 
bridging social capital within the environment. If bridging social capital is evident and 
relatively strong the prospects for strong bonding social capital to result in the outbreak 
of violent conflict is likely to diminish. This is because the potential for an 'us and 
them' attitude to develop is subdued. Bridging social capital represents the bridges 
between networks, associations and communities and, as such, unites society. Such ties 
are outward looking and provide a link between diverse groups and across social 
cleavages. Although the bridging ties are relatively weaker than bonding ties, they are 
vital for social cohesion within society; they enable societies to 'get along'. If bridging 
social capital is evident and of enough strength, the menace of strong bonding social is, 
to some extent, offset. However, if bridging social capital is too weak or non-existent 
there is no mechanism to offset the threat of overly strong bonding social capital. If the 
crosscutting ties between groups and communities are ineffective or nonexistent this can 
serve to magnify the strength of bonding social capital through limited interactions 
between groups as well as reducing the opportunity for societal conflict. resolution 
mechanisms to evolve. Bridging social capital is instrumental, indeed essential, for the 
management of tensions that arise between communities if these communities are to be 
an active part of the same society. If such social capital is non-existent, in parallel with 
overly strong bonding social capital between antagonistic groups, the proclivity for 
violent conflict is increased. 
Vertical social capital evident between leaders and government institutions and the 
community (synergy), also plays a part in the outbreak and intensification of violent 
24 This explanation is written in the first person to emphasise the personal nature of how the creation and 
strengthening of group identity can lead to conflict. 
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conflict. When vertical social capital is apparent and equal this can enable the fostering 
and development of social capital within society. However, the absence of vertical 
social capital can provide the opportunity for the manipulation of social capital resulting 
in negative consequences for society. Civil society may not be granted the space in 
which it needs to operate and both bonding and bridging social capital may be distorted 
for private gain. Indeed, policies of discrimination toward one group while favouring 
another may lead to the strengthening of bonding social capital within the two groups, 
as social capital in the discriminated group strengthens in order to cope with such 
discrimination and provide a safety net to members of the group, while social capital in 
the favoured group strengthens to protect their advantage. In tandem with this, bridging 
social capital between the two groups diminishes as a result of such discrimination. 
Thus bonding social capital is strengthened, bridging social capital is weakened and 
vertical social capital is strengthened between the state and the favoured group and 
weakened between the state and the discriminated group. In the event of government 
propaganda bonding social capital is further strengthened, bridging social capital is 
weakened and vertical social capital between the state and the affected group or 
community is reduced. Thus social capital, in the three forms identified, has the 
potential to contribute to the outbreak and intensification of conflict. 
Social capital, as well as contributing to the outbreak of violent conflict, undergoes a 
transformation throughout the process of violent conflict in three main ways: bonding 
social capital within groups is either strengthened or weakened, bridging social capital 
between groups is weakened, and vertical social capital (synergy) is either weakened 
between the state and civil society or strengthened between the state and particular 
groups within civil society. Violent conflict can strengthen bonding social capital 
within particular groups involved in violent conflict, in particular, rebel groups, militias 
and the military. This is due to the fact members of these groups have a common aim 
that unites them and reinforces their identity; emphasising the 'us and them' attitude. In 
an environment of violent conflict the inward looking ties that bind are strengthened in 
order to provide the cohesion, discipline and security necessary for success. 
Bonding social capital may also strengthen among the civilian groups supporting rebel 
forces due to the need to 'pull together' and provide a group safety net for its members. 
It may be the case that civilian communities are relatively unaffected by the conflict 
either due to proximity or to protection from the rebel forces, and thus may be able to 
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go about their lives comparatively normally with bonding social capital maybe 
strengthening but not transforming radically. In a case in which the civilian population 
is affected by the conflict one may expect people to pull together and look after each 
other and indeed, this does occur in some instances. However, in an environment 
defined by uncertainty and insecurity, bonding social capital is generally weakened 
within civilian communities as such an environment is not conducive to the 
e~tablishI1lent or existence of trust. Although there is the need to provide for family 
members and members of close group members this is a particularly difficult task in a 
conflict environment and the uncertainty and insecurity of such an environment leads to 
the breakdown of bonding social capital. A further factor that weakens bonding social 
capital, particularly within civilian groups is that violent conflict increasingly results in 
civilian deaths thus leaving large numbers of orphans who trust no one or families with 
a large number of dependants which adds to the pressures faced by those who survived. 
This contributes to the decimation of social networks within society as such orphans are 
left vulnerable. The reSUlting impact on bonding social capital therefore, is to 
strengthen bonding social capital within conflicting groups and either weaken, 
strengthen or not affect bonding social capital within civilian groups, depending on their 
proximity to the conflict and the effects of the conflict on them. 
The main effect of violent conflict on social capital is on bridging social capital, which, 
except in isolated, individual cases, is inevitably drastically weakened if not destroyed 
all together. The level of the damage to bridging social capital will have serious 
implications for the ability for communities to reconcile in a peE. At the outbreak of 
violent conflict, bridging social capital has already undergone a weakening process, as it 
is this weakening that ultimately permits the outbreak of violent conflict. During the 
course of the conflict bridging social capital is further weakened for several reasons: 
first, the strengthening of bonding social capital within conflicting factions serves to 
deepen social cleavages existing between these groups and their supporters due to a 
reinforcing of the 'us and them' attitude. Second, in the cases where bonding social 
capital is weakened one may assume this will provide the capacity for bridging social 
capital to develop; however this is generally not the case. When bonding social capital 
is weakened during the course of violent conflict previously affiliated groups fragment 
and disperse, undergoing a reductionist process that results in isolated units of family 
members and only the most trusted of contacts. In this sense bridging social capital 
transforms to a micro scale with isolated family units being linked by these contacts. 
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This is due to the dearth of trust in a contlict environment; trust is no more prevalent 
within groups and is either almost non-existent or completely absent between groups. 
Third, when government policy has been oppressive or discriminatory, the ability to 
maintain or forge bridges between groups has been impeded. When such practices 
result in, and are maintained in, violent contlict it becomes almost impossible to 
maintain any existing linkages or forge new ones. Generally, if discriminatory policies 
have been practiced prior to a violent contlict, thus contributing to the contlict, they will 
at least be maintained during the contlict, if not intensified. This leads to the further 
weakening of bridging social capital and can, in some instances, damage these bridges 
to such an extent that reconciliation is made highly difficult and unlikely, if not 
impossible. 
The final way in which violent contlict transforms social capital is through vertical 
social capital. Where vertical social capital is weak, non-existent or discriminatory 
prior to the outbreak of violent contlict, it will generally be the case that such a pattern 
continues, though at a more intense level. It is often the case that the nature of civil 
contlict pits the state army against a rebel forces. In these instances vertical social 
capital between the state and the rebel group, and its civilian supporters, breaks down; 
although it may strengthen between the state and rebel militias who support the state. 
This is particularly the case when state-sponsored violence is apparent, as vertical social 
capital is weakened between the state and the group persecuted by the state, and 
strengthened between the state and the group conducting the violence. The weakening 
of vertical social capital can have deep running implications for the successful 
resolution of the contlict, as trust between the state and rebel factions is not a common 
resource in the negotiation process. At the conclusion of violent contlict it can be 
extremely problematic to engage in post-contlict reconstruction practices as the ability 
for the state and civil society to communicate, cooperate and coordinate is diminished 
through the weakening of vertical social capital. However, the dynamic of vertical 
social capital may change at the cessation of hostilities if the state which had previously 
engaged in discriminatory practices is replaced by the political wing of a rebel force, or 
other entity, if it is in receipt of popular support. Strengthening vertical social capital, 
as much as strengthening bridging social capital and offsetting overly strong bonding 
social capital is essential in the post-conflict reconstruction period if society is to 
recover and reconcile. 
100 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of Y oric, 2008 
The diagram below demonstrates the potential transformative relationship between the 
various types of social capital and conflict indicating how, through the outbreak and 
intensification of violent conflict, social capital transforms, thus making conflict 
management and peacebuilding particularly problematic in the PCE. 
Plwe 1 Plwe2 Phase 3 
• Gzoup A 1I :or Gzoup B 
Figure 6 - Transformative Social Capital and Conflict: Author 
As we can see, in phase one groups A and B share relatively strong bridging social 
capital between each other and vertical social capital between government and bonding 
social capital, represented by the thickness of the colouring, is not too strong. 
When a form of social change occurs that results in the government privileging Group 
A over Group B and the society as a whole does not have the necessary capacity with 
which to manage it, we move toward phase two and conflict intensifies. As a 
consequence, vertical social capital between government and Group A strengthens 
(represented by a thicker connecting line and a closer distance) while vertical social 
capital between government and Group B weakens (thinner connecting line and farther 
di ce). uently bondi g social capital in both groups gets stronger (the 
up protect i position of privilege and Group B 
Bridging ial capital n 
rd· ) 
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the emergence of an 'us and them' mentality intensifies contlict more. Consequently, 
intolerance between the two groups develops further as Group A's bonding social 
capital strengthens further still and Group B' s bonding social capital strengthens but in 
a loose form, based around only the most trust of members (represented by the thicker 
colouring and the fragmentary lines). By this point trust between Groups A and B has 
weakened considerably, if not broken completely (thinner, fragmented linkage line) 
while vertical social capital between the government and Group A increases strength 
and between Group B reduces significantly. Conflict intensifies more and more as we 
move into phase three. 
DDR programmes have a potentially critical role to play in the restoration of social 
capital in a PCE. Disarmament and demobilisation play an important function in 
confidence-building through demonstrating a commitment to the resolution of the 
contlict and the creation of peace. When effective they can contribute to the putting in 
place of the foundations of trust without which it would be exceptionally difficult to 
move forward in the attempt to restore social capital. This, however, is not guaranteed 
and much will depend on the aims and design of the programme. The main value D & 
D have in building the foundations of trust is that they provide the necessary tangible 
commitment to peace; if combatants were not willing, and seen to be willing, to lay 
down their arms, how could other combatant factions, civilians or the state trust in their 
commitment to the peace process? While D & D can be seen as necessary for the 
restoration of social capital they are not sufficient; reintegration too plays a .significant 
role. 
The economic reintegration of ex-combatants is particularly important as it provides a 
basis from which social networks can be re-established. Social capital is often 
examined through the lens of economics and it is. apparent that economic interaction of 
a repeated nature enables the creation and strengthening of social capital through the 
generation and maintenance of a reciprocal relationship based on trust. Economic 
reintegration enables weak bridging social capital to strengthen through the ensuing 
networks and linkages that are established, as well as by reinforcing vertical social 
capital through the communication, cooperation, coordination and commitment 
expressed between the state and civil society. It therefore follows that the economic 
reintegration of ex-combatants is crucial to the restoration of social capital. Similarly, 
political reintegration is also important to the restoration of social capital as the 
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inclusion of ex-combatants in political processes enables synergy between the state and 
civil society to be augmented. Indeed, it is invariably the case that in order to achieve a 
sustainable peace process it is necessary to include members of the competing factions 
hierarchy into the newly formed government after a conflict. Increasingly we are 
witness to the involvement of former combatants in all levels of the State from being 
local level leaders to Prime Ministers and Presidents. Political reintegration can often 
be seen as necessary to the peace process through, in a perhaps superficial form, its 
pacificatory nature. It can also aid the transition from conflict to peace if all conflicting 
parties are committed to a power-sharing agreement in which each faction has a role to 
play in the social, political and economic reconstruction effort. 
The social reintegration of ex-combatants is, however the most crucial element of 
reintegration to the restoration of social capital. The effective social reintegration of ex-
combatants can restore and strengthen bridging social capital between previously 
conflicting groups or factions. Returning or resettling ex-combatants represent one 
groul? of a complex organism that constitutes a peE. Into this environment, coalesce 
ex-combatants from previously conflicting factions, refugees traumatised by conflicts in 
neighbouring countries with perhaps alien requests and demands, IDPs traumatised by 
the conflict and forced to leave their homes relocating to other areas in the country, and 
those who remained throughout the conflict and faced the destruction of their 
community. Social reintegration enables the (re)establishing of networks and linkages 
between these groups that is essential for bridging social capital. When ex-combatants 
can claim to have successfully socially reintegrated they have been accepted into the 
society and this entails the acceptance of all groups, thereby ensuring linkages have 
been forged, at least in a loose form. 
Effective social reintegration can also restore, strengthen and balance vertical social 
capital between the state and all groups within civil society. When groups in 
communities and societies are effectively socially reintegrated and cooperate together 
they create a space in which civil society can operate. Through creating this space they 
demonstrate a commitment to civil society and can build the foundations for the 
restoration and strengthening of vertical social capital between the state and civil 
society. Where vertical social capital has previously been strong between the state and 
certain groups within civil society and weak between the state and o~ers, social 
reintegration can serve to balance and equalise synergy between the state and all groups 
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in civil society. This occurs primarily due to the strengthening of bridging social capital 
due to the linkages between groups and the subsequent strengthening of civil society. 
The restoration and strengthening of bridging social capital between previously 
conflicting groups or factions and vertical social capital between the state and all groups 
within civil society offsets very strong bonding social capital within groups with 
previously antagonistic relations with other groups. When bridging social capital is 
relatively strong it can suppress the effects of overly strong bonding social capital by 
reducing the propensity for an 'us and them' attitude to develop or be maintained. 
Equally, balanced synergy between the state and all groups within civil society 
promotes equalised relations between groups as neither are advantaged or 
disadvantaged by the state, or at least not to the degree that may result in violent 
conflict. Although this may not directly affect bonding social capital, by having equal 
vertical social capital between the state and all groups in civil society, bridging social 
capital can be developed between groups, resulting in the benefits previously explained. 
Thus the beneficial effects of social reintegration on bridging and vertical social capital 
also have positive knock-on effects for bonding social capital. It can be claimed 
therefore, that social reintegration can transform social capital in a positive manner in a 
PCE. 
The effective social reintegration of ex-combatants, and the subsequent positive 
transformations in social capital, has beneficial implications for the reconciliation 
process. The social reintegration of ex-combatants and the transformations in social 
capital that ensue from such a process promote an environment conducive to the 
facilitation of the reconciliation process. Social reintegration and social capital 
restoration imply the creation and fostering of trust in some degree. If trust can be 
established and expanded in a PCE it builds strong foundations for a reconciliation 
process. Although this may occur at a micro scale, if social reintegration is effective 
countrywide this also implies that the development of trust, albeit within small 
communities, is also occurring countrywide. The key to a successful reconciliation 
process is linking these micro successes to generate trust throughout the country at a 
more macro level. This may be partially facilitated through the restoration and 
balancing of vertical social capital, which again is a product of the successful social 
reintegration of ex-combatants. Implicit within social reintegration and social capital 
are the ideas of communication, cooperation, coordination and commitment. If these 
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are forthcoming, the environment they produce is one in which the foundations of 
reconciliation can be established. 
A further implication the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants has for the 
reconciliation process is that it facilitates the development of the relevant skills, 
capabilities and commitment necessary for the reconciliation process. Successful social 
reintegration requires a great deal of commitment on behalf of all groups in the society 
and such a commitment will follow through into the reconciliation process. 
Additionally, the skills and capabilities ex-combatants and community members acquire 
throughout the reintegration process - for example, negotiation skills, the development 
of tools to aid forgiveness and healing and skills of cooperation - are skills that will be 
necessary for successful reconciliation. In light of this it can be strongly argued that the 
social reintegration of ex-combatants constitutes an essential element of reconciliation, 
at least at the micro or grass roots level. 
Whilst the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants and the positive 
transformation of social capital that arises from such reintegration have positive 
implications for the reconciliation process, this is a reciprocal relationship. A positive 
reconciliation process also reinforces both the effective social reintegration of ex-
combatants and the beneficial transformation of social capital. As the pervasiveness of 
trust increases within society throughout the reconciliation process this in turn feeds 
back into the effectiveness of social reintegration and the strengthening of social capital. 
This is the case as social reintegration can be seen as an element of reconciliation and, 
as social r~integration serves to strengthen social capital the same can be said of 
reconciliation. In this way we can see the interlinking nature between social 
reintegration, social capital and reconciliation that is so crucial to the peacebuilding 
process. The diagram below attempts to capture the discussion regarding the way in 
which DDR may impact on social capital and reconciliation, and the reciprocal nature 
of that relationship. 
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Figure 7 - DDR and its Impacts on Social Capital and Reconciliation: Author 
Having delineated the theoretical framework that guides this thesis it now seems 
appropriate to include the main research question that will lead the remainder of this 
study, which is as follows: 
In what ways can the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants promote 
enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment, and what are the 
implications of such a promotion for reconciliation? 
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4.3 Methodological Overview 
This research was conducted using a combination of qualitative research methods 
including ethnographic methods, life histories and elite interviews in order to best 
determine the ways in which the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants may 
promote enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment and to identify 
the implications of such a promotion for reconciliation. The fieldwork research took 
place over two phases, the first being a period of three months in Rwanda during which 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with policy designers and implementers 
concerned with the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP), 
government officials and life history analysis of a sample of ex-combatants and 
civilians based in Kigali. The life history analysis involved life history interviews of 
approximately 45-120 minutes in order for the process to yield the most beneficial 
results. The data was transcribed then coded and analysed, allowing me to identify the 
areas most important to the reintegration process and restoration of social capital. 
During the first phase I also identified a number of potential sites for the ethnographical 
study in the second phase of fieldwork. 
The second phase involved a three-month period again in Rwanda. For the first period 
of this phase, approximately two weeks, I addressed issues arising from the first phase 
of the research and put in place logistical arrangements pertinent to the ethnographical 
study. The second period of this phase, approximately two months, included four 
ethnographical studies of approximately one week in each of the chosen sites. The final 
period of around two weeks enabled me to finalise and conclude my fieldwork research 
and tie up any loose ends. 
4.4 Theoretical Underpinnings 
This sub-section is concerned with the theoretical underpinnings of this research. It is 
particularly important to examine these prior to designing a research methodology as 
such underpinnings influence not only the way in which one locates a researchable topic 
but also the research methods chosen. As Archer states, "the practical analyst of 
society needs to know not only what social reality is, but also how to begin to explain it, 
before addressing the particular problem under investigation" (Archer, 1995: 5). To 
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this end I shall discuss my ontological and epistemological positions that influence this 
research, along with other considerations that need to be made. 
Ontological questions address the nature of 'being' or 'existence', and essentially 
surround the issue of whether or not there exists a 'real' world 'out there' that is 
independent of our knowledge of it (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Fundamentally, this 
question involves the issue of whether it is possible to consider social entities as 
objective entities that have a reality external to social actors, or whether such social 
entities can be considered social constructions created from the perceptions and actions 
of social actors (Bryman, 2001). The two main ontological positions that are debated 
are those of objectivism and constructionism (or constructivism). Objectivism asserts 
"social phenomena and their meaning have an existence that is independent of social 
actors. It implies that social phenomena and the categories we use in everyday 
discourse have an existence that is independent or separate from actors" while 
constructionism asserts, "social phenomena and their meanings are continually being 
accomplished by social actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not 
only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of 
revision" (Bryman, 2001: 17/18). 
The ontological position I maintain within this research is that of a constructionist 
position. This is because I believe that the social world and its meaning are not 
independent of social actors and in fact gain such meaning from the interpretations and 
interactions of social actors. Contlict, from the way in which it is created, waged and 
resolved, is implicitly constructed through interactions, language and understanding that 
are continually being established and revised; it does not exist independently or separate 
to actors. As Potter states, "the world ... is constituted in one way or another as people 
talk it, write it and argue it" (1996: 68). Not only is contlict itself a social construct but 
so too is the way in which it interacts with other social phenomena such as social capital. 
It is evident that social capital is a social construct as it is recognised to be certain 
features of social organisation such as networks, norms and trust. The interaction 
between contlict and social capital cannot therefore be independent from social actors, 
as it is social actors that provide meaning and understanding to these concepts. 
Reintegration and reconciliation are also both socially constructed in that they are both 
particular to given cultures and times. What is conceived of as reintegration or 
reconciliation in one culture may differ radically in another. Similarly, such meanings 
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may change over time. This ontological position may also be tenned as anti-
foundationalist. 
An epistemology is a theory of knowledge and as such examines what we can know 
about the world and how we can know it. As with ontological positions, there appear to 
be two main positions in the epistemological debate, those of positivists and 
constructivists. Positivists advocate the use of scientific research methods in the 
researching of social reality whereas constructivists recognise the difference between 
people and the. objects of natural science and therefore utilise methods that enable the 
understanding of subjective meaning of social action. Essentially, positivists "seek a 
convergence, if not consensus, among investigators on observations made and' 
interpretations offered' while "based on the assumption that the world is understood 
through actors' perceptions, constructivists prefer to rely on reflections, perceptions, 
and stated beliefs of the actors themselves. By attempting to capture the relatively 
unique experiences of actors, constructivists attempt to illuminate the context of 
experience or the idea of 'multiple realities '" (Druckman, 2005: 5/6). The 
constructivist epistemological position is also known as interpretivism. 
The ontological position maintained in this research will influence, although not 
determine, the epistemological position taken. As my ontological position is 
constructionist or anti-foundationalist it then follows that the epistemological position I 
take is that of constructivist or interpretivist. This is the case because an irlterpretivist 
position enables the understanding of human behaviour. If it is the case that conflict is a 
socially constructed phenomenon then in order to be able to as fully as possible 
understand it, it is necessary to engage the reflections and perceptions of those who 
have constructed this phenomenon. Moreover, an interpretivist epistemological position 
is taken in this research because I also hold to the belief that "no observer can be 
'objective' because they live in the social world and are affected by the social 
constructions of 'reality '" (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 19). This is a significantly 
important line of reasoning as the implications this may have for research are crucial. 
The way in which such a lack of objectivity affects research is through the double 
hermeneutic in which the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and 
their interpretations are interpreted by the observer (second hermeneutic level). 
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A further consideration to take when reflecting on the theoretical underpinnings of this 
research is debate about comparative research. An emic approach sees conflict as a 
unique event, which must be understood in its own context and thus case studies are 
imperative in which the subjective probes of actors are essential in determining 
intentions. In an etic approach it is the type of conflict - sources, dynamics and 
influences - that are of interest and as such research is usually of a comparative nature 
(Druckman, 2005). This research does not hold a specific position in terms of an ernie 
or etic approach, instead utilising aspects of each. While this research may be directed 
more by the emic tradition it is nevertheless important to note the role of the etic. As 
this research utilises qualitative research methods within the case country of Rwanda 
one make may the claim this follows the emic approach to research. However, it is also 
making a comparison between four sites and therefore holds some etic principles. 
Additionally, this study looks at the broader societal consequences of conflict in terms 
of social capital and reconciliation and as such follows etic tradition. This is, however a 
strength of the research rather than a weakness. As Seligman notes, "in a way emic and 
etic approaches also entail differences in the scope and locus of data and the kind of 
lens one is using - fish eye, telephoto, single lens reflex, the use of satellite or videotape. 
Are the data longitudinal or do they form a constellation of a single movement? Close-
up or overarching?" (2005: 249). The dual activities of interpretation and translation 
allow for the bridging between the emic and etic, thus enabling the presentation of 
research that methodologically rigorous and understandable to others. 
The theoretical underpinnings of this research thus lie in the constructivist ontological 
. . 
position and th~ interpretivist epistemological position utilising both emic and etic 
approaches to research. This will have important implications for the choice of research 
methods and this shall be discussed now. 
4.5 Qualitative Research Methods 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to detail the practical conducting of this 
research. It first begins with a justification of choice of case country, which is 
important as several parameters for this choice are identified and alternative case 
countries considered. Site selection for the research is covered also. The section then 
moves on to examine the research methods utilised in this study and justifies the choices 
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made. Questions of sampling are then addressed and finally the section considers data 
collection and analysis approaches involved. These issues are important and require 
due consideration as they will ultimately determine the robustness of this research. 
4.5.1 Why Rwanda? A Justification of Case Study Country 
This research is concerned with genocide as it is possible to strongly argue the case that 
the social fabric of a society that has experienced genocide is damaged to a far greater 
extent than other forms of violent civil conflict, unless that genocide is entirely 
successful. Therefore, the challenge faced by such societies in the post-conflict 
reconstruction effort after a genocide is more complex and, as such, appropriate 
measures need to be put in place. Genocide is defined as "any of the following acts 
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious groups, as such: (a) Killing members of the group: (b) Causing serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group" (Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948: Article II). Genocide differs to ethnic 
cleansing through intent. The intention in genocide is to exterminate the ethnic, racial 
or religious group that has been targeted however ethnic cleansing is primarily 
concerned with the removal of a group from a particular area. In that sense, as Petrovic 
claims, "ethnic cleansing is a well-defined policy of a particular group of persons to 
systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, 
ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and is very often connected 
with military operations. It is to be achieved by all possible means, from discrimination 
to extermination, and entails violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law" (1994: 11). Although there are similarities between the two, and indeed a policy 
of ethnic cleansing may include what could be classified as genocidal activities, it is the 
difference in intention that influences the focus of this research. It is not the aim of this 
research to argue that ethnic cleansing or other forms of civil conflict do not have 
enormous negative repercussions for the society involved. However, it is the view of 
this author that the damage to society through genocide is greater and more complex 
and therefore, more challenging to repair if, indeed, that is a possible outcome. This 
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research will examine the effects of genocidal conflict on social capital within a society 
and the potential for reconciliation. 
When considering suitable case studies for this research several factors need to be taken 
into account. Firstly, as mentioned above, it is a requirement of this research that it 
examines a conflict of a genocidal nature. Secondly, it is necessary that a sufficient 
period of time has elapsed between the end of the genocide and the time of this research 
so as to ensure it is possible to identify and examine any changes in social capital during 
that period and to assess the reconciliation process over that time. It would therefore 
make sense to consider genocides that took place within the last 20 years. Thirdly, it is 
necessary that a DDR programme was put in place after the conflict. It is therefore 
highly likely that the genocide would be a result of a civil conflict in which military, 
paramilitary and rebel forces were active. 
When considering conflicts that fall into the time frame identified in this research, and 
those which have utilised a DDR programme only East Timor, Rwanda, Bosnia and 
Kosovo could be considered. Arguably, however, both East Timor and Kosovo were 
examples of ethnic cleansing and therefore cannot be considered. Bosnia too was an 
example of ethnic cleansing although it could be argued that it experienced genocidal 
activity, for example, the approximately 8,000 Bosniak men and boys slaughtered in 
Srebrenica. 
Rwanda presents itself as an ideal case study in which it is possible to examine all the 
concepts relevant to this research. The conflict in Rwanda culminated in 1994 with a 
genocide which left an estimated 800,000 dead, 130,000 detainees in the national prison 
system, 2,000,000 Rwandan refugees, 700,000 returning Rwandan expatriates and 
650,000 alleged participants in the genocide (Marks, 2001). As a consequence of such 
devastation, the social fabric of Rwandan society was decimated; social capital was all 
but destroyed and reconciliation seemed impossible25• The nature of the conflict and 
genocide in Rwanda affected all the major forms of social capital: bonding, bridging 
and vertical, which have had subsequent effects on the reconciliation process. This, in 
conjunction with the amount of time that has past since 1994, makes it the only 
genocidal case that would be suitable. The amount of time that has past is an important 
factor to take into account as the three concepts of social reintegration; social capital 
25 This will be discussed in detail in the following case study chapter. 
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and reconciliation all take time to re-establish. Therefore, it is necessary to take this 
into consideration when deciding on the case study . Rwanda has also undergone two 
DDR programmes since 1997 with the first phase designed and implemented by UNDP 
between 1997 and 2001 and the second phase from 2001 to 2008, which was designed 
by the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) and Rwanda 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and implemented by the RDRC. 
The process has been ongoing until recently due to the return of Hutu militias from the 
DRC who were involved in the conflict or recruited after the conflict to engage in 
ongoing paramilitary activity since 1994. 
Rwanda also holds a personal interest for me in that the news coverage of the genocide 
was a major catalyst for my interest in world politics and international relations. I was 
in my mid-teens at the time and the reporting of the genocide was one of the first 
significant events that held my interest in politics, so much so that it led to my working 
as a volunteer tutor for asylum seekers and refugees from conflict zones in my years as 
an undergraduate student. I then went on to study a masters degree in International 
Development with a focus on Africa and conflict and this has progressed !n my PhD 
study. Throughout my studies my interest in African society and politics has increased 
and been heavily influenced by the fact I have many African friends. It therefore seems 
logical to conduct this research in Rwanda as I have a personal interest in the country 
and region and Rwanda meets the needs of this research. 
4.5.2 Site Selection 
A total of five sites were selected from which to collect data for this research. The first 
site was that of the capital city, Kigali. It was necessary to conduct some of the research 
in Kigali due to the fact that the RDRC and MDRP, as well as other organisations that 
fell into category three of the sample (officials), are situated in Kigali. Whilst based in 
Kigali I also conducted life history interviews with ex-combatants and civilians. This 
was done so as to provide me with a sub-sample of urban interviews through which I 
could draw comparisons with rural areas. In the rural areas four sites were selected, one 
from each of the provinces: in the Northern Province a village near Busogo, in the 
Eastern Province a village near Ngenda, in the Southern Province a village near 
Ruramba and in the Western Province a village near Nyundo. The map below indicates 
each of the four places mentioned. 
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Map 1- Map of Rwanda: United Nations Cartographic Section (2008) 
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The map on the next page is a satellite image of Rwanda taken in 1995 and shows the 
positioning of mass graves (the blue dots), genocide memorials (red dots) and sites of 
resistance (green dots), the national border is white. Using both maps it is apparent that 
the areas in which I conducted research were either adjacent to or relatively close to 
mass graves thus indicating an intensive level of killing during the genocide. 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
Map 2 - Rwanda after the Genocide: Genocide Studies Program, Yale University (2008) 
The two main factors that directed site selection in the rural areas were: presence of ex-
combatants and access. Prior to undertaking phase two of the research I obtained from 
the RDRC details of ex-combatant settlement patterns and identified a number of 
potential sites that contained enough ex.;.combatants from all three groups 26. Ex-
Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) combatants are much more numerous and so could 
essentially be found in most locations however, those from Forces Armees Rwandaises 
(FAR) and the Armed Groups (AGs) were situated mostly in the North and Northwest 
of the country, therefore it was not expected that I would find equal number in each site. 
Additionally, the number of ex-FAR and AGs to be interviewed was lower than e -RDF 
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then took me to sites we had decided upon and we met with the sector executive 
secretary to discuss the research and to assess the suitability of the particular site. 
The four sites 27 decided upon fulfilled the two main criteria of presence of ex-
combatants and the granting of access. They also enabled a degree of comparison thus 
enabling a more comprehensive understanding of the situation in Rwanda. Two of the 
four sites (North and West) were located on one of the major tarmac roads with good 
transport and communication links. The other two (East and South) were located away 
from a major road artery, requiring a minimum of one hour's travel on unmade roads by 
motorbike or Matatu28 . 
4.5.3 Choice and Justification of Research Techniques 
Ethnographic Methods: Theory 
Ethnography can be seen as a combination of research methods that aim to decipher 
social meanings and behaviours of those in a given field or setting primarily through the 
observation of such behaviour. Ethnography then, "is the study of people in naturally 
occurring settings or 'fields' by means of methods which capture their social meanings 
and ordinary activities, involving the researcher participating directly in the setting, if 
not also the activities, in order to collect data in a systematic manner but without 
meaning being imposed on them externally" (Brewer, 2000: 10). The use of 
ethnography in a study of this nature will allow a deeper, more unique understanding of 
the three conceptual processes examined within this research: social reintegration, social 
capital and reconciliation. 
As highlighted in the three literature review chapters, the dominant literature on each of 
these concepts is of a 'western' construction and measurement. By using ethnographic 
methods it was anticipated that this study would result in a fuller understanding of the 
concepts and their interlinking dynamic as it would enable an examination of these 
concepts in their relevant application in the natural setting (Hammersley, 1998). 
Moreover, this enabled me to develop an understanding of how Rwandan society define 
and measure the three concepts and the processes through which each process evolves, 
27 See Appendix S.4 for more details on the four sites. 
28 A Matatu is a shared taxi. 
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as well as the way in which they interlink. An effect of this was to facilitate an 
understanding of the concepts that was not bound by ethnocentrism or state-centric 
approaches. 
An ethnographic approach is particularly relevant due to the nature of the phenomena 
examined and the theoretical underpinnings of this research. Relating to the latter, this 
study is neither strictly inductive nor deductive, instead occupying a middle ground 
albeit with strong inductive tendencies. Ethnographic methods enable the development 
of theory that is situated between inductive and deductive theory in that it is guided by 
previous research and literature, and thus a rudimentary understanding of the concepts is 
attained prior to fieldwork, but the strength of the study comes not from theory testing 
in the field, but from inductive reasoning and application to previous research through 
the knowledge obtained in the field (Seligman, 2005). Important to this is the fact that 
the ethnographer is "a learner among the more knowledgeable, and should tackle the 
research project with the humility appropriate to being in an inferior position to those 
being researched" (Payne & Payne, 2004: 73). The nature of the research phenomena 
also provides justification for the use of ethnographical methods. As Brewer states, 
"where fully fledged theories are developed from ethnographic data, they are never 
'general theories' but 'theories of the middle range '. That is, they do not explain 
society or social action on a grand scale but some more limited aspect thereof (like 
deviance), and do not have universal applicability" (2000: 149). Although the locus of 
this study is relatively broad through the examination of the three concepts and their 
interconnectivity, it does not seek to elucidate theory on a grand scale and is indeed 
relatively focused even within the field of post-conflict reconstruction. Ethnographic 
methods afford me the tools through which I can "engage in theoretically informed 
practice" (Seligman, 2005: 230) and develop theory enlightened by local knowledge 
and understanding. 
Ethnographic Methods: Life Histories 
The use of narrative research has, according to Priest et al (2002), become increasingly 
popular in recent years. The primary narrative research method utilised is that of 
biographic methods such as life histories. When examining concepts such as DDR, 
social capital and reconciliation, such methods offer not only an insight into what the 
individual feels about the conflict, and their role in the conflict in relation to their own 
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lives, which therefore feeds into the personality of the ex-combatant, and how he 
subjectively constructs his own identity, but equally into how this individuals reality 
may add to our understanding of this issue at a societal level, thus enabling us to 
construct policy more effectively. 
Life histories, as Bell writes, provide "culturally shared images and conventions to 
present and interpret experience, as well as to draw connections between individual and 
society" (2004: 49). Similarly, Goodson makes the claim that life histories "have the 
potential to make a far-reaching contribution to the problem of understanding the links 
between personal troubles' and public issues'" (1983, cited in Cohen & Manion, 
1994: 59). This, I argue, augments the development of a comprehensive understanding 
of how the individual experience throughout the conflict and the reintegration process 
influences social capital and the implications this has for reconciliation. A life history 
approach also enables the gathering of richer data from informants than could be 
achieved through structured or semi-structured interviews, due to the highly personal, 
subjective and sensitive nature of conflict and reintegration. It is for these reasons that 
life histories are to be employed as a primary data collection and analysis tool. 
The types of life histories taken were retrospective, as the informants reconstruct the 
past events in their life using present feelings and interpretations. The mode of 
presentation adopted in this research is a combination of thematically-edited and 
interpreted and edited, with more emphasis on the thematically-edited mo.de (Hitchcock 
& Hughes, 1995)29. Themes were identified throughout the course of the life history 
and then became the guiding principles for the interpretation and editing process. This 
is due to the interpretivist tradition directing the methodological choices taken in this 
research, which aims to construct theories via the understanding and interpretation of 
the phenomenon under investigation, in this case, the social reintegration of ex-
combatants. 
29 Hitchcock & Hughes (1995) present a an analysis of the three possible different types of modes of 
presentation of a life history: naturalistic, in which the life history is told as a life story largely in the 
words of the participant; thematically-edited, in which the infonnants words are preserved intact but 
presented by the researcher in a series of themes, topics or headings; and interpreted and edited, in which 
the researchers has sifted though the data and edited and interpreted accordingly. 
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Ethnographic Methods: Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) 
PRA is a collection of techniques developed to enable the researcher to quickly 
ascertain certain features of local communities primarily in order to identity the needs of 
communities as expressed by those communities themselves so as to be able to design 
appropriate development programme to meet those needs (Brockington & Sullivan, 
2003). PRA is a particularly effective technique as it empowers those being researched 
and challenges the dominance and power of the researcher thus giving more prominence 
to the voices of the researched (Gueye, 1999). The primary reason for using this 
technique is to be able to obtain a reasonably fast comprehension of the situation in the 
community prior to the use of other ethnographic methods whilst building the trust 
necessary for an effective ethnography. PRA also provided me with an opportunity to 
get to know those in the community to some extent before I engaged in a full 
ethnography as well as enabling me to assess the overall dynamic in the community 
which, although somewhat superficial, provided me with a foundation from which I 
could build the bulk of my research. 
The specific PRA techniques I used were: Landscape mappmg, institutional 
diagramming and analysis, social network mapping, and social capital indicators. 
Landscape mapping is invariably used as a tool to derive similar information that one 
would achieve from an aerial map (Rocheleau & Ross, 1995). Essentially it involves 
constructing a physical map of the community, which may include farming plots, water 
provision, schools, or whatever the mapping group decide is relevant. In terms of this 
study the use of landscape mapping did not result in concrete data; however this was not 
the intention in using such a technique. The primary motive of using landscape 
mapping was to introduce me to the community and engender their trust and this proved 
a useful method through which to do so. It also enabled me to observe the ways in 
which community members interacted with each other during the mapping process, 
which was useful for understanding community dynamics. 
Institutional diagramming and analysis enables the researcher to "understand the roles 
of local organisations and the perceptions that people have about them" as "it clarifies 
which institutions are the most important, which have the respect and confidence and 
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women and men, and who participates in and is represented by which ones,,30 (Slocum 
et aI, 1995: 127). This is a particularly useful technique for better understanding how 
vertical social capital is embedded within society and how such vertical social capital 
may contribute to the development of bridging social capital. It is also a particularly 
useful technique, as not only does it contribute to an indigenous measure of social 
capital, but also provides an understanding of the local institutions which inform further 
ethnographic study. 
Social network mapping facilitates the identification of the complex economic, social 
and cultural relationships that exist within a community and how they are manifest 
within that community (Weller-Molongua & Knapp, 1995: 186). In particular it 
examines the way in which exchange takes place within the community focusing on the 
types of exchange and the direction of exchange, which provides indications of social 
inclusion and exclusion. This is significant as it enables a deeper understanding of 
social capital and how, and between whom, it is constructed. It also helps to determine 
how ex-combatants have undergone reintegration and the degree of reconciliation 
prevalent in the community. 
The final PRA technique used was social capital indicators. This is a technique 
developed by the author, which facilitates a comprehensive understanding of social 
capital through the identification of proxies and proxy variables for social capital. 
These proxies are then discussed with community members who identify particular 
community events, formal and informal networks and associations, among others, that 
contribute to social capital in the community31. This technique is . particularly useful in 
deciphering ways in which social capital formulation occurs within the context of a 
developing country and thus builds on our understanding of the measurement of social 
capital. 
Ethnographic Methods: Elite Interviews 
Elite interviews are particularly important to this study because they provide us with an 
alternative view of the world from communities. The divergence between the elite and 
non-elite is increasing globally in terms of relative power and as such understanding 
30 Adapted by editors from Thomas-Slayter et al, 1993. 
31 See Appendix 2.0 - Rwanda Social Capital Indicators 
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what drives the elite is essential (Cormode & Hughes, 1999). Additionally, in tandem 
with this divergence in power there has been a divergence in opinion between elites and 
non-elites as to how politics and development should be pursued (Mullings, 1999). 
These two points combined are very important as, if one applies dependency and 
structuralist worldviews, one could argue that the elite and non-elite are two sides of the 
same coin and therefore, "for coherent representations we need to understand both 
sides" (Scheyvens, Scheyvens & Murray, 2003: 183). 
Essentially, "elite interviewing can be used when it is appropriate to treat a respondent 
as an expert about the topic in hand" (Leech, 2002: 663). In the course of this research 
interviews were conducted with various elites who can be considered experts in their 
given field. These included: World Bank officials based with the MDRP; programme 
designers and implementers from the RDRC; government officials based in the National 
Unity and Reconciliation C<?mmission (NURC); officials from various UNDP units; and 
International NGO representatives, among others. Essentially, "elite interviewing may 
lead to good (topical, interesting, incisive) writing about political themes" (Burnham et 
aI, 2004: 218) and this is of particular use to this research as it enables the identification 
of the justifications for programme design and policy and to compare the views of elites 
and none-elites on matters such as social reintegration and reconciliation. 
4.5.4 Sampling 
The sampling method used for this research was a combination of quota and purposive 
sampling. The sample was divided into three main groups: ex-combatants, community 
members and policy makers/implementers and officials. I have chosen these three 
groups for particular reasons. Ex-combatants have been included as they lie at the 
centre of this research. Without including them in the sample I cannot claim with 
validity to understand the reintegration process from the viewpoint of ex-combatants. 
Community members are a section of the sample group, as I believe it is of vital 
importance when researching ex-combatant reintegration to examine the communities 
into with they are reintegrating. This is the case because it can be argued that the views 
of ex-combatants and community members over how successful or unsuccessful ex-
combatant reintegration has been may diverge. Therefore, by examining the views and 
experiences of both groups I would argue that a balance between the two could be met. 
This, I believe, provided me with an ideal sample group from which to glean 
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information crucial to this research. Policy makers/implementers and officials have 
also been included in the sample as I feel this will enable me to make considerations as 
to any differences between official views as to how reintegration has occurred and 
views from the community itself (the community including ex-combatants). 
The ex-combatant sample group comprised ex-combatants from the ex-FAR, the RDF, 
and ex-AGs repatriating from the DRC. Life history interviews in Kigali during the 
first phase numbered 8, all of which were former members of the RDF. In the 
communities during the second phase ex-combatants from each group were interviewed 
with 24 ex-RDF, 7 ex-F AR and 11 ex-AGs being interviewed. When considering 
official demobilisation and reintegration figures for Rwanda it is apparent that 66% 
were ex-RDF, 22% ex-FAR and 12% ex-AG32. In terms of the composition of total 
interviews conducted 64% were ex-RDF, 14% ex-FAR and 22% ex-AGs. Although the 
figures do not entirely match it is possible to claim a reasonably high level of 
representativeness. The ex-combatant sample also include two women ex-combatants 
which represents 4% of the total (more than the number of female ex-combatants in the 
programme which was less than 1%), one ex-child soldier which represents 2% of the 
total (less than the 10% of ex-child soldiers in the programme) and 25 disabled veterans 
which is 50% of the total. 
The second sample group, that of community members, included several sub-groups: 
returning refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), genocide survivors, those who 
remained during the conflict, and community leaders. This was to ensure a 
representative cross-section of society. In terms of number, 22 civilians in total were 
interviewed across the research sites of Kigali, Northern Province, Eastern Province, 
Southern Province and Western Province. The below table indicates the composition of 
ex-combatant and civilian interviews conducted over phase one and two of the research. 
32 Based on figures provided by the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) 
Coordinator in October 2006 of: 38,731 ex-RDF, 13,000 ex-FAR and 6,200 ex-AOs with a total caseload 
of57,931. 
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Ex-RDF Ex-FAR Ex-AG Civilians Total 
Northern 1 3 2 5 1 1 
Eastern 11 1 2 5 19 
Southern 8 2 1 3 14 
Western 4 1 6 3 14 
Kigali 8 0 0 6 14 
Total 32 7 11 22 72 
Table 2 - Field Interview Composition, Rwanda 2006-7: Author 
It was intended that 12 ex-combatants and 8 civilians would be interviewed in each site 
thus providing a total of 100 interviews with a representative number of men and 
women among the civilians and female ex-combatants, child soldiers and disabled 
veterans. This, however, was not possible to achieve primary due to the understandable 
unwillingness of some to give up a significant amount of their day for unpaid work33 
and to those who committed to being interviewed but did not turn up at the arranged 
time. Those included in the sample for these two groups were selected through· 
negotiation with a gatekeeper. In Kigali ex-combatants were identified and called for 
interview by the DRO in one of the districts and civilians were identified through my 
translator and through UN Habitat who took me on a field visit to one of their housing 
projects. In the communities my first port of call was the Executive Secretary in charge 
of the sector in order to introduce myself and notify himlher of my presence, the 
research I was conducting and the support I had from the RDRC for this. We would 
then meet with the President of the Demobs34 to discuss the research and what I was 
looking for in terms of sample composition and an interview venue. We then arranged 
a time to meet a number of ex-combatants to brief them on the research and allocate 
interview times for those who were willing to be interviewed. Civilians for the PRA 
exercises and interview were identified by the Executive Secretary or one of hislher 
subordinates. 
Whilst such a method of sampling is not ideal and issues of sample bias may have 
arisen as a result35 it was, nevertheless, the only way I could conduct the research. 
First, the existence of 'gatekeepers' is a very real issue for social research of almost any 
33 This issue will be addressed during the discussion of research problems. 
34 The President of the Demobs is an ex-combatant who is elected by other ex-combatants to represent 
them in the area in which they reside. 
35 The issue of Sample Bias will be discuss in section 4.6.3 
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nature; in Rwanda this proved to be an even bigger issue. Although I had obtained 
permission by the Chairman of the RDRC to conduct this research I had to also obtain 
permission from local leaders as they essentially controlled my access to the ex-
combatants and the population as a whole. Second, there existed no sample frameworks 
for either the ex-combatant sample group or the community member group; therefore 
my ability to use probability sampling was restricted. Third, because there were a 
number of sub-groups within each sample group, each needed to be chosen based on 
their representing a certain type or group that is conceptually important (Miller, 2000). 
In order to effectively achieve this, the use of selective sampling took precedence over 
that of probability sampling and as noted this was carried out through the identification 
of key gatekeepers in each research site. 
The final sample group of policy makers/implementers and officials numbered 26 and 
included World Bank officials based with the MDRP; programme designers and 
implementers of the RDRP from the RDRC; government officials based in the NURC; 
officials from various UNDP units; and International NGO representatives, among 
others. The obtaining of these elite ihterviews was enabled using snowball sampling 
based on preliminary interviews with two key gatekeepers: the Coordinator of the 
RDRC and the MDRP Coordinator. In terms of whom I interviewed in this category, 
choices were tlighly selective as it was necessary to concentrate on particular 
individuals in particular roles and to discount others. 
4.5.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
Important to the effectiveness of ethnographic methods is the role the ethnographer 
takes on. Gold· classifies a continuum of participant observer roles ranging from 
complete participant to complete observer. A complete participant is a fully functioning 
member of the social setting with his or her true identity being concealed. A 
participant-as-observer is essentially the same as a complete participant however 
members of the social setting are aware of the researcher status. An observer-as-
participant is generally an interviewer with some observation but little participation. 
The complete observer does not interact with people and purely observes them (Gold, 
1958). For this research I took on the role of observer-as-participant. 
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The life history data for this research was collected during one life history interview per 
interviewee with each lasting from between 5 and 120 minutes. All interviews were 
audio recorded with permission of the interviewee36 and notes were taken during the 
interviews. Although initially I planned to carry out three life history interviews with 
each interviewee as I hoped this would engender trust between the interviewee and 
myself, as well as providing me with an opportunity to focus the latter interviews on 
pertinent issues and unanswered questions, this proved difficult to do. First, to conduct 
three interviews with each interviewee required a significant time commitment on their 
behalf; this was something I could, understandably, not gain. Second, due to time 
constraints of my own I would have been forced to sacrifice breadth in favour of depth 
to some degree. In order to maintain interviewee commitment and to strike a balance 
between breadth and depth I chose to opt for a single round of interviews. However, 
though using PRA techniques prior to starting life history analysis, I was able to 
introduce both myself and my research to the community prior to interviews thus 
gaining a degree of trust that was built upon in the interview process. Additionally, this 
enabled me to attract suitable interviewees who would commit to the time necessary for 
such interviews to take place as those who volunteered to be interviewed were generally 
interested in the work and were willing to be interviewed further. 
The PRA techniques were conducted in three of the four37 community sites over two 
days prior to interviewing. Sessions were open to all members of the community 
however as the composition of these sessions was constructed by local leaders this 
would suggest that not all civilians had an equal chance of attending. The time during 
the PRA techniques served as an introduction period to the community, as well as 
providing me with vital data concerning the physical and social constitution of the 
community and community dynamics. The picture below is me with members of a 
PRA group after the exercises. 
36 Excluding two interviewees who would not give their pennission for audio recording. Instead I took 
detailed notes of these interviews. 
37 In the Western Province I could not get people to attend the PRA sessions as it meant giving up a 
significant amount of their time which they would not agree to. 
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Diagram 1 - PRA Exercises Photo: Author<O 
In terms of analysis this research is guided by the interpretivist tradition in that it aims 
to construct theory via the understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon under 
investigation. Due to this the analysis of the data collected in this study follows the 
realist approach in which "the key point is that of constantly evaluating the developing 
concepts in light of concrete data - hence 'grounding' the theory in data" (Miller, 
2000:114). The first phase of this research enabled me to identify areas that required 
particular attention, both in terms of interview technique and issues addressed, and as 
such provided me with a period of reflexive time in which I could further develop the 
methodology in order to be most productive in the second phase. In the first phase the 
life history interviews followed a loose form, thus allowing the informant to provide 
hislher account through monologue as much as possible within the constraints of the 
study. This, in tum, enabled me to identify pragmatic categories throughout the 
account, which would provide the foundations for analysis. A strict following of the 
realist approach would involve the development of these categories through several 
readings of the transcripts after all interviews were conducted. The method employed in 
this research differs however in that the initial coding of the transcripts taken from the 
fust phase, and the subsequent identification of the categories imbedded within the data, 
th n followed by a second period of reading and coding from the second field 0 
required further e ploration in the second p 
. th . ch to guide intervi 
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positively contributing to data in their own right, the interviews conducted in phase one 
acted as a pilot study through which it was possible to refine my methodology for the 
second phase. Finally, transcripts from the first and second phase for all interviewees 
were analysed and coded for a second time in light of the findings from each separate 
analysis. This, I believe, enabled the facilitation of the coordinated codification of the 
identified categories. Essentially, this process provided a skeleton, via the first phase, 
on which to affix the flesh of the second phase. 
As with any methodology, qualitative or quantitative, issues of validity, reliability and 
generalisability are of significant importance in the generation, analysis and 
presentation of data. These issues are particularly pertinent to life history research as 
the credibility of such methodology is often brought into question by the positivist, 
deductive school (Cohen & Manion, 1994 & Plummer, 1983). 
Questions of validity are "concerned with assessing whether what actually is being 
measured corresponds to some external reality" (Scott & Alwin, 1998: 123). In order to 
address these issues Plummer (1983) identified the following checks: 
1) The subject of the life history may present an -auto critique of it, having read the 
entire product. 
2) A comparison may be made with similar written sources by way of identifying 
points of major divergence or similarity. 
3) A comparison may be made with official records by way of imposing accuracy 
checks on the life history. 
4) A comparison may be made by interviewing other respondents. 
This research directly follows as many of the recommendations Plummer has made as 
much as possible. Numerous interviews were recorded enabling comparison 
interviewees. Available official records and written documents were also examined. 
This will be done to ensure claims of validity are justified. In terms of Internal Validity 
it can be claimed that although the research meet with problems in the field, it was 
designed and executed in such a way as to enable causal conclusions. Similarly, 
External Validity can be claimed, as it is possible for the results of this research, at least 
in part, to be generalised to a macro level within the conceptual boundaries of this 
research. Finally, Construct Validity has been achieved when we take into account the 
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theoretical framework at the beginning of this chapter and the way in which the 
methodology serves to operationalise such a framework. 
Reliability centres round "reference to the consistency of measurement ... over multiple 
attempts to measure the same thing using the same methods" (Scott & Alwin, 
1998: 123). In order to increase reliability in life history research it is necessary to 
identify sources of bias and apply techniques to reduce them. Such bias can appear in 
various fashions. For instance, bias on the part of the informant may occur through 
evasion, appeasement, deception or self-deception, and on the part of the researcher 
through their attitudes, demeanour and expectancy. Additionally, the interaction 
between informant and researcher may be a source of bias via the physical setting of the 
interview, non-verbal communication or vocal behaviour (Cohen & Manion, 1994). In 
order to minimise the potential or actual levels of bias within this study several practices 
were followed38 
The issue of generalisability results from claims that the scope of the findings of 
qualitative research is restricted. It is often argued that due to the use of participant 
observation or unstructured interviews with a small sample size it is impossible to 
generalise the findings of such research to the whole population (Bryman, 2001). This 
research can, however, claim to be generalisable. First, this research does not seek to 
provide findings or theory to be applied to the general population. It specifically seeks 
to provide findings and/or theory regarding the social reintegration of ex-combatants 
and its subsequent impact on social capital and reconciliation in Rwanda and in this 
sense it achieves its goal. Additionally, some of the conclusions and recommendations 
resulting from this research may also be applicable to other contexts. Second, the use of 
qualitative methods in this research, despite their arguable faults, provides richer data 
than could be gathered in the confines of quantitative research. This ensures that, while 
the issue of generalisability to a macro level in terms of ex-combatants worldwide may 
be contested, the issue of validity cannot. 
31 See sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4 
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4.6 Methodological Issues and Constraints 
4.6.1 The Research Context: Conducting Research in a PCE 
Social research of any nature has its generic difficulties and problems; however research 
in PCEs is affected all the more by these difficulties and presents us with a number of 
other problems of an altogether different disposition. 
Generally all social researchers face the issue of access; however this can be more 
prevalent and complex in PCEs if the nature of such research is sensitive. It may be the 
case that access is not forthcoming with restrictions being put in place by officials or 
community members themselves. In order to gain access it is often sagacious for a 
researcher to approach individuals in a position of power or respect as this not only 
enables initial access to the physical setting but also acceptance by the local population 
which is key for the quality of data collected. It therefore seems evident that two forms 
of access apply in the PCE: official access and emotional access. 
Official access may be difficult to obtain and will generally be dependant on the nature 
of the research itself and the agenda of those providing access (Lee, 1995). The gaining 
of this access may involve careful inspection of their background and research agenda; 
however this is not to say it cannot be achieved. Emotional access may be more 
difficult to achieve. By emotional access I am referring to the ability of the researcher 
to gain social acceptance within the community and gain access to the rich data that the 
respondents themselves hold. Even with official access it does not necessarily follow 
that emotional access is forthcoming. PCEs are characterised by a lack of trust and this 
may severely limit the ability of a researcher to gain the required data due to intense 
suspicion of the nature of the research and the 'outsider' status of the researcher. The 
gaining of emotional access is an arduous process made ever more difficult by the 
intensity and duration of the conflict and may be strongly influenced by decisions made 
by the researchers regarding the way in which they interact with officials and 
community members (Lee, 1995; Druckman, 2005). Identifying and engaging a 
gatekeeper is crucial in enabling access as this can open doors otherwise closed to an 
'outsider'. However this can also present problems in that affiliation with a particular 
gatekeeper may close certain doors that would otherwise be open either through 
deliberate manipulation on the part of the gatekeeper, or distrust of the gatekeeper from 
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the community. The key to achieving access is to identify potential effective 
gatekeepers prior to the fieldwork and then to evaluate the situation on the ground when 
on location. 
Researching in a PCE also presents the very real issue of personal safety. While the 
conflict may have officially ended the transition period between war and peace is very 
often punctuated by intermittent and sporadic skirmishes and battles. The physical 
dangers faced in the research process have been divided into two: 'anonymous' and 
'presentational' (Yancey & Rainwater, 1970), where "the former is present in any 
situation in which the researcher is more than ordinarily vulnerable to threat from a 
~tranger. The latter arises when the researcher's presence or behaviour triggers a 
hostile response" (Feenan, 2002: 157). Anonymous danger, therefore, could be found 
in many research settings and are not necessarily synonymous only with research in a 
peE. Presentational danger however, is a danger that is particularly relevant to such an 
environment. Such dangers can, however, "be mediated through foresight, planning, 
and skilful manoeuvre" (Sluka, 1995: 277) and especially important to the mediation of 
such dangers is the establishment of a rapport with local informants. Additionally, a 
positive outcome of such dangers is that in learning to cope, through the acquiring of 
local knowledge, a deeper understanding of the culture in which one is operating is 
facilitated; this can be instrumental to analysis. 
The issue of emotions play a role in all types of social research involving fieldwork 
with researchers facing the dilemma of developing close enough ties with those they 
study but at the same time retaining some distance, "some social and intellectual 
'distance '. For it is in the /space' created by this distance that the analytical work of 
the ethnographer gets done" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983: 102). However, research 
in PCEs, particularly of the nature of this study, presents much greater problems for 
researchers. One such problem researchers may face is feelings of sympathy or 
empathy for those who we perceive to have committed immoral acts. In a study of this 
nature it is the norm to communicate with respondents who have committed war crimes, 
particularly of a genocidal character. "Typically, fieldworkers put themselves in these 
positions so that they can understand the phenomenon well enough to stop it. But 
developing cognitive empathy (understanding why people think, feel, and as they do) 
can generate feelings of sympathy in the researcher. These feelings make the 
researcher uncomfortable" (Kleinman & Copp, 1993: 38). This creates a dual problem 
130 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York. 2008 
in that researchers are more able to recognise the social or structural elements that result 
in immoral acts but also there is the issue of how to behave toward respondents and to 
what extent one engages in behaviour he or she believes to be immoral. 
A further, and arguably more significant emotional issue faced by researchers is that of 
the collection of sensitive data and the way in which it affects us. As Chaitin states, 
"carrying out qualitative research in conflict-ridden contexts, in which people have 
experienced much social trauma in their lives is a difficult task ... they [life history 
interviews] are rich in detail, emotionally touching, and, at times, emotionally difficult. 
I do not always hear things that I would like to hear, and at times, I wished I had not 
asked the question" (2003: 114611151). In this sense we can see that sensitive research 
may affect not only the respondent, as commonly acknowledged, but also the 
researcher. Field research can be a highly isolated endeavour and it is somewhat natural 
for those in such circumstances to engage more rigorously in their work. Engaging at 
an intense level in in-depth interviews and ethnography brings the researcher into close 
proximity to the traumas experienced by the respondents and this can be increasingly 
difficult for the researcher to cope with emotionally. When researchers are absorbed in 
copious amounts of interviews and narratives the demands and challenges placed on 
them can be great. In addition to this the nature of the interviews can be highly charged 
emotionally (Johnson & Clarke, 2003). Although it may be difficult, some degree of 
detachment needs to take place in order to be able to maintain the frame of mind 
conducive to effective research. 
4.6.2 Ethical Considerations 
Issues of ethics are of particular importance for two main reasons in this research. First, 
ethnography and life history research, by their very nature, are invasive. They seek to 
uncover aspects of one's life that may have been suppressed for some time and may 
cause the respondent distress to recall and talk about. The issues that arise in a life 
history interview and throughout ethnography can also have ramifications for present 
'life as noted by Roberts, "the recollection of past events is inextricably connected with 
people's current life and its place in the group and wider community" (2002:104). 
Second, any research of a psychosocial nature in a peE such as Rwanda will also give 
rise to a situation in which the content of the interviews may be disturbing for the 
respondent, and indeed for the interviewer. There is, therefore, a need for sensitivity 
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throughout the research process. Indeed, as Smyth notes, "conducting research in a 
manner that uses people as objects without due regard for their subjectivity, needs and 
the impact of research on their situation is ethically questionable. This becomes 
particularly apparent in psychological terms, since respondents may be at a stage of 
denial in relation to the horrors that have happened to them" (2001: 5). The 
combination of life history research and ethnography in a PCE presents a potentially 
volatile situation in which ethical considerations must be a significant priority in the 
planning of the research and must permeate throughout the research period. Research in 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction is not, as yet, constrained by an ethics board; however 
there exists a moral obligation and research benefit to adhere to certain ethical practices. 
Therefore this research is guided by ethical considerations taken by researchers in this 
and other fields. 
The issue of informed consent is one that is continuously of great importance when 
considering ethics in social science research. In life history research the dynamics of 
power regarding informed consent can be very different from other research methods. 
On one hand the respondent holds a great deal of power in that they control the degree 
and depth of information given to the researcher. This not only places them in a more 
comfortable position, but also ensures the researcher behaves in such a way so as to 
gain access to the information he or she requires. On the other hand, the use of 
deception regarding the purpose of the research can swing the pendulum of power back 
to the researcher. In either case, informed consent needs to be acquired through the 
briefing and debriefing of each respondent prior to and concluding· each session. 
Respondents were asked if they understood what the research was about and what was 
to be asked of them and were informed they were free to withdraw at any time. 
Anonymity is another ethical factor taken into consideration when designing this 
research and was guaranteed to each respondent. The one group that do not receive 
anonymity is those in the elite interviews. This is because, although their opinions are 
no more significant than community members, they form a group that may provide 
potentially very influential data and it is difficult to substantiate this data if their names 
and positions are not revealed, particularly the more 'elite' they are in the elite group. 
Additionally, "many institutions and publicjigures are almost impossible to hide, and if 
they cooperate in research they may have to accept a considerable measure of 
exposure, particularly if the media picks up on the research" (Punch, 1986' 46). Data 
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derived from this group, when directly used in the write-up, is referenced by 
organisation and position with their personal names being omitted. 
The guarantee of anonymity to those who will receive it (ex-combatants and civilians) is 
necessary for three main reasons: First, it is more difficult to attain a sample of 
informants if they believe statements attributed to them may be made public knowledge. 
Second, the quality of the material collected is better if the respondent trusts the 
researcher; the guarantee of anonymity is a good foundation on which to build a 
. relationship of trust between researcher and informant. As Hermansson et al state, 
Hinterviews about painful experiences require adequate time and a relationship of 
trust" (2003: 144). Third, and most importantly, to protect informants from any danger 
the information they provide may place them in. 
The reasons identified for the need for anonymity are indicative of the need to be 
sensitive throughout the interviews. Crucial to the collection of life histories is 
sensitiveness, empathy and non-possessive warmth on the part of the interviewer 
(Plummer, 1983). Without these attributes not only will the interview fail to yield the 
rich data required for a study of this nature but, more importantly, may result in distress 
and trauma for the respondent. Although sensitivity is critical to life history research, 
the very nature of the unstructured/semi-structured interview enhances such sensitivity. 
By allowing the respondent to recall events throughout their life over a period of time 
and in a relationship of trust the interviewee need only divulge information he or she 
feels comfortable with. If the researcher lessens the degree of direction he or she places 
on the interview the informant feels more at ease and is more likely to provide richer 
data. 
4.6.3 Research Biases 
One of the most problematic issues confronting a researcher is the various biases he or 
she may face. Research bias affects the validity of research and as such due 
consideration must be forthcoming. The initial stage of bias mitigation is the 
identification of potential or actual bias; in terms of this research three potential biases 
need to be addressed. 
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Sample Bias: Refers to bias within the sample population. As previously noted, the 
sample population for this research included three groups and in total 98 interviews 
were conducted (ex-combatants = 50, civilians = 22, policymakers/implementers and 
officials = 26). Within the ex-combatant group ex-RDF, ex-FAR and ex-AGs were 
in~erviewed (32, 7 and 11 respectively) which roughly represents the proportions within 
the demobilised population however, it should be noted the proportions for ex-FAR and 
ex-AGs in this research have effectively been reversed. This does not represent a 
significant bias in the research, as proportional differences do not exceed more than 
10%. 
What does, however, require consideration is the way in which ex-combatants were 
selected. Ex-combatants were identified by the President of Demobs and the Executive 
Secretary in the area; in this sense both these individuals held the position of 
gatekeepers and this is a potential source of bias. In research of this nature, gatekeepers 
can be an issue as "even the most friendly and co-operative gatekeepers or sponsors will 
shape the conduct and development of research. To one degree or another, the 
ethnographer will be channelled in line with existing networks of friendships and 
enmity, territory, and equivalent boundaries" (Hammersely & Atkinson, 1983: 73). 
During the research the majority of ex-combatants were positive regarding the efforts of 
the RDRC and the government, which gave rise to some suggestions that ex-combatants 
may have been selected based on such support. Indeed, there were two instances in 
which direct obstruction was evident. In the first instant one DRO was insistent I 
conducted research in a sector in which the executive secretary was a close personal 
friend and also wished to accompany me during the site period. This issue was resolved 
when we met with the district executive secretary who overruled the ORO and gave me 
free access to the site I wished and furnished me with a letter of introduction for the 
sector executive secretary. In the second instance one of the local leaders assisting with 
the identification of ex-combatants for interview excluded certain individuals. This 
came to my attention when by chance an ex-combatant heard about my research and 
approached me in this regard. Indeed, during the interview this particular individual 
proved to be relatively critical of local leaders. 
This demonstrated the need to be vigilant during the selection process and address 
potential concerns within the interviews themselves through appropriate questions and 
probing. Additionally, my translator was important in determining ways in which the 
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sample may have been compromised and mitigating for such eventualities. Similarly, 
civilian respondents were also selected by local gatekeepers and so the same issues and 
mitigation strategies for ex-combatants applied. Whilst biases may have occurred 
within the selection process the presence of gatekeepers left me with little option but to 
work with them; a feature of the majority of social research, particularly of this nature. 
Without engaging with these gatekeepers the establishment of a sample would have 
been virtually impossible. It is, however, necessary to take these potential biases into 
consideration during the analysis stage of the research project. 
Those interviewed as part of the policymakers/implementers and official sample group 
were selected using purposive sampling and a process of snowballing. Because of their 
importance to this research by virtue of their position certain individuals were included 
in this sample group and bias in such selection is evident. This does, however, 
represent a somewhat moot point, as it was necessary to interview officials engaged in 
the relevant policies and programmes that this research is concerned with. Within the 
RDRC, the RDRP Coordinator held the role of gatekeeper; however he was in no way 
obstructive and gave me. access to interview any employee of the RDRC that I wished 
and to a number of documents not privy to the general population. Similarly, tho~e 
holding gatekeeper roles in organisations such as the World Bank gave me full access 
and made recommendations as to who else may be suitable for interview. This was 
further supplemented by my own research, which identified a number of potentially 
useful interviews. 
Whilst sample bias is an important consideration as it can have important and 
devastating consequences for the integrity and validity of research results it was not 
found to be significantly detrimental to this research. In the few isolated incidents in 
which it was evident, measures were taken to mitigate for such bias. Reflexivity and 
triangulation39 proved important in this process, as did having a suitably trained and 
briefed translator. Ultimately, while the negative impact of sample bias should not be 
ignored or underestimated, it needs to be recognised that in research of this nature a 
certain element of such bias will exist and that, if the research is to be conducted, the 
only way forward is to mitigate for such bias as best as possible. I feel the design of 
this research, and a reflexive research process, allows for this. 
39 These issues will be discussed later in the section. 
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Person Bias: Chambers (1983) identifies person bias as the bias against poorer people 
within the rural setting. Although specifically focusing on rural development 
Chambers' theory also relates to this research; to which two of the four person biases 
identified by Chambers apply: elite bias and male bias. Elite bias refers to the favouring 
of the less poor and more influential within the village, in this case, in the research. It is 
the elite within the village who contribute to activities that involve development 
practitioners, local-level officials and researchers, whereas the "the poor are often 
inconspicuous, inarticulate and unorganised. Their voices may not be heard at public 
meetings in the communities where it is customary for only the big men to put their 
views" (Devitt, 1977: 23). Due to this, research that favours the elite within the village 
will be skewed and thus cannot claim to be credible. 
Because the majority of the life history interviews (58 of 72) and all the PRA exercises 
took place in rural areas the issue of elite bias is a pertinent one. Although the majority 
of the rural population are subsistence farmers and endure levels of poverty they are 
generally in a similar position as their neighbours. Having said that there are cases of 
abject poverty and life is very much more difficult for those in female and child-headed 
households, of which there are relatively many. Although respondents were identified 
by gatekeepers in their given communities the sample population did include people 
from different groups in the community. Among ex-combatants most of those 
interviewed, as expected, were subsistence farmers. This sample did, however, include 
individuals with HIV / AIDs and from disability as well as single-headed households and 
victims of homelessness. A number had also applied from the Vulnerable Support 
Window (VSW), a support package from the RDRC, thus indicating the sample 
included the poor. 
Interviews with civilians were perhaps where elite bias was most evident as it was more 
difficult to attract civilians to the research, as many believed it was only for the benefit 
of ex-combatants and would not help them. The sample did include the subsistence 
poor however it was dominated by those holding positions of authority in the 
community (local-level leaders, teachers, religious leaders) who represented 10 of 16 in 
the rural sample. This indeed is problematic as it does not give much scope for the 
voice of the poorest who may have a different experience of ex-combatant reintegration 
and reconciliation, or who may not be able to effectively articulate such a voice, 
particularly in the context of Rwanda where society is very hierarchical and respect for 
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those in authority is high. The PRA exercises did, however, provide the opportunity for 
poorer members of the community to be more involved. These were conduc~ed prior to 
interviews and as such perhaps contributed to why poorer members of the community 
were not willing to be interviewed as they had already given up some of their time and 
could not afford more; During the PRA there were more of the poor in attendance and 
they were heavily involved. Indeed, at one point when one man, a teacher, was 
dominating proceedings two female farmers interjected with their own opinions. What 
was important here was that in examining social capital and reconciliation at the 
community level through such techniques it is necessary to allow societal processes to 
occur as naturally as possible in order to accurately observe community dynamics. 
Male bias relates to gender bias within the sample and within the research team. 
Because both my translator and I are men there is an obvious gender bias in terms of the 
research team. The only way this could have been overcome would have been the use 
of a female translator; however the technical university (KIST4o) I approached only 
recommended male translators. In spite of this obvious gender bias there did not seem 
to be any problem with the actual conducting of the research. 
In total 6 of the 22 civilians, 2 of the 50 ex-combatants41 and 9 of the 26 policy 
makers/implementers and officials were women. Although it represents only 17.3% 
much of this is due to the low numbers of female ex-combatants. As stated before, local 
leaders selected civilians so this may have had an effect on who was selected. In terms 
of the policy group whether of not an individual was included in this group was solely a 
matter of their position not their gender. Although it may be fair to argue that women 
are unequally represented in positions of power and authority, it is not the mandate of 
this research to discuss this. Within the PRA exercises the proportion of women's 
involvement was higher with 45% of those being involved being women. This was 
particularly important, as it was the PRA exercises that presented an arena for the 
observation of community dynamics. During these exercises the debate and 
negotiations that took place provided vital information regarding social capital and 
reconciliation. The involvement of women in these exercises was therefore important 
and illustrated their importance in the community. Although perhaps less numerous in 
40 Kigali Institute of Science and Technology 
41 Although 2 out of 50 ex-combatants interviewed is a small number it represents more than 4 times the 
proportion of female ex-combatants in Rwanda. 
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this research the voice of women was heard and any male bias within the sample was 
due to the nature of the research; one may reasonably argue that research into the 
reintegration of ex-combatants will generally concentrate on men more than women. In 
terms of the quality of interviews with women and the consideration given to women 
there was a gender balance within the study. 
Researcher Bias: Refers to the biases a researcher brings into, and develops in, the 
research process. Researcher bias is particularly important as it represents a significant 
problem in achieving validity and credibility within a research project. Where 
researcher bias is evident it can have negative consequences for a research project at 
every stage; the design process may be flawed from the beginning, meaning the 
implementation stage will be flawed and the analysis process will be biased. As noted 
in section 4.4, objectivity, whilst being something to strive for, is not an attribute that 
social researchers are privy to. Our experiences as individuals shape us and cause us to 
have subjective impressions of the way the world is; the very reason we focus our 
individual research on particular issues is due to this subjectivity. Whilst it is important 
to make attempts to mitigate for this subjectivity in the research process it is also 
important to acknowledge it, as it is through such acknowledgement that we, as 
researchers, can effectively reflect on our research practices and improve the way we do 
things. 
Researcher bias can manifest itself in a number of ways however it is essentially the 
holding of preconceived beliefs or attitudes towards a particular phenomenon that 
influence the way in which we observe it. In order to minimise the potential impact of 
. . -
such bias it is important to mitigate for it as much as possible through being reflexive42 
at every stage of the research process. In terms of this research, it was born out of an 
interest in the way in which ex-combatants attempt to normalise within a community 
after the construction of a combatant identity and conduct synonymous with being a 
combatant (along with behaviour considered out with the combatant remit). In this 
sense my bias as a researcher is toward ex-combatants and so whilst conducting this 
research my emphasis lies more with ex-combatants than with other sections of the 
community. Additionally, my choice of Rwanda as a case country was, in part, led by 
the impact the news coverage in 1994 had on me. From such coverage was derived an 
42 The issue of reflexivity will be discussed is section 4.6.4 
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empathy toward the Tutsi population in Rwanda which may have biased my initial 
thought processes when in the first stages of the research design process. 
Whilst my subjective attitudes towards ex-combatant reintegration and the Rwandan 
genocide in general may have initially led to some degree of researcher bias, so too did 
my subjective experiences of conflict enable me to mitigate against such bias. My 
experiences of conflict come from extensive reading of international and civil conflicts, 
observing news coverage of conflicts, teaching of asylum seekers displaced through 
conflict, the conducting of field research in Kosovo and having an older sister and 
younger brother with whom I would be in regular 'conflict'. Due to the fact that in the 
first of these instances I have been an outsider to the conflict I have been able to retain 
some distance and, whilst I may have had leanings towards one side or another, I have 
been able to logically view a given conflict. This, coupled with my own personal 
experience of conflict, has enabled an understanding that there are at least two stories to 
every conflict and if one wishes to accurately understand and analyse a conflict then 
each story must be taken into account. In terms of this research this was achieved in 
two main ways: first, by including in the research civilians from different sub groups in 
the community, the voices of ex-combatants are not the sole voices in the research and 
both social groups are able to voice their opinion of how ex-combatant reintegration is 
taking place. Second, active listening to the opinions of those in the Hutu social groups, 
despite these opinions not necessarily coinciding with my own, and non-inflammatory 
questioning of both groups was necessary to build an accurate picture of the conflict. 
Linked to this also is the way in which a researcher related to both groups. It is 
fundamental to the success of social research of this nature to treat each group with the 
same levels of respect and access. Access is not a one-way event and researchers grant 
access t<? their respondents through the way in which they relate to them, through 
acknowledging their views and attitudes as important even if we, as individuals, do not 
agree with them. Research of this nature often results in the researcher being told things 
they do not particularly like to hear and the way we react to that will dictate how 
respondents, as individuals and as part of a social group, react to us. Throughout this 
research I made conscious attempts to generate as much objectivity I could and absorb 
both stories as equally as possible. 
Translation BillS: Is associated with the bias that may arise when using a translator to 
translate between the interviewer and the respondent. During the fieldwork two 
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translators43 were used. Both translators were male, in their early twenties, university 
educated, urban, spoke a number of languages fluently including: English, French, 
Kinyarwanda and Swahili, and they were both Tutsi. All interviews concerning either 
translator were conducted in English-Kinyarwanda and as such involved all but one ex-
combatants, all but 4 civilians and four of the policy officials, or in other words, 72 of 
the 98 (730/0) interviewed in the process of both phases. 
Because of my interpretivist epistemological stance it is apparent that "translators must 
also form part of the process of knowledge production. There is no neutral position 
from which to translate and the power relationships within research need to be 
acknowledged' (Temple & Young, 2004: 164). In this case then a number of issues 
relating to the choice of translator allude to the potential of translator biases in this 
work: first, both translators were male which may lead to problems when interviewing 
female respondents; second, they were young thus possibly causing problems when 
interviewing older respondents; third, they were university educated which for the 
majority of interviews made them considerably more educated than the respondent; and 
fourth, they were both from urban areas which may have caused issues when in rural 
areas; and, fifth, they were both Tutsi which could potentially be a problem when 
interviewing Hutus. There is, of course, the general issue of using any translator. 
In order to mitigate for any potential translator bias a number of measures were taken. 
Prior to the translators being employed, I had a general conversation with them to gauge 
their level of English and whether or not I felt we could have a good working 
relationship. I then spoke in detail about my research telling them what I was 
researching, how I intended to go about it and what sort of research techniques I would 
be using. During this conversation the guidelines regarding how I expected the 
translation to progress were established which both translators were happy with. When 
the first phase in Kigali began, and again when the second translator was used, I initially 
encountered a problem in that the translator did not translate word for word, instead 
summarising their main points. This issue was soon rectified when I explained the 
importance of knowing exactly what they had said. From then on both translators took 
great care to translate as regularly as possible in the interview process and, in cases 
where the respondent did not understand the question, would relay this to me rather than 
43 This was the case because my original translator was not always available, and so he put me in contact 
with someone else who could help, rather than him not being suitable. 
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changing the question himself. Over the period of the fieldwork we spent a lot of time 
together and got to know each other well which I feel was useful in developing a good 
working relationship and at no point did I feel that either translator was deceiving or 
misleading me regarding the responses given in interviews. 
In terms of the specific issues that may have caused translator bias I felt these had a 
minimal affect, if at all, on the quality of interviews. The fact they were male did not 
seem to have any effect when interviewing women, indeed the women interviewed 
seemed perfectly willing to engage in the interview and generally gave a good interview 
with plenty of rich information. Their age also seemed to play a minimal role in the 
quality of interviews with many ex-combatants and civilians being of a similar age. 
Those who were older responded through the translators to me and so it became less of 
an issue anyway. The fact they were both educated and from urban areas had no impact 
when alongside less literate people in rural areas, as evident by the way they could joke 
with them before and after interviews. The biggest potential bias, that of them being 
Tutsi, also never seemed to materialise. Those from the ex-AGs, ex-FAR and who 
identified themselves as Hutu seemingly had no issue talking through a Tutsi translator 
and many Hutus in this fieldwork gave very strong interviews. Only at one point did 
one female respondent get upset when talking about how she felt she was tre~ted by the 
Tutsi; however she continued and gave a very insightful interview. Additionally, the 
way the translator responded to the outburst indicated to me that he himself harboured 
no biases within this research. 
Of the five potential causes of translator bias the first four of the characteristics 
identified were also shared with me. Whilst it is important to be vigilant and look for 
any signs of bias, it is also important to acknowledge that some bias may exist and that 
this does not necessarily invalidate the results. Sometimes research can only be 
conducted via translation and therefore we, as researchers, need to expect a certain 
degree of bias whilst attempting to mitigate it as much as possible. The next section 
looks at the issues of reflexivity and triangulation as attempts at mitigating for bias and 
other methodological constraints. 
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4.6.4 Mitigating Methodological Constraints through Reflexivity and 
Triangulation 
The issue of being reflexive within the research process is crucial as it feeds into the 
validity debate. "Reflexivity is the practice of researchers being self-aware of their own 
beliefs, values and attitudes, and their personal effects on the setting they have studied, 
and self-critical about their research methods and how they have been applied, so that 
evaluation and understanding of their research findings, both by themselves and their 
audience, may be facilitated and enhanced' (Payne & Payne, 2004: 191). The need to 
be reflexive is highly important if claims of validity are to stand. One's own ontology 
may influence the way in which research is designed, conducted and analysed and, as 
such, it is necessary to be reflexive of those personal biases, belief, views etcetera, in 
order to be able stand up to criticism. However, as Brockington and Sullivan note, it is 
important not to take such reflexivity too far as this will deviate from the research topic 
itself. "Extreme reflexivity regarding one's own position as a researcher, while 
important can also render the production of ethnography as something more akin to 
individual psycho-analysis than as a means of enabling alternative perspectives on the 
'real world' to gain public space" (Brockington & Sullivan, 2003: 66/7). Taking this 
into account I will now consider ways in which this research has been reflexive. 
This research was specifically designed in such a way as to maximise the opportunities 
for reflexivity whilst retaining focus on the conducting of the research project. In the 
initial stages of research design the need to be adaptable was recognised and in order to 
ensure this the fieldwork period was divided up over two phases. By conducting policy 
interviews and identifying potential ethnographic sites in the first (pilot) phase, I was 
afforded the opportunity to be reflexive in my approach. After returning from the field 
following the first phase and transcribing the 8 ex-combatant and 6 civilian interviews 
completed in Kigali, I was able to identify a number of weaknesses in my interview 
technique which I was able to eradicate for the second phase. This was my first time 
conducting interviews using a translator, which brought with it some problems and as 
such these issues required addressing. My previous interview experience in Kosovo and 
the UK had involved interviews in English with relatively competent speakers of 
English and this had perhaps shaped my expectations regarding my research in Rwanda. 
Due to the language barrier there was a need to be more patient, not only with the 
translator himself but also the respondents. In doing this it was necessary to ask 
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questions in a more simplistic manner and probe appropriately. By being reflexive 
according to my experiences in the first phase I was able to make the necessary 
adaptations to improve the quality of my research. 
In terms of the analysis of data gathered in the field it is important to take note of the 
biases I, as a subjective researcher, brought to the research. As discussed above, I made 
several efforts to mitigate for such bias. This was particularly relevant due to the 
ontological (constructionist) and epistemological (interpretivist) positions taken in this 
research. Because I hold the view that the social world and its meaning is not 
independent of social actors and that the world is understood through social actors 
perceptions, whilst appreciating the effects of the double hermeneutic, the possibility for 
researche.r bias in the analysis process is evident. This is because the interpretation of 
data will be dictated, at least in some part, by the meanings we attach to certain aspects 
of the social world and therefore our analysis can be skewed as a result of our 
experiences throughout our lives. Being reflexive regarding our ontological and 
epistemological positions and the ways in which our history affects our interpretations 
is as important as reflexivity during the data collection period as these positions will 
affect the way in we construct research and analyse data. 
Methodological constraints can also be mitigated through the use of triangulation. 
Triangulation refers to "the idea that looking at something from multiple points of view 
improves accuracy" (Neuman, 2006: 149) and is derived from navigation and 
measurement techniques to pinpoint accurate locations. In terms of social research 
there are four types of triangulation: triangulation of measure, triangulation of 
observers, triangulation of theory and triangulation of method. Within this research 
triangulation of measure - the use of mUltiple measures of the same incident - was 
achieved through the use of three different samples groups, which permitted an 
understanding of ex-combatant reintegration from three different perspectives. 
Triangulation of observers - the introduction of different observers in order to provide 
alternative perspectives - was not possible in this research due to funding constraints, 
which meant I could not employ other researchers in the research project. Triangulation 
of theory - the use of multiple theoretical perspectives during research design and 
interpretation - has been accomplished to some degree through the use of social capital 
theory and reconciliation theory, along with concepts pertinent to DDR. Triangulation 
of method - the mixing of data collection methods - is the most evident form of 
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triangulation in this study and has clearly been obtained using life history interviews, 
elite interviews and PRA techniques. 
The methods of triangulation utilised in this research have ensured that I am best able to 
view the issue of ex-combatant social reintegration. By collecting data from three 
sample sub-groups using three data generation techniques it was possible to corroborate 
different stories and identify different perspectives regarding the same events. The use 
of multiple methods also increases claims of validity as not only is it possible to derive 
a clearer understanding of the way in which ex-combatant social reintegration occurs 
and the implications for social capital and reconciliation, but biases .can be better 
managed throughout the process providing reflexivity is apparent. 
The use of reflexivity and triangulation are perhaps the best ways of mitigating against 
methodological constraints but this does not discount the fact that it may not ~e possible 
to mitigate against some constraints such as financing and time. However, these two 
techniques are extremely valuable in ameliorating those constraints that can be and 
should be used to reduce potential biases and obstacles as much as possible. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has made an attempt the traverse the difficult area of the research methods 
utilised within research. By first providing an analysis of the ways in which the three 
concepts introduced in the preceding chapters may interrelate and interact, the 
discussion of the methodological design of this study is more logical thus enabling the 
reader to engage better with this chapter. The theoretical framework provides a lens 
through which it is possible to not only better comprehend the social reintegration of ex-
combatants, but also to understand the ways in which the social reintegration of ex-
combatants impact on the post-conflict reconstruction effort. 
The conducting of this research, as to be expected, threw up some challenges and 
obstacles that perhaps had not been expected and as such, necessary changes were made 
throughout. By conducting two phases of fieldwork it was possible to identify changes 
and adjustments that needed to be made and incorporate them into the second phase. 
However, such changes were relatively small and the basic structure of the research 
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methodology remained unchanged. The adaptability necessary within this research is, 
however, important and it is throughout the research process that such skills are 
developed. By being reflexive and triangulating research methods within this study it 
was possible to mitigate against the biases that have been discussed previously and are a 
feature of most social research. This is particularly important as it is only through being 
reflexive that one can design methodology as robustly as possible and adapt it when 
necessary. 
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Chapter Five: 
The Rwanda Case Study 
Understanding why they died is the best and most fitting memorial we 
can raise for the victims. Letting their deaths go unrecorded, or 
distorted by propaganda, or misunderstood through simple cliches, 
would in fact bring the last touch to the killers' work in completing 
the victims' dehumanisation 
(Prunier, 1995: xii) 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis to the Rwanda case. This begins 
with section 5.2, which provides a historical overview of Rwanda that addresses the 
conflict and its causes. Within this section we firstly analyse the Rwandan conflict 
beginning with the transition from colonialism to independence and then considering 
the period of Hutu rule from the 1960s to the 1990s before investigating the 1990-1994 
civil war and the events that led to the 1994 Genocide. We then move on to explore the 
causes of the conflict concentrating firstly on the external influences such as colonialism 
and economic factors, then on domestic factors such as political fragmentation and 
demographic issues before concluding with psychosocial aspects such as the nature of 
Rwandan society. 
Section 5.3 provides an in-depth analysis of the Rwandan Genocide through the 
application of Stanton's (1998) 'The Eight Stages of Genocide' model. The eight stages 
are as follows: classification, symbolisation, dehumanisation, organisation, polarisation, 
identification, extermination, and denial. Essentially this section considers each stage 
of the model theoretically and then applies each stage to the Rwandan genocide 
providing examples in order articulate such an application. 
The penultimate section introduces primary data for the first time in the thesis in an 
examination of the transformation of social capital in Rwanda. This draws on life 
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history analysis conducted with ex-combatants from all three groups and civilians, 
along with PRA exercises with civilians in rural areas and elite interviews with policy 
officials. The purpose of this section is to explicate the transformation of social capital 
from pre-1990, through to the period of the civil war and genocide. 
The final section offers a conclusion that draws together all of the previous section of 
this chapter in an attempt to construct the foundations upon which the proceeding 
analysis chapters shall be built. 
5.2 Rwanda: A Historical Overview 
This section of the chapter is concerned with an historical overview of the conflict in 
Rwanda. Its aim is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the causes of the conflict and 
the subsequent genocide; rather it aims to provide the foundations from which an 
analysis of the transformation of social capital can be made. Specifically, it will 
consider the Colonial period from which the period of Independence, and the conflict 
years, can be better understood. From this point this section will examine the years 
1990-1994 with a sharper focus and this will then lead on to an in-depth analysis of the 
stages of genocide in the following section. 
To the uninitiated the mention of Rwanda will invariably conjure up thoughts and 
images of the genocide of 1994; however, in order to understand how and why such a 
genocide occurred, and the subsequent effects for Rwandan society, it is necessary to 
investigate the roots of the conflict and genocide. Such roots are highly complex 
however, as Hintjens notes, "three broad types of explanation can be identified ... (i) a 
focus on external influences, both colonial and neo-colonial; (ii) a focus on domestic 
causes, including demographic factors and 'ethnic' conflict; and (iii) a psychosocial 
account based on the presumed social conformism and obedience of Rwandans" (1999: 
243). The remainder of this section shall examine the causes of the Rwandan conflict 
and genocide using these three categories; however, prior to this shall be a brief 
overview of the history of the conflict. 
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S.2.1 The Rwandan Conflict 
Throughout the 20th Century Rwanda experienced periods of what has been tenned as 
'ethnic' conflict. Specifically, the 1959-62 Revolution, during which Rwanda made the 
transition from Belgian colonial rule to independence, was the first significant 
occurrence of violence between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. Within this period "an 
estimated 10,000 Tutsi44 had been killed and ten times that number had been forced to 
flee the country" (Hintjens, 1999: 248), in addition to the overthrow of Tutsi aristocratic 
rule through the Mwami (king). In late 1963 Tutsi exiles staged an offensive from 
Burundi attacking Bugesera in the southeast. This led to the killing of an estimated 
10,000 Tutsi between December 1963 and January 1964 and the execution of all 
surviving Tutsi politicians in Rwanda (Prunier, 1995). 
Between October 1972 and February 1973 President Kayibanda, the Hutu evolue45 who 
had come to power in 1961, in a desperate attempt to cling onto power, had instigated a 
hate campaign against the Tutsis involving the creation of vigilante committees tasked 
with the enforcement of the ethnic quota policy46. The result of this campaign triggered 
a further mass exodus of Tutsis out of Rwanda in this year (Prunier, 1995). Later on in 
1973 Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana swept to power in a bloodless coup which 
received public support nationwide, including from the Tutsi. Throughout the early 
period of Habyarimana' s regime, peace was the norm; however this came at a price of a 
one-party state, the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour Ie Developpement 
(MRND), and the institutional discrimination of the Tutsi. In the 1980s however, the 
environment changed. Consecutive poor harvests (Guillebaud, 2002), land pressures 
due to high population density (Pottier, 2002), and the collapse of world coffee prices 
(Prunier, 1995; Hiltjens, 1999) conspired to destabilise the already precarious situation 
in Rwanda leading to political conflict between Hutu and Tutsi and the Northern Hutu 
elites and Hutus from the South. It was against this backdrop that Tutsi exiles in 
Uganda formed the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in 1980. In 1987 
RANU became the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), "an offensive political organisation 
dedicated to the return of exiles to Rwanda, by force ifnecessary" (Prunier, 1995: 73), 
44 This figure is placed at 20,000 by Destexhe, 1995. 
45 Evolue is a French terms used in the colonial period to describe an indigenous African who had 
'evolved' through education or assimilation and accepted European values and patterns of behaviour. 
46 See Jean-Pierre Chretien (1985), Hulll et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi, in Amselle & E'Bokolo 
(1985) (Eds). Au Coeur de I'ethnie, Paris: La Decouvette, pp. 129-66 for a more in-depth discussion. 
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which held connections with Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda 
due to· many of its hierarchy fighting Obote, the then incumbent ruler of Uganda, 
alongside the NRA. From 1987 to 1990, those in the RPF made preparations for an 
invasion of Rwanda. 
On 1st October 1990 the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the RPF, 
led by Major-General Fred Rwigyema, attacked a Rwandese border post at Kagitumba 
in Northern Rwanda and began the civil war between the Tutsi dominated RPA and the 
Hutu dominated government FAR. Over the period October 1990 to April 1994 the 
civil war was waged, with French intervention on behalf of the Rwandan government 
(Scherrer, 2002). In March 1991 a cease fire was signed in N'Sele, Zaire agreeing to 
"an immediate end to hostilities, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the establishment of 
a neutral military observer group to monitor adherence to the ceasefire, the opening of 
political dialogue within fifteen days, and an end to hostile media propaganda by both 
sides" (African Rights, 1995: 29). The ceasefire was not to hold and after a series of 
skirmishes the war escalated with a number of attacks on Tutsi communities in the 
Northwest between December 1992 and January 1993. The RPA responded with an 
assault on Kigali in February 1993, which was only halted with the support of French 
troops (African Rights, 1995). 
The breaking of the N'Sele ceasefire came during a period of peace negotiations 
between the Government of Rwanda (GoR) and the RPF. In June 1992 the Arusha 
peace process began in Arusha, Tanzania. Arusha represented an ambitious, 
sophisticated attempt to merge conflict resolution and management practices with the 
democratisation process and a complex power sharing agreement. Both the GoR and 
the RPF sent delegates however, with so much to gain from the Arusha talks, the RPF 
sent a strong, disciplined and effective negotiating team; in contrast to the weak, 
divided, undisciplined and ineffective team representing the GoR (Jones, 2001), perhaps 
indicating the level of commitment of the government to a peace process that would 
result in a reduction of power and, as history has now shown us, would lead to a 
political backlash from the angered Hutu extremists in Rwanda. 
The Arusha peace negotiations began with a cease fire; a clear signal of commitment to 
the process. The cease fire was supported by a monitoring body fonned by the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). On 18th August 1992 the Protocol on the Rule of 
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Law was signed in which the main sources of the conflict were identified and the 
principles, structures and processes necessary for the establishment of a new political 
order in Rwanda were defined. These were based on national unity, reconciliation, 
democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights (Mpungwe, 1999). Five months 
later, on 9th January 1993, the Protocol on Power Sharing was signed. This protocol 
~'identified and created organs of state with their respective powers to be 
proportionately shared by the main political forces during the transitional period. 
These organs were the presidency; the broad-based transitional government; the 
transitional National Assembly and the judiciary" (Mpungwe, 1999: 2). This followed 
by the signing of the Protocol on the Repatriation of Refugees and Resettlement of 
Displaced Persons on 9th June 1993 which provided for the mechanisms of voluntary 
repatriation of the hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees scattered around Africa 
and, to a lesser degree, Europe, and their resettlement in their choice of location in 
Rwanda. The 3rd August 1993 saw the conclusion of the Arusha peace negotiations 
with the signing of the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces and the 
Protocol on Miscellaneous Matters and Financial Provisions. The Protocol on the 
Integration of the Armed Forces was, along with the Protocol on Power Sharing, the 
most difficult to pass. It paved the way for the integration of the FAR and RP A into a 
national army with specific consideration of the composition and division of command 
and control positions and the proportional composition of the rank and file (Jones, 
1999). The Protocol on Miscellaneous Matters and Financial Provisions dealt with the 
additional aspects of duration of the transitional period, timetable for implementation, 
the relationship between the peace agreement and the National Constitution and the 
development of indictment procedures with respect to the President in case of 
agreement violations (Mpungwe, 1999). The Arusha Peace Agreement was finally 
signed on 4th August 1993 by President Habyarimana and Colonel Alexis Kanyarwenge, 
the then chairman of the RPF. 
Although the lengthy negotiation process yielded a successful outcome in terms of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement viewed as "Africa's most strategic and successful response to 
an African conflict to date" (Mpungwe, 1999: 3), the implementation of the agreement 
proved altogether more problematic. The GoR negotiating team had ceded much power 
to the RPF in the form of concessions on military composition, equal representation for 
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the MRND(D) 47 and the RPF in the twenty-one member transitional Council of 
Ministers (with five members each, the other eleven going to five of the smaller parties 
that had been established since 1991 when Rwanda became a mUlti-party state), and 
unequivocal right of return for refugees and exiles (Clapham, 1998). This loss of power 
to the Inyenzi 48 was unacceptable to the Hutu Power extremists who tapped "deep 
currents of popular feeling ... to justify and entrench their position ... It was a strategy for 
obstructing the peace and democracy process" (African Rights, 1995: 37). Support for 
President Habyarimana from Hutu extremist elements waned and it was, arguably, only 
the presence of the Akazu 49 that saved Habyarimana, although it is also argued that the 
President was manipulated by the Akazu (Prunier, 1995). President Habyarimana, 
caught between the derision and anger of Hutu extremists and pressure from both the 
RPF and the International Community to comply with the Arusha agreement, stalled the 
implementation process in a desperate attempt to retain power. 
On 6th April 1994 President Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam for a meeting with the 
Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, George Saitoti, the Vice-President of Kenyan, 
President Ntaryamira of Burundi and President Museveni of Uganda. The agenda on 
the table was regional with specific focus on events in Burundi; however H~byarimana 
was met with an onslaught of criticism from all present over his refusal to implement 
the Arusha Agreement. Habyarimana succumbed to the pressure and reaffirmed his 
commitment to Arusha (Prunier, 1995; Jones, 2001). Later that day Presidents 
Habyarimana and Ntaryamira boarded Habyarimana's presidential jet to fly back to 
Kigali and then on to Bujumbura to deliver President Ntaryamira. At around 8.30 p.m., 
as the jet was coming in to land at Kigali airport it received a direct hit from two 
missiles fired from the airport perimeter. All those on board were killed. 
The events of 6th April 1994 are commonly attributed as the catalyst for the genocide 
that was to sweep through Rwanda over the next ninety days (Kuperman, 2001). RPF 
rebels were blamed for killing the president in an attempt to re-Iaunch their offensive, 
while Hutu extremists were blamed due to their anger at the 'liberal' concessions 
47 On 5th July 1991 the MRND, under international pressure to engage in the democratisation process, 
added a second D to its name to become the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour Ie 
Developpement et la Democratie. 
48 A Rwandan word meaning Cockroaches used as a label for Tutsis by Hutus. 
49 The AIcazu, or Clan de Madame, was the nickname given to the inner core of the Habyarimana regime 
which centred around Habyarimana's wife, Agathe Habyarimana, and her powerful brothers (Prunier, 
1995). 
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Habyarimana had made in Arusha and as the death of Habyarimana mobilised the 
population and triggered the genocide, the 'final solution', which suited the extremists. 
Mystery still shrouds the identity of who was behind the assassination of President 
Habyarimana; however, what is clear is that the preparation of the genocide had been 
ongoing from late 1990 onwards. 
Over the period of the civil war the FAR had expanded from 5,000 at the time of the 
RP A invasion in 1990 to 35,000 by 1994; the Presidential Guard (GP), formed in 1990 
from the Hutu Power heartland of the Northwest, later played a key role in the genocide; 
the Gendarmerie were politicised and also held a key role in the genocide; a civilian 
militia named Interahamwe 50 was created under the banner of the 'MRND Youth 
Movement' and first engaged in massacres of Tutsis in 1992 later becoming the main 
perpetrator of the genocide; political death squads patrolled the country killing 
opposition politicians and Tutsis reported to them by the Interahamwe; arms and 
training were provided by the French, with Egypt and South Africa also supplying 
weaponry; hate propaganda was distributed throughout the country primarily via the 
extremist newspaper Kangura and the Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines 
(RTLM) (African Rights, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Clapham, 1998; Callamard, 2000; 
Dalliare, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2006). These factors, and others, contributed to 
the planning of what came to be the most efficient genocide of the twentieth century -
"In one hundred days up to one million people were hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed 
and burnt to death" (Keane, 1995: 29). 
5.2.2 Causes of the Conflict: External Influences 
The main external influence in the outbreak of conflict and genocide in Rwanda can be 
argued to be the colonial era. Prior to the colonialisation of Rwanda, Hutus, Tutsis and 
the Twa (the three social groups to be found in Rwanda) lived side by side in relative 
harmony. The Hutus, who constituted roughly 85% of the population, were 
agriculturalists who worked the land. The pastoralist Tutsi made up 1.4% of the 
population with the traditional hunter-gather Twa completing the population with 1 %. 
Generally, it is accepted that the Twa were the first inhabitants of what is now known as 
Rwanda with the Bantu Hutu coming from Central Africa and settling sometime later, 
several centuries prior to the arrival of the Tutsi from the North during the 15th and 16th 
so A Kinyarwanda word meaning 'Those who work together'. 
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century (Prunier, 1995; African Rights, 1995; Uvin, 1997; Hintjens, 1999). The social 
relationships between these three groups had their complexities with the country being a 
highly organised political system, the head of which was the Tutsi Mwami (King) 
presiding over the predominately Tutsi court. Debate exists surrounding the nature of 
the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi with claims made that, historically, the Tutsi 
aristocracy considered themselves to be superior to the Hutu and, as such, these 
prejudices manifested in the feudal system (Hintjens, 1999). Conversely, counterclaims 
stating that relations between Hutu and Tutsi were symbiotic rather than antagonistic 
(Prunier, 1995) are also made. What is clear however, is that despite the differing 
heritages of the three groups they spoke the same language, share the same culture and 
practice the same religion and as such "the Rwandans are basically a single ethnic 
group, with the differences between Hutu and Tutsi reflecting socio-economic divisions" 
(Uvin, 1997: 93). 
With the introduction of colonialism, first by Germany between 1897 and 1919 and then 
the Belgians between 1919 and 1962, social relationships within Rwanda underwent 
fundamental changes that contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1990 and the 
genocide in 1994. During German control of Rwanda few changes to the existing 
structures were made; however, it was in this period that the seeds of change were 
sowed. German explorers and anthropologists who first encountered the Rwandan 
people, returned to Europe as proponents of what was known as the Hamitic thesis. 
"Rooted in racist understandings of the inherent superiority of white European races, 
the Hamitic thesis attempted to explain Europe's encounter of sophisticated tribal 
kingdoms and peoples in their various incursions in to Africa" (Jones, 2001: 17). 
Essentially the Hamitic thesis argued that the Tutsi were originally from the Hamitic 
(Nilotic) race which had spread from the Northeast of Africa throughout Africa taking 
with them their sophisticated culture. The Tutsi, who were generally taller, lighter 
skinned and more regal looking than their Hutu counterparts, and as such closer to 
Europe races than the Bantu Hutu, had imposed their natural superiority over the Hutu 
and dominated the political arena as a result of this superiority. This was, however, a 
simplification of the social situation in Rwanda. Intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi 
over centuries had mixed original bloodlines and the initial categories of Hutu and Tutsi 
were fluid rather than fixed with mobility between the social-economic classes being 
possible; Hutu could become Tutsi and vice versa dependant on factors such as wealth, 
military prowess and family (Jones, 200 1). 
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With control of Rwanda passing from Germany to Belgium as a result of World War I, 
a more oppressive system of rule was put into place. The Belgians introduced a system 
of divide and rule favouring the 'ethnically superior' Tutsi over that of the Hutu. 
Further measures were taken to racialise the difference between Hutu and Tutsi during 
the 1933-34 official census. During this period Rwandans were classified as Hutu or 
Tutsi based on cattle ownership: if a man owned ten or more head of cattle he, and his 
children, were classified as ethnic Tutsi; those owning less than ten head of cattle were 
classified as ethnic Hutu (Mamdani, 2001). Despite the existing debate over the nature 
of the relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi prior to colonialism, and the fact that the 
classifications of Hutu and Tutsi existed in this time, the Belgian policies pursued at this 
time served to bastardise Rwanda's social system, redefining social-economic 
difference as ethnic and creating a system based on discrimination "which allowed the 
Tutsi privileged access to the state, to jobs, and to the church" (Jones, 2001: 19). 
Essentially, this created an ethnic hierarchy, at the head of which the Tutsi would sit. In 
the future this perversion of ethnicity would remain embedded within Rwandan 
consciousness and have disastrous results for Rwanda. 
With the 'winds of change' that swept across Africa in the 1950s and 1960s Rwanda 
began to avail herself to the idea of decolonialisation. This led to the Belgian colonial 
rulers to switch their allegiance from the Tutsi to the Hutu in an attempt to retain some 
influence within Rwanda in the era of African independence that was to come. The 
main effects of this change in policy were twofold: first, the minority: and now 
unsupported Tutsi, pushed "even harder to obtain independence while they still retained 
political dominance. In their quest, the Tutsi obtained support from international 
communist sources, which only reinforced Belgium's shift" (Kuperman, 2001: 6); and 
second, the Hutu began to build their own political and nationalist movement as a 
response to the oppression of the Tutsi under the colonial Belgians. This movement 
was known as the Parti du Mouvement et de I 'Emancipation des Bahutu 
(PARMEHUTU), that is, the Hutu Emancipation Party, and held the platform that the 
emancipation of the Hutu was necessary from not only from the Belgians but, more 
importantly, the Tutsi invaders from the North (Kuperman, 2001). It was against this 
backdrop that significant violence broke out between the Hutu and Tutsi for the first 
time in 1959, as the Hutu made a concerted challenge for power which resulted in the 
deaths of over 10,000 Tutsi and the migration of 100,000 to surrounding countries. 
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From this point on Hutu policy toward the Tutsi was aggressive and, in a reversal of 
roles, the Tutsi found themselves oppressed by the majority Hutu who enjoyed the 
support of Belgium. In the mid-1960s, mid-1970s and mid to late-1980s violence 
between Hutu and Tutsi erupted again, eventually embroiling the country in civil war 
between 1990-1994 and culminating in the genocide of 1994. 
A further external influence in the outbreak of civil war was the change in the economic 
situation of Rwanda. Prior to the mid-1980s the economy of Rwanda had been 
relatively well-managed; for the 90% of Rwandans living in rural areas access to 
drinking water, electricity, primary education, and basic healthcare was impressive 
when compared to other African states. The economy was stable with low inflation, 
foreign debt and corruption (Waller, 1996). This was, however, not to last. In 1986-7 
global coffee prices fell which was to have catastrophic effects for the economy, which 
was heavily dependant on the cash crop. Rwandan receipts for coffee fell from 14 
billion to 5 billion Rwandan Francs (Rf) in one year (ACR, 1989). External debt rose as 
a result of the economic shock rather than domestic mismanagement and this had 
consequential negative effects for the rest of the economy. Pressure on the existing 
redistributional mechanisms and welfare policies increased and the blame for the 
economic crisis was passed by Habyarimana to the 'parasitic' traders and 'misguided' 
intellectuals who conspired to exploit the working man and undermine social cohesion 
(Newbury, 1992). Essentially, blame for the economic crisis was placed on those 
professions in which the Tutsi tended to specialise, the result of which was to further 
damage the already fragile relationship between Hutu and Tutsi. 
5.2.3 Causes of the Conflict: Domestic Influences 
The primary domestic influence into the outbreak of the civil war and subsequent 
genocide is strongly linked to the manipulation of ethnicity undertaken by the Belgians. 
Under Belgian control and influence first the Tutsi held positions of power and privilege 
and then the Hutu held this power. However, within the country during the 1980s and 
into the 1990s political fragmentation between the Hutu took place. The tribal, or clan, 
politics system that resulted from patrimonialism in Rwanda, and the colonial and neo-
colonial influence, ensured that Habyarimana, in order to retain power, rewarded his 
supporters as they represented the foundations of his power-base. As previously 
discussed, the 'inner house', or the AIcazu, supporters, and influencers, of President 
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Habyarimana from his homeland in the Northwest held positions of power and privilege 
such that it caused division between Hutus from the North and those from the South. In 
an attempt to move away from this problem, in the late 1980s and early 1990s "ethnicity 
was used as a tool to foster mistrust of the minority, and to conceal divisions within the 
majority - in order that a tiny elite might retain its power and privileges" (MacKintosh, 
1997: 471). The pursuit of political power, and the riches that could be derived from 
such power, seduced the political elite who, in the political game of winner-takes-all, 
engaged in a policy of fragmentation; a policy which would result in the deepening of 
social cleavages between not only the Hutu and Tutsi, but also Hutu and Hutu. The 
Akazu, in their attempt to maintain power, faced threats from all sides through the push 
for democratisation and the RPF issue (Reyntjens, 1996) and as a result increased their 
extremism, which they focused with increased rancour toward the Tutsi. The effect of 
this was to exacerbate relations not only between Hutu and Tutsi but also between 
extremist Hutus and moderate Hutus, an effect that was to have severe consequences for 
moderates who were targeted in the period 1990-1994 and to a high degree in the 
genocide itself. 
A further commonly cited domestic influence on the outbreak of war and genocide was 
the demography of Rwanda. At the beginning of the civil war Rwanda, with a 
population of slightly over 7.1 million, had the highest population density of all African 
states standing at 380 per square kilometre of arable land in 1989 (Nduwayezu, 1990). 
Such a high population density, although not independently and out rightly causing the 
conflict and subsequent genocide, was undoubtedly used by the Habyarimana regime as 
a tool with which the blame for Rwanda's ails could be directed toward the Tutsi. 
Indeed, the 'overpopulation' argument was utilised to great effect by Habyarimana, the 
result of which was to attract international aid and to provide a counter-argument to the 
demands made by the RPF regarding the repatriation of Tutsi refugees (African Rights, 
1995). During the genocide itself radio broadcasts were made to the Hutu masses 
warning of the Tutsi threat of "re-imposing feudalism, wiping out all the Hutus and 
taking their land" (Berkeley, 2002: 111). Additionally, the motivation of many 
genocidaires to engage in the genocide was the promise of their victims' land (Prunier, 
1995). Thus, despite the 'overpopulation' argument being somewhat of a myth, it was 
influential in directing the heads and minds of the Hutu population towards greater 
'ethnic' division. 
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5.2.4 Causes of the Conflict: Psychosocial Aspects 
Linked to both colonial and neo-colonial issues and the pervasiveness of the State 
within Rwandan society is the third influence in the outbreak of conflict and genocide: 
that of the psychosocial nature of Rwandan society. Prior to colonialisation, Rwandan 
society had been highly stratified and as such hierarchical. This had resulted in a high 
level of obedience within the population. During the colonial period levels of 
obedience remained high and this continued in the post-independence era. At this time 
the Habyarimana regime deepened the social structures that enabled such obedience 
through "a top-down network of control rooted in the precolonial kingdom, codified by 
the colonisers, and preserved after independence ... Rwanda is a nation of followers, 
people who "must obey the rules," and do" (Berkeley, 2002: 108 & 106). The 
conformity of the population and the dominance of the state in almost all aspects of 
social and commercial life combined to produce an environment in which orders 
travelled efficiently from top to bottom and were followed just as efficiently. "The 
result was a highly efficient machinery of government that enabled the implementation 
of a complex genocide plan in a short period of time, using highly effective propaganda 
techniques and with a high degree of military preparedness" (Hintjens, 1999: 271). 
The respect for authority, however legitimate or illegitimate, held by the Rwandan 
population is generally seen as a key factor in the genocide that resulted from the 1990-
1994 civil war. Not only is this specific for the case of Rwanda but as Stanley Milgram 
has proposed, respect for authority can lead individuals to inflict pain and even death on 
others with no feelings of guilt or responsibility (Milgram, 1974). 
The complex combination of external, domestic and psychosocial influences 
contributed to the outbreak of civil war in Rwanda and the genocide that followed. The 
following section applies Stanton's (1998) Eight Stages of Genocide model to Rwanda 
and provides examples of occurrences in Rwanda that contributed to the completion of 
each stage. 
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5.3 Rwanda: The Eight Stages of Genocide 
Stanton's (1998) Eight Stages of Genocide model presents a useful tool with which one 
can examine the process of the genocide in such as way as to provide the foundations 
for a deeper understanding of how such a phenomenon may affect social capital in a 
genocidal and post-genocidal environment. The remainder of this section will apply 
Stanton's model to Rwanda and will provides examples and analysis of each of the 
eight stages: classification, symbolisation, dehumanisation, organisation, polarisation, 
identification, extermination, and denial. 
a) Classification 
Classification is the creation of categories that distinguish people between 'us' and 
'them' and is a feature of all societies and cultures. Such classification is not 
necessarily negative however; if systems through which ethnic or racial divisions can be 
transcended are not put into place then the likelihood for bipolar societies lacking mixed 
categories to descend into genocide is increased (Stanton, 1998). 
In Rwanda systems of classification have been used throughout all of recorded history; 
however, it was not until the colonial period that such classifications became 
malevolent. Prior to colonialism the classification between Hutu and Tutsi was one of 
socio-economic status with mobility between the two classifications being possible. 
Relative harmony between the two groups was a feature of this time and social relations 
were, on the whole, strong. Intermarriage occurred, and indeed thrived, with beneficial 
effects for Hutu and Tutsi alike. Whilst there may have been antagonisms due to wealth 
and power distributions this generally did not manifest into antagonism between Hutu 
and Tutsi. In fact, it was that case that some Hutu could be rich and powerful and 
likewise, some Tutsi were poor with no power (Prunier, 1995; African Rights 1995; 
Destexhe, 1995; Scherrer, 2002).' 
Classifications between Hutu and Tutsi altered and became deeper, with a negative 
subtext, as a result of the colonialisation process and the colonial policies implemented 
during this time. The Belgian policies of privileging the Tutsi and the perversion of 
'ethnicity' served to engender a society of distrust, hatred and antagonism. In this 
simmering cauldron of discontent the classification between Hutu and Tutsi became 
158 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
rigid and embodied a process of fragmentation and division with no system in place 
through which tolerance and reasoning could be promoted. The Catholic Church in 
Rwanda, an institution which one would think could transcend the division between 
Hutu and Tutsi, not only failed in this endeavour but actually exacerbated the already 
complex situation. In the colonial period the Catholic Church was Tutsi dominated. 
However, when independence occurred the church, in the same way as the Belgians, 
transferred allegiances to the Hutu. Throughout these periods it became "a legitimising 
factor, a banner, a source of profit, a way of becoming educated, a club, a matrimonial 
agency and even at times a religion. But since it was all things to all men, it could not 
have any real healing power when faced with the deepening ethnic gap which the 
Belgian authorities kept absentmindedly digging" (Prunier, 1995: 34). The unimpeded 
(re)c1assification process in Rwanda was to provide the foundations on which the 
genocide was to take place and served as a destructive influence on the social fabric of 
Rwandan society; an influence that will resonate through time" and may prove to be a 
destabilising effect on the reconciliation process. 
b) Symbolisation 
Symbolisation did not take place in Rwanda in the same way as it did in Nazi Germany 
where Jews were made to wear the yellow star to identify them as Jews, or in Khmer 
Rouge Cambodia where those from the Eastern Zone where forced to wear a blue scarf. 
Indeed, symbols of difference that were used were more tacit in their nature and were 
used both in the colonial period to symbolise the assumed superiority of the Tutsi over 
the Hutu, and in the independence era to symbolise Hutu supremacy over the Tutsi. 
Symbolisation in Rwanda generally took place in the form of policy. During the 
colonial period race education played an important role in symbolising the classification 
differences of Hutu and Tutsi. Tutsi privilege in both the school system and local 
administration provided the symbols of difference (Mamdani, 2001). The school 
system represented the "womb of racial ideology" (Mamdani, 2001: 89) through which 
the ethnic hierarchy was justified and expanded. Throughout the colonial period, and in 
particular, in the 1930s, the schools system crystallised the notion of such a hierarchy 
with admission restricted mainly to Tutsi (particularly to upper schools) and the quality 
of education received by the Tutsi being superior to that of the Hutu. Such 
discrimination not only passed through to the administrative system, but also aided this 
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transfer. The discriminatory school system dictated the future for most Rwandese, with 
the Tutsi progressing into positions of wealth, power and privilege whilst the Hutu were 
groomed for a life of manual labour, discrimination and oppression. In the 
administrative system this translated to a more ordered form of discrimination. The 
restructuring of local government focused power into Tutsi hands, which served to 
reinforce the ideology of Tutsi racial superiority. "The new Tutsi chiefs were the 
products of schools for the sons of Tutsi chiefs. Nourished on a diet of Hamitic 
supremacy, they were appointed chiefs as if by birthright" (Mamdani, 2001: 91). The 
systems of privilege constructed in Rwanda represented symbols of superiority that 
deepened social cleavages and provided fertile ground in which the seeds of genocide 
were planted. 
As Belgian allegiance transferred from Tutsi to Hutu throughout the 1950s the symbols 
of classification that existed in Rwanda remained the same; however, in the same way 
as the Belgians, these symbols too switched their allegiance from Tutsi to Hutu. After 
independence, privilege was bestowed on the now ruling Hutu. In the same way as the 
Tutsi had discriminated against the Hutu, the Hutu now discriminated against the Tutsi. 
The symbols of classification remained the same but ownership of these classifications 
changed hands. The Tutsi, from occupying the top of the ethnic hierarchy in the pre-
colonial and colonial periods, now occupied a place at the bottom of the hierarchy and 
were now identified as an alien race. The social cleavages that had developed through 
the discriminatory practices of the colonisers deepened further as a result of 
discrimination against the Tutsi and the Tutsi grievance that ensued. 
c) Dehumanisation 
Key to the progression of the genocide in Rwanda was the dehumanisation process that 
took place in the 1980s and 1990s. The dehumanisation process occurs when the 
humanity of one group is denied by the other group and as a result "overcomes the 
normal human revulsion against murder" (Stanton, 1998: 1). In Rwanda the 
dehumanisation process was a highly organised and extremely effective endeavour 
characterised by a climate of fear and distrust. 
The common term used to describe Tutsi in Rwanda after the 1959 Revolution was 
Inyenzi meaning cockroach. Over the course of time the frequency of use of the term 
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increased and with the degree of dehumanisation of the Tutsi. In schools teachers 
required Tutsi children to stand up and confirm themselves as Inyenzi, they were then 
~eparated from the Hutus and ridiculed for their 'ethnicity' (Prunier, 1995; Gourevitch, 
1998). In 1990 the process of dehumanisation gathered speed and, spurred on by the 
Arusha Peace Agreement, became imbedded within daily life in Rwanda. At this time 
the leading proponent of the dehumanisation message was the bimonthly magazine 
Kangura, which regularly disseminated messages of hate. Indeed, Kangura was 
"denounced by the International Commission of Jurists for its vicious incitement of 
racial hatred' (La Brosse, 1995 cited in Chalk, 2000: 95). The messages Kangura 
spread had a second, important impact on the decline into genocide. In the early 1990s, 
as the democratisation process was occurring, moderate Hutus who made attempts to 
build a society in which Hutu and Tutsi could live together, founded parties in 
opposition to the MRNDD. The newspaper Kangura, with its influence derived from 
senior extremist members of the military and intelligence services, was able to silence 
the voices of moderate Hutus who attempted to diffuse the volatile situation as well as 
admonish Hutus who rejected its divisive tendencies (African Rights, 1995). In doing 
so Kangura served to negate opposition to the increase in racial hatred and provided an 
avenue through which the architects of the genocide could gain the necessary public 
participation for the genocide to take place. 
The racialist propaganda machine gathered increased momentum with the creation of 
the radio station RTLM in September 1993. For rural Africa the radio serves as the 
primary tool through which to disseminate information. In Rwanda RTLM's function 
was to destabilise opposition to the forthcoming genocide through the incitement of 
violence between Tutsi and moderate Hutus as well as stoking the fires of ethnic hatred 
through its vitriolic messages of hate targeted towards the Tutsi (Chalk, 2000). RTLM 
went on to crystallise such messages of hate throughout the genocide and represented a 
crucial tool for the mechanisms of genocide to dehumanise its intended victims and 
polarise the two groups. 
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d) Organisation 
In 90 days the genocide claimed the lives of approximately 800,000, primarily through 
the use of rudimentary weapons such as machetes, masus5/, spears, knives and bow and 
arrows as well as more conventional weaponry such as automatic rifles, mortars and 
grenades (African Rights, 1995). This represented "within three months, the most 
intense period of slaughter at any time in the twentieth century anywhere in the world, 
with more people killed per day than even during the Nazi Holocaust" (Huband, 2001: 
184). In order for such an effective killing machine to operate, organisation of the 
genocidal system was a prerequisite and it is argued by many that such organisation 
took place over a number of years prior to the outbreak of genocide (African Rights, 
1995; Prunier, 1995; Mamdani, 2001; Scherrer, 2002). The organisation of the 
genocide was so crucial due to the need for Hutu Power extremists to mobilise the 
sentiments of the masses. As Mamdani notes, "if we are to understand the context of 
the mass killings that together constituted the hundred-days genocide, we need to move 
away from an assumption of the genocide as simply a conspiracy from above to an 
understanding of how perceptions could radically shift in response to an equally radical 
change in forces and circumstances - by making the genocide thinkable" (2001: 195). 
The organisation of the genocide had many facets. Perhaps the most obvious of these 
was military organisation and this included not only the organisation of the government-
controlled military but also the creation and training of militias, the flow and stockpiling 
of weaponry and the financing of the genocide. Attributed with the overall role of 
organising the genocide is Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, the Director of Services in the 
Ministry of Defence, however the organisation of the government-controlled military 
was essentially overseen by the Defence Minister, Major-General Augustin Bizimana 
"who oversaw the logistics and also influenced the reluctant elements in the FAR so 
they would not stand in the way" (Prunier, 1995: 240). He was aided in this work by the 
commander of the paratroopers, Colonel Aloys Ntabakuze, and Lieut. - Colonel Protias 
Mpiranya, Head of the Presidential Guard (GP). Between the RPA invasion in October 
1990 and start. of the genocide the size of the army had expanded from 5,000 men with 
limited combat experience to approximately 35,000. Throughout the genocide the 
primary role played by the military was that of organising, training and arming the 
militias, which was critical in terms of the effectiveness of the genocide. As African 
SI The masus is a club studded with nails. 
162 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of Y orlc, 2008 
Rights argue, "such a large number of people would never have died in Rwanda if it 
was notfor the role played by the army" (1995: 48). Although this was the primary role 
of the military, there were many incidents of direct massacres by the military as well as 
the military providing reinforcements when required by the Interahamwe. The GP were 
particularly active particularly in terms of political assassinations, pe~haps due to their 
allegiance to the President and the Akazu. 
Key then to the instigation and development of the genocide was the creation of 
militias. The most active of the militias were the Interahamwe who, from 1992, carried 
out sporadic attacks on the Tutsi populations and then, from April to June 1994, 
conducted the genocide in earnest. The Interahamwe began as the MRNDD youth wing 
developing into a fully operational killing machine with the introduction of new 
members and training by the GP and French military advisors. The ranks of the 
Interahamwe were filled with young unemployed and disenfranchised men seduced by 
the promise of be~r, money and looting potential (African Rights, 1995). It is this 
militia that is attributed as the worst of those involved in the genocide. Another group 
involved in the genocide were attached to the Interahamwe and were made up from 
refugees from Burundi and Zaire (DRC). In particular, the Burundian refugees had a 
reputation for extreme brutality and were involved in massacres in Gitarama, Bugesera, 
Nyamirambo, Butare, Cyangugu and Gisenyi. The third faction or militia that played a 
significant role was that of the Death Squads coordinated by "Network Zero". The 
Death Squads worked between the GP and the Interahamwe and were responsible for 
targeted assassinations of those named by the Interahamwe. 
The role of the militias was reliant on the supply of arms, which took place via several 
channels. The supply of machetes was Ubiquitous due to its prevalence as a farming 
tool. However, in the years preceding the genocide, machetes were imported en masse, 
from China in particular, and other sources. The supply of more sophisticated 
weaponry primarily came from France, Egypt and South Africa. Although the supply of 
arms to the military and the militias proved to have devastating consequences 
throughout the course of the genocide, arguably the most influential factor was the 
training provided to the military and the militias, in particular by the French. Military 
intelligence gathering and training of the FAR, Gendarmerie and the GP was undertaken 
by the French throughout the period 1990-1994. The GP then went on to train the 
Interahamwe under the noses of the French. Whilst the argument could be made that 
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French policy in Rwanda was a response to an 'external' invasion, the level of political 
violence within the country between 1990 and 1994 would suggest either a degree of 
naivety on the part of the French, or a distinct involvement. As Callamard notes "the 
appointment of French advisers within the highest ranks of Rwandese military and 
political authority, the presence of French soldiers manning checkpoints, and France's 
contribution to the rapid expansion of the armed forces and the Presidential Guard are 
sufficient in and by themselves to raise very serious concerns regarding French military 
ethics in particular and French policy more generally" (2000: 167). 
The organisation of the genocide did not, in this case, represent a distinct and separate 
stage of the genocide as in Stanton's model. Because the genocide was planned and 
orchestrated by the higher echelons of the Hutu Power extremists the organisation stage 
of the genocide can be seen as being more fluid, taking place within each of the other 
stages and because of the other stages. That is, the classification, symbolisation, 
dehumanisation, polarisation, identification and extermination of the Tutsi by the Hutu 
required organisation but also each stage contributed to the overall organisation of the 
genocidal process. Therefore, much of the organisational aspects of the process are 
discussed in each of the stages. 
e) Polarisation 
Polarisation between Hutu and Tutsi was an ongoing process throughout the colonial 
and post-colonial periods however it was not until the RP A invasion of 1990 that this 
process really gathered speed. Perhaps the most influential tool used in the polarisation 
process was the Hutu Ten Commandments published in 1990 by the Kangura 
newspaper. The Hutu Ten Commandments captured the Hutu extremist ideology that 
was being developed and disseminated at this time. They included: 
1) Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for 
the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a 
traitor any Hutu who: 
• Marries a Tutsi woman; 
• Befriends a Tutsi woman; 
• Employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or concubine. 
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2) Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and 
conscientious in their role as woman, wife and more of the family. Are 
they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? 
3) Hutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons 
back to reason. 
4) Every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His 
only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Hutu who 
dpes the following is a traitor: 
• Makes a partnership with Tutsi in business; 
• Invests his money or the government's money In a Tutsi 
enterprise; 
• Lends or borrows money from a Tutsi; 
• Gives favours to Tutsi in busiriess (obtaining import licences, 
bank loans, constructions sites, public markets ... ). 
5) All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and 
security should be entrusted to Hutu. 
6) The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority 
Hutu. 
7) The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience 
of the October [1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member of the 
military shall marry a Tutsi52. 
8) The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi. 
9) The Hutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be 
concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. 
• The Hutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for 
friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu 
brother; 
• They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda; 
• The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi 
enemy. 
10) The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu 
Ideology, must be widely taught to every Hutu at every level. Every Hutu 
52 From before 1990 no member of FAR could marry a Tutsi without official pennission. 
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must spread this ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother 
Hutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology is a traitor. 
Published in Kangura, 10 December 1990. 
The Hutu Ten Commandments set the standard for what was expected of the Hutu in 
terms of how they related to the Tutsi and this proved to be pivotal in the mobilisation 
of the Hutu masses. Essentially, they played "on simplistic notions of "majority rule" 
and the homogenous nation-state, equating these with democracy. In the hands of 
clever journalists, academics and diplomats, this was a highly effective component of 
the ideology, appealing to Rwandese and westerners alike" (African Rights, 1995: 43). 
However, the Ten Commandments alone could not polarise Hutu and Tutsi to the 
degree necessary for the outbreak of the genocide. The role of the media in reinforcing 
the process was crucial. Both Kangura and R TLM made regular statements subjecting 
the Tutsi to hateful propaganda including; explicit and regular citations to mass murder, 
verbal attacks, the publishing of lists of Tutsis to be killed and threats to the families of 
Tutsis (Chretien, 1991; Centre Nord-Sud, 1994). Such propaganda continued 
throughout the genocide with perhaps the best-known broadcast from RTLM, "You 
have missed some of the enemies. You must go back there and finish them off. The 
graves are not yet full 1,,53. 
The broadcasts promoting the genocide that were made by the Rwanda media were all 
the more powerful due to the fear that had developed over the late 1980s and the 1990s 
preceding the genocide. This had begun with the government creating a climate of 
ambiguity through the Arusha Peace Process and had evolved into a climate of fear by 
the outbreak of the genocide. Commands to engage in "bush clearing"S4 and "pulling 
out the roots of the bad weeds"ss were heard widely and fear was placed in the hearts of 
the Hutu masses of the Tutsi invasion in which Rwanda would be re-colonised by the 
Tutsi. On particular speech that strongly influenced the genocidal wave was from the 
leading Hutu Power politician Leon Mugesera, "They [the Tutsi] belong in Ethiopia and 
we are going to find them a shortcut to get there by throwing them in the Nyabarongo 
River [which flows north]. I must insist on this point. We have to act. We have to wipe 
them all out/" (Mugesera, cited in Prunier, 1995: 172). Two years later the genocide 
53 RTLM. Kigali, Rwanda, 1994. 
,. Bush clearing was the tenn, used by the media and political figures. for chopping up men 
" Pulling out the roots of the bad weeds, used by the media and political figures, was the term used for 
the slaughtering of women and children. 
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began. Tens of thousands of mostly Tutsi bodies floated down the Nyaborongo River 
and washed up on the shores of Lake Victoria in Uganda. This indicates the strong 
effect the rhetoric of leaders in Rwanda had. The climate of fear that had developed 
was enabled by the structured nature of Rwandan society, which had fostered a culture 
of obedience. The commands issued to the masses by the media and by local and 
national level politicians were followed. The obedient nature of Rwandan society thus 
had enormous implications for the polarisation of Hutu and Tutsi and the subsequent 
genocide. 
f) Identification 
In the conducting of genocide the identification of its victims is a vital part of the 
process and is connected with its organisation. The identification of the victims in 
Rwanda was made much easier again because of the hierarchical nature of Rwanda 
society. Death lists of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were drawn 'up by local Interahamwe 
members and passed onto their leaders and the Death Squads and GP. Throughout the 
genocide itself much of the identification of victims was conducted through the use of 
roadblocks and checks on identity cards, which stated the carriers' ethnic group. The 
tool used by the Belgian colonials to aid divide-and-rule thereby became the most useful 
weapon in the extremists' arsenal. Marauding Interahamwe were directed to people 
hidden by relatives or neighbours via radio reports (Article 19, 1996: 101) or by 
civilians, both Hutu and Tutsi, attempting to secure their own survival. Massacres 
occurred where people congregated for security, in places such as churches and schools, 
as those people were adjudged to be enemies of the Hutu 
g) Extermination 
The genocide began on the evening of the 6th April 1994 after President Habyarimana's 
aircraft was shot down over Kigali airport. The first on the death lists to be killed were 
moderate Hutu opposition members who were targeted by the GP. These included the 
President of the Constitutional Court, Joseph Kavaruganda, and Minister of Information, 
Faustin Rucogoza and then, on the morning of 7th April, Prime Minister Agatbe 
Uwilingimana. These assassinations were crucial in what was proving to be a Coup 
d'Etat against the backdrop of genocide. The President of the Constitutional Court held 
influence in the swearing in of senior politicians while the Minister of Information had 
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authority over Radio Rwanda. All three were members of the Hutu opposition. As 
word of the President's death spread, so too did the call to arms as the Hutu masses 
were mobilised to join the slaughter of the Tutsi. 
The violence spread out from Kigali across the country. Neighbours killed neighbours, 
teachers killed pupils, and husbands killed wives (Destexhe, 1995). At road check 
points the Interahamwe slaughtered all Tutsi, and some Hutu who were perceived to 
look like a Tutsi. Tutsis fled their homes looking for refuge. Some were hidden by 
neighbours or relatives. Others sought the sanctuary of churches; however, in some 
cases, this proved to be a devastating strategy. In Kibuye parish over 4,000 Tutsi were 
killed as they sought refugee in the church, in Nyarubuye over 3,000 and in Ntarama 
there were so many dead it was impossible to count, "it was impossible to enter the 
church because bodies were piled so high at the entrance. This made it very difficult to 
estimate the death toll; but looking through the window, every inch of the inside of the 
church was taken up by corpses which were piled on top of each other" (African Rights, 
1995: 261-2). In cases such as this the killing often took place over a number of days 
and would involve the use of grenades and mortars frequently with military 
reinforcements. "The killers did not spare women, old people, children or even babies" 
(Prunier, 1995: 248). 
Other hiding places were in the roof cavities of buildings, in banana groves, car wrecks, 
pit latrines, swamps, anywhere that was hoped to provide some degree of cover. The 
Interahamwe routinely searched such places and killed anyone they found there. 
Neighbours would inform on the whereabouts of their neighbours through fear of 
reprisal. The killings went on for 90 days until the RP A gained control of the country. 
Some two million Rwandan refugees fled into Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and the DRe, 
the majority of them Hutu peasants forced to flee by the retreating deposed government 
and the FAR who used the refugees as a human shield. Over the course of the genocide 
the widely quoted figure of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. 
h) Denial 
Denial was, and still is, a key feature of the Rwandan genocide. Throughout the 
genocide itself the government cut domestic communication channels and engaged in a 
strategy of misleading the international press. By following such strategies and denying 
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the genocide the government was able to conceal the truth for three weeks, which 
proved instrumental in the effectiveness of the genocide. It was in the first three weeks 
that most people were killed. Although this has something to do with the fact that the 
killings slowed due to it being more difficult to find the victims as many of them had 
been killed, the three-week period of unrelenting killing was enabled through a 
combination of the denials of the government and the naivety of the international press 
and governments. 
Denials of the genocide or roles within the genocide are made to this day from all levels 
of the genocidal organisation. At the highest level of the justice process, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), denials that it was a genocide that 
took place or denials of specific roles within the genocide take place (Berkeley, 2001). 
This serves to not only absorb revenue that could be more effectively used in the 
reconstruction effort but more importantly, prolongs the suffering of the victims and 
damages the reconciliation process. Denial from the top also takes place outside of the 
ICTR. Agathe Habyarimana, the wife of President Habyarimana and the centre of the 
powerful Akazu, is to this day living in France and denies any role in the genocide 
(BBC, 2007). Further down the hierarchy of genocidal organisation denial still occurs. 
Many genocidaires remain in Eastern DRC were they have engaged in insurgencies into 
the North West of Rwanda. The denial of these people threatened the future of Rwanda 
and may serve to destabilise relations between Hutu and Tutsi (African Rights, 1998). 
Associated to denials of the genocide is the blame that is sometimes attached to the 
victims. Indeed, this can be a highly dangerous phenomenon. The culture of blame 
arises as a perverse justification for the crime. As Moore states, "for injustice to be 
acceptable evidently it must resemble justice" (1978: 55), therefore extremist 
movements such as the Hutu Power movement seek to rationalise and justify 
exclusionary practices. To this end, "the party which seeks to take power by instituting 
and legalising exclusion, expulsion, segregation and [even] extermination, claims to be 
a victim itself' (Guillaumin, 1990: 9). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Tutsi were 
made into a scapegoat for the evils of the colonial period and problems since 
independence. In order to maintain their grip on power Habyarimana and the Alcazu 
invested in this culture of blame, particularly through the Bahima conspiracy in which it 
was argued that the Tutsi were making plans to engage in a political genocide by 
slaughtering enough Hutu to ensure an electoral majority (Lemarchand, 1996). This 
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would result in, at a minimum; the re-colonisation of the Hutu by the Tutsi (Chretien, 
1995; Thibon, 1995) and, as such, drastic preventative methods needed be put in place. 
This essentially enabled the Hutu elite to generate a climate of fear, which provided the 
foundation from which the organisation of the genocide could be built. "In this 
allegorical account of events, the RPF ceased to be a nationalist military force based on 
Rwanda exiles, with a socialist political orientation. Instead, it was depicted as a 
royalist army of pastoralist raiders, intent on restoring feudalism across the entire 
Great Lakes region" (Chretiens, 1995: 253 cited in Hintjens, 1999: 264). The blame 
culture that was developed within Rwanda has influenced the degree of genocide denial, 
which, as previously noted, has subsequent negative effects on reconciliation. 
5.4 Rwanda: The Transformation of Social Capital 
The previous section has provided an in-depth, secondary account of how the Rwandan 
Genocide was made possible. This section introduces primary data for the first time in 
this thesis and intends to put forward an analysis build from data collected over two 
periods in the field, which addresses the transformation of social capital in Rwanda. It 
will draw on the results of life histories taken from ex-combatants and civilians, PRA 
exercises with rural civilians, and elite interviews with policy officials. The section .is 
divided into two sub-sections: social capital in the pre-1990 civil war period and social 
capital in the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide period. Social capital in the post-1994 
Genocide period will be discussed as part of chapter seven. 
5.4.1 Social Capital in the pre-1990 Civil War Period 
As previously established, Rwanda experienced relative harmony in the pre-colonial 
period with Hutu, Tutsi and Twa living together in a community. During this time 
bonding social capital was more the social capital of a geographical community, that is, 
a village. Villages had bonds that tied them together and aided the functioning as a 
community. Bridging social capital was the social capital between geographical 
communities, that is, it was the bridge between different village communities. Vertical 
social capital, or synergy, was the social capital between the state, as it was in that 
period, and all communities. Whilst the Tutsi monarchy dominated in this period and 
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society was somewhat decentralised in terms of zones of influence, relative peace 
prevailed. 
With the coming of colonialisation all types of social capital were transformed. Due to 
Belgian ethnicisation of Hutu and Tutsi, and the elevation of the latter, social capital 
became based around constructed ethnicities. Vertical social capital became 
discriminatory with the Tutsi being favoured at the expense of the Hutu. This had the 
effect of strengthening bonding social capital between Hutu as they attempted to cope 
with and overcome the discrimination they experienced. Similarly, bonding social 
capital between Tutsi was also strengthened in order to maintain their position of 
privilege. Combined, the transformation of vertical and bonding social capital had the 
effect of weakening bridging social capital between Hutu and Tutsi. However, perhaps 
due to the presence of the colonial power, this weakening of bridging social capital was 
never permitted to reach the point at which it would lead to serious conflict; rather it 
was kept at a level that ensured Hutu and Tutsi could not cooperate together to 
undermine Belgian dominion. 
At the onset of independence, social capital in Rwanda transformed again and continued 
to do so up to the period of the conflict in 1990. With the shift in power from Tutsi to 
Hutu a change in the relations within vertical social capital also occurred. Vertical 
social capital between the State and the Hutu strengthened with Hutu being elevated 
into favour whilst vertical social capital between the State and the Tutsi weakened due 
to State persecution in retaliation for Tutsi discrimination in the colonial period. Over 
time, in the period before the 1990 civil war, as Hutu discrimination towards Tutsi 
increased, bonding social capital between Tutsi strengthened in response. As one 
civilian noted, "if people are facing the same problem it becomes a basis for them to 
feel understanding better than before in good times so they become much closer than 
before because they were being oppressed together in the same way"S6. During this 
time bonding social capital between Hutu remained relatively strong. In some instances 
it may have increased, particularly in geographical areas with a high proportion of Hutu 
extremists (predominately in the Northwest) who sought to capitalise on the weak 
vertical social capital between the State and Tutsis, or a relatively high proportion of 
Tutsi (predominately the East and South) in which they felt somewhat under threat. In 
other areas it may have remained unaltered. 
56 Interview with C1V20, October 2006. 
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Bridging social capital at the local level depended to a large degree on geographical 
location. In the East there was a weakening of bridging social capital due to segregation 
developing between Hutu and Tutsi children with Tutsis being denied continued access 
to school57. However, in the South there was more contestation with some, both Hutu 
and Tutsi, stating there were no problems between the groups whilst others differed 
with one in particular stating that, as early as 1960, "because it was coming from high 
authority all children were pressed to know where they came from. That's when hatred 
started in a bad way, deep hatred between peop/e,,58 . 
Rwandans in the West pre-1990 seemed to be more cohesive than in any other part of 
the country. Of the eleven ex-combatants"and three civilians interviewed in the West all 
believed relations between Hutu and Tutsi to be relatively good anq it was not until 
1990 that these relations really changed. According to one ex-combatant who joined the 
RPF in 1993 it was not until the RPF started in 1990 that "confusion" started between 
Hutu and Tutsi 59 . Up to that point "Rwandans lived well, they had weddings, 
intermarriage, and they were visiting each other as neighbours. There was not this kind 
of lacking of trust [ ... ] for me according to what I know things started changing in 1990. 
That's when Hutus started killing Tutsis,,6o. In the North too, relations were considered 
to be relatively good. Interestingly, two Hutu civilians from this area reported that they 
either had a godfather who was a Tutsi61 or acted as a godfather to a Tutsi family62. Ex-
combatants in this area also attested to good relations between Hutu and Tutsi, again 
making reference to intermarriage and reciprocal exchange between the two groups. 
Bridging social capital between Hutu and Tutsi in Kigali in the pre-1990 period suffered 
mostly due to the proximity to the discriminatory vertical social capital that targeted 
Tutsi. Of those civilians interviewed in Kigali, 50% of them all drew attention to their 
experience of their segregation as children in schools, stating that their teachers 
routinely separated pupils into three groups according to ethnic group. The divisive 
practices of the government had the effect of amplifying the supposed difference 
between Hutu and Tutsi through strengthening the bonding social capital of these two 
.57 Interviews with XCRDF4 and XCRDFS, June 2007 . 
.5a Interview with CIV6, June 2007 . 
.59 Interview with XCRDF21, June 2007. 
60 Interview with XCAG6, June 2007. 
61 Interview with CIV14, July 2007. 
62 Interview with CIV 1 S, July 2007. 
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groups as the following quote demonstrates: "The only problem was at school because 
they used to ask us which ethnic group we belonged to and when you were a Tutsi there 
was a problem and when you were a Hutu there were so many you felt like a king, to be 
a Hutu was a privilege,,63. 
Geographical differences influenced the effects of bonding social capital on bridging 
social capital between Hutu and Tutsi. In those areas in which bonding social capital 
became much more based on ethnic bonds and was relatively strong this translated into 
relatively weak bridging social capital. This was particularly the case in Kigali and in 
the East and South. Perhaps not surprisingly, these areas suffered heavy human loses in 
the genocide. The three forms of social capital (vertical, bonding and bridging) 
continued to transform in the pre-civil war period. However, as the civil war approached, 
the negative connotations attached to such transformation became increasingly evident. 
The next section considers the ways in which social capital transformed throughout the 
civil war and genocide period. 
5.4.2 Social Capital in the 1990-1994 Civil War and Genocide Period 
Literature addressing the Rwandan genocide places a high degree of culpability with the 
extremist Hutu government and this view is supported by those interviewed, Hutu and 
Tutsi alike. In the immediate period leading up to the civil war, relations between Hutu 
and Tutsi were suffering as a result of discriminatory vertical social capital practised by 
the Hutu government towards the Tutsi. With the invasion of the RP A and the outbreak 
of civil war in October 1990 the persecution of the Tutsi by the government increased 
and so, whilst "Hutu and Tutsi interacted somehow, the problem was the 
implementation of politics by the government which taught one group [Hutu] to hate 
another [Tutsi] and to see how they can use one group to destroy and eliminate the 
other, and from that there some signals from the instruction given to the Hutu against 
the Tutsi"64. According to one ex-combatants the reason for this was a struggle for 
power in which the people were manipulated by a bad leadership who deliberately 
orchestrated division between Hutu and Tutsi in order to meet its own objectives; "What 
people argue for is power [ ... ] you find that lower leaders say, 'if I remove that big man 
I will have a better life, I will drive a nice car, I will have a big house. Before he 
63 Interview with elV 16, October 2006. 
64 Interview with CIV20, October 2006. 
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removes him he will first go through villagers and the population to divide them so he 
goes through the population and brings a darkness in the population, it is only through 
bad leadership that things changecl,65. 
The government became solely a government for the Hutu and engaged in propaganda 
that served to alienate the Tutsi from society. Tutsis were called Inyenzi and snake and 
were frequently accused of being spies for the RP A. Government policies of exclusion 
and discrimination translated to a complete breakdown of vertical social capital between 
the State and Tutsis with a corresponding strengthening of vertical social capital 
between the State and Hutus; a process that continued and indeed intensified the more 
protracted the conflict became. Such a transformation of vertical social capital had 
important implications for both bonding and bridging social capital. 
The strengthening of vertical social capital between the State and Hutus served to 
privilege Hutus over Tutsis and thus crystallise the notion of group bonds being 
established and reinforced along ethnic lines. The creation of political parties weakened 
the position of the Tutsi and propaganda such as the Hutu Ten Commandments and 
newspapers dehumanised the Tutsi and foretold of a Tutsi attempt to gain power and 
kill Hutus. A climate of fear was created in which the Hutu were sensitised to believe 
that they were surrounded by Tutsi spies66• Rumour, lies and speCUlation regarding the 
RP A was spread in order to mystify their presence and create distrust among the 
population. This was ratcheted up to reach a level whereby, upon the death of 
President Habyarimana, orders were passed down the hierarchy to eliminate the Tutsi, 
"we kept hearing on the radio, we were hearing a journalist called Kantonoe saying 
stand on the roadblocks, don't let anyone survive,,67. 
Over this period, bonding social capital between Hutus strengthened in the face of 
perceived threat and the promise of land. Perhaps the most chilling example of such 
overly strong bonding social capital between Hutus came from the genocide itself. To 
kill 800,000 people over the course of 100 days using such rudimentary weapons as 
machetes, spears and clubs takes a great deal of unity and cooperation. Whilst the 
genocide may have been planned and orchestrated by the ruling elite, it was put into 
6$ Interview with XCFARS, July 2007. 
66 Interview with C1V14, July 2007. 
67 Interview with CIVIS, October 2006. 
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practice by the population. This not only indicates the degree of control the State had 
over the population, but also the bonds between Hutu. Although on the whole bonding 
social capital between Hutus strengthened at this time there were those who resisted the 
State and helped the RP A and members of the Tutsi population targeted by the 
Interahamwe. Seemingly such behaviour was based on the ties that had previously 
bound certain people together. In one surprising interview a Tutsi civilian gave 
testimony of how he was rescued in the genocide by the local president of the 
Interahamwe who he knew from childhood: 
Where I used to live I was near the president of the In teraham we. 
Because we were neighbours and we studied at the same school we 
knew each other. He is the one who hid me and my three children. 
He hid us in his house for two and a halfmonths. [ ... ] He said if you 
want to live please you and your children come in my house, I will 
protect you. I had to trust him, it was a relationship we had since we 
were children, when we were children we were very goodfriends. 68 
This, perhaps, provides an indication that those original bonds between people had not 
been entirely destroyed and that with strong vertical social capital between the State and 
all groups in society reconciliation may be possible. 
Bonding social capital between Tutsis in this period was more complex. At a macro 
level, bonding social capital between Tutsis also strengthened due to their identical 
position. Tutsis naturally grouped together in an attempt to find a solution to their 
predicament and in this way "were interacting in the way of seeing how they can live in 
the society because the society had rejected them, they were not seeing themselves in the 
society so they were planning how they can live in the society,,69. In some cases those 
who had fled their homes and taken refuge in other areas were assisted with money, 
food and clothing by Tutsis in those areas70• However, whilst at the macro level, Tutsi 
bonding social capital strengthened in response to their situation and through mutual 
assistance, at the micro level, bonding social capital became increasingly under threat 
due to the distrust that became a pervasive feature of the conflict and genocide 
61 Interview with CIVl, June 2007 
69 Interview with CIV21, October 2006. 
70 Interview with XCRDF22, June 2007. 
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environment. "There was a big fear of grouping together. If you were said to be a spy 
you would be jailed and even killed,7}. This led to the fragmentation of Tutsi groups in 
which trust was progressively based around smaller units. 
The Tutsi were politically very weak and, as the conflict and genocide increased, and 
with it the threat from Hutu extremism, so to did distrust between these newly emerging 
micro units of Tutsi. Communication broke down between many Tutsi partially due to 
the extreme insecurity and the lack of freedom of movement, and also because they 
could not necessarily be sure that their position was not given away by fellow Tutsi in 
an attempt to secure their own safety. "Everything started stopping at that time, we 
started living on our own, each person in his house [ ... ] there was no more visiting 
between neighbours and at that time of political parties being created, you couldn't 
trust anyone because you didn't know what party he was in,,72. In such an extreme 
climate of distrust and uncertainty that results from conflict and genocide, it is perhaps 
understandable that those being persecuted chose only to trust those closest to them, 
reserving judgement towards others to a time when they had no other option. However, 
even among family units one might not be able to guarantee his or her survival. It was 
often the case that family members were responsible for the killings of other family 
members e'ither because they were forced into such actions or because they were Hutus 
operating on the instructions of the government and Interahamwe killing husbands, 
wives and children because they were Tutsi73• In such an environment the levels of 
trust are drastically diminished and with them ties that bind people together. 
The effects of discriminatory vertical social capital and the transformations of bonding 
social capital were devastating for bridging social capital between Hutu and Tutsi. The 
discriminatory practices of vertical social capital that privileged Hutu above Tutsi 
served to drive a wedge between the two groups despite the fact they had previously 
, 
been neighbours. As Hutu persecution of the Tutsi increased in the years between 
1990-1994 so too did the distance between both groups. The government created and 
exacerbated Hutu fear of the RPF claiming among other things that the "RPF were 
splitting wives and they remove the children [from the womb] and they peel them and 
make the mother of that child eat them, but they were lying to make us afraid of them,,74. 
71 Interview with CIV21, October 2006. 
72 Interview with CIV 1 t June 2007. 
73 Interview with NURC Executive Secretary, July 2001. 
74 Interview with CIVI8, October 2006. 
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Additionally, the government promised Tutsi land and property to the Hutu when the 
genocide was finished and this, in a country with severe land pressure, acted as a 
motivation to engage in such persecution 75. In face of this threat the Tutsi withdrew 
further from society and the bridges between the two communities grew ever weaker. 
At this point "you could see people were not fine. In the war people couldn't talk to 
each other and there were divisions,,76. Relationships between neighbours and family 
members deteriorated to the point were trust was practically nonexistent and within the 
family "you could say to your wife you are a snake or a cockroach, why did I marry you? 
You start abusing him or her, that was one of the signs of division between groups,,77. 
This continued with more intensity as time went on until the point came were, "when 
you are Hutu you talk to Hutus who share your ideas, when you are Tutsi you talk with 
Tutsis. No one trusted each other,,78. At the conclusion of the genocide, when the RPF 
took control of the country, the bridges between Hutu and Tutsi had been almost 
completely burnt and with it the social fabric of society decimated. In the post-1994 
Genocide period the new RPF government was faced with the task of rebuilding social 
capital throughout the country and building the foundations of the reconciliation process. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Rwanda offers an extremely complex case through which to view ethnic conflict and 
genocide. Whilst the external influences behind the conflict draw parallels with other 
sub-Saharan African states, internal influences and psychosocial aspects bring their own 
intricacies to the equation. Political fragmentation, a feature of most conflict-ridden 
countries, when connected to demographic pressures unlike anywhere else in Africa, 
coalesced to produce an environment in which distrust was rife and when psychosocial 
aspects of hierarchy and authority were exploited the environment exploded. Ultimately, 
such influences brought Rwanda along a specific path that resulted in conflict and 
genocide and created or exacerbated cleavages in society that will take generations to 
heal. 
75 Interview with CIV20, October 2006. 
76 Interview with CIV8, June 2007. 
77 Interview with CIV21, October 2006. 
78 Interview with CIVl, June 2007. 
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The use of Stanton's Eight Stages of Genocide model supplies an ideal structure 
through which an understanding of the genocide process is made easier. What is 
important in this regard is the development of our ability to effectively analyse a 
specific genocide in order to ascertain its lifespan and identify the ways in which 
recovery can be pu!sued, as well as understanding its causes to ensure it does not 
reoccur. In the case of Rwanda the application of this model adds a further dimension 
to the analysis of the genocide, one that as yet has not been forthcoming. By 
approaching such an analysis in a structured way our understanding is developed. 
The final section of this chapter brings with it the first analysis in this thesis that results 
from primary data collected by the author. In order to lay claims regarding the effect of 
ex-combatant social reintegration on social capital, it is important to consider the ways 
in which social capital transformed as a result of the conflict, before then examining 
how the social reintegration of ex-combatants may have altered it in the post-genocide 
environment. To this end this section provides an analysis of social capital over two 
distinct time periods: pre-1990 and 1990-1994. This enables a comprehension of the 
transforms in social capital within Rwanda, providing us with further understanding of 
the effects of the conflict. Essentially this data demonstrates the level of social 
destruction Rwanda experienced as a result of decades of political mismanagement, 
civil war and genocide. 
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Chapter Six: 
The Social Reintegration Path: How it Works in Rwanda 
6.1 Introduction 
As apparent from the literature addressed in Chapter Two, the social reintegration of ex-
combatants is particularly difficult to evaluate due to its intangible nature. As such, 
much literature and evaluation of DDR programmes concentrates on economIc 
reintegration resulting in a somewhat exiguous comprehension of how social 
reintegration occurs and to what effect. This chapter seeks to fill this evident hiatus in 
our understanding and provide a foundation from which it will be possible to appreciate 
the impact social reintegration may have on the restoration of social capital and 
reconciliation. 
The chapter is divided into two parts: The first part sets the scene for understanding 
how ex-combatants successfully socially reintegrate in Rwanda because, in order to do 
this, it is necessary to first comprehend the changed environment into which ex-
combatants reintegrate. This part therefore details the key problems faced by ex-
combatants in Rwanda. The second part of the chapter logically follows on from an 
analysis of the key problems by examining what is necessary for the successful social 
reintegration of ex -combatants in Rwanda. It is subdivided into three categories: macro 
level elements, meso level elements and micro level elements. The structure of this 
chapter is designed in such a manner due to the difficulty in representing the complexity 
of the ex-combatant social reintegration in an accurate and lucid form. Because it is not 
possible to explain the complete mechanism of ex-combatant reintegration, and the 
interrelatedness of all the component parts, as one may see it with the naked eye, it is 
necessary to use a linear structure that is as logical a possible. For this reason we begin 
by building an understanding of the immediate environment ex-combatants encounter 
and the potentially detrimental issues they themselves bring, usually indirectly, through 
psychosocial trauma or status as a member of a vulnerable group. This will provide the 
foundations from which we can most effectively understand how ex-combatants 
successfully socially reintegrate in Rwanda leaving the chapter at an ideal point from 
179 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
which to examine the implications of such successes for social capital and reconciliation. 
Due to the interrelatedness of all the components of ex-combatants reintegration it will 
be necessary to highlight how these relations work together as and when the time arises 
in order to build the complete picture. Additionally, structuring the chapter in this way 
ensures a logical flow from the final section of the previous chapter through developing 
our understanding of the context in Rwanda at that time. The analysis in this chapter 
was derived from life histories taken from ex-combatants and civilians and from elite 
interviews with policy makers. 
6.2 Problems With and Obstacles to Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration 
This section addresses key issues that are problematic in the social reintegration of ex-
combatants in Rwanda. The first two are concerned with issues that influence the 
environment in which ex-combatants find themselves when returning to the community, 
while the second two relate to the potentially detrimental aspects introduced by ex-
combatants themselves. 
6.2.1 The Starting Position of Ex-Combatants 
Arguably the greatest, and overarching, obstacle to the successful reintegration of ex-
combatants is the position from which they start such reintegration. A recurrent theme 
among ex-combatants when asked about the problems they had experienced in their 
reintegration was that they returned to their communities (or indeed settled in new 
communities) with nothing. Invariably ex-combatants would have a low level of 
education, little or no training other than military and limited capacity, which, when 
coupled with scarce resources, familial responsibilities and possible disadvantages such 
as disability or psychosocial trauma, provided an unenviable position from which to 
start their reintegration. Despite the training they had been given during Ingando 79 and 
the benefits they received by way of their Basic Needs Kit (BNK), Recognition of 
Service Allowance (RSA) and Reintegration Grant (RG), many ex-combatants 
expressed a feeling of returning to nothing and having to start from zero. 
79 The concept of Ingando will be introduced in the meso level elements discussed in the next section. 
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In a peE this is not at all uncommon and such was the economic, infrastructural and 
social damage that resulted from the civil war and genocide that most of the population 
in Rwanda found itself in a similar position. Ex-combatants were not alone in returning 
to zero with little hope of reconstructing a country. However what differentiates ex-
combatants from ordinary civilians is the aspect of time. Ex-combatants who 
demobilised a number of years after the genocide, articulated a feeling of having been 
left behind; whilst they were fighting in the Northwest and in the ORe (either as 
members of the RDF or AGs) civilians were slowly engaging in the reconstruction of 
the country and developing themselves and their communities. This is succinctly 
encapsulated in the following quote: 
When for example someone who has the same age as me and the 
same health we start together. When me I was fighting 15 years 
before he was building his own life, he was studying or something so 
he has reached somewhere I have not yet reached because I was 
doing something else and for me to reach that level he has got today 
it is not easy to reach where they are especially when we have low 
means and have no capacity80 
This is an extremely important point as although the capacity of those in rural areas may 
not necessarily be much higher than ex-combatants, and civilians have experienced 
similar degrees of destruction and devastation as ex-combatants, a difference does exist 
due to the time element. Ex-combatants from this study have a collective average 
service time of 8.2 years (7.6 years for RDF, 7.8 years for AGs and 11.4 years for FAR) 
thus demonstrating the relative disadvantage they may be at when they return. This 
problem is not so relative for ex-FAR due to the fact they either stayed in Rwanda after 
the genocide or returned with their families, and so began from the same point as them 
in terms of reconstruction and were generally relatively well educated and trained. 
Those in the RDF and the AGs were most affected. Ex-AGs in particular have a very 
low level of education, completing just a year or two of primary school, and were 
poorly trained militarily, which reduced the chance of them possessing transferable 
skills they could utilise in the community. 
10 Interview with XCRDFJO, November 2006. 
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The fact ex-combatants return to the community in a situation that is behind that of 
civilians clearly puts them at a disadvantage in terms of their reintegration. Socially this 
can have an impact in terms of the burden ex-combatants may place on their families 
and the community as a whole. It can also influence the motivation8l of ex-combatants 
and their ability to transform their identity from that of a combatant to a civilian. For 
this reason adequate training of ex-combatants is vital and as such training in Ingando, 
associations and Community Based Reintegration (CBR)82 can prove to be a valuable 
resource and should be encouraged and promoted. If well managed, and this will 
include the cooperation of the community and local leaders, ex-combatants can initially 
piggyback on the activities of the community in order to elevate their starting position 
and build some capacity that will allow them to reduce their burden on the community 
and begin to actively contribute to it, thus increasing their acceptance. 
6.2.2 Access to Land and Housing 
Linked to the problem of ex-combatants starting position is the issue of access to land 
and housing. Rwanda suffers from immense land and population pressure and many ex-
combatants do not have access to land, which reduces not only their chances of 
. . . 
economic reintegration but also their ability to reintegrate socially. In rural areas, 
access to land usually equates to access to a livelihood. When access to land is not 
forthcoming or is dependent on securing employment cultivating others' land a 
sustainable livelihood is difficult to attain. This increases the burden of ex-combatants 
on their families and the community. It makes starting a new life problematic as their 
livelihood, and indeed their survival, is dependent on others. When ex-combatants do 
not have control of their economic reintegration it introduces problems to their social 
reintegration. In situations where land is unavailable the provision of adequate training 
may provide an alternative that will aid their economic reintegration and thus connect to 
their social reintegration. 
Similarly, access to housing can also be problematic for ex-combatants. Many returned 
to homes that had been destroyed or were occupied by others. The reconstruction of 
destroyed houses has, in some instances, facilitated the beginnings of reconciliation as, 
81 The issue of ex-combatant reintegration is addressed under the micro level elements discussed in the 
next section. 
12 CBR will be discussed further in the micro level elements analysed in the next section. 
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for example, ex-combatants are sometimes helped by the community to build their 
house. By working together for a common goal and spending time together, trust 
begins to be established and this also indicates a willingness to accommodate ex-
combatants in the community. However, not having access to a property can also 
reduce the possibility for access to the community. Part of community acceptance of 
ex-combatants is derived from their ability to contribute to the community and those 
without their own home are not considered stable; "I am not stable for them, they see me 
as someone who can change his mind and move from this place to another place. Until 
I get a house that is when they can accept me. Those who have got how to build houses 
they have been accepted because they say anyhow he is going to live here for a while, 
we do not need to reject him so they start to live well with him,,83. A lack of property 
also makes it impossible to access lines of credit and can prove to be a barrier to 
association membership particularly if the association is based around microcredit 
activities. Effectively then, the owning of a house symbolises stability and being a 
stakeholder in the community, a homeowner is therefore more worthy of trust than one 
who does not own his or her house. 
Access to land and property is considered vital by ex-combatants and the community 
alike. Land provides a livelihood and a house provides a base; without these it is much 
more difficult for an ex-combatant to normalise and fully reintegrate a civilian. There 
also exists a danger that such a lack of access may result in a return to arms, particularly 
among the AGs, as one ex-FAR explains, "someone who doesn't have a house and 
where to cultivate he will become a thief in the future. When you don't have a roof you 
will steal a roof, I think they should support us in those main things and then we will be 
ok, we will be safe, someone who cannot see the benefit of living in society he may go 
back and fight in the bush,,84. The provision of access to land and property evidently 
has direct implications for the successful reintegration of ex-combatants but furthermore, 
it is also important to the sustainability of stability and security in Rwanda and the Great 
Lakes region, as such access will diminish the likelihood of ex-combatants returning to 
arms. 
13 Interview with XCRDF22, June 2007. 
14 Interview with XCFAR2, June 2007. 
183 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York. 2008 
6.2.3 Psychosocial Issues 
Interviews at the RDRC indicated some ex-combatants suffer from psychosocial 
trauma85 and this, given the nature of conflict in general but the Rwandan conflict in 
particular, is to be expected. According to the RDRC Reintegration Officer around 10% 
of the ex-combatant community require psychosocial support86 however the data from 
this research suggests this figure to be just over 25% (13 out of 50 ex-combatants). 
Psychosocial issues faced by ex -combatants included nightmares, anxiety, extreme 
paranoia and feelings of hopelessness, which resulted in anti-social and isolationist 
behaviour, heavy drinking and violence. Proportionately, these figures translate to 
36.3% (4 of 11) ofex-AGs, 14.3% (1 of7) of ex-FAR and 25% (8 of32) ex-RDF being 
affected by psychosocial issues, which suggests the conflict and living conditions in the 
DRC had a significant affect on those from the AGs. This was perhaps due to the lower 
average age of entry in the AGs (17.7 years old as compared to 19.5 and 23 for ex-FAR 
and ex-RDF, respectively) and the length of active service in poor conditions with very 
low morale87• 
Ex-combatants suffering from psychosocial problems face an enormous struggle to 
reintegrate into social life: "if someone has problems with the trauma of being a soldier 
it is very rare they are going to concentrate on something and progress on it, it is very 
rare that they are going to maintain the trust they have for the community, it is very 
rare that they are going to stabilise in what they are doing,,88. However, despite the 
apparent difficulties faced by ex-combatants in terms of psychosocial issues, it has been 
recognised by the RDRC that there is a problem with the identification of such ex-
combatants. Given the conflicting figures for the proportions of ex-combatants with 
psychosocial problems between the RDRC and this research it would appear that such 
recognition is accurate and, when coupled with the negative effects of such problems on 
social reintegration, it is apparent that the mechanisms in place for dealing with such 
issues need to be reformed. There exists a very need for better planned, financed and 
8S This research does not claim to make medical evaluations of ex-combatants. Rather, when discussing 
psychosocial trauma, I am referring to symptoms that can be expected to be known, and therefore 
identified, by someone who has read at a rudimentary level on the subject such as nightmares, anxiety, 
instability of mood, heavy drinking, violence, and paranoia, among others. Any judgement made in this 
regard is based on themes brought up in the life history interviews. 
86 Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006. 
17 Although the average length of service for the ex-FAR was the longest almost 50% of this was in 
peacetime compared to ex-AO and ex-RDF who experienced longer periods of conflict. 
'I Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006. 
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implemented psycho-social provision to be in place which operates for the individual 
and the community as all other efforts can be undermined without adequate provision 
within this area. 
6.2.4 Special Groups 
Most literature utilises the term 'vulnerable groups' to refer to female ex-combatants, 
child soldiers and disabled veterans; however the RDRC view all ex-combatants as 
being vulnerable and hence use the term 'special groups' to refer to these categories. 
Female ex-combatants are generally considered to be especially vulnerable when they 
return to their villages, facing greater stigma than their male counterparts and being 
forced to return to previous roles after having fought, and in some cases led, on the 
frontline. In Rwanda female ex-combatants accounted for just less than 1% of those 
demobilised, in this study they comprised 4% of those interviewed. The RDRP 
recognises the vulnerability of female ex-combatants and, as such, positively 
discriminates in their favour in all activities including for example, special facilities 
during demobilisation and easier access to the VSW89• 
Neither of the two female ex-combatants interviewed (one from the RDF and one from 
the AGs) expressed serious social reintegration problems when they returned, although 
there was some difference between the two. XCRDF32 demobilised in 1999, at the 
very start of the first DDR phase, and was at first viewed somewhat awkwardly, 
partially due to the fact the community were not yet used to ex-combatants, and 
partially because she is a woman; "It was very tough at that time because people were 
not used to seeing us and especially for me, a lady, they used to think I am not like other 
ladies and they were a little bit scared of me. For example working in groups like other 
civilian ladies it was very tough for them to accept me. And for example my way of 
understanding things as a soldier it was not the same as other ladies who were 
civilians. Now I got used even them they have seen that I am like them. Firstly 
something that helped me was because I was humble at that time, I used to approach 
them and talk to them and whenever someone was requested for a service I was able to 
89 The VSW is a financial aid package provided to ex-combatants who are particularly vulnerable to assist 
in their engagement in an Income Generating Activity (lOA). 
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serve, I was always ready to serve,,90. As is evident, some issues did arise due to her 
being female; however these were not serious and, due to her effort and motivation to 
reintegrate, she was successful. For XCAG9 who demobilised in 2006 things were 
easier because the community was much more used to ex-combatant returning home 
and in addition, the area she lived in was rather remote and thus gave rise to perhaps a 
greater level of interdependence than other areas may have; this aided in her social 
reintegration through the need for mutual self-help. 
From figures provided by the RDRC in November 2006 it is evident that 10% of ex-
combatants demobilised were child soldiers. The data collected in this research 
suggests only 2% (1) of ex-combatants interviewed were child soldiers91 • This is not to 
disprove the figures provided by the RDRC; rather it may indicate the sample was not 
fully representative according to quota. This makes it difficult to make any judgements 
regarding the reintegration of child soldiers in Rwanda. However, from the one 
interview that was conducted, psychosocial trauma was not evident, either in the 
answers to questions put to the individual or in his general demeanour. What was 
apparent was desire to keep his combatant life a secret because, "for example when you 
are studying somewhere, even when I was studying secondary, when theyfind out you 
used to be a soldier other students used to be scared of you, they don't like to approach 
you, they feel like they have to put you there like someone who is speciaf'92. Evidently, 
child ex -combatants, at least as far as can be claimed by this interview, potentially face 
levels of fear among their peer group that may be higher that that faced by their adult 
counterparts. 
This can have serious consequences for their reintegration, especially when we consider 
that, "due to physical and mental immaturity the effects [of conflict] on children. are 
greater [than for adults]. They require specialised attention and support during 
reintegration due to the trauma they face. Such trauma is beginning to translate into 
PTSD. All they know is bloodshed, stealing, and forest life. Nothing of community or 
development ... [It is, therefore,] very vital to let children socialise in terms of sports, in 
terms of cultural activities, in terms of interaction with surrounding community. This 
facilitates social reintegration in terms of acceptance,,93 . One of the biggest challenges 
90 Interview with XCRDF32, November 2006. 
91 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the sampling methods used in this research. 
92 Interview with XCRDF26, November 2006. 
93 Interview with RDRC Child Protection and Liaison Officer. November 2006. 
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in terms of reintegrating child soldiers then, is an adequate response to the needs a child 
soldier has in order to counter the isolation they experience, both through their own 
actions and the actions of other children94• 
In terms of disabled veterans 50% of those interviewed defined themselves as having 
some form of disability, most of which were the result of being shot or having shrapnel 
in their body. The extent of the disability varied with a range of between 30% and 100% 
as defined by the RDRC medical staff. Whilst being a disabled veteran had significant 
affect on economic reintegration, as in some cases employment was impossible, it did 
not seem to have any significant affect on their social reintegration other than through 
their problems with economic reintegration. 
As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, economic reintegration has 
derived benefits for social reintegration and indeed, social reintegration is made much 
more difficult if economic reintegration is not achieved. However, this does not seem 
to be the case for disabled veterans. Where such ex-combatants are unable to work they 
are supported primarily by their family and secondarily by their neighbours. Of the 25 
ex-combatants who defined themselves as handicapped, 12 held a position of 
responsibility in the community thus indicating they have been accepted by the 
community and are seen as useful. Only 1 of the 25 indicated any serious implications 
for his social reintegration due to his disability. This particular ex -combatant had been 
shot on the penis, a result of which is that he no longer viewed himself as a man as he 
was unable to leave behind a family (on his death). Clearly this individual was 
suffering from deep trauma due to his injury and had been unsuccessful both in 
economic and social reintegration95• He was unemployed, had no land or a house and as 
a result "/ feel like / don't want to stay with them but what can / do, / feel like / don '/ 
have anything else / can do, / have to live with that problem,,96. Disability, in general, 
does not necessarily hinder an ex-combatants social reintegration in Rwanda. Although 
we might expect social reintegration to be more difficult due to problems with economic 
reintegration, this is not the case because even though disabled veterans may be a 
burden to their family and the community, in the sense that the have to care for them, it 
is a burden they are willing to carry. 
94 Interview with Save the Children Rwanda Child Protection Officer, July 2006. 
95 Interview with XCRDF28, November 2006. 
96 Interview with XCRDF29, November 2006. 
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Ex-combatants predictably do face some problems with their social reintegration. Most 
of these arise as a result of problems in achieving the necessary elements of social 
reintegration. These are problems that are inevitable for a proportion of ex-combatants 
regardless of country; however they do affect those in Rwanda particularly acutely. 
Attempts to remedy these problems will involve the RDRC but must also engage other 
actors in the process if they are to be overcome and social reintegration is to be achieved. 
The following section examines the factors that are necessary for the successful social 
reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda. 
6.3 Requirements for Successful Social Reintegration in Rwanda 
Of the three levels alluded to in the introduction to this chapter the first, the macro level, 
examines those elements from the political level that contributes to the successful social 
reintegration of ex-combatants. This includes political will and security and stability. 
The meso level considers elements of a middle order 97 nature that include 
demobilisation camps, community sensitisation and acceptance, and local leaders. The 
final level, the micro level, contemplates elements from the grassroots level such as ex-
combatant motivation and behaviour, family, association membership, and economic 
reintegration. Each of the three levels, and the factors within each level, combine to 
comprise the conditions necessary for the successful social reintegration of ex-
combatants. However, it is necessary to note that each level is as important to the social 
reintegration process as the others although certain elements within each level may play 
a more significant role than others. 
6.3.1 Macro Level Elements 
Political Will 
The macro level is vital to the success of social reintegration as it invariably provides 
the foundation from which such an endeavour is made possible. Arguably, one of the 
97 By middle order I am simply referring to those elements that occur in between the macro. or political, 
level and the micro, or grassroots, level. 
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most essential factors from all three levels is that of political will. Political commitment 
to, and government support of, the reintegration of ex-combatants has been crucial to 
the success of the programme and also demonstrates to the population the intentions of 
the government. In the aftermath of the civil war and genocide, trust in the government 
was very low with the traumatised population understandably suspicious of government 
after decades of manipulation culminating in civil war and genocide. In order to 
achieve peace the government was required to restore the population's trust in 
government and thus build vertical social capital in such a way that it was not 
discriminatory but instead promoted the re-establishment of bridging social capital. 
Commitment to the successful reintegration of all three ex-combatant groups delivers a 
strong message not only to the ex-combatants themselves, but also to the population 
regarding the political will of the government to achieve unity and reconciliation. 
The creation of the RDRC to design, implement and maintain the RDRP perhaps best 
exemplifies the government's commitment to the successful reintegration of ex-
combatants. It is the RDRC that supports the reintegration process and, as such, the 
effectiveness of such an organisation can be said to be direct indication of political will. 
If political will is not forthcoming it can be expected that such an organisation would be 
relatively ineffective, however this is not the case in Rwanda according to the MDRP 
Task Team Leader, "In terms of the organisation I think the RDRC is, . in the context, a 
relatively robust implementing mechanism. Serious political will on the side of the 
government and a fairly robust staffing of the national commission which is partly a 
translation of that political will [ ... ] it is one of the better national commissions I've 
seen" 98 • Additionally, the establishment of complimentary institutions such as the 
NURC and the Community Development Project (CDP) 99 serves to reinforce the 
activities of the RDRC through the sensitisation of communities, the establishment of 
co~munity-based reintegration and development activities, and a general c~mmitment 
to development and unity and reconciliation.. Such supplementary assistance to the 
reintegration of ex-combatants further demonstrates the political will of the government. 
However, what is important here is how those who are affected by it view such actions 
of the government. In terms of the ex-combatants themselves most recognition of 
98 Interview with MORP Task Team Leader, July 2007. 
99 The COP is a project run in conjunction with the Decentralisation programme by the Ministry of Local 
Administration, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs (MINALOC) 
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political will on behalf of the government came from former members of FAR and the 
armed groups who registered their surprise that the RPF government took care of them 
considering they had fought against them. Indeed, as one ex-FAR stated when referring 
to the BNK and the RSA, "We were given that money, some people would use it to buy 
land, to buy a house, to buy clothes, just to start a new life and I really wondered why 
they gave us that money, I was really surprised When we were given that money we 
were not expecting it because we were their enemies, because we were fighting against 
th~m"loo. By including ex-FAR and ex-AGs into the DDR programme and providing 
for all three groups, the government signalled their intent in terms of the future. They 
have invested large financial resources 101 into the successful reintegration of ex-
combatants and have put into place additional support systems to aid this process. This 
places ex-combatants on an equal footing and shows them they are not being deserted 
thus helping to restore their trust in government. 
However, although most ex-combatants communicated appreciation for the political 
will of the government, some expressed a belief that there was a difference between 
how ex-RDF and ex-FAR are treated by the government arguing that "the government I 
worked for don't recognise me as someone who used to work for them, and the 
government that is here now they cannot appreciate me for what I did in the past [ ... ] 
You know, these people from the RDF, they have worked and now they are being paid 
but us, the people we used to work for are no longer here so we don't have someone to 
lean on,,}02. Whilst this view is that of a small minority it is nevertheless important as it 
represents a failure in the process that needs to be addressed. Even the presence of a 
minority to think or feel in this way can prove detrimental to the reintegration process 
and the reconciliation process as a whole. It is, however, important to note that most 
ex-combatants exhibit a form of gratitude towards the government, believing it is not 
only due to the government that they are receiving some financial help, but also that 
they are being accepted into the community and are secure in those communities. 
Civilians too accredit the successful reintegration of ex-combatants to the government, 
highlighting the fact that when ex-combatants, in particular those from the AGs 
100 Interview with EXFAR1, June 2007. 
101 The GoR contributed 510 million out of the $19 million that the first DDR programme ran by UNDP 
received and 52.7 million of56S.S million of the second DDR programme run by the MRDP-World 
Bank. 
102 Interview with EXF ARl, June 2007. 
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returning from the DRC, return to the communities it is not easy for the population to 
immediately trust them. The establishment of trust between ex-combatants and the 
communities is derived from the fact that the government has demonstrated trust in 
them, and that they have been assisted with a DDR programme. Indeed, it is this 
programme that is viewed as the most influential tool in terms of ex-combatant 
reintegration; "The most effective thing I see is the government programme. They go in 
training, they are given money, those who want to keep studying they keep studying. I 
think that is the most helpful thing they are getting,,103. The importance of the RDRP 
for civilians as an indication of government support for ex-combatants is evidentl04 and 
this send a message of unity and reconciliation to the community that is received and 
put into practice, at least at a level that one may expect 14 years after a genocide. 
Government support has been paramount to the success of social reintegration and to 
the generation of equitable vertical social capital 105, and has demonstrated a 
commitment to ex-combatants, communities and the larger objective of unity and 
reconciliation. This represents a crucial foundation to the success of the RDRP and the 
creation and enhancement of social capital by (re)establishing the trust between 
civilians (including ex-combatants) and government that had been destroyed during the 
period of conflict. Without this reintegration, social capital creation and reconciliation 
could not occur 106 and without strong political will, exhibited through government 
support, such reintegration would be extremely difficult to achieve. If we imagine the 
problems ex-combatants would encounter should the government be disinterested or 
un supportive of ex-combatants and their reintegration, this point is surely evident. 
Whilst it is important to acknowledge the GoR' s commitment to successful 
reintegration of ex-combatants, it is also important to recognise that more could be done. 
These ideas will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter, and indeed the 
following chapter, and the importance of political will shall be enunciated further. 
103 Interview with CIV6, June 2007. 
104 Interview with CIVS, June 2007. 
lOS This idea will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter. 
106 This idea will be developed further in the following chapter. 
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Security and Stability 
Whilst difficult to achieve in a PCE, the establishment of security and stability can be 
crucial in the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. Firstly, because in an insecure 
environment a combatant will be less willing to disarm and demobilise and ex-
combatants become more likely to return to arms if they feel under threat. Secondly, 
because the community are likely to be more suspicious of an ex-combatant when in an 
insecure environment and thus the ex-combatant may find himlherself excluded from 
society. 
It is perhaps a paradox to aspire towards security and stability in the conflict to post-
conflict transition; it is, after all, the conflict that has led to insecurity and instability. 
However, in situations such as that in Rwanda where combatants may be disarming and 
demobilising whilst conflict (whether violent or political) is ongoing (AGs returning 
from the DRC and political suppression within Rwanda107) then security is still an issue 
and the likelihood of this occurring is reduced if those combatants fear for their safety. 
Most ex-combatants from the AGs expressed a fear of returning to Rwanda, due to their 
military leaders in the DRC manipulating their lack of information to suit their own 
ends and informing rank and file combatants that they would be killed by the RDF if 
they returned 108. As security in Rwanda was established after the insurgency in the 
Northwest, and as word got to those still fighting in the DRC, combatants more readily 
disarmed and demobilised. This was due to sensitisation exercises contacted by the 
RDRC and MONUC aimed at informing them of the security status in Rwanda. Thus, 
in the case of Rwanda, it was first necessary to establish some degree of security to be 
able to encourage combatants in the DRC to return as the following quote indicates; "In 
the country [Rwanda] the killing had stopped, courts had started, there were no longer 
disappearances of people and people were travelling all around the country wherever 
they wanted to go, that's why I came back into the country"I09. The importance of this 
for civilians is also evident as the return of AGs from the DRC increases the security of 
the country, yet without some security being established the rate of this return was low. 
This then indicates the paradox alluded to at the start of this section. 
107 See for example Corey & Joireman (2004) 
108 Interview with XCAG3, June 2007. 
109 Interview with XCAG6, June 2007. 
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Security and stability also enhances the likelihood of ex-combatants remaining as ex-
combatants and not returning to arms. In most African countries, and Rwanda is no 
exception especially considering its porous borders with the ORC and Burundi, small 
arms proliferation is high and the possibilities to return to arms, either internally or in a 
regional conflict, are numerous. Ensuring security and stability, at least to the extent 
this is possible in a PCE, goes a long way in enabling ex-combatants to begin the 
reintegration process. It is by no means sufficient for the successful reintegration of ex-
combatants but it is necessary. Security provides a certain amount of space in which 
people can think about development and cooperation can be fostered. It is in this space 
that ex-combatants start to rebuild their lives and actively contribute to community 
development, thus ingratiating them with the local community. Establishment and 
maintenance of the rule of law enables freedom of movement and essentially "the fact 
that people don't have to worry or be concerned about being killed or dragged off for 
no reason" 1 10 enables ex-combatants to commit to the reintegration process. 
Civilians in Rwanda also have a vested interest in security and stability as the 
catastrophic effects of the civil war and genocide were felt most heavily by the 
communities. One of the critical aspects of the social reintegration of ex-combatants, 
that of community acceptance 1 1 \ has been made possible in Rwanda due in part to the 
level of security and stability there. Communities, in essence, hold the key to social 
reintegration; if the community does not accept ex-combatants then it will prove 
impossible for them to reintegrate socially, politically Qr economically. The Rwandan 
government have introduced a number of confidence building measures 1 12 that assist in 
the gaining of community acceptance, however the importance of security and stability 
in the eyes of the community cannot be understated. When ex-combatants in Rwanda 
return to their communities or settle in new ones there is a period of transition of around 
five or six months in which the individual and the community become familiar with 
each other 1 13 • Particularly during this period relations can be somewhat fragile and trust 
is not immediately forthcoming from either party; ex-combatants are viewed with fear 
and suspicion by many in the community and indeed, ex-combatants may themselves be 
110 Interview with MDRP Task Team Leader, July 2007. 
III Community acceptance will be discussed in the next subsection. 
112 These will be introduced in the next subsection 
III Based on interviews with DROs, ex-combatants and civilians. 
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fearful I ]4. If this stage is not successfully negotiated there is a high risk that ex-
combatants will become marginalised from society, resulting in a number of issues that 
threaten social cohesion such as increased psychosocial trauma, arming oneself, heavily 
drinking and violence. Establishing security and stability is one of the necessary 
measures in ensuring the potential for such marginalisation is reduced as much as 
possible. 
In order to overcome these issues the government and the security apparatus have 
worked hard to ensure security and stability and, whilst they have been subject to 
criticism for being overly autocratic and suppressive, they have been relatively 
successful in this endeavour. General security has enabled AG members to disarm, 
demobilise and repatriate back to Rwanda and enter into the reintegration process. 
Likewise it has supported the reintegration of ex-combatants already in the country and 
has provided communities with the confidence to accept these ex-combatants back into 
the community. Stability of the government has also supported such reintegration and 
has fostered an environment of development in which the ex-combatants can engage, 
thus further enabling their social reintegration. Additionally, government stability sends 
a strong message to the population that normalisation and unity and reconciliation is 
possible: "When the government is stable or when they are living well even the people 
live well together" I ]5. This is not to say that the GoR have got everything right or 
cannot be legitimately criticised and that their actions in other spheres have not 
,undermined the reconciliation effort. However, in terms of their commitment to the re-
integration of ex-combatants and establishment of stability and security] ]6, the GoR has 
been relatively successful. 
6.3.2 Meso Level Elements 
The meso level elements that are necessary for the successful social reintegration of ex-
combatants are those that contribute to the creation of an environment in which the ex-
combatant can work towards his or her reintegration. They include the demobilisation 
camps, community sensitisation and acceptance, and local leaders. 
114 This issue will be addressed in greater detail in section 7.2.2 
lIS Interview with XCRDF30, November 2006. 
116 The importance of stability and security for development in general and ex-combatant reintegration 
specifically has been attested to by ex-combatants, civilians and policy maker alike. 
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Demobilisation Camps 
Upon disarmament all combatants in the programme are taken to Ingando, 
demobilisation camps, 117 to be discharged and prepared for civilian life. In the first 
DDR programme, run from 1998 to 2001 by UNDP, those demobilised were all from 
the RDF. Adult soldiers were taken to a demobilisation camp at Musenyi in the Eastern 
Province where they remained for two weeks, while child soldiers 1 18 were taken to a 
Kadogo school near Butare in the Southern Province for a three-month period. The 
second DDR programme, run by the RDRC with the MDRP between 2001 and 2008, 
included combatants from the RDF and AGs from the DRC. RDF soldiers were taken 
to a demobilisation in Muhazi in the Eastern Province while combatants from the AGs 
were taken to Mutobo demobilisation centre in the Northern Province. Child soldiers 
from the AGs 119 were identified at Mutobo and transferred to Gitagata where they 
received a three-month demobilisation and reintegration programme. Ex-F AR soldiers 
intermittently entered demobilisation for a two-week period throughout both stages. 
Once at the demobilisation camps combatants undergo identification and verification l20 
before a socio-economic profile is taken. Ex-combatants are also medically screened 
and, if they choose, screened and counselled for HIV / AIDs. After this the ex-
combatants enter into the Pre Discharge Orientation Programme (PDOP). Those from 
the RDF complete a short, two-week version of the course whiles ex-AGs take the full 
two month course, the logic being that those in the RDF have been in the country and 
are aware of much of what is taught and they do not have the ideology that many in the 
AGs may have l21 • The DPOP includes, among others, teachings on the history of 
Rwanda and the reasons for the genocide, unity and reconciliation, entrepreneurial 
117 In Rwanda demobilisation camps are routinely referred to as Ingando. Ingando are solidarity camps 
based on a traditional practice in which the issues pertaining to the well-being of the community are 
discussed in an open forum. In the post-genocide environment this practice has been revived, initially to 
aid the reintegration of Tutsi returnees, and has been extended across the country to include post-
secondary/pre-university students, politicians, released genocidaires, church leaders, community leaders, 
Oacaca court judges, Women's groups and ex-combatants. 
118 This section will not cover the issue of child soldiers in demobilisation camps in any detail as this has 
already been covered in the preceding section. 
119 There were no child soldiers from the RDF as they had all been demobilised in 1997/8. 
120 For the purposes of this thesis it is not necessary to discuss this process further. 
121 This is the case regardless of whether the ex-RDF combatant was original RPA, ex-FAR then RDF, 
ex-AO then RDF or new RDF as those who joined the RDF from FAR or AGs were obliged to attend 
Ingando before they joined the RDF. 
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skills, government programmes in Rwanda and civic rights and duties 122 • The 
difference in Ingando length between ex-FAR and RDF and ex-AGs is both 
understandable and problematic. Ingando for ex-combatants is slightly different than 
for civilians in that it re-educates ex-combatants in preparation for their civilian life. 
Because of this it is possible to argue that those coming from the AGs need more time 
in the camps as they have spend long periods of time out of the country after the 
genocide and have been seen by many as a security threat. Communities, if they are to 
accept returning ex-AGs, need to feel comfortable with this and it is clear, as will be 
demonstrated, that the symbolism of such camps is not lost on the communities or the 
ex-combatants themselves. Problems arise when there is a difference in the way ex-
combatants are treated by the government. The criticisms levelled at Ingando, as 
discussed later on, are not substantiated by this research; however, where criticism may 
be applicable is in this differing treatment of ex-combatant groups. Whilst the reasons 
for this may seem logical to many, to the ex-combatants experiencing this differing 
treatment, and to the communities who see it, a message is received. In order to 
ameliorate this potential problem it may be better for the minimum length of stay 
necessary for anyone ex-combatant group to be applied to all groups. This would 
further demonstrate the government commitment to equality and reconciliation. 
On the whole, however, Ingando has shown itself to of vital importance to the 
reintegration process. The socio-economic profiling conducted in Ingando is a valuable 
planning and monitoring and evaluation (M & E) tool through the collating of 
information such as demographic characteristics including age, gender, and marital 
status, number of children, number of dependants, educational level, health status and 
wealth .. It also considers the perceived needs and aspirations of the ex-combatants 
themselves which is valuable as this provides a deeper understanding of what will be 
necessary in order to achieve successful reintegration. This information is also 
important to obtain as it enables the planning of a reintegration stage that can be most 
responsive to the needs of the ex-combatants. 
The reintegration stage of a DDR programme is the most unpredictable and the more 
information that feeds into the planning of this stage, the more likely it is to be able to 
respond to changes in the social, economic and political environment that will affect ex-
combatants. As the RDRC Reintegration Officer notes, "the importance of this survey 
122 For a sample of the POOP conducted at Mutobo Ingando please see Appendix 6. 
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so far is that from the study we have conducted we are trying to relate the profile after 
two or three years to what has happened to this person, you base yourself from that 
information to try and track the trend of the reintegration of that person and try to 
generalise to the larger group,,123. The profile provides a baseline analysis of all ex-
combatants coming through the programme thus enabling the RDRC, and other 
institutions connected with the reintegration of ex-combatants, to utilise this information 
and adjust the reintegration component to manage any challenges it faces or to make 
evaluations as to its success. 
Evidently, the PDOP is viewed one of the most crucial aspects of the reintegration 
process by ex-combatants and civilians alike. The teachings ex-combatants receive in 
this programme are aimed to provide them with the necessary preparation for their 
return to civilian life, "in this programme they are given insights ahead of returning to 
the communities, about government programmes in the communities, the roles and 
expectations of them in the community. We are preparing them for the transition from 
military life to life in the community" 124 • The vast majority of ex-combatants 
interviewed indicated to the influence of Ingando in their reintegration, with 44% of 
them being highly positive about the process. Many attribute their success in 
reintegrating as being due to the trainings they received, "I was taught about how to 
behave [in the community], they taught me about the conflicts, about unity and 
reconciliation. They taught us about the whole history of this country, the government 
programmes also. So why shouldn't I live well in the population after those teachings? 
There was division before and I tried to compare what was done before in this country 
with what we were being told by the new government" 125 • Seemingly, the aspect of the 
programme that proved fundamental to the ex-combatants was the teachings on what the 
expectations of the community were and how to behave when they returned. Ex-
combatants were encouraged to live like the other civilians, to be humble and 
disciplined and provide a role model for the community, to engage with the community 
and involve themselves in community events, associations and local leadership. 
Ingando also receives support from the community who consider it important in 
ensuring that ex-combatants return to their communities (or settle in new ones) with 
12l Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006. 
124 Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006. 
12' Interview with XCFAR2, June 2007. 
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necessary frame of mind to settle peacefully. In the transitional period ex-combatants 
need to win the trust of the community and they do that through exhibiting signs that 
they have successfully transformed their identity from that of ex-combatant to 
civilian 126; the PDOP is seen as contributing to such a transformation. "I think those 
guys are peaceful and live well, they are hardworking men and they are prepared 
before they return home. They are taught about politics, they are taught about how to 
behave in the population. I think this is the main thing that helps them fit into the 
population and be peaceful,,127. Another reason why civilians are appreciative of the 
PDOP is the space it provides between leaving the armed forces or an AG, and 
returning to the community; this is particularly relevant for ex-AGs. Because ex-
combatants spend time in Ingando and are prepared for their return, during which time 
their family and members of the community can visit them in the camp and they can 
attend day visits to their communities, it creates a confidence in ex-combatants 
themselves and a confidence in the societyl28. Indeed, not one person interviewed from 
all three sample groups spoke negatively of Ingando with a large majority relating to 
Ingando in positive terms. The only criticism that was made was that the amount of 
time ex-combatants spend in Ingando was not long enough129. 
The PDOP has been criticised by some for being a process of political indoctrination 
utilised by the RPF government to secure its position (See for example Mgbako, 2005). 
However, much of this criticism seems to ignore the voices of those who pass through 
Ingando, assuming them to have no agency in their lives and disregarding components 
of the programme such as training in personal hygiene, entrepreneurial skills, designing 
and managing development projects and IGAs, directing criticism around the historical 
teachings of Ingando. Whilst there may be some legitimacy in the criticisms of Ingando 
it is nevertheless evident that the reorientation of mentality from combatant or soldier to 
that of civilian has been critical to reintegration success. Indeed, the 
sensitisationlsocialisation education ex-combatants receive in Ingando have proven 
crucial in shaping their ability and desire to effectively reintegrate through the provision 
and development of skills to facilitate the effective negotiation of the civilian 
environment. 
126 This issue will be covered in more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter and in the next chapter. 
127 Interview with CIVIO, June 2007. 
128 Interview with UNDP Head of Justice, Gender & H1V I AIDs Unit, November 2006. 
129 Interview with CIV21 , October 2006. 
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Community Sensitisation and Acceptance 
The preparation of the community to receIve returning ex-combatants has been 
instrumental to their acceptance and compliments the work done with ex-combatants 
during Ingando. The RDRC focus a lot of attention on the sensitisation of communities 
with much of this work being conducted by the RDRC Commissioners who represent 
each of the five provinces (Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Kigali) and by the 
DROs 130, along with the RDRC Public Relations and Information Officer. The 
Commissioners operate at the local level in conjunction with the DROs moving around 
their district holding community meetings in which they sensitise the community about 
the activities of the RDRC and the government programme for the reintegration of ex-
combatants. They also hold meetings with local leaders and opinion leaders 131 in the 
community such as NGOs, microfinance organisations, leaders of ex-combatants 
associations and others "to tell them about our [the RDRC] programme and their role 
as community actors to facilitate the ex-combatants to reintegrate fully,,132. During 
such meetings the community are encouraged to welcome returning ex-combatants and 
to accommodate them into the community. This includes involving them in community 
activities and not excluding them from any programmes of support that may be 
introduced by local government or NGOs. Specifically, it draws attention to the benefit 
that ex-combatants can bring to the community and delivers a message of "forgiveness, 
to welcome people as civilians who are going back to their civilian lives. To work 
together, to create activities together, not to stigmatise, not to marginalise. It's more a 
message of forgiveness, tolerance and reconciliation" 133 • The DROs, in their daily 
activities with ex-combatants and the communities, reinforce this message mediating 
between ex-combatants and the community as and when the need arises. 
Additional to this, other bodies are incorporated into the sensitisation process through 
their strategic position within either the political structure or the communities. The 
NURC works with the community and those in authority such as local leaders, teachers, 
religious leaders, local NGOs and businesses in a general sensitisation exercise in an 
attempt to foster unity and reconciliation. Whilst the NURC does not differentiate 
130 The DROs are RDRC staff in each district charged with coordinating the RDRP at the district level. 
They work with the ex-combatants to promote their reintegration into society and sensitise the community 
to accept returning ex-combatants. 
131 This was a tenn used by the RDRC Public Relation and Information Officer. 
132 Interview with RDRC Public Relations & Information Officer, October 2006. 
133 Interview with RDRCIMDRP Communications Consultant, October 2006. 
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between or focus on specific societal groups this process implicitly includes ex-
combatants as the effective "interaction of the community, of which ex-combatants are a 
part, is crucial,,134. Other community leaders such as religious leaders also engage in 
the sensitisation of the community on a more general level. The Peace and Justice 
Commission of the Roman Catholic Church are heavily involved in sensitising 
communities around messages of human rights, rule of law and unity and reconciliation. 
By educating the community about their basic legal rights they also promote tolerance 
and respectl35 • Such sensitisation on a general level has trickle-down effects for ex-
combatants as, not only are they less marginalised as a group, but they also receive such 
sensitisation as a member of the community and this helps in their acceptance within the 
community. 
In general community acceptance of returning ex-combatants has been forthcoming 
however there are complexities in reaching this conclusion. On the whole the 
sensitisation of the community, coupled with the fact the ex-combatants had passed 
through the PDOP, enabled community acceptance of ex-combatants. Community 
acceptance is based very much around trust and this is rarely given immediately. The 
degree of trust and acceptance achieved, and the time it takes to achieve this, depends 
on a number of things. If ex-combatants are returning to their family in their home 
community then, in the main, they are readily accepted by their family who view them 
as a lost relative returning homel36• Many neighbours will also accept them, however 
this will depend on relations within this micro-community prior to the civil war and 
genocide and relations between the ex-combatant's family and the neighbours after the 
genocide; if these relations have been harmonious the likelihood of acceptance is 
increased. 
Acceptance will also depend on which phase of demobilisation the ex-combatant is on. 
Those who demobilised in the first phase generally encountered more resistance to 
community acceptance than those on the second phase, due in part to the relatively 
shorter time between the end of the conflict and demobilisation but primarily because 
by the time the second phase of demobilisation began the community had adjusted to 
the presence of ex-combatants in the community. When asked about this difference it 
134 Interview with NURC Director of Civic Education, November 2006. 
135 Interview with CIVil, President of the Peace and Justice Commission. June 2006. 
136 The issue of family and reintegration will be discussed in detail in the next subsection. 
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was also highlighted by the MDRP Task Team leader who stated, "I think the difficulty 
when you demob right after a war everything is raw. In certain places lots of things 
would be broken, trust would be low and economic growth doesn't necessarily pick up 
and labour opportunities are not necessarily immediately there so there may be 
challenges around that"137. From the data collected this is certainly the case and this 
links to the fact that ex-combatants demobilising in the second phase, at least those from 
the RDF, invariably had wives in the community and took leave to return to their 
families thus enabling the community to familiarise themselves with their presence over 
time138• However, attention should also be drawn to the fact that those reintegrating in 
the second phase have, to some degree, been left behind by the community as 
previously discussed. 
The final two issues that influence the community's ability to accept ex-combatants are 
those of the combatant group from which the ex-combatant has demobilised and the 
location of settlement. Both these issues are linked. Community acceptance of those 
returning from the DRC is highly dependent on the location in which they settle. Ex-
AGs predominately settle in the North and West where they account for 14% and 19.5% 
of the ex-combatant population (in comparison to their general ex-combatant population 
of 100/0) and in particular avoid Kigali (2.2%) and the East (3.7%). This translates into 
77.2% of all ex-AGs settling in either the North or the East which not surprising given 
that the areas they choose to settle in are predominately Hutu areas; 139 they are returning 
to their home villages and are welcomed by their families and these areas were less 
affected buy the genocide, partially due to the low proportion of Tutsi but primarily to 
the fact that the Northwest was held by the RPA. Acceptance of ex-AGs seems to be 
less forthcoming in Kigali, the East and the South, areas that were particularly affected 
by the genocide. For example, in the South one ex-combatant reported that there is a 
problem between ex-AG and the community as "when you walk on the street you find 
people calling you mucengezi, mucengezi 140 and that hurts you, you say I am not 
mucengezi, they are out of the country, me I have come back"141. Such opposition to 
137 Interview with MDRP Task Team Leader, July 2007. 
138 The issue of family and reintegration will be discussed in detail in the next subsection. 
139 These areas are also the areas in which Hutu Power had their base and so they are welcomed back as 
heroes despite having given up the struggle they were engaged in. There are relatively low proportions of 
Tutsis in these areas, around 10%, and ethnicity is still recognised, as opposed to the South and East (see 
appendix 5.4) so acceptance in made somewhat easier. 
1.fO Mucengezi is the Kinyarwanda word for infiltrator and is used to refer to those who fought from the 
ORC. 
141 Interview with XCAG3, June 2007. 
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returning AGs depends very much on the area to which they are returning and their 
actions when they do return. 
Similarly, ex-FAR also experience some problems with acceptance, however not to the 
same degree as ex-AGs. This is principally because those who demobilised as ex-FAR 
did not engage in the conflict in the DRe or the insurgency in the Northwest and are 
generally presumed not to have participated in the genocide 142. The ex-FAR are 
generally well dispersed around the country although the West does seem to be their 
favoured location for demobilisation (27.5%) and the North their least (15%). Only in 
Kigali it is really noticeable that they are under-represented to any degree where they 
constitute 18% of all ex-combatants compared to 22.5% at the national level. The ex-
RDF experienced the least problems with community acceptance and are, on the whole, 
well accepted by the community. 
Stigmatisation of ex-combatants in the community is however evident. The primary 
reason for stigmatisation is fear. As one DRO stated, "they have a problem living with 
people [when they first return], the population also don't feel like getting close to them, 
they have another view of them. It used to happen before in the first phase because 
there were not many demobs around in the villages but now it is happening more the 
population is used to them"143. Whilst in the immediate stage they were welcomed by 
their family and their neighbours, the wider community initially view them with fear 
and in many cases they differentiate between groups at least in the immediate stage. As 
one civilian from the South stated, "You see it is a fact that they [civilians] should not 
trust them on the same level because one he is coming from the government army, there 
is nothing to be scared of him. But the other one [AG] when they come, because of 
what he used to do, they were against their [civilians] security or their safety and they 
always wonder if they have really changed But those who have come back they have 
really changed, that is why' they start trusting them"144. Such fear is understandable and 
it is only with time and familiarity that it will dissipate and trust can. begin to develop. 
The most important influence in the process of community acceptance is the way in 
142 This is because they either remained in Rwanda after the genocide or returned from the DRe soon 
after when the refugee camps were destroyed in 1996. Any ex-FAR suspected of participating in the 
genocide are identified and brought before the Gacaca courts. 
n3 Interview with DRO 1, June 2007. 
144 Interview with eIV8, June 2007. 
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which ex-combatants behave in the community 145 . That said, although the RDRP 
engages heavily in community sensitisation it is clear that in some areas the community 
and ex-combatants could benefit from more intensive sensitisation in order to reduce 
evident stigmatisation of some ex-combatants, in particular those from the ex-FAR and 
AGs. 
However, whilst stigmatisation is reducing over time, ex-combatants from all groups are 
regularly marginalised with regard to receiving support from government and NGO 
programmes that are operating in the community. There is a perception within many 
communities, held particularly by local leaders, that ex-combatants are supported by the 
RDRC and they are therefore very often denied access to such support. This can have 
detrimental effects to not only their economic well-being and livelihood formation, but 
can also serve to create division in the community. Ex-combatants from all three 
groups have argued that the assistance they receive from the RDRC is part of the 
mechanism to facilitate their transition to civilian life; it is there to provide them with a 
'soft landing' when they return to the communities as they start from a position of 
relative disadvantage compared to civilians in the community. 
Generally when this occurs it is local leaders that exclude ex-combatants from such 
programmes and this can cause setbacks to the reintegration process. For one ex-AG, 
''problems I am meetings is lacking jobs and in some cases when there is aid or help for 
civilians they don't include us saying we are different, that the Commission takes care 
of us so we miss sometimes that help,,146. Staff at the RDRC has obviously identified 
this as a problem although they may be reluctant to admit that in reality it is. However, 
the fact that the Commission repeatedly sensitise the community and local leaders to 
involve ex-combatants in community development and assistance indicates the potential 
for this. As the RDRC Public Relations & Information Officer attests there exists a 
constant need "to tell them [local leaders] about our programme and their role as 
community actors to facilitate ex-combatants to reintegrate fully, so they don't look at 
ex-combatants as another group of people, so they look at them as civilians. And if 
there is any support at the local level they should not exclude them saying that these 
people are of the Commission, they should support them as they would any other 
145 This issue will be developed in the next subsection. 
146 Interview with XCAGIO, July 2007. 
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civilian,,147. Whilst community acceptance in terms of ex-combatant presence in the 
community is to a great extent evident across all groups, it seems that their exclusion 
from certain programmes is an indication of the difficulties ex-combatants are faced 
with in their transition from combatant to ex-combatant to civilian. Arguably it is not 
until the primary identification of an ex-combatant is that of a civilian that we can state 
they have been completely socially reintegrated. Community sensitisation, therefore, 
plays a crucial role in both the preparation of the community to receive ex-combatants, 
and also an altering of their perceptions towards ex-combatants. 
Community sensitisation has proven to be vital to the acceptance of ex-combatants by 
the community and in general such acceptance has been forthcoming. However, as 
touched on, it is the behaviour of the ex-combatants themselves that will ultimately 
dictate whether or not the community will accept them and, to a large degree, whether 
or not the ex-combatant will successfully reintegrate l48 . A further influence as to this 
success is that of the local leaders who in a sense playa role of intermediary between 
the community and the ex -combatants. This is the content of the next aspect of this 
subsection. 
Local Leaders 
The role of local leaders (such as municipal authorities, Umudugudu leaders, Church 
leaders and business people) in the social reintegration of ex-combatants can be seen 
very much as one of an intermediary between the community and ex-combatants. In the 
initial stages of ex-combatant reintegration they must mediate between the needs of the 
. 
ex-combatants and the demands of the community. When ex-combatants return they 
are, in the immediate stage, viewed with fear and suspicion. Additionally, ex-
combatants themselves are often fearful when they return to the community as "they 
have no confidence in themselves and they are not sure they will have the confidence of 
the leaders,,149. Whilst ex-combatants have passed the POOP at the demobilisation 
camp and the community has been sensitised to receive ex-combatants, the actions of 
local leaders can have a significant influence as to the success of these endeavours and 
ultimately, the success of ex-combatant reintegration. 
147 Interview with RDRC Public Relations & Information Officer, October 2006. 
148 This issue will be expanded in the next subsection. 
149 Interview with DR03, May 2007 
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Where local leaders accommodate ex-combatants and assist in their reintegration two 
results are achieved. Firstly, ex-combatants gain in confidence and are more able to 
successfully reintegrate, as they have more trust in their environment and the support 
systems in place and engage with these systems; and secondly, the community are 
encouraged by the example set by the local leaders and this translates into higher degree 
of community acceptance and cohesion. Local leaders are the first point of contact for 
local affairs and, as such, it is necessary that ex-combatants feel they can approach 
them. By taking active steps to assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants local leaders 
not only demonstrate approachability and thus increase ex-combatants' trust in the 
leadership, but they also establish local ownership of the reintegration of ex-combatants 
which has the effect of generating greater trust, not only within the community as a 
whole, but also between the population and leaders and ensures the community as a 
stakeholder in the reintegration process. 
Local leaders can playa key role in the successful reintegration of ex-combatants 
through ensuring that ex-combatants adhere to the lessons learnt during Ingando. As one 
ex-RDF soldiers states; "They kept reminding us, you guys you don't have to be proud, 
you have to live like the other population, yes you have got a different experience other 
than them but try to be simple and live with them, you know how to behave with them, 
now you are civilians, behave like civilians. I think that has had a really great impact 
in me and in the demobs around here,,150. Local leader commitment to the successful 
reintegration of ex-combatants demonstrates to the community a sense of equality and 
when "the population see how they are being equally considered when they come back 
that helps their reintegration in to the community,,151. In addition, local leaders are 
most responsible for the sensitisation of the community to accept ex-combatants as they 
have the most contact with the community and are in a position to identity issues as and 
when they arise. This places local leaders in a relatively important position regarding 
the reintegration of ex-combatants. 
As much as local leaders can assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants so too can they 
obstruct it. The benefits of the POOP can only be realised if the environment into 
which ex-combatants return is the one described in those teachings. If ex-combatants 
150 Interview with XCRDF3, June 2007. 
151 Interview with CIVS, June 2007. 
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arrive in a community with the belief that government programmes are inclusive for all 
groups in the community; that Rwandans are Rwandans first and foremost, Hutu and 
Tutsi or ex-combatant and civilian in the second instance; and that, although there may 
be initial difficulties, the community is ready to receive them, and they do not find this 
to be the case it can have extremely negative effects on their social reintegration. 
Indeed, as one ex-FAR says "when you see your neighbours living well, S01tleOne who 
cannot see the benefit of living in a society he may go back and fight in the bush. I 
know a friend who left; he has gone back in Congo to fight. I don't approve, he was 
saying he is poor and has no future but I don't agree. People should sit and wait and 
follow the municipality but we need also to be supportecl,152. Local leaders bear much 
of the responsibility of the creation of such an environment as they are in effect the 
grassroots implementers of government policy; members of the community tum to them 
in the first instance and thus they exert a considerable influence over the community. 
When this influence is used in such as way that it excludes ex-combatants from 
programmes and activities in the community, it can have severe implications for their 
successful socially reintegration. First, it disadvantages them, and the community, as 
when one of the most vulnerable groups in society is excluded from programmes that 
may enhance their ability to forge a livelihood and become more successfully 
reintegrated, self-sufficient and able to meaningfully contribute to society, this places 
greater burden on their family, and thus the community. Second, it demonstrates to 
them that the teaching they received in Ingando was not necessarily accurate and society 
is not completely inclusive; that they are identified as a group separate to civilians. This 
can result in the disillusionment of ex-combatants, which may translate to a lack of 
effort on their part and a threat to social cohesion. Third, it sends a signal to the 
community of segregation and undermines efforts toward establishing unity and 
reconciliation. The community in Rwanda takes its lead from those in authority and if 
they exhibit prejudice towards particular groups this will become apparent in the way 
the community respond to ex-combatants. Combined, this can vastly impede the 
successful social reintegration of ex-combatants, as one ex-RDF demonstrates; "When 
you are demobilised you are not really a civilian. Like the day you talked with the 
civilians and did the PRA I was also called but they told me no, you used to be a soldier, 
you are not included. So you wonder yourself, many times you are told no. The man 
who is in charge of the Umudugudu was the one who told me. When they tell me I 
152 Interview with XCFAR2, June 2007. 
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cannot do things because I used to be a soldier I don't know where to put myself; in 
which category do I belong?") 53 • This clearly and succinctly emphasises the influence 
local leaders can have in the processes of identity transformation and social 
reintegration. They can either reinforce the process through offering encouragement 
and support to returning ex-combatants, and mobilising and sensitising the community 
to also receive and support them, or they can undermine the process by demonstrating 
prejudice toward them, undermining their ability to effectively reintegrate and creating 
segregation in the community. 
The PDOP, and demobilisation camps in general, and community sensitisation offer 
complementary structural practices to best prepare both ex-combatants and the 
community for the reintegration of ex-combatants. They are, in particular, highly 
influential in establishing social reintegration and thus should be encouraged and where 
possible, strengthened. Local leaders are particularly well placed to bring together the 
benefits of the two practices in such a way as to stimulate social reintegration and playa 
vital role in the creation of an environment that is able to accommodate ex-combatants. 
However, as acknowledged, local leaders can also threaten and undermine this process 
and as such it is necessary for the RDRC and MINALOC to coordinate their practices to 
ensure this does not occur. 
6.3.3 Micro Level Elements 
Micro level elements are those at the individual level that on a daily basis influence an 
ex-combatants social reintegration. They include: ex-combatant motivation and 
behaviour, family, association membership and economic reintegration. 
Ex-Combatant Motivation and Behaviour 
The motivation ex-combatants have to reintegrate, and the behaviour they engage in 
when they have returned are arguably the greatest influencing factors that determine the 
effectiveness of their social reintegration. This is linked strongly to demobilisation 
camps and the way they are received by the community and in this sense ex-combatant 
behaviour and community acceptance are mutually reinforcing. 
15' Interview with XCRDF13, June 2007. 
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Overcoming the initial period of apprehension and suspicion is a crucial determinant of 
the successful social reintegration of ex -combatants and is generally dependent on their 
behaviour in the community (as acknowledged by ex-combatants, civilians and policy 
makers alike). Many would, upon arrival in the community, present themselves to the 
community and local leaders asking for assistance in their reintegration as noted in the 
following; "When you come back you must come to the population and tell them I used 
to be a soldier but now I have come back and I want to be with you. I want you to help 
me get developed, show me what you are doing, what you have already achieved and be 
humble and follow what they are doing" 154. When ex-combatants made concerted 
efforts to get close to the community and reintegrate within it, those efforts are 
acknowledged by the community and this goes a long way in establishing community 
trust in them. Ex -combatants who demonstrated most success in their social 
reintegration, in terms of community acceptance, were proactive in their mentality and 
their behaviour exhibited this. 
The notion of being humble in the community is a reoccurring one across the country 
and is shared by ex-combatants from all groups. Civilians also draw attention to this, 
expressing an ability to accept ex-combatants in the community based on such humility 
and the apparent desire of ex-combatants to settle peacefully. It is only in the course of 
taking the initiative that ex-combatants are truly successful in their reintegration and 
what is important is this recognition by ex-combatants themselves. Ex-combatants are 
returning to a changed environment and as such the onus is on them to manage their 
reintegration. Among many this message seems to have been internalised as the 
following denotes, "/ think it is not their job to come and see if they could accept me or 
not, it is according to how / behave towards them so I think it is my job to behave in a 
way that they feel free to approach me,,)55. This is, however, a somewhat lengthy 
process that requires patience on the part of the ex-combatant who is required to 
continually and consistently demonstrate their commitment to peace and prosperity in 
the community. Over time, as the community are better able to judge the intentions of 
ex-combatants and see that they no longer represent a threat to their security, acceptance 
is greater and trust begins to develop. Related to this point is the way in which ex-
154 Interview with XCRDF14, June 2007. 
155 Interview with XCRDF30, November 2006. 
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combatants respond to those who have admitted to or are suspected of killing their 
family members. A large number of, particularly ex-RDF but also ex-FAR and AGs, 
returned to their communities to find out members of their family had been killed in the 
civil war and genocide. Potentially this can, and does, cause severe problems not only 
for the reintegration of ex-combatants who are obliged to be neighbours with the killers 
but also, in a derived fashion, to the cohesion of the community. If ex-combatants seek 
revenge the effects on social cohesion and security could be catastrophic. Whilst it may 
appear too difficult to expect, and indeed difficult to understand, ex-combatants have 
seemingly to some extent been able to forgive the killers or, at the very least, co-exist 
with them and this has been crucial to sustaining peace. When the community sees that 
ex-combatants are not going to use violence to solve their problems it engenders their 
acceptance in the community. 
Becoming active in the community and contributing to community development aids 
their reintegration in economic terms but also, perhaps more significantly, in social 
terms. By being active in the community ex-combatants demonstrate a number of 
things: first, that they are not a burden on society and are capable of making the 
adjustment from combatant to civilian; second, that they can in fact be of use in the 
community and benefit its attempt in development; third, that they have a commitment 
to the community which is demonstrated through their efforts in its development and 
their behaviour towards the civilians of that community. In this vein then, ex-
combatants who attend municipal meetings, Gacaca and Umuganda, who join 
associations and generally behave in a disciplined manner, are those who are most likely 
to be accepted by the community and therefore be successful in their social reintegration. 
There are however, some examples of ex-combatants not behaving well in the 
community and in these instances they are not integrated into the community and can 
undermine some of the good work done by those ex-combatants who do make positive 
contributions to the community. If an ex-combatant engages in heavy drinking, crime, 
begging or violence they are despised and ostracised by the community. The behaviour 
of ex-combatants is therefore crucial to their acceptance as "when you behave badly that 
is how people consider you. When you are not disciplined people will consider you as 
someone who is not disciplined, that is how the population is here. If you respect 
yourself they will respect you, if you wish to behave badly they will despise you, when 
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you go stealing or you try to not be honest in the society people take you the way you 
are, the way you behave,,156. While these negative cases do occur they are not regular. 
However, the fact they do occur gives rise to the notion that more support, either to the 
individual ex-combatant or the community as a whole, may be needed. 
Whilst it is evident that the behaviour in which ex-combatants engage is crucial to their 
social reintegration, it is also important to consider what motivates such behaviour as 
this provides us with valuable information as to how the design and implementation of 
DDR can be improved. The primary source of motivation comes from themselves, 
particularly among the RDF and AGs. Unless the reason for demobilisation was 
physical disability in the case of the RDF or capture in the case of AGs, combatants' 
demobilisation Pre Discharge Orientation Programme occurred as a matter of choice. 
This has a big influence on the way in which they behave in the community as "when 
someone has demobilised he has accepted it. When someone has been demobilised 
willing he knows what to do, they come into the community actively. For someone who 
knows what to do, who has a purpose, it won't be difficult for him"157. The fact ex-
combatants have chosen to demobilise does seem to indicate a motivation to reintegrate 
and in a sense, a commitment to disarm represents a commitment to reintegrate. In 
terms of ex-RDF specifically, one civilian raised a very interesting point which he 
believed motivated them to reintegrate successfully; "they are the ones who led the 
liberation war so I don't think somebody who took the decision to go to the battlefield 
for peace and the rights of people afterwards will become the one to destroy what he 
was struggling for,,158. This is perhaps very relevant for those demobilising from the 
RDF but does not necessarily follow for those from the AGs, or even the ex-FAR. If it 
is not evident that members from these two groups will be motivated to contribute to the 
rebuilding of Rwanda then this surely indicates the importance of Ingando in instilling 
such a motivation. 
Although ex-combatants may internally possess a motivation to reintegrate, this does 
not necessarily translate to success in the reintegration process. It is often the case that 
such motivation will need to be supported, nurtured and transformed into capacity. Ex-
156 Interview with XCFAR2. June 2007. 
157 Interview with DR02. July 2007. 
158 Interview with CIV20. October 2006. 
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combatants, whilst having the motivation to reintegrate, do not automatically have the 
capacity to do so and this is where Ingando comes in. The PDOP that ex-combatants 
complete during Ingando aims to equip ex-combatants with the required tools to be able 
to successfully reintegrate, this has the effect of reinforcing their existing motivation as 
it breeds the confidence to plan for a civilian life, and "on an individual level he starts 
now to think and mapping his way, how he will move, what he wishes for his children, 
for his family and also for himself. When you tell him he is the one who will decide 
what to do or what not to do now he knows he has that responsibility ,,159. Ingando then 
plays a key role in sustaining and expanding the motivation to reintegration through 
preparing ex-combatants with the skills and belief necessary to be able to succeed. 
Evidently, the motivations of ex-combatants have a significant effect on how they 
conduct themselves in the community, which in turn has a significant effect on how 
they are accepted into the community. This, therefore, highlights the need for existing 
systems to be strengthened, in order to ensure such motivations are cultivated and ex-
combatants are endowed with the necessary skills to facilitate their reintegration. Much 
of this is based around Ingando and community sensitisation and, as discussed in the 
previous section, it is necessary to have effective local leaders who are capable and 
committed to supporting ex-combatants in their reintegration. However, whilst it is 
important to prepare the ground for ex-combatants, it is crucial to focus on the 
individuals themselves. This is the case because "the single greatest method of social 
reintegration is first of all to sit with the ex-combatant who is to be reintegrated and 
convince him that he is the agent of his own reintegration,,160. The importance of this 
quote cannot be understated. The successful social reintegration of ex-combatants, 
while being dependent in part on external factors, is ultimately decided by internal 
factors, that is, themselves. Whilst it is important to create an environment conducive to 
ex-combatants' reintegration, and support this process, it is imperative that only a 
certain level of support is forthcoming or the risk of dependency becomes an issue. It is, 
at the end of the day, ex-combatants themselves who will be the biggest influence on 
their reintegration. 
159 Interview with RDRC Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, October 2006. 
160 Interview with DR04, June 2007. 
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Family 
Also linked to the motivations of ex-combatants to reintegrate is the family. The family 
provides the beginning of a social network that can be crucial to the success of social 
reintegration. This occurs through two primary methods: first, the family provides a 
support network to assist in the reintegration; and second, when the ex-combatant is the 
head of the home or the main provider the family provide a responsibility to the ex-
combatant which may focus him or her in the process of reintegration. 
When ex-combatants initially return to their communities they are somewhat vulnerable 
compared to the rest of the community. Invariably they would return to their family, 
either their parents or wife and children if they had survived or members of the 
extended family if they had not. In the case of those demobilising from the RDF who 
joined from exile, it is often argued that they are most disadvantaged of the three ex-
combatant groups because they return to nothing: no land, no family and no network161 • 
However the evidence from this research does not support this. Of the 32 ex-RDF 
interviewed, 24 (75%) of them were married and of those 16 (50%) had married prior to 
demobilisation and returned to their wives. Seven of the eight (87.5%) who were 
married after demobilisation returned to a least one family member and off the 8 (25%) 
who remained unmarried 4 (50%) of them also returned to at least one family member 
leaving the remaining four essentially without a network. Therefore, of the 32 ex-RDF 
combatants interviewed only 5, or 15.60/0, of them had no family network in place when 
they returned. When compared to those from ex-FAR and ex-AGs we can see that a 
larger percentage (84.4%) of ex-RDF returned to a family network than did ex-FAR 
(57%) but a slightly smaller percentage thanex-AGs (90%). Additionally, a 
significantly larger percentage of ex-RDF were married prior to demobilisation than ex-
AGs, 50% compared to 18%. This is slightly lower than that of ex-FAR of whom 57% 
were married prior to demobilisation. Although there are some differences between the 
three it is not accurate to state that ex-RDF returned to no family network. More ex-
RDF had a family network than did ex-FAR and more were married prior to 
demobilisation than ex_AGs162• 
161 Interview with RDRC Coordinator, November 2006. 
162 It was not the intention of this research to analyse the composition of ex-combatants with families, 
however it is apparent that this is an issue. Whilst the numbers of ex-RDF interviewed are relatively 
212 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
The presence of a family network in place when ex-combatants return to the community 
can be invaluable to their social reintegration. Those who demobilised from the FAR 
either remained in the country at the end of the genocide or they returned to Rwanda 
within a year or two of the genocide, usually with their families. Because in the initial 
stages there existed no support towards their reintegration from the government or the 
international community, essentially they just returned home and resumed life as 
subsistence farmers, which in a sense may have enhanced their reintegration prospects 
as they were forced to develop social networks and rely on the family networks they did 
have all the more. For ex-RDF there was a time lag of at least three years between the 
end of the genocide and demobilisation. In this period the RDF was fighting an 
insurgency in the Northwest however, many RDF married during this period and 
established families, which they visited on leave. This has proven to be extremely 
helpful in their social reintegration as, during these periods of leave, they were able to 
develop wider societal structures that remained in place when they finally did 
demobilise. Additionally, and evidently more importantly, the wives who remained in 
the community played an important role in preparing the ground for their husbands' 
reintegration 163. Although the community may not have had much interaction with the 
ex-RDF prior to their demobilisation, as periods of leave were short and infrequent 
during the late 1990s when the country was insecure, they did have plenty of contact 
with their families. When they did return they returned to a family with an established 
social network, ''people didn't really know me but they knew about me because they 
knew my family, and my children and they used to see me come on leave and go back 
again,,164. Whilst those from the AGs may not have had the opportunity to visit their 
families or marry prior to their demobilisation 90% of them returned to some form of 
family. 
The family is important in supporting ex-combatants' social reintegration as it provides 
an entry point into the social network and in this sense "certainly people going back into 
areas where they come from and where they have family and social networks would 
high, there were significantly less numbers of ex-FAR and ex-AGs interviewed and this may distort the 
figures. Therefore further research may be advisable. However the proportions of ex-RDF, ex-FAR and 
ex-AOs interviewed are relatively accurate when compared to the proportions demobilised. 
163 Interview with UNDP Rwanda DDR Manager 1998-2001, July 2007. 
164 Interview with XCRDF2, June 2007. 
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probably find it easier to playa positive role than those who moved into new zones 
where they are nobodies" 165 • This can have important implications for their acceptance 
in the community and their ability to find employment. Additionally, in the immediate 
stages where the returning ex-combatant does not have a house or land they are able to 
share this with their family. If this were not forthcoming the prospects of social 
reintegration would be considerably lower. The family also offers emotional support as 
many ex-combatants, in their initial period of return, experience some degree of trauma. 
It is at this time that they are changing their lives and they have come to discover certain 
members of their family or their friends have been killed. This period can be one of 
great turmoil and having the family around can help, through offering comfort and by 
providing a focus. 
As well as assisting in ex-combatants' social reintegration through the methods 
discussed above, the family functions as a focus or motivation to ex-combatants' 
reintegration. Where ex-combatants return to their family it is often the case that they 
are the head of the household or the primary provider and this is certainly the case for 
married male ex-combatants. Having dependants who rely on them for their survival 
instils in them a sense of responsibility and a motivation to successfully reintegrate. 
Indeed, it was for the purpose of returning to take care of their family that inspired a 
number of ex-combatants to demobilise. For many in the RDF who married in the 
period between the end of the genocide and their demobilisation, the expansion of their 
family led to a desire to return. From the interviews in which it was possible to 
ascertain the number of dependents, 166 it is apparent that the average number of 
dependents167 per ex-combatant is 3.5. The figures for ex-RDF, ex-FAR and ex-AG are 
3.9, 2.7 and 2.8, respectively. Taking care of these dependents, and others in the wider 
family such as siblings and parents, is clearly of great importance to ex-combatants and 
it is often the need to feed, clothe, educate and provide a home for them and the 
responsibility they felt towards their family that drove them forward in their 
reintegration. In many instances it was necessary to rebuild family homes destroyed in 
the war and, when this was carried out with the help of those in the community, it aided 
16S Interview with MDRP Task Team Leader, July 2007. 
166 I did not ascertain the number of dependents in all interviews due to the life history mode of 
interviews. Where respondents did not bring up the issue of dependents I did not probe further and these 
respondents were not included in the calculations. This number accounts for 8 out of SO respondents. 
Where it was only apparent that a respondent has a wife and the presence of children was unknown only 
the wife was counted as a dependent. 
167 Only wives and children were included as dependents in these calculations. 
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social reintegration, particularly when such actions were reciprocal, through proximity, 
familiarity and mutual self-help. 
Although the family provides assistance in the social reintegration of ex-combatants and 
can help in their stabilisation there can also be problems associated with this. As with 
the rest of the population, it is sometimes the case that the family is initially fearful of 
their returning relatives. Whilst initially they are welcomed as it has often been a long 
time since the family has seen them, once the first moments have passed the initial 
elation at having a family member back home is sometimes replaced with apprehension. 
This is particularly relevant for the ex-AGs who have been out of Rwanda for a long 
period of time. As one ex-AG explained, "they wanted to check my thoughts, the way I 
think, the way I act, the way I walk and they didn't really, even my own family, they 
didn't really trust me and welcome me. Afterwards we would go and take a drink 
together and they got used to me and up to now we are fine but at that time they wanted 
to see how I behave,,168. This lack of trust or restricted trust, even between family 
members, is understandable given the climate in which ex-combatants were 
reintegrating and it takes a period of time and effort on the part of the ex-combatant to 
demonstrate appropriate behaviour for the family to fully accept them. Additionally, the 
negatives effects of psychosocial trauma are more acutely felt by the family and this 
may affect the way in which the family respond to returning ex-combatants. 
Ex-combatants also indicated difficulties in association with their families in terms of 
providing for them. The majority of ex-combatants have a low level of education and 
obtaining paid employment is particularly difficult for them. Whilst the responsibility 
of providing for a family can help focus ex-combatants in their reintegration, it can also 
become .a burden due to the difficulties they have individually. Ex-combatants, 
attempting to negotiate a particularly volatile environment and adjust to civilian life can 
sometimes find providing for a family a bit too much and this can cause some tension in 
the family. For example, "if you are living in your home and you are not earning and 
living poorly then there is already that tension within the family, if you get work in the 
family their social life improves,,169. During such periods the burden that was initially 
felt by the ex-combatant can be passed onto the family who need to provide for them. 
168 Interview with EXAGl, June 2007. 
169 Interview with RDRC Community-based Reintegration Officer, June 2007. 
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This is particularly the case for disabled ex-combatants who are unable to work and 
cannot tap into the benefits of economic reintegration to help enhance their social 
reintegration. 
Generally speaking, the family provide an additional support in the social reintegration 
of ex-combatants. Despite the existence of some problems associated with the family, 
on the whole it is crucial to the ability of ex-combatants to make their way in the 
community. To this end assistance given to families by the Commission and NGOs will 
undoubtedly aid in the reintegration of ex-combatants. 
Association Membership 
It is the aim of the GoR to build "in that direction of promoting social cohesion and not 
only social cohesion but social cohesion that translates into economic prosperity,,)70 
and to this end it has promoted the creation and expansion of associations across the 
country. During Ingando ex-combatants are encouraged to join civil associations when 
they return to the community, or to create their own and invite civilians to join. 
Associations, the government believe, will help solve many of the issues facing Rwanda 
today: 
The first purpose of these associations is to gather these potential 
and capital together. For instance when someone has less than the 
other they put all their resources together and all together they have 
the power to move forward together. The second purpose is social, 
it's to help these people who have been in the army to feel 
comfortable with those ex-combatants and for the ex-combatants to 
feel secure [ ... ] the second purpose is to help socially, to meet 
together in harmony and peace and help each other~7 J 
Whilst the primary aim of associations is to improve economic prosperity it is 
recognised that they contribute in a significant way to the development of social 
170 Interview with RDRC Coordinator, November 2006. 
171 Interview with DROI, June 2007. 
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cohesion in the community. Membership of an association enables community 
interaction in which all members are united in the pursuit of a common goal. 
Associations, as well as providing a common goal usually of an economic nature, create 
a space in which debate and dialogue can take place, a space in which negotiation is 
formulated. The familiarity that breeds from sustained interaction and proximity 
contributes to the (re )establishment of trust in society which in turn is reinforced 
through the associations activities; "It [association membership] breaks, in matters of 
reconciliation, it breaks down the walls that were built during the genocide, people get 
close to each other, they are no longer sacred of each other. They have united people, 
those who have survived and those who have killecf,l72. As members repeatedly work 
together, support each other, lend money to each other, share experiences and prosper 
economically together, it helps recreate a time prior to conflict in which the community 
worked as a collective and helps construct the foundations of reconciliation. 
Associations in Rwanda have been created to include many different groups and to 
serve many different functions. There exist associations of wives of genocide victims 
and wives of genocide perpetrators, orphans, HIV / AIDs, the disabled, farmer, fisherman 
and various others. Predominately these associations engage in economic activities 
such as various forms of agriculture, pasturing, tailoring, environmental cleaning, and 
security. Many of these associations are either created by or include ex-combatants in 
their membership and this is attributed as contributing in a significant way to their 
successful social reintegration. On an individual level "when you are in an association 
where there is some earnings you get through the projects you do then you are all 
together to benefit from those earnings. They are not very good at the highest level but 
at least you get something. You don't feel lonely, you are with other people, you meet 
other people and you get friends. It helps bring people close together" I 73 • Association 
membership is, evidently, beneficial financially, however the main benefit does seem to 
be social as such membership serves to generate interdependence and help facilitate the 
~ocial reintegration of ex-combatants. 
Social reintegration is assisted in three main ways through association membership: 
first, it brings together ex-combatants and civilians and provides a common goal, which 
172 Interview with CIV4, June 2007. 
m Interview with XCRDF4, June 2007. 
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promotes similarity rather than difference. Over time, as ex-combatants and civilians 
continue to work together and mutually benefit from such work, trust between the two 
develops and this continues to the point where positive relationships can be constructed 
and maintained. An example of this comes from an association created by a blind ex-
combatant to work for blind people in Kigali; "We are one, we don't say you are an XC 
or not, we just say you are a Rwandan. We have the same aim, as most of them are 
blind. The association helps to get people from solitude so they are not lonely. There 
are some people who feel like they are discriminated against because of their blindness 
and it helps them get out of that loneliness, that's how it helps" 1 74. 
Second, by pooling resources members of the association have a greater ability to 
survive and prosper in the market. They are more flexible and can adjust to market 
shocks thus ensuring the potential to be sustainable. Additionally, ex-combatants are 
more accessible to the RDRC when they are in an association, a factor that advantages 
them as individuals but also the association as a collective, as the benefit from training 
and support provided to ex-combatants by the RDRC is accrued by the collective175• 
Third, ex-combatant membership in associations contributes to the development of the 
community and, as such, reduces the burden of ex-combatants on the community thus 
demonstrating to the community that ex-combatants can be a benefit to the community 
rather than a burden, threat or nuisance. This is exemplified in the following, "an ex-
combatant who stays here, he has started an association of masonry. Whenever anyone 
is building a house they are on standby and when they are called they do and help so 
they are helping the society to build houses and they earn from that so they are 
usefuf' 1 76. 
Ex-combatant membership in associations generally aids their reintegration into society 
through the economic benefits derived from the associations' activities in addition to the 
creation of a space in which dialogue, familiarity and, ultimately, trust can develop. 
However, that is not to say no problems exist. Local leaders, as well as the level of 
acceptance of the community, which, as previously identified, is controlled in part by 
local leaders, can influence ex-combatant membership in associations. In instances in 
174 Interview with XCRDF31, November 2006. 
175 The benefits of economic reintegration for social reintegration will be discussed in the next subsection. 
176 Interview with CIVS,June 2007. 
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which ex-combatants are excluded from joining, this can have consequential negative 
effects on the cohesion of the community as it usually points to, and indeed exacerbates, 
division within society. Additionally, being refused entry into associations effectively 
contributes to the economic marginalisation of ex-combatants, as they are unable to 
share in the benefits that accumulate. The effects of this are felt by the community as a 
whole due the fact ex-combatants are unable to reintegrate effectively, both 
economically and socially, and therefore become a burden on their families and the 
community. Effective sensitisation of both local leaders and the community to accept 
returning ex-combatants is evidently important in such cases and this, if it is carried out 
effectively, is a reflection of political commitment to the successful reintegration of ex-
combatants. 
Economic Reintegration 
The successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants can have a number of 
important implications for their social reintegration also: first, economic reintegration 
decreases tije burden that is placed on the receiving community thus reducing the 
potential for resentment and possible marginalisation. This is partially because 
economic reintegration reduces tensions within the family. Familial tensions that arise 
due to the lack of economic reintegration have knock-on implications of social 
reintegration as "those who turn to begging they will be despisec/' 177 • When ex-
combatants are successfully economically reintegrated these burdens on the society 
dissipate to some degree. 
Second, economic reintegration demonstrates the productivity and usefulness of ex-
combatants, which increases the likelihood of their acceptance in the community as, 
rather than being a burden on society, they are actively contributing to its development. 
This can be seen in the following; "I am living well with the society because I started a 
project of digging toilets, I can dig a toilet of 20 metres and I get like Rf 20k and out of 
that money I hire people to work on my land and out of that money I do other small 
projects, . that is how I am living. Even I sometimes buy drinks after and I call other 
people and we share those drinks,,178. What this indicates is that ex-combatants who 
177 Interview with CIV 11. June 2007. 
171 Interview with XCA03, June 2007. 
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are economically productive and useful for the community, in this case through the 
improvement of sanitation facilities, are also socially accepted, as indicated by the 
sharing after. 
Third, repeated economIC relations provides a mechanism through which the 
(re )establishment of trust is made more possible; if economic reintegration does not 
occur this avenue cannot be exploited. Fourth, economic reintegration generates 
networks that assist social reintegration for example, through the provision. Points 
three and four are relatively strongly connected as the networks generated by economic 
reintegration can result in increased trust, which then helps social reintegration. This is 
demonstrated by the following quote from an ex-combatant who works as a tailor in 
Kigali; "because I am a tailor when I make clothes for someone and he is glad he goes 
and tells people and they come, that is a link I have, this one tells another one and he 
brings another one,,179. 
Fifth, economic reintegration reduces likelihood of a return to arms thus allaying any 
fears the community may have of ex-combatants. The following quote is a particularly 
lucid example of the five positive implications of economic reintegration on social 
reintegration; 
They trust me because they see that I do everything, I am a 
hardworking man. I have a bike even though it is old and sometimes 
I go to Goma, I buy this local beer because there is a better quality 
there, people like it, and I sell and I sell cigarettes at the same place 
where I sell beer and I have 5 chickens at home and I sell the eggs. 
So when they see all those activities they trust me, I don't go and 
steal, I don't do wrong acts, it is a way of them to trust. Through 
that local beer that I sell at home people like coming and we interact, 
h d . dv' 180 we s are an we give a Ice . 
These points are further exemplified when considering association membership and 
CBR. Association membership clearly has an influence in the economic reintegration 
of ex-combatants as well as social reintegration, as demonstrated previously. CBR are 
179 Interview with XCRDF27, November 2007. 
110 Interview with XCRDF22, June 2007. 
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labour intensive public works projects operating at the district level that run from 
between six months and a year and comprise 50% ex-combatants and 50% civilians, the 
aim of which is to bring civilians and ex-combatants together to contribute to the 
development of the community whilst benefiting economically through job creation. 
Projects include rural road rehabilitation, bridge building, swamp reclamation, re-
forestation, and hill terracing, among others. Members of the project teams are required 
to save 50% of their wages, which they receive at the end of the project, and all monies 
are paid into a bank account, the purpose of which is to teach ex-combatants and 
civilians alike about the banking and saving system. This renders members 
creditworthy and enables them to access credit, which previously they were unable to do. 
They also receive on-the-job training in various trades such as masonry and in project 
design and management. The intended end result is that they (ex-combatants and 
civilians) pool the savings they have made in order to create associations and 
cooperatives, utilising the skills and experience they have gained to move into 
sustainable employment. 
CBR is an extremely useful mechanism to combine both economIC and social 
reintegration and create tangible benefits for ex-combatants and the community as a 
whole. The creation of employment, which is attributed to the presence of ex-
combatants in the community 181, provides an opportunity for ex-combatants and 
civilians to adjust to each other's presence and develop positive relationships in much 
the same way as an association, as the following acknowledges: 
Often when ex-combatants return to the villages they feel they are 
different to the people so they just keep to themselves, and also the 
population may not be accepting them, they feel they are different. 
So this brings them together and they get time to change, the 
perceptions change. They become real civilians, it is a way of 
helping them become real civilians like the rest of the population 
then they are accepteti82 
tit Interview with RDRC Coordinator, November 2007. 
tl2 Interview with RDRF Community Based Reintegration Officer, June 2007. 
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This view also seems to be supported by ex-combatants who state that the sharing of 
work and complaints about the work lead to the sharing of drinks after work and, 
ultimately, friendships. 
The economIC reintegration of ex-combatants has clear benefits for their social 
reintegration through enabling ex-combatants to make positive contributions to the 
community and develop trust between ex-combatants and civilians. Whilst economic 
reintegration helps facilitate social reintegration it is necessary to also note that this is a 
reciprocal relationship as social reintegration makes economic reintegration easier: first, 
previous social networks, when re-established, may offer economic opportunities that 
otherwise would not forthcoming. Second, community acceptance may increase 
economic opportunities through demonstrated trust. Third, social reintegration provides 
a security net in times of economic difficulty through increased and strengthened 
networks, particularly family networks. Four, social reintegration does more to 
normalise ex-combatants as civilians thus making them more productive in a civilian 
environment. It is therefore evident that both economic and social reintegration are 
mutually reinforcing and whilst the final aim of a DDR programme may be to achieve 
social reintegration, such an endeavour is inextricably linked with economic 
reintegration. 
Ex-combatants, and indeed the community itself, face many challenges when they 
return to their communities. While macro and meso level elements are crucial to ex-
combatant reintegration through the creation of an environment that can best aid this 
process, it is ex-combatants themselves who hold the key to their futures. Ex-
combatants need to take advantage of the opportunities they are presented with and 
make the most of them. This is epitomised in the following: 
One thing I want to say is that when you really want to do something, 
when you feel you have the courage to do something, you tell 
yourself I have to do this for my kids to grow up well so you do it 
with all of your heart. I can't say that I met with a bad life or a good 
life, I feel like I am in between [ ... ] the life that I used to have before 
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I went in the army that is what life I continue to live in after being 
reintegrated. /83 
Arguably this is the very aim of the reintegration process; to return an ex-combatant to 
the life they had prior to conflict. Any more would be to elevate them above the living 
standard of the community and any less would be reduce their chances of reintegration 
and thus run the risk of a return to arms. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Although the social reintegration of ex-combatants has been relatively successful for the 
reasons identified above, it is not without its problems and obstacles. It is important to 
recognise these issues in order to be in a position from which it will be possible to better 
design and implement DDR programmes. Many of the problems and obstacles to social 
reintegration are the negatives of the factors identified as necessary for· successful 
reintegration, for example, when community acceptance is not forthcoming and 
stigmatisation is evident, when local leaders are not supportive instead excluding ex-
combatants from activities from which they could benefit and when political 
commitment is not in place, and have been addressed in the previous section. However, 
the social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda thus far has been relatively 
successful. 
Social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda can be understood through the analogy 
of a painting. Macro level elements are akin to the canvas; the combination of political 
will and security and stability provide the foundations from which social reintegration is 
made possible. Without these the successful social reintegration cannot be fully 
realised as all aspects of the process are undermined before they really begin. Meso 
level elements can be compared to the outline of the painting; together demobilisation 
camps, community sensitisation and acceptance, and local leaders create and prepare 
the environment for successful social reintegration to take place. If these elements are 
not forthcoming there is little direction or structure to social reintegration and any 
successes that are achieved are partial and leave gaps that could undermine the whole 
183 Interview with XCRDF27, November 2006. 
223 
Richard Bowd PhD Post-war Recovery Studies University of York, 2008 
process. Micro level elements represent the colour; the union of ex-combatant 
motivation, the family, associations and economic reintegration operate at the 
grassroots level to negotiation the environment that has been made possible and created 
by the macro and meso level elements. If any of these aspects are absent the painting 
will remain incomplete. 
The three levels of social reintegration identified and analysed in this chapter are 
interdependent. For successful social reintegration to occur it is not only necessary that 
the elements within each level are present, but also that they function together to 
represent a whole. If one or more of the elements is missing, it will weaken the social 
reintegration process as a whole. Certain elements - political will, community 
sensitisation and acceptance and ex-combatant motivation - may be more crucial to the 
process as a whole and would result in greater damage overall if they were absent. 
However, the non-existence or susceptibility of other elements from all levels will also 
undermine the process, to the point that that the successful social reintegration of ex-
combatants remains elusive. 
Such is the fragility of the whole social reintegration process, certainly in its infancy, 
that even the presence of the elements identified in this chapter do not entirely ensure 
social reintegration will be successful. There are a number of isolated problems with, 
or obstacles to, the successful reintegration of ex-combatants that can conspire to 
destabilise the process. These obstacles - the starting point of ex-combatants, access to 
land and housing, psychosocial issues and special groups - can, in part be ameliorated 
through the achievement of the identified elements. However, in order to effectively 
manage them it will take the introduction of other actors and stakeholders in the 
process. 
The next. chapter presents an analysis of the way in which ex-combatants socially 
reintegrate in terms of what is necessary to make this process successful. In doing so it 
provides the foundations from which an analysis of the implications social reintegration 
has for the restoration of social capital and reconciliation. 
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Chapter Seven: 
The Impacts of Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration on Social 
Capital and Reconciliation 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an analysis of the social reintegration of ex-combatants. 
This is of particular importance as, if one is to understand the effects of social 
reintegration on social capital and reconciliation it is first necessary to appreciate how 
such reintegration takes place. As is evident from chapter six, the process of ex-
combatant reintegration is multifaceted and therefore the effects of such a process on 
the restoration of social capital and promotion of reconciliation will be highly complex. 
Beginning with a consideration of reconciliation in Rwanda this chapter endeavours" to 
assess the contribution of ex-combatant reintegration to this process. By first 
examining this aspect it is more possible to understand the ways in which ex-combatant 
reintegration aids the process. The chapter then investigates how ex-combatant social 
reintegration affects social capital. This consists of a consideration of vertical, bonding 
and bridging social capital and the interrelatedness of the three. Having identified such 
affects the chapter moves on to an analysis of ex-combatant social reintegration and its 
effects on reconciliation. In this part of the chapter, reconciliation is divided into 
political and social reconciliation. The conclusion will then draw together the key 
lessons learned from this chapter in order to allow a full consideration of the research 
question. 
7.2 Reconciliation in Rwanda 
When considering reconciliation in Rwanda one may be forgiven for questioning 
whether, after the destruction of the civil war and subsequent genocide, such an 
achievement is possible. The process of reconciliation begins in a climate of distrust, 
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suspicion and even hatred. There is often a simplistic assumption that reconciliation 
entails the bringing together of two or more conflicting groups in order to work through 
and reconcile their differences. However, as demonstrated in the final section of 
chapter six, violent conflict has changed the identity of these groups, and the way in 
which they relate to each other, through its effects oil social capital and thus the 
environment in which reconciliation takes place, and the actors involved in the process 
have undergone marked transformation. In terms of the literature regarding 
reconciliation most concentrates on the issue of transitional justice and, in the Rwandan 
case in particular, the Gacaca process. However, this section considers the way in 
which reconciliation is pursued at a community level and to this avail it will link very 
strongly with the previous analysis of the restoration of social capital in the post-
genocide period as the indicators for such a restoration are transferable to the 
reconciliation concept. 
Reconciliation has been high on the agenda of RPF government since they took power 
in 1994 and a number of measures have been introduced in the pursuit of this 
endeavour. However, in order to accurately evaluate their success it is first necessary to 
consider the position the government found itself in 1994. As previously noted, 
bridging social capItal had been destroyed throughout the conflict and genocide as a 
result of years of discriminatory vertical social capital practices. Nevertheless, it is 
important to acknowledge that reconciliation in Rwanda must not only take place 
between Hutu and Tutsi; it is an altogether more complex phenomenon. Indeed, as the 
Executive Secretary of the NURC emphasises: 
Reconciliation in Rwanda is looking at different facets; it is not only 
HutulTutsi. There was a time when you had division between the 
Hutus, from the South, from the North, from the East. Then you have 
the aspect of victims and perpetrators of genocide, then you also 
have people living in the country and returnees. There has been a 
lot of suspicion even at the family level [ ... ] The genocide was so 
complicated Sometimes it was within households or neighbours 
killing another neighbour. And you know there had been a lot of 
intermarriages between Rwandese so someone betraying a cousin, so 
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complicated to understand. It's not only the Hutus and Tutsis 
reconciling, it's more than that. 184 
When we take into account this point, it becomes more apparent just how difficult 
reconciliation in Rwanda is to achieve. Moreover, when we add to this equation the 
presence of ex-combatants from the three different groups, the return of Hutu refugees 
from the DRC, IDPs within Rwanda, orphans, widows and the disabled, the complexity 
of this situation grows all the more. As a result of this complexity the question may 
arise as to whether or not reconciliation is desirable; however it is evident from the data 
that in the Rwanda context the answer to this question is a resounding yes. There is a 
general view that "whether we like each other or not we have to live together because 
we are in the same field, the same hill, almost the same house as your neighbour,,185 and 
as such "there was a challenge between survivors and perpetrators and also between 
people who returned, people had to rebuild their lives and to live together and become 
one nation" 186. In response to the need for reconciliation the GoR established the 
NURC in 1999 with a mandate to promote the unity and reconciliation of the Rwandese 
people. The NURC engages in civic education, conflict mediation and provision of 
support to communities 187. 
Whilst the NURC is charged with the promotion of unity and reconciliation, it has no 
legal mandate and as such cannot investigate previous human rights abuses or hold 
people to account for atrocities either before or during the genocide. Instead, the 
creation of the ICTR and the Gacaca COurtS I88, as well as the strengthening of existing 
national courts, is mandated to carry out these functions. The ICTR and national courts 
deal with category one cases while Gacaca deal with category two, three and four l89• 
The implementation of the Gacaca court system was another of the GoR's initiatives to 
help generation reconciliation. A third major initiative by the GoR was the 
Decentralisation Programme, which began in 2000 and included Administrative 
184 Interview with NURC Executive Secretary, July 2007. 
18S Interview with RDRC Coordinator 
186 Interview with researchers at the Centre for Conflict Management, National University of Rwanda. 
187 For an in-depth analysis of the activities of the NURC please see the Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation (IJR) Final Report (2005). 
188 See Chapter Three for a discussion on Gacaca Courts. 
189 Category 1 crimes - planners and organiser of the genocide, killings of particular fervour and sexual 
crimes - are tried by the ICTR and National Courts; Category 2 crimes - Killing or intending to kill under 
direction of others - are tried by the District-level Gacaca; Category 3 crimes - those involving bodily 
injury - are tried by the Sector-level Gacaca; and Category 4 crimes - property crimes - are tried by the 
Cell-level Gacaca. 
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Territorial Reform. This, in effect enabled greater public participation in the policy 
making process and overall developmental direction taken by Rwanda and thus helped 
to foster trust in the government, thus aiding the reconciliation process. 
Reconciliation is an extremely unpredictable process that is dependent on a number of 
interrelated factors. Specific to Rwanda, when one is attempting to evaluate the level of 
reconciliation 190, two issues in particular should be taken into consideration: first, the 
nature of the civil war and genocide, as discussed in chapter six, had devastating effects 
on the society as a whole thus making any attempts of reconciliation all the more 
difficult. Second, at the time of writing it has only been 14 years since the genocide, 
which is an exceptionally short period of time when considering what level of 
reconciliation one might expect in such an environment. Both these issues should be 
factored in to any analysis of reconciliation in Rwanda today. That said it is important 
to give full regard to the efforts and progress that has been made to date. 
The process of reconciliation in Rwanda has, over the past 14 years, slowly taken shape. 
In the immediate aftermath of the genocide the returning Tutsi exiles controlled the 
country and a great number of Hutus had left Rwanda for the DRC. During this time 
the country was not secure, suffering from insurgency in the Northwest and general 
insecurity as Hutu extremists within Rwanda and from the refugee camps in the DRC 
attempted to destabilise the government and take back the country. Fear and distrust 
were still relatively high and, between the Tutsi, there was a process of normalisation in 
progress between the returnees and those who remained. The government's primary 
objectives were to ensure the security of the country and attempt to get the economy 
functioning again, which meant their focus on reconciliation at this time was, in a sense, 
minimal. Whilst they advocated for reconciliation to occur this could not be reinforced 
with effective community initiatives. It was not really until security had been 
established in the country and the refugees returned to Rwanda that the reconciliation 
process could really get underway with the full support of the government, however this 
brought with it a paradox; whilst the security that was necessary for reconciliation to 
progress had been established, the return of so many refugees added another layer to the 
PCE thus further complexifying the reconciliation process. 
190 An endeavour which in itself is extremely difficult, due to its particularly subjective nature. 
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In the communities prior to the refugee return relations differed according to location. 
In some places cooperation was relatively high with people sharing and helping each 
other as they needed it. However, over the majority of the country "after the genocide 
people no longer trusted each other, right after the genocide, because of what they went 
through. People were scared that others might kill them, there was no trust. After 
security kept on being strengthened through police station and the government kept on 
teaching about unity and reconciliation it kept changing slowly by slowly,,191. Certain 
places in Rwanda were affected more than others during the genocide and in these 
places reconciliation has been harder to achieve. In the South and East levels of trust 
were exceptionally low and communities did not cooperate straight away. As security 
was established and the government continued with its message of unity and 
reconciliation the population began functioning more effectively and people cooperated 
more readily. 
With the creation of the NURC in 1999 community initiatives to promote unity and 
reconciliation really took off and the process gathered pace. Whilst during this time it 
would not be accurate to claim reconciliation had been achieved one could make a case 
for some level of co-existence. As Rwandans began to rebuild their communities they 
turned to traditional practices to aid the process. The table below illustrates the results 
of PRA exercises aiming to identify community activities that increase feelings of 
solidarity, improve communication and promote civic mindedness. 
Community Event Effects 
Ubukwe Sharing food/drinks, gift giving, dancing, 
(wedding) exchange cows; Affects around 300; 
Kubatirisha Feast/drinking after church. God-parents give 
(baptism) speech and offer gifts and rosary beadslbible, 
feast again; Around 50 attend 
Gusohora Umwana On 8th day after birth people gather to eat, drink 
(baby naming ceremony) and celebrate. Involves everyone there; Medium 
affect 
Kugabirana Exchange of cow and continued eating at 
(communal feast & drinking) recipient's house 
Kuva Ku Kiriliyo A means of support, collection of money to 
(mourning stage after death- enable activities throughout the period; 
length dependent on age - Affects whole community and beyond 
Young = 7 days, old = 1 month) 
Guhlngisll. Develops unity, cooperation and efficient 
(sharing drinks after working on working; Effect is smaller but very strong within 
191 Interview with e1V8, June 2007. 
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others' land) the group 
Umuganda Takes place on last Saturday of the month -
(communal cleaning everyone works together then drinks in the 
programme) afternoon; Affects the whole community 
Gacaca Promotes Unity & Reconciliation, share 
information about the past (communication), 
forgiveness. Maximum affect, whole community 
and country. 
. . Table 3 - ReconcIhatory Commumty Events: Author . 
Additionally, informal networks of exchange (Kugabiral92 and Ubudehe l93) and various 
associations 194 indicate a high incidence of behaviour born out of a need for mutual 
assistance and reciprocity that help foster and reinforce solidarity, cooperation and trust. 
Such behaviour developed over time and was actively encouraged and supported by the 
government who implemented various programmes such as Ingando and Gacaca. In 
terms of the population it was the general perception that things had improved, that 
people were living well and society was functioning and a lot of this was attributed to 
the government, which was seen as strong and sincere. 
Despite the progress made there are a number of problems. There still exist sectarian 
mentalities and some degree of social exclusion. One female civilian, a Hutu whose 
Tutsi husband was killed in the genocide, described how both sides excluded her in her 
area saying, "They killed my husband. I don't understand, I am rejected on both parts, I 
am rejected by Hutus and Tutsis, how is it that I am living badly?". She then became 
hysterical and directed the following statement at the Tutsi translator, "You are the one, 
, 
if I tell you what are you going to do to me? You are one of those people who are 
hurting me; you are all the same, why are you all hurting me? Why am I Uvi,!g this way? 
I used to love my husband, why am I being hurt in this way? Ask the government, why 
are they helping only some?,,195. This indicates a number of issues: first, there exists 
some degree of division, at least between some people. This woman believed herself to 
be rejected by her family for being married to a Tutsi and rejected by Tutsi for being a 
Hutu. Second, there is, among some, fear of the other group. Third, the very fact that 
people still talk in "us and them" terms indicates the government policy of being 
192 Kugabira is the cultural exchange of cows that takes place within the community and promotes 
reciprocity mutual interdependence. For further information please see Gravel (1967). 
193 Ubudehe is government promoted traditional practice involving collective action in the community to 
assist the most vulnerable and reduce poverty. For further information please see Joseph (2008). 
194 See appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 
195 Interview with e1V17, October 2006. 
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Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi has not been fully internalised by all. Four, there is 
a belief that the government favours Tutsi which thus undermines the reconciliation 
effort. Whilst these beliefs do not appear to be widespread there is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that there still remains a problem. This, coupled with the fact that genocide 
witnesses and survivors often live in fear of death, indeed many have been killed l96 
resulting in reprisal attacks and a number of deaths in custody of genocide suspects 
have taken place 197, indicates the problems that still exist. It is therefore perhaps 
necessary to ask 'Is this true reconciliation?' 
Whilst the problems that are apparent within Rwanda are not widespread it is clear that 
what is occurring in Rwanda is not 'true' reconciliation. However it is of paramount 
importance to also state that neither should it be. Reconciliation is a process that takes a 
significant amount of time and cannot be expected to be completed within 14 years. 
Given the scale and nature of the death and suffering in Rwanda it would be 
unreasonable to expect Rwandans to be reconciled at this point in time. However, 
despite the negatives in the country there has been much progress. A number of ex-
patriots working with the World Bank and United Nations and having lived in Rwanda 
for a number of years made reference to the Rwandan culture as having made this 
possible. One in particular stands out, 
One of the big positive factors is the generally very strong social 
fabric in Rwanda even though shattered. That group thinking and 
not individualistic thinking is a very big advantage. You wouldn't 
leave out anyone in the community even if you hated that person. It 
wasn't the case that everyone loved each other in '94, they probably 
.still don't. But the thing is because you are together in one place 
and because you think you belong you stay in a house next to each 
other and you still talk to each other. 198 
Rwanda is in the process of reconciliation and has made significant gains towards this 
end but overestimating its success thus far could be dangerous as it obscures the truth. 
The NURC, created to promote Unity and Reconciliation has been essential in this 
196 For more information on this see Human Rights Watch and African Rights among others. 
197 See following Human Rights Watch report - http;llhrw.orglreportsl2007/rwanda0707/6.htm 
I"lnterview with UNDP Rwanda DDR Phase One Manager, July 2007. 
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endeavour and can arguably claim to have been successful in establishing a significant 
level of unity thus far. This is important for reconciliation as it builds the foundation for 
continued reconciliation: 
Unity is more about political reconciliation I would say: the 
reintegration of refugees; the reintegration of ex-combatants; the 
abolition of identity cards that were so discriminatory; equal access 
in terms of opportunities for education, for jobs; the civic education 
programmes; the inclusion; the power-sharing. I think all that has 
been reached and what needs to be done is to consolidate it. But 
what also needs to be done is to ensure that communities own it 
because at the end of the day you want sustainability and 
sustainability comes from the people not from the government. 199 
Political reconciliation can be claimed to have been very successful. There is still more 
that needs to be done, such as the broadening of the power-sharing government, but 
significant progress has been made. Likewise significant progress has been made in 
social reconciliation; however it is this area that is the most problematic due to the 
devastation of the genocide. Nevertheless, as political reconciliation deepens it acts as a 
driver for social reconciliation and it is possible to move from a position of co-existence 
and build even more positive relationships. It is necessary to reiterate an earlier point at 
this juncture: Experience show that the progress that has been made in Rwanda 
regarding social reconciliation and reconstruction has, as demonstrated by interviews, 
PRA exercises and observations in the field, for all its problems and faults been 
remarkable. The question that remains for this chapter to answer is: 'What are the 
implications of ex-combatant social reintegration on social capital and reconciliation?' 
7.3 Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration and Social Capital 
The section begins with a discussion of social capital restoration in the post-genocide 
period and combines this with the analysis of the macro, meso and micro level elements 
of ex-combatants' social reintegration as considered in the previous chapter, to provide 
a more comprehensive understanding of how the social reintegration of ex-combatants 
199 Interview with NURC Executive Secretary, July 2007 
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impacts on the restoration vertical social capital. This begins by first examining the 
transformation in social capital in the post-genocide period and progresses to a 
consideration of how ex-combatant social reintegration affects vertical social capital 
before then progressing to an analysis of bonding and bridging social capital. 
7.3.1 Social Capital in the post-1994 Genocide Period 
In the immediate aftermath of the genocide the restoration of social capital proved to be 
extremely difficult. Not surprisingly, in a climate of fear, distrust and insecurity, there 
still existed great division between Hutu and Tutsi. As a result of the civil war and 
genocide Rwandan society had been fundamentally altered. With up to 800,000 people 
killed in the genocide, 2 million refugees into neighbouring countries, 130,000 
detainees in the national prison system, 700,000 returning Rwandan expatriates and 
650,000 alleged participants in the genocide, the challenge facing the RPF government 
was enormous. Because bridging social capital had been devastated, primarily through 
the discriminatory vertical social capital practices of the previous regime, the path that 
the RPF government chose to take would prove vital. 
In the years immediately following the genocide Rwanda still experienced a certain 
degree of insecurity due to the insurgency in the Northwest from the FDLR in the DRC. 
At this time "the population, it was not fine. There were troubles because some people 
were supporting the infiltrators and some people were supporting the RPF',200. As a 
result the government concentrated on the securitisation of its borders and crushing the 
remnants of the genocidal ideology. At this point intercommunal trust was still very 
low, as one civilian claimed, "There was no trust, people really feared each other 
because you could not tell if this one had killed or not killed, you couldn't tell if this one 
would kill you or not. When you were returning you couldn't tell what would happen 
and people were emotional, you had lost everything, even your relatives, so it was not 
easy to trust"201. It was apparent that security was an important issue and would define 
the process of social capital restoration. The suspicion, trauma and distrust among large 
proportions of the population meant that any efforts to rebuild security would have to 
take into account the fear of continued killing and revenge killings202• 
200 Interview with XCAGS, June 2007. 
201 Interview with CIV8, June 2007. 
202 Interview with CIV8, June 2007. 
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At this point bonding social capital within the two groups was also somewhat weak. 
Among the Tutsi there were a large number of orphans, widows and disabled who 
experienced varying degrees of trauma and had very low levels of trust. However, due 
to the precariousness of their position they were forced to attempt to rebuild their lives 
with those around them203 . Additionally, a large number of exiled Tutsi returned to 
Rwanda to find their relatives killed and their property looted or destroyed. Among this 
group of returnees it was common to see groups being established according to previous 
networks204 . Whilst this may have initially added to the complexity of bonding social 
capital among the Tutsi, over time these networks became more established and the ties 
that bound people together, though they may have been based on negative connotations, 
began to develop. In this same period bonding social capital between Hutu was also 
problematic. To begin with many Hutu had left the country as the RPF took control and 
this, coupled with the fact that the Hutu were not really able to have any political say in 
the country, meant that bonding social capital was weakened205 . Additionally, "on the 
part of Hutus they were not so strong because those who stayed behind they were still 
ashamed of what their group did and they could not interact between themselves easily, 
they still had that shame,,206. The present government, often criticised for being too 
autocratic, are evidently wary of the risk of further 'ethnic' trouble and there is the 
general feeling that their grip on the security apparatus of the country would not allow 
conflict to break out again. In this way bonding social capital between the Hutu is 
unable to develop again to overly strong levels. 
As security became increasingly established within Rwanda the government began 
attempts to foster bridging social capital. Over time, because the government would not 
tolerate revenge attacks and encouraged the community to live together, trust between 
the groups increased: "things kept on changing slowly, slowly, slowly until Tutsis 
wanted to live well with Hutus. I remember at first Tutsis had that spirit of revenge, 
that anger. But because the government was not supporting it they kept on changing,,207. 
Government policies such as the creation of Gacaca courts, focus on association 
memberships, development programmes, and the establishment of institutions and 
203 Interview with CIV9, June 2007. 
204 Interview with CIV21, October 2006. 
205 Interview with UNDP Rwanda DDR Manager 1 II Phase, July 2007. 
206 Interview with CIV21, October 2006. 
207 Interview with C1V6, June 2007. 
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social initiatives aimed at social cohesion have had some effect in developing trust and 
increasing cooperation and communication. It is, however, apparent that such trust is 
fragile and there remains a lot to still be done. Whilst the government remain 
committed to nurturing trust within the community and maintaining security the 
indication is there that bridging social capital can develop further. However what is 
crucial to this process is that the government ensure equality in their policies and do not 
engage in discriminatory vertical social capital, as this will ensure that the foundations 
for bridging social capital can never truly develop. 
As security is maintained and the benefits of government developmental programmes 
come to fruition for Hutu and Tutsi alike, co-existence is made easier and bonding 
social capital transforms from being based around ethnic groups back towards 
geographical communities. The establishment of the Umudugudu 208 locates the 
community together around a centre in which "even the way people are living is helpful, 
it helps security, the hospital, water, schools, many things are now c/ose,,209. Whilst a 
return to the period in which bonding social capital was more based around 
geographical communities and bridging social occurred between those communities is 
undoubtedly a long way away, it nevertheless appears to be the direction the 
government are moving in. 
During the fieldwork stage of this research PRA exercises were conducted in three rural 
sites 210. The exercises relative to this section included social network mapping, 
institutional diagramming and social capital indicators. From both the output of these 
exercises and observations made throughout the process it is apparent that in 
comparison to the situation at the end of the genocide, the restoration of social capital 
has been somewhat successful. In terms of vertical social capital it would appear that 
the relationship between the state and the community has strengthened. This is apparent 
when we consider the results of the Institutional Diagramming in which between 66% 
and 83% of institutions in the community that were regarded as being of most 
importance are provided and maintained by the state. These included: hospitals, 
markets, .schools, the municipality, government-run associations, Gacaca courts, the 
208 The Umudugudu is the lowest level of the municipality - province, district, sector, cell, Umudugudu-
and ranges from ten to fifty households which would include anywhere up to 500 people. The word 
Imidugudu is also often used and refers to the singular. Umudugudu is therefore the plural. 
209 Interview with CIV6. June 2007. 
210 Although the research was conducted in each of the four rural provinces I was unable to conduct PRA 
activities in the West. 
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police, a military base, and Mutobo Demobilisation centre211 • As is evident, these 
institutions provide development, leadership and security. For communities to identify 
these as the most important institutions to their lives gives an indication as to what is 
most important to the community and the trust they have in the leadership. This is 
further reinforced when we take in account the result from the Social Capital Indicators, 
which clearly reveal that the community trusts both local leaders and the national 
government and there exists significant support for government programmes 212 • 
Additionally, within this exercise criticism was levelled towards certain aspects of 
government programmes and this further demonstrates a trust in government, as 
community members feel comfortable enough to be able to criticise the government. 
Evidence also suggests that bridging social capital is also being re-established. Social 
Network Mapping indicates that households within, and between, Umudugudus engage 
in the reciprocal exchange of water, food, information, tools, money, salt, wood, labour 
and petroe 13 • This demonstrates a level of trust within the community. Initially such 
exchange took place out of necessity however, over time, with increased interaction and 
communication, trust developed and exchange took place based upon the relationships 
that became established. What made it possible for such relationships to develop was a 
combination of community events, informal networks and associations that engendered 
trust, social cohesion and collective responsibility 214 • Community events such as 
weddings, baptisms, baby naming ceremonies, communal feasts, Umuganda 215 and 
Gacaca provide a space in which community members gain familiarity with their peers 
through proximity and, over time, are able to develop relationships within the 
community. Similarly, associations based around economic activity and social and 
sporting activities helps to develop support networks, increase reciprocal exchange and 
solidarity and cohesion. Ultimately these associations stimulate self-help, mutual-help 
and interdependence, thus assisting in the establishment of bridging social capital216• 
Observations made during the PRA exercises further supports these claims. Throughout 
the process, debate arose as was to be expected and in some instances certain 
211 See appendices 4, 4.1 and 4.2. 
212 See appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 
213 See appendices 3.0, 3.0a, 3.0b,3.Oc, 3.1, 3.la, 3.1b and 3.2 
214 See appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 
215 Umuganda is a communal cleaning programme that takes place on the last Saturday of the month 
during which the community works together to clean their locality and then shares drinks in the afternoon. 
216 See appendices 2.1.2.2 and 2.3 
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individuals dominated the discussion. However, rather than this being based along 
ethnic lines it seemed that gender and age were the main criteria for authority with older 
men in the group being more dominant. Nevertheless, as a whole the groups worked 
well together, supporting each other's understanding until consensus was reached. This 
indicates not only relatively harmonious relations in the community, but also the 
effective management of conflicts as and when they arise. Although this cannot be 
generalised to more serious conflicts, the fact that the group negotiated among itself and 
came together to reach agreement bodes well for the establishment of social capital and 
conflict management techniques. 
Whilst progress has been made the situation is far from perfect. However, as the 
following quote from a Hutu priest from the Western province indicates, there IS 
evidence to suggest that the hope for a united Rwanda is not completely misguided: 
Among the people there was fear and a lack of trust that had been 
generated by the war and conflicts that had taken place but after a 
while, when people saw there was progress they started sharing, they 
were sharing activities, people were coming from abroad and other 
regions, people started working together and you saw that things 
were improving slowly. What I can tell you is that when you see 
people working together on the hills they help each other without 
trying to see which group he or she belongs to, I think that is a step 
towards unity and reconciliation. I cannot say unity and 
reconciliation is perfect but we have reached somewhere217 
Social capital in Rwanda has been restored to some degree. Whilst the government can 
be criticised on certain grounds, the discriminatory vertical social capital so readily 
practiced by the previous regime does not define state-population relations in Rwanda 
today. Bonding social capital amongst both Hutu and Tutsi is not so overly strong that 
it could lead to the re-emergence of the "us and them" mentality that was so damaging 
to Rwandan socie~18, and it is transforming to become based around ties other than 
ethnicity. Bridging social capital, the variant of social capital damaged the most 
217 Interview with eIVIO, June 2007. 
211 Unless discriminatory vertical social capital practices re-emerge resulting in a manipulation of bonding 
and bridging social capital. 
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throughout the civil war and genocide, is developing between Hutu and Tutsi but also 
between newly emerging identity groups. Indeed, the situation is not perfect and the 
process is not complete but what is important to note is the relatively short time between 
now and the end of the genocide and the progress that has been made in such a short 
time, in such dire conditions and from such a devastated starting point. The remainder 
of this section examines how the social reintegration of ex-combatants has augmented 
such a transformation in social capital. 
7.3.2 Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration and the Balancing and 
Strengthening of Vertical Social Capital 
As previously discussed, vertical social capital in Rwanda had been of a discriminatory 
nature favouring first the Tutsi over the Hutu in the colonial period and then the Hutu 
over the Tutsi from independence onward. In the independence period the 
discriminatory nature of vertical social capital led to a complete breakdown in trust 
between Tutsi and the Hutu government and between Hutu and Tutsi in the population. 
The loss of organisational integrity within government gave rise to inefficiency within 
governmental, economic and social systems, and the population as a whole suffered 
whilst the Tutsi found themselves the scapegoat for such a collapse in society. State-
community relations became manipulative toward Hutu and persecutory toward Tutsi. 
With the transfer of power to the victorious Tutsi in 1994, vertical social capital 
transformed again. The Hutu, even if they realised the depth of their manipulation by 
the previous regime, had a distrust of the Tutsi government fearing reprisal for the 
genocide. The Tutsi who remained and survived in the country were also initially 
apprehensive as their experience of government had been negative. With all forms of 
social capital having become distorted out of all recognition as a result of the genocide, 
and the hierarchical and obedient nature of Rwandan society, the State, as the ultimate 
provider of public good~ and the final arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law as well as 
being the actor most able to facilitate enduring alliances across the boundaries of class, 
ethnicity, race, gender, politics, and religion, clearly became the focal point for any 
sustainable reconstruction effort. Herein lays the paradox. 
The State, critical for the entire reconstruction of Rwanda, lacked credibility and trust 
among the majority of the population. Social interaction is shaped by both the social 
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and political environments; however, due to the relative paralysis of the social 
environment such social interaction had to be driven by the State. In order to be able to 
function effectively as a government it would be necessary to behave in such a way that 
it very specifically included all aspects of society in order to gain the trust of the 
popUlation as a whole, thus rebuilding vertical social capital between the State and all 
elements of the community, whilst also moving to negate the actions of contlict 
entrepreneurs or 'spoilers'. The State, therefore, was required to establish 
organisational integrity based on equity and fairness, whilst providing a secure 
environment, in order to initiate the renewal of vertical social capital. Conventionally 
the sources of social capital come from cognitive processes and structural elements;219 
however, due to the genocide, the cognitive processes that utilise collective norms, 
values, attitudes and beliefs in order to promote MBCA had been severely undermined 
and as such the structural elements of roles, rules, precedents and procedures were 
required to stimulate these cognitive process and the growth of social capital. In this 
sense social capital in a PCE is constructed rather than endowed and as such the 
establishment of vertical social capital is vital to this endeavour. 
How then does the social reintegration of ex-combatants promote the enhancement of 
vertical social capital? In Rwanda it is apparent that there exists a dialectical 
relationship between the macro level elements that support and enable social 
reintegration and the establishment of vertical social capital with each having an 
intluence on the other. The political commitment to ex-combatant reintegration and the 
extension of this support to all three combatant groups provides an important signal not 
only to ex-combatants themselves, but to the population also, as the MDRP Task Team 
Leader identifies in the following; "The signal that the government sends in terms of 
commitment to reconciliation and moving forward by providing support to the ex-FAR 
and taking the A Gs back is symbolically important and politically important. I think 
that does send a signal into the society and communities,,22o. As identified, previous 
forms of vertical social capital were exclusionary and persecutory. If the government is 
truly committed to creating unity and reconciliation it must openly engage in a 
programme of inclusion and as such, by designing and implementing a DDR 
programme that encompasses the three conflicting groups, the government contributes 
to its national message that aims to structure social interaction around inclusion rather 
219 See Chapter three. 
220 Interview with MDRP Task Team Leader, July 2007. 
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than exclusion. Ex-combatant reintegration is one of the tools utilised by the 
government to restore vertical social capital and complements its other endeavours of 
refugee reintegration, abolition of identity cards, establishment of equal opportunities, 
civic education and power sharing221. Whilst it is not the only available means to 
effectuate such a restoration it is perceived to be important as it aids reconciliation. 
This is the view of civilians and policy makers alike as shown in the following, "The 
Commission of the reintegration of ex-combatants takes ex-combatants from RDF, AGs 
and ex-FAR with all of them getting the same benefits, that's another way of uniting 
people. Now people are glad, they appreciate it,,222. This is because: 
If you take one group only, say take the RDF and only reintegrate 
them and the A Gs they can go to hell, they caused a lot of chaos, now 
the relatives of these guys they start to say tah this government is 
also sectarian, they only help one group'. But when you help all 
groups and see that they are all catered for then it helps 
reconciliation. So in a way it has created confidence that this is an 
all embracing government, they have taken all groups into 
consideration so it has created confidence among the population and 
shown them an example.223 
The notion that being inclusive in terms of ex-combatants sets an example to the 
population is an important one. Rwandans in post-genocide Rwanda looked to the 
government for two main reasons: first, as apparent in Rwandan culture, it is normal to 
look to the government for an indication of how to behave. Second, in the post-
genocide climate Rwandans were more questioning of the action~ of the government. 
Therefore, by setting an example of inclusion the GoR was able to both direct .the 
Rwandan population on the path toward reconciliation and demonstrate its own 
trustworthiness. 
By committing itself to the social reintegration of ex-combatants from all three groups 
the GoR sets out the guidelines by which social interaction should occur (the structural 
category of social capital formation). Over time, as ex-combatants and the population 
221 As identified by NURC Executive Secretary. 
222 Interview with CIV4, June 2007. 
223 Interview with RDRC Coordinator, November 2006. 
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see this commitment translated into practice and results this then influences the way in 
which norms, values, attitudes and beliefs (the cognitive category of social capital 
formulation) are shaped and established and the notion of inclusion is internalised. The 
example set by the government therefore influences the way in which it is seen by the 
"population and the way in which the population responds to the language of the 
government. This is particularly apparent when we consider the effects of community 
sensitisation before and during ex-combatant reintegration and this serves to reinforce 
the message of the government. By advocating at all levels of society and politics for 
the acceptance of ex-combatants, the government further demonstrates its commitment 
to reintegration; this, in tum, facilitates the construction of vertical social capital as 
State-Community relations improve not only through the messages that are given and 
the commitment that is shown, but also by the fact that the government and 
representatives of the government (the RDRC) are seen to be present and active in the 
community through their sensitisation practices. 
A further way in which the government demonstrates its commitment to ex-combatant 
reintegration and provides an example to the community is the fact it does not obstruct 
ex-combatants being elected into leadership positions or positions of responsibility and 
indeed actively encourages them to enter such roles. From the table below it is evident 
that a significant number of ex-combatants have been elected to important leadership 
positions within the community224. Overall, 46% of ex-combatants interviewed hold, or 
at some point held one or more position of responsibility in the community. In terms of 
composition the following applies: 34.5% of RDF, 45.5% of AGs, 100% of ex-FAR. 
This firstly indicates the non-obstruction of ex-combatants in such positions, which is 
important in sending a signal to the population that it is necessary to accept ex-
combatants as a group into the community and secondly, that all sub ex-combatants 
groups are to be treated equally. This is a message not lost on the ex-combatants 
themselves; "It has shown me that here is trust in the government and that also the 
population trust me, that I should be confident and work with them. When you are 
elected into a position the government doesn't say that person we don't want him, they 
accept you to be the way you are. I think that's a good thing,,22s. The table below 
indicates the positions of responsibility or leadership held by ex-combatants interviewed 
during fi~ldwork. 
224 The benefits of this for social reconciliation shall be analysed in the following section. 
225 Interview with XCAGll. July 2007. 
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Combatant Position of ResponsibilitylLeadership 
XCRDFI Inyangamugay0226 2000/5, Gacaca Judge 2006+ 
XCRDF2 Inyangamugayo, Gacaca 2nd Vice President Sector, Spiritual Father227 
(Church) 
XCRDF4 Security (Umudugudu), Association President (x3) 
XCRDF7 Umudugudu Leader 2006 
XCRDF8 Security (Umudugudu), President of Demobs (sector) 
XCRDFII Cell Leader 2001-6, Sector Council Committee 2004-6, Gacaca Court 
Cell level 2006, President Gacaca court sector level 2006 
XCRDF14 Inyangamugayo, Gacaca Court (8 months), Auditor of Govt run project 
(Ubudehe) 
. XCRDF17 Inyangamugayo Gacaca Judge 2006, Nyumbakumi22s- 2004-6 
XCRDF19 Gacaca Court (Cell) 
XCRDF21 Gacaca Court 2003-6, Vice President ofUmudugudu Leader 
XCRDF31 Gacaca Vice President, Development leader in Umudugudu 
XCAG5 In Charge of Information in Umudugudu 2006 to present 
XCAG7 In charge of Demob Discipline in Umudugudu, last 7 months 
XCAG8 Security (Umudugudu) 1 year 
XCAGIO Nyumbakumi 
XCAGll Abunzi229 & in charge of discipline in Umudugudu 
XCFARI In charge of security in sector 1998-2002, Sector Councillor 2002-2005 
XCFAR2 In charge of development in cell 2001-2005 
XCFAR3 . Nyumbakumi (10 households) & VP Health Insurance 
XCFAR4 Abunzi 
XCFAR5 In charge of Security in sector 1997-8, Sector Coordinator 2001-2005, 
Abunzi 2006-Present 
·XCFAR6 In Charge of Information in Cell, 1999-2001, Cell leader 2001-Present 
XCFAR7 In charge of development in cell 2003-Present, President of Cell Gacaca 
2003-Present 
Table 4 - Ex-Combatant Positions of Responsibility in the Community: Author. 
If vertical social capital is crucial for political stability and social cohesion then the 
leadership roles ex-combatants engage in are particularly noteworthy, especially in the 
context of a PCE. By occupying positions within the Gacaca system, security provision 
and the development of the community ex-combatants are making significant 
contributions to the post-conflict reconstruction and are operating in potentially. very 
sensitive areas. Such confidence in ex-combatants on the part of the government breeds 
.confiden~e in the population and has the effect of unifying the community ,toward the 
collective goals of unity and reconciliation and development. It also represents 
recognition by the government that it alone cannot guarantee these goals and as such 
226 Inyangamugayo is a Kiny8lWanda word meaning one who is trustworthy or persons of integrity. Upon 
introduction of the Gacaca Courts the judges were known as Inyangamugayo judges. 
227 Spiritual father is a mentoring role taken in the church to help the spiritual development of a younger 
~arishioner. 
28 Nyumbakumi is the Kiny8lWanda name given to the leader of ten households. 
229 Abunzi are community mediators who are trained to resolve disputes within the community. 
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there is a need to forge effective partnerships with all constituents of the community in 
order to achieve these collective goals. In doing this the GoR helps to create a 
collaborative relationship between the State and the population and maximises its role 
in facilitating and driving positive developmental outcomes, the effect of which is to 
assist the renewal of vertical social capital. 
Successful reintegration of ex-combatants further aids the development of vertical social 
capital through the establishment of security and stability in the country. Security and 
stability were identified as necessary elements for the successful reintegration of ex-
combatants due to the fact that ex-combatants are more willing to disarm and remain 
disarmed if security and stability is established, and because in a secure and stable 
environment the community is more likely to accept ex-combatants. Whilst the 
successful reintegration of ex-combatants is reliant on these factors it also serves to 
reinforce security and stability. Ex-combatants who are successfully reintegrated 
represent a greatly reduced risk to actual and perceived security and as such are 
accepted even more thus contributing to security and stability. The fact that the 
government is a driver of this reintegration which helps establish security and stability, 
contributes to the development of vertical social capital as the government are seen as 
providing security and stability, factors that are crucial to the development of the 
country and reconciliation as a whole. 
In short, the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants can positively contribute 
to the renewal of vertical social capital due the fact such success is dependent, in part, 
on political commitment to the process. Such commitment, exemplified through the 
establishing and resourcing of the RDRC, equal treatment of the three ex-combatant 
groups, sensitisation of the community to accept ex-combatants and government 
tolerance of ex-combatants from all groups holding positions of responsibility in the 
community, represents one of the measures available to the government to facilitate the 
development of trust in the government and the forging of a productive, collaborative 
relationship between the State and society. 
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7.3.3 Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration and the Renewal of 
Bridging and Bonding Social Capital 
7.3.3.1 Bridging Social Capital 
In terms of social capital the social reintegration of ex-combatants has the most 
significant impact on bridging social capital. When we consider the environment into 
which ex-combatants return or settle we can see a coalescence of different groups into a 
complex organism that constitutes the peE. These groups include: ex-combatants from 
all three factions, returning refugees, IDPs, victims and perpetrators of the genocide, 
widows, orphans, disabled and various others. The successful social reintegration of ex-
combatants can enable and facilitate the (re )establishing of networks and linkages 
between these groups that are essential for bridging social capital. When ex-combatants 
can claim to have successfully socially reintegrated they have been accepted into the 
society and this entails the acceptance of all groups, thereby ensuring linkages have 
been forged, at least in a loose form. The process of gaining this acceptance IS 
synonymous with the process of bridging social capital renewal. 
One key way in which ex-combatants contribute to the restoration of bridging social 
capital is through their involvement in the community. The results of this research 
demonstrate that ex-combatants are heavily involved in the community through a 
variety of mediums. As previously discussed, ex-combatants hold, or have held, a 
significant number of leadership positions or roles of responsibility23o. Whilst there 
may be concern that a disproportionate amount of ex-combatants are community 
leaders (46%) when we consider that 12 of 25 civilians interviewed (48%) also hold 
positions of leadership and responsibility in the community this would not seem to be 
the case. The closeness of these figures, rather than indicating that the environment has 
been militarised through ex-combatants being over represented in leadership positions, 
actually indicates that ex-combatants are successfully socially reintegrating as they are 
accepted as civilians and hence are elected into such positions in the same proportions. 
Specifically taking the example of Gacaca, ex-combatant attendance of Gacaca trials 
aids the establishment of bridging social capital by enabling the community to, over 
230 See Table 4 - Ex-Combatant Positions of Responsibility in the Community 
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time, adjust to the presence of ex-combatants. It also provides an arena in which ex-
combatants can make concerted efforts to be accepted through demonstrating they are 
trustworthy. This issue is particularly succinctly put in the following, "when I first 
reached here there was a fear, people used to be scared of me. It was not easy for them 
to get close to me but / was showing them although I used to be a soldier I didn't have 
any intentions of behaving badly. Through Gacaca people got close together and talk 
again because before they had no ways of talking together. In a way people now have 
got close together and there is no more fear now" 231. Gacaca, like many other 
community activities, enables ex-combatants to demonstrate their ability to live in the 
community and over time they come to be accepted by the community. Indeed, as this 
research suggests, a significant number of them are trusted to be more than mere 
spectators of Gacaca and are elected by the population to sit as Gacaca judges, or 
Inyangamugay0232. 
The very nature of the position of Inyangamugayo is based on trustworthiness, integrity 
and honesty and therefore, for an ex-combatant to be elected to such a position by his or 
her peers, is arguably strongest indication that they have successfully reintegrated. In 
order to achieve such a position ex-combatants must not only have been .accepted by the 
community but must also have gained its trust. It cannot be stressed enough that the 
establishment of this trust comes from the actions of the ex-combatants themselves as 
many ex-combatants and civilian testify to. One particular ex-combatant emphasised 
this point stating, "/ tried to be honest in the population and they saw how I was 
behaving, / was responsible and my kids were studying so they trusted me. When 
Gacaca started I became the Vice President and / was judging well, people were 
trusting me,,233. This view is also held by civilians who argue the role played by ex-
combatants in the community engenders their acceptance, "when they come in the 
population they live like other civilians, they do some patrols, they go in Gacaca, they 
go in meetings, they go in Umuganda. You see that they are like other people ... you see 
that trust is being rebuilt firstly because of Gacaca which works on the principle of 
unity and reconciliation,,234. Similarly, election to positions of Abunzi, leaders within 
the Umudugudu or cell, and various others, signifies a level of trust and acceptance 
231 Interview with XCRDF17, June 2007 
232 18% of ex-combatants in this research at some point held the position of Inyangamugayo at various 
levels. 
233 Interview with XCRDF31, November 2006. 
234 Interview with CIV7, June 2007. 
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from the population, especially when the importance of these positions to the 
reconciliation process is taken into account. When we consider, for example, of all 
those interviewed who held the position of Abunzi (3), two were held by ex-combatants, 
one of whom was an ex-AG while the other was ex-FAR, we can see that firstly, ex-
combatants are being accepted into the community and secondly, there is no significant 
difference in the way ex-combatants from the three different groups are treated, at least 
in terms of election to leadership positions. 
Ex-combatants also involve themselves in the community through engagmg with 
community events, such as Umuganda and Ubudehe among others, which contribute to 
feelings of solidarity, improve communication and promote civic mindedness 235 • 
Whilst ex-combatants may not be ·leading these events, the fact they attend and 
participate in them helps not only ex-combatant reintegration but also the process of 
bridging social capital renewal. An example of this is in the following quote; 
"Whenever there are weddings your neighbour feels they are part of it more that your 
family who are far away but those who are near they come to help you, I have seen it 
many times, they come and support you,,236. Such community activities have the effect, 
over time, of galvanising community spirit and facilitating the development of 
networks. Weddings affect many people in the community and bring together those 
from different communities also. Ex-combatants returning to their home communities 
or settling in new ones are encouraged during Ingando to engage in such communal 
activities in an effort to reintegrate into the community. Invariably they do and this has 
shown to be a particularly powerful way of connecting with the community for reasons 
that will be discussed shortly. 
The reintegration of ex-combatants also aids the reconstruction of bridging social 
capital through the contributions to development that ex-combatants make. Particularly 
through associations, but also through general daily living and CBR, ex-combatants 
engage in communal work with civilians, which result in tangible development 
outcomes and demonstrate the benefits of ex-combatant reintegration to the community. 
Ex-combatants are believed to have a higher capacity than civilians due to their training 
and experience. When returning to a community in need of reconstruction this capacity 
is crucial and ex-combatants who involve themselves in the community are welcomed; 
23' See Table 3: Reconciliatory Community Activities 
236 Interview with RDF3, June 2007. 
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"Because of the shattered society, because it forced the people to stick together much 
more it was then easier for the community to see what types of advantage an ex-
combatant can bring. They have been used to a structure, they are very good 
organisers so while they may not be very skilled in farming they organise farming 
associations or they organise transport in order to get farming products to the capital. 
This is not something that maybe a farmer could have done on his own. This is 
something that was very important for the people to see at that time that these guys had 
some comparative advantages and they kind of appreciated them,,237. By engaging in, 
and initiating, constructive activities in the community they demonstrate firstly that they 
are not a burden to the community and secondly that they can be of benefit to the 
community. This is important as the likelihood of them being accepted in the 
community is greater if they are not a burden to the community, and greater still if they 
can positively contribute to it. 
A number of ex-combatants were responsible for founding associations, beginning work 
projects that employed others or helping organise communal functions such as security 
patrols. This is particularly important as it expresses a commitment to the community. 
Ex-combatants who engage in such undertakings indicate their desire to enter civilian 
life, living as other civilians and rebuilding the country with them; "They come like 
simple people, they come like civilians and they come finding some of their relatives. 
Like simple people they try like others to rebuild Rwanda, their country,,238. This quote 
is important as it recognises not only the need to share Rwanda, but also that the 
objectives of ex-combatants are the same as those of civilians. This is vital in enabling 
the community and ex-combatants to live together as social capital becomes based more 
around those common goals rather than divisive practices. As development in the 
community takes place it does so in a number of ways. While the community develops 
according to how one might generally conceptualise development - stimulation of the 
local economy, provision of basic services such as water, health care, schools, among 
others, and the rebuilding of infrastructure - it also develops socially as these activities 
are conducted by the community themselves, and the presence of these common goals 
helps to build positive relations within the community that are based around and 
reinforced by the achievement of these goals. Ex-combatants, by contributing to, and 
237 Interview with UNDP DDR Manager 1st Phase, July 2007. 
231 Interview with eIV8, June 2007. 
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indeed organising and leading, community development also assist in the development 
of these community relations and the renewal of bridging social capital. 
The effects of ex-combatant involvement in the community and contribution to 
community development are significant. First, such activities as discussed above signal 
the intentions of the ex-combatant to the community. When ex-combatants return to the 
community and make concerted efforts to involve themselves in the community through 
Gacaca, leadership positions, the Church, and other mediums, and contribute to 
development through associations, CBR and other initiatives, they demonstrate a 
commitment to the community and a willingness to rebuild the country. The fear that 
the popUlation initially have of ex-combatants, over time, dissipates as their intentions 
become evident. This enables the creation of an environment in which social capital 
renewal is possible as collective goals are identified and linkages are developed. 
Second, such communal activities result in a familiarity between ex-combatants and 
civilians due to their immediate proximity. The cooperation and coordination that is 
necessary to achieve collective goals act to reinforce the existence of the collective goal, 
thus indicating similarity rather than division, and stimulates communication between 
all groups involved. As this cooperation, coordination and communication continues, 
patterns of interaction develop. Relationships transform from professional ones to 
personal ones thus further reinforcing the collective. Trust is cultivated through this 
interaction and bridges are constructed and strengthened. "The way it seems to be is 
when people are working together and have common interests their attachment will be 
greater because of those common interests. The more they interact as they work 
together the more it helps, especially in the process o/unity and reconciliation,,239. Ex-
combatants generally make positive contributions to this process and can, in many 
cases, be drivers of the process. 
7.3.3.2 Bridging Social Capital into Bonding Social 
Capital 
The elements that lead to bridging social capital do so through their development of 
trust. Ex-combatants facilitate this process as explained above and in doing so they 
become role models. This reinforces the notion that ex-combatants contribute to the 
establishment of social capital. As that trust develops and networks grow stronger 
239 Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006. 
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social capital transforms further. The bridges that held disparate groups (ex-combatants, 
civilians, victims, perpetrators, and others) now become bonds between these groups. 
The geographical community which had become fragmented during the civil war and 
genocide when bonds were based upon ethnicity and remained fragmented in the 
immediate post-genocide period based along these group lines now becomes a 
community held together by bonds rather than bridges with bridging social capital now 
occurring between geographical communities. 
Evidently, the holding of leadership positions or roles of responsibility in the 
community indicates a level of acceptance of and trust for those individuals involved 
and such involvement elevates these individuals to a role model status thus encouraging 
other ex-combatants in their reintegration. By being elected to a leadership position or 
role of responsibility ex-combatants effectively deliver a message to other ex-
combatants of the possibilities should they demonstrate a hardworking and honest 
character. By positively engaging in community activities and making efforts to fit 
back in to society ex-combatants are able, in some degree, to influence their future. The 
election of ex-combatants to leadership positions due to such character demonstrates the 
way in which ex-combatants may be able to reintegrate and this serves as an assistance 
and motivation to newly returned ex-combatants in their reintegration. 
Within these leadership roles, and in their contribution to community development, ex-
combatants also serve as role models to the community. Initially, by working together 
ex-combatants show the community that collective working is possible, "when you see 
people from RDF, ex-FAR and A Gs, when they are demobilised and they come and live 
in a village they do many activities together like agriculture. It's a nice example for the 
population to see that people who used to fight together now are living well together 
and working together,,24o. The behaviour of ex-combatants is therefore crucial not only 
in ensuring their own individual acceptance within the community but also in acting as 
a 'roadmap' for how newly returning ex-combatants can reintegrate. In the overall 
picture this provides a role model to the community and demonstrates to them the 
benefits that ex-combatants can bring with them. 
By acting a role model in the community ex-combatants help to solidify the bridges that 
have developed with the community. The message of unity and reconciliation that ex-
240 Interview with CIV8, June 2007. 
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combatants disseminate through their actions and behaviour has the effect of altering the 
bonds within the community. With continued cooperation and interaction, bridging 
social capital strengthens and as this continues and the community develops in unison 
based around collectively identified goals the bridges that connected them become 
bonds. Structural procedures that help build social capital then become cognitive 
processes as the dominant collective norms, values, attitudes and beliefs become based 
around MBCA rather than ethnicity. This is, however, a process in its relative infancy. 
Gradually, over time, with support from the government and local leaders, and highly 
dependent on the equity of benefits, bonds based around collective benefit will continue 
to take shape and will become more and more the dominant form of bonding social 
capital. At this stage the strength of these bonds differ between people in the 
community and sometimes may not exist at all. Bonds that are based on ethnicity still 
remain and in some areas are very strong and will remain so whilst fear and ignorance 
remains. Ex-combatants, through their relative positions as role models, are well placed 
to facilitate the transformation of bridging social capital to that of bonding social capital. 
Ex-combatants, when they return, adapt to the community they are returning to but they 
~lso adapt the community. What is crucial is the way in which they adapt the 
community, as this can be either positively or negatively. For this reason the training 
they receive in Ingando, and the way they are treated by local leaders, is important, as it 
will, to some extent, direct their behaviour once they return. 
7.3.3.3 Bonding Social Capital Based on Geographical 
Area 
As bonding social capital becomes more based on geographical communities rather than 
ethnicity or divisive politics the issue of the family becomes more important. Although 
in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, and still now to some extent, trust was not 
evident in the community and bonding social capital was based around ethnicity, over 
time this changed; family re-establishment and generation had a lot to do with this. In 
the complex environment that was Rwanda after the genocide "generally one of the 
advantages during that time was that there was almost nobody who had a normal family 
structure anymore. Families were so decimated and the whole socialfabric had been 
so destroyed that there wasn't anyone left in a village or in any kind of community who 
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would have had what you might call a normal family structure,,241. The effect of this 
was instrumental in the social reconstruction of Rwanda. In such an environment 
normalisation began with the family, the composition of which was somewhat irregular. 
In such a time of need, and despite a dearth of trust, families were created from 
survivors, orphans, widows and remarriages. People became bonded together with 
hardship and need as the focus of that bond rather than ethnicity. Whilst in the 
immediacy Tutsi families would not generally be created with Hutus the development 
drive of the community required the whole population of the community to work 
together. As Hutu refugees returned they also engaged in such familial renewal and the 
community grew together out of this situation. Over time this has, and will continue to 
contribute to the development of bonding social capital based around geographical 
community as the predominant focal point. This is not to say ethnicity is not still 
relevant and does not playa role in the way in which people bond but that it is gradually 
becoming less important. As development continues based upon community 
development the fact the community drive this should ensure this continues. 
Ex-combatants have shown to be influential in this process. On average 69% of ex-
combatants either married, remarried or adopted orphans after the genocide, either 
before or after demobilisation (78% ofex-RDF, 57% ofex-FAR242 and 73% ofex-AGs). 
This rebuilding of families not only helps ex-combatants reintegrate into the community 
but it also contributes to the transformation of social capital within that community as 
new familial bonds are created at the same time as networks between families. With the 
simultaneous creation of bonds they become inextricably linked as bonding social 
capital becomes based around the geographical community. Ex-combatants can be an 
integral part of this process. 
The social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda has had positive implications of 
the restoration of social capital. As the process of ex-combatant social reintegration 
occurs those elements that make such reintegration possible also work to facilitate the 
establishment of bridging social capital. The interconnected natures of the elements that 
combine to make social reintegration possible ensure that these elements are mutually 
reinforcing and it is this that has such an effect on the restoration of bridging social 
241 Interview with UNDP DDR Manager 1 st Phase, July 2007. 
242 The lower percentage of ex-FAR who married, remarried or adopted orphans after the genocide, 
compared to the ex-RDF and ex-AGs, is explained by the fact the remaining 43% were married prior to 
the conflict meaning 100% of ex-FAR were, at the time of this research, married. 
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capital. The trust that ex-combatants establish through various means in the social 
reintegration process translates into bridging social capital through the roles that ex-
combatants occupy within the community. 
As bridging social capital has been established through various mechanisms it has then 
transformed, to a degree, bonding social capital so that it is based on geographical area 
rather than ethnic group. This is not a complete process and is very much in its infancy. 
Fear regarding the past and the future, economic deprivation, remnants of extremist 
ideology and the presence of ethnic entrepreneurs combine to ensure this transformation 
is slow and difficult but rather than bonding social capital occurring between Hutu and 
between Tutsi as a general rule, it is now starting to take place within the community. 
Ethnic bonds are gradually being replaced with bonds constructed around collective 
action based on a geographical area. Therefore, the bridging social capital between 
Hutu and Tutsi, victim and perpetrator, returnee and those who remain, among others, 
that is developed initially step by step transforms into bonding social capital within 
geographical communities and bridging social capital becomes the links between 
geographical communities. This process is highly complex and is essentially enabled 
through a dual directional movement from both the top down and the bottom up; indeed, 
the only way this process could genuinely take place is through the commitment and 
support from the government whilst being owned and implemented but the community. 
7.4 The Implications of Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration for Reconciliation 
Referring agam to the idea that "a reconciled community assimilates rather than 
discriminates, promulgates humane and legal rights, does its best to dissolve alienation 
and fear, encourages people to share values and develop congenial relationships, and 
promotes a hope that material benefits will accrue as a product of peaceful transitions 
and independence" (Whittaker, 1999: 8), we can see that Rwanda is not yet a reconciled 
country. However, reconciliation is both a process and a goal and therefore, it is 
possible to state that Rwanda is genuinely engaged in the process and progress has been 
made. Moreover, when we take into account the relatively short time since the end of 
the genocide and the time of writing it is also reasonable to claim that such progress has 
been substantial given the magnitude of the task at hand. Rwanda, at the conclusion of 
the genocide, was a country characterised by decades of political violence, ethnic 
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~ntrepreneurship, exclusion, conflict and genocide. The task facing the RPF 
government was daunting. Not only did it have to secure the country, in terms of both 
its borders and its population, it also had to kick-start a collapsed economy, rebuild 
decimated infrastructure systems, establish and uphold the rule of law and attempt the 
seemingly impossible: the reconciliation of a extremely traumatised population, all 
under the 'watchful' eye of the International Community, who had done nothing to stop 
the genocide that was unfolding in front of those very 'watchful' eyes yet apparently 
knew what was best for Rwanda in its aftermath. Whilst not the only mechanism 
~ 
available to the government in the pursuit of reconciliation, the social reintegration of 
ex-combatants has proved to be one of the most critical. 
7.4.1 The Movement Toward Political Reconciliation through Ex-
Combatant Reintegration 
Due to the fact the previous Rwandan government had, over decades, engaged in 
political violence and certain elements of the government were responsible for the 
planning and orchestration of the genocide, coupled with the reality that the current RPF 
government was initially regarded with apprehension, if not hatred, by a large 
proportion of the population in Rwanda, the issue of political reconciliation is pertinent. 
Political reconciliation can be seen as reconciliation between those operating at the 
political level and reconciliation between the polity and the population. In Rwanda this 
includes initiatives such as Gacaca, legal reform, power-sharing, the creation of the 
NURC and Ingando. The reintegration of ex-combatants is also a mechanism through 
which political reconciliation can be pursued. As previously noted, ex-combatant 
presence and involvement in the community demonstrates a commitment by the GoR to 
ex-combatant reintegration by virtue of the fact they are welcomed back into society 
and not blocked from taking up these positions, and are actively encouraged to enter 
such engagement. This represents vertical social capital and renews community trust in 
the government that had been decimated through the conflict and genocide, an 
important aspect of political reconciliation. 
At the end of the genocide the RPF created The Broad Based Government ~f National 
Unity comprising the Rwandan Popular Front (RPF), the Democratic Republican 
Movement (MDR), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Liberal Party (PL), and the 
Centrist Democratic Party (PDC). The MRND was outlawed. Whilst power in this 
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power-sharing agreement is disproportionate in favour of the RPF, which has been 
heavily criticised for engaging in authoritarian rule, there have been a number of 
measures taken to encourage political reconciliation between political actors. The 
reintegration of ex-combatants can be seen as contributing to this due to the fact that 
combatants from the three groups are accepted by the government and receive the same 
benefits243 • This provides an example to the RPFs coalition partners of its intentions 
regarding unity and reconciliation. If this message is internalised and accepted by these 
partners it is evident that the reintegration of ex-combatants plays a role in the 
establishment of political reconciliation between political actors, at least in some degree. 
In terms of political reintegration between the polity and the population this is, in part, 
synonymous with vertical social capital. Vertical social capital represents the linkages 
between, in this case, the State and the population; such linkages can be positive or 
negative. If positive vertical social capital is extant then it can be said that there is at 
least a minimal level of trust between the two entities and they have a productive 
functioning relationship 244 . As positive vertical social capital is established and 
develops it equally follows that the relationship between the State and the population is 
improving as such social capital is a result of this relational improvement. This 
relational improvement symbolises political reconciliation between the polity and the 
population. Therefore, for the very reasons that the social reintegration of ex-
combatants contributes to the development of vertical social capital - the establishing 
and resourcing of the RDRC, equal treatment of the three ex-combatant groups, 
sensitisation of the community to accept ex-combatants and government to.lerance of 
ex-combatants from all groups holding positions of responsibility in the community - it 
also contributes to the development of political reconciliation. 
Although perhaps not the most significant influence on the establishment of political 
reconciliation, the reintegration of ex-combatants is however important. Ex-combatant 
reintegration aids in the foundation and development of political reconciliation, 
particularly between the polity and the population, via its facilitation of positive vertical 
social capital. 
243 Other than the ex-AGs who do not receive Recognition of Service Allowance (RSA) as they fought 
against the country. 
2~ There will of cow-se be power relations within this relationship but it is not the purpose of this research 
to provide an analysis of them. 
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Such political reconciliation is vital for social reconciliation in Rwanda as it promotes 
individual and group preparedness to engage in the reconciliation process and make 
concessions for the sake of tolerance and peace. The Government plays a pioneering 
role in the reconciliation process as it enables the creation of an environment conducive 
to the reconciliation process and provides an example to this end. The next subsection 
examines the role ex-combatants reintegration plays in establishing social reconciliation. 
7.4.2 The Development of Social Reconciliation through Ex-Combatant 
Social Reintegration 
Social reconciliation can be seen as the ongomg development of functioning 
relationships at the community level. Similarly to that of political reconciliation, social 
capital can be utilised in order to better understand how the social reintegration of ex-
combatants impacts on social reconciliation. Implicit in the successful social 
reintegration of ex-combatants is the generation of trust; for an ex-combatant to 
successfully make the transition from combatant to civilian it takes the acceptance of 
that ex-combatant by the community, which, in the absence of trust in that individual 
would not be forthcoming. If such trust can be established and expanded in a PCE it 
builds strong foundations for a reconciliation process. Although this may occur at a 
micro scale, if social reintegration is effective countrywide this also implies that the 
development of trust, albeit within small communities, is also occurring countrywide. 
The key to a successful reconciliation process is linking these micro successes to 
generate trust throughout the country at a more macro level. 
Implicit within social reintegration are the ideas of communication, cooperation, 
coordination and commitment. If these are forthcoming the environment they produce 
is one in which the foundations of reconciliation can be established. Ex-combatant 
involvement in, and acceptance by the community clearly indicates a trust in them as 
individuals and this means three things: first, it is, dependant on the behaviour of an ex-
combatant, possible to gain the community's trust; second, involvement in the 
community through election to positions of leadership and roles of responsibility 
demonstrates a clear trust in that individual and a successful reintegration; and third, the 
involvement of ex-combatants in the community signals to newly returning ex-
combatants that their reintegration is possible and provides them with 'roadmap' as to 
how they can achieve it. The trust that is demonstrated by electing an ex-combatant to a 
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position of responsibility thus indicates that a certain level of reconciliation between ex-
combatants and their community has been achieved. The behaviour of the ex-
combatants and the commitment they demonstrate to the development of the community 
often elevates them to a role model status, which further demonstrates the process of 
reconciliation, at least to some extent. 
The role that ex-combatants play in the reconciliation process can perhaps best be 
exemplified through their involvement in Gacaca. As previously stated, it is the 
intention of Gacaca to augment the reconciliation process in Rwanda and from the 
results generated in this research it would seem that Gacaca is having the desired affects. 
In two of the three villages in which PRA exercises were conducted Gacaca was 
e~pressed as a key mechanism for engendering trust, forgiveness, collective 
responsibility, social cohesion and unity and reconciliation. Two exercises utilised 
during the PRA were Institutional Diagramming245 and Social Capital Indicators246• In 
one village Institutional Diagramming indicated that Gacaca was a central and crucially 
important institution in that community. The criteria for this, as defined by the 
community, were that it had a large range affecting many people, it was vital for 
survival, it had long-term sustainability, and it was high employer within the 
community. It was also indicated that Gacaca had strong linkages with local schools, 
through the education of unity and reconciliation, and the police force, through the 
establishing of security. Within this same village, in the Social Capital Indicator 
exercise, Gacaca was identified as a community event that: enables communication 
through the sharing of information regarding the past, encourages forgiveness, and 
promotes unity and reconciliation. Additionally, Gacaca helps the development of 
intercommunity trust and social cohesion through collective responsibility as it had an 
80% attendance rate at that site. This was also apparent in the second village. 
Interviews with ex-combatants, civilians and policy personnel alike stress the 
importance of Gacaca in .the reconciliation process. Specifically, reconciliation is 
progressing because "since Gacaca started, now we are going on another step of unity 
and reconciliation because these people are knowing who killed their family, they are 
245 Institutional Diagramming is used to generate an understanding of local institutions and the 
importance attached to them by the community. 
246 Social Capital Indicators is an exercise that allows community members to identify and explain 
indicators of social capital in their community. 
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knowing the truth and I think it is another step on unity and reconciliation,,247. One 
member of the International Community drew attention to the role Gacaca plays in the 
reconstruction of Rwanda stating; 
I do think there is a Rwandan culture, its not like these are two 
groups who have never lived with each other competing over land 
now, they have lived with each other for hundreds of years so there's 
a shared history, a shared language, a shared tradition there and 
that in a sense is what they go back to and try to work through and 
Gacaca is trying to pull an element of that, to try and deal with the 
trauma and come up with some kind of local justice. Some of the 
things they do around community development are similarly inspired 
by this tradition. I do think that there is a sense of society that exists 
between the groups, even if they don't completely trust each other 
they will try and look forward and there are remarkable stories of 
people trying to move on and doing remarkable thingi48. 
There are many more examples of these kinds of beliefs coming from ex-combatants, 
civilians and policy personnel and this indicates the importance that Gacaca has for 
reconciliation in Rwanda. Ex-combatants, purely by engaging with Gacaca like other 
civilians therefore bring benefits to reconciliation in Rwanda. They also make more 
specific contributions, an argument that rests in the notion that ex-combatant 
involvement in Gacaca is an indication of their successful social reintegration. 
Ex-combatant interaction with the community, through the positions of responsibility 
they hold, the development endeavours they engage in, the renewal and creation of 
family networks and their general behaviour and motivation, is only possible through 
the establishment and development of dialogue and communication. From this 
communication cooperation is made possible and, over time, distrust and fear dissipate 
creating the space in which collaboration can thrive and trust can develop. This, set 
against a background of mutual poverty and hardship, ensure that with patience the 
positive actions of ex-combatants can contribute to the restoration of bridging social 
capital, which translates into reconciliation. Whilst by no means does this research 
247 Interview with XCRDF 11, June 2007. 
241 Interview with MDRP Rwanda Task Team Leader, July 2007. 
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make the claim that the social reintegration of ex-combatants has led to the attainment 
of reconciliation, it does support the premise that such reintegration does positively 
contribute to the reconciliation process. 
A further factor that facilitates the contribution of ex-combatants to the reconciliation 
process is a by-product of their reintegration. The successful social reintegration of ex-
combatants indicates a successful transformation from combatant to civilian and 
throughout the process of this transformation; ex-combatants develop skills that enable 
them to operate in civilian life, to eliminate the mental perception of affiliation to a 
specific combatant group both within their own psyche and that of the community. The 
skills and capabilities ex-combatants and community members acquire throughout the 
reintegration process - for example, negotiation skills, the development of tools to aid 
forgiveness and healing and skills of cooperation - are skills that will be necessary for 
successful reconciliation. In light of this it can be strongly argued that the social 
reintegration of ex-combatants constitutes an essential element of reconciliation, and 
because involvement in the community provides an arena in which such skills can be 
further developed and disseminated within the community it follows that such 
involvement has reconciliatory benefits. 
The social reintegration of ex-combatants represents a critical component of the social 
reconciliation process. Through the development of trust that is implicit within social 
reintegration social capital is renewed, in particular bridging social capital. Indeed, ex-
combatant reintegration in Rwanda has contributed to the transformation of bonding 
social capital from being based on ethnic communities to being based on geographical 
communities; something crucial to the reconciliation process. When talking about the 
role of ex-combatant reintegration on the reconciliation process one civilian 
commented, "/ have a strong belief that the reintegration of ex-combatants, the way 
they have been reintegrated, it has been very helpful to peace in this country. / do not 
know how it could have been without this; it has been a really great thing,,249. 
249 Interview with elVIO, June 2007. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
The social reintegration of ex-combatants represents a normalisation process that affects 
not only them as individuals but also their families and the community as a whole. 
Upon their return ex-combatants attempt to re-enter civilian life and as such "many of 
them they have built houses, they have got married, they have children, and they live 
with their neighbours. They are somehow stable; they are bUilding a Rwandan society 
h · h' bl ,,250 I . h h h' w IC IS sta e . t IS t roug t IS process that ex-combatants engender trust and 
such trust is not specific to them alone. In a peE trust is a commodity in short supply; 
however, as ex-combatants build trust within their immediate families, with their 
neighbours and, over time, with the community as a whole the effects of this restoration 
of trust resonate through the rest of the community. The building of trust between ex-
combatants from different groups and between ex-combatants and the community serve 
as an indication that trust is achievable. Whilst this may not be immediately 
forthcoming between certain groups or individuals, it does denote the possibility. It is, 
however, important to highlight the role of the macro and meso elements of ex-
combatant reintegration in the ability of such reintegration to promote reconciliation. 
The development of vertical social capital through ex-combatant reintegration 
represents a crucial facet in successful reintegration and subsequent devel~pments of 
other forms of social capital. The mutual reinforcement each of the aspects of social 
reintegration offer each other is, therefore, clearly significant. 
Evident from this research is the role the social reintegration of ex-combatants plays as 
a driver for social capital restoration. This is the case because: first, successful social 
reintegration is made more likely when government commitment is forthcoming and 
therefore vertical social capital is created through the governmental desire for social 
reintegration. Second, vertical social capital is enhanced through successful social 
reintegration due to the fact that as social reintegration successfully develops 
government support also increases. Third, social reintegration restores, to differing 
levels, the trust decimated throughout the conflict. This facilitates the strengthening of 
bridging social capital. Four, successful social reintegration is driven by community 
involvement and activity; this represents Putnam's central thesis of social capital, both 
bonding and bridging. During violent conflict an 'us and them' mentality is often 
developed; in Rwanda this was primarily the case between Hutu and Tutsi but also 
250 Interview with elv 4, June 2007. 
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between combatant and civilian and combatants of different groups. In order to 
overcome this mentality in the PCE it is necessary to build bridges between such groups 
and enable them to cooperate with each other, bridging social capital. As bridging 
social capital is restored and strengthened antagonisms between previously conflicting 
groups are reduced thus building the foundations for reconciliation to take root and 
develop. 
The successful social reintegration of ex-combatants has clear positive effects of the 
renewal of social capital in a PCE and indeed the claim can be made that such 
reintegration promotes the restoration of social capital. With this promoti<;ln of social 
capital restoration we also see the progression of the reconciliation process, particularly 
at the grassroots level. The trust that is established between ex-combatants and the 
community during the process of reintegration enables the regeneration of bonds and 
bridges that represent part of the social capital arrangement. This, in conjunction with 
the development of trust between civilians (including ex-combatants) and the 
government, has positive implications for"the reconciliation process. 
Social reconciliation begins with the establishment of co-existence from which 
reconciliation can develop. Implicit within this notion of co-existence is the building 
and spreading of trust. As this occurs and familiarity is evident, the gradual process of 
reconciliation is deepened. Additionally, the role played by ex-combatants in the 
community often elevates them to role model status and their behaviour in the 
community sets an example for the rest of the community. When ex-combatants 
positively engage with this status they can be extremely effective in promulgating the 
reconciliation message. As ex-combatants reintegrate into the community and actively 
contribute to the management and development of that community they also facilitate 
the generation of trust between the community and government and this has positive 
implications for political reconciliation. Therefore, when the social reintegration of ex-
combatants is successful one can make the claim that this has positive implications for 
reconciliation, both social and political. In contrast, should the social reintegration of 
ex-combatants not be successful reconciliation can be made more difficult !o achieve. 
Trust does not develop to the necessary or desired levels and the security and stability of 
the community is diminished. As this occurs so too do we see a decline in social 
cohesion. The social reintegration of ex-combatants clearly, then, has important 
implications for reconciliation. When ex-combatants reintegration is forthcoming an 
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environment conducive to reconciliation is developed and the probability of this 
occurrmg IS increased. If such reintegration is not forthcoming the likelihood of 
building reconciliation is threatened. 
Building on the foundations constructed in the preVIOUS chapter this chapter has 
endeavoured to provide an analysis of the ways in which the successful social 
reintegration of ex-combatants promotes enhanced social capital in Rwanda and the 
implications of such a promotion for the reconciliation process. The following chapter 
will provide an overall conclusion to the thesis as a whole and will seek to draw 
together chapters seven and eight to present a comprehensive answer to the research 
question. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Conclusions and Thesis Outputs 
8.1 Introduction 
You see when you used to be a soldier for you to come back and live 
with population it requires a lot of effort to come back and behave 
like a civilian. We used to be taught that we should not go stealing 
and doing other wrong acts; that we shall go back and live with 
them. Civilians, they don't really trust people who have been 
soldiers; it is not easy for them to trust you. To leave the soldier 
work and come bac~ changing the climate and starting a new life 
depending on yourselfwas not easy. 25/ 
The above statement made during an interview with an ex-RDF combatant in the 
Southern Province indicates the key issues faced by ex-combatants when they return. 
Various concerns such as the need for identity transformation, distrust or low trust 
towards ex-combatants by civilians, the changed and changing environment to which 
ex-combatants return, and the need to build one's own life being self-reliant combine to 
ensure the reintegration process is a difficult one, in particular, social reintegr3tion. 
The remainder of this chapter is primarily concerned with crystallising the link between 
the three concepts as developed in the theoretical framework in order to effectively 
present an answer to the research question. To begin the chapter consists of a summary 
of the thesis so as to provide a succinct review of the areas covered. The chapter will 
then progress to the drawing together of the conclusions of the study and provide an 
answer to the research question. From here it then moves on to the provision of thesis 
outputs that: (1) offer recommendations that develop our methodological ability to 
conduct research of this nature; (2) advance our theoretical understanding of 
reconciliation and social capital; and, (3) provide recommendations to facilitate our 
251 Interview with XCRDF13, June 2007 
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capability of designing and implementing effective DDR programmes. The final 
section will then examine potential future research in this area. 
8.2 Thesis Summary 
The key aIm of this research was to examme the interrelatedness between the 
achievement of social reintegration, social capital and reconciliation, with a particular 
focus on the implications of social reintegration for social capital and reconciliation. 
This is reflected in the following research question, which was the basis of this study: 
In what ways can the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants promote 
enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment, and what are the 
implications of such a promotion for reconciliation? 
In order to do this the thesis began with a preface problematising the research subject, 
justifying its importance as an area of advanced study and stating the aim and objectives 
of the project. This was important as it provides a rationale for the research and 
demonstrates not only the originality of the work, but also the advantages it imparts on 
the topic under investigation. Having set out the purpose and scope of the study, 
chapter one introduced the issue of reconciliation in the PCE, which provides the 
overarching theme of this research, beginning with a consideration of the PCE that 
suitably situates the next section of the chapter; an analysis of reconciliation within the 
context of post-conflict reconstruction. The chapter then progressed to an examination 
of reconciliation tools, differentiating between western-centric and state-centric 
conventional methods and indigenous approaches, before highlighting the apparent 
need to develop not only our thinking toward reconciliation, but also our pursuit of it. 
Chapter two then built on the analysis of the previous chapter by examining the 
potential role that DDR can have in the reconciliation process through the social 
reintegration of ex-combatants. The chapter started with a conceptual and contextual 
exploration of DDR before moving on to consider each of the three stages to DDR: 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Specific focus was targeted towards 
social reintegration and the reconciliatory benefits of ex-combatant social reintegration. 
The result of this analysis was the conclusion that whilst the social reintegration of ex-
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combatants has significant potential in facilitating the reconciliation process it is, at 
present, neither sufficiently well enough understood as to how exactly this may 
transpire, nor taken advantage of in programme design. 
Having set out the problems associated with achieving reconciliation in chapter one and 
a potential solution, in part, to these issues in chapter two, chapter three then sought to 
provide a link between DDR and reconciliation by utilising the concept of social 
capital. Commencing with a conceptualisation of social capital the chapter then moved 
on to consider how social capital can contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict and 
how conflict transforms social capital, before analysing ways in which social capital can 
be 'rebuilt' and the process of reconciliation followed. 
Chapter four detailed the methodology used within this research beginning with a 
theoretical framework that built on the first three chapters to provide a synthesised 
framework of analysis which would guide the remainder of the research. The second 
part of the chapter entailed a discussion of the research methodology. This included the 
research techniques that were utilised in the fieldwork phases, followed by a 
consideration of the logistical demands of the research and finally, problems 
encountered throughout. 
In the next chapter a case study analysis of Rwanda was provided. This began with a 
historical overview of the Rwandan conflict, paying particular attention to the external, 
internal and psychosocial causes of the conflict, before then going on to apply Stanton's 
(1998) 'Eight Stages of Genocide' model to the Rwanda case. The chapter then 
introduced primary data for the first time through an analysis of the transformation in 
social capital in the pre-1990 period and the period between the 1990 beginning of the 
civil war and the end of the genocide in 1994. 
Continuing on with the use of primary data chapter six examined the way in which ex-
combatants reintegrate into society. This began with a consideration of the problems 
ex-combatants faced in such reintegration, before going to introduce the factors that 
contribute to their success. These were divided into macro, meso and micro level 
factors. Chapter seven then built on the previous chapter by providing an analysis of 
how the social reintegration of ex-combatants contributes to the balancing and 
strengthening of vertical social capital and to the re-establishment of bridging social 
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capital, which when combined help to offset overly strong bonding social capital. The 
chapter then examined the implications of these transformations in social capital on 
reconciliation, the purpose of the thesis. 
8.3 Conclusions 
When considering the question of what contribution the social reintegration of ex-
combatants makes to social capital and reconciliation' it is first necessary to consider the 
overall picture in Rwanda in terms of social capital and reconciliation as this represents 
the environment into which ex-combatants reintegrate. 
Decades of political violence prior to the outbreak of civil war in 1990 began the 
process of undermining social capital in Rwanda. Tutsi domination of the Hutu during 
the colonial period and the reversal of this power balance in the years of independence 
led to persecutory vertical social capital between the state and the various groups within 
the population. The effect of this was to create overly strong bonding social capital 
within the Hutu group and the Tutsi group whilst bridging social capital became eroded 
over time. Trust, communication and cooperation became based on ethnic groups and 
the development of a rigid 'us and them' mentality ensued. With the outbreak of civil 
war and genocide, social capital transformed still further. Trust became depleted to 
such a degree communication, cooperation and coordination between Hutu and Tutsi 
became to all intents and purposes impossible thus rendering bridging social capital 
effectively nonexistent. Within the Hutu group the bonds that defined the group and 
held it together grew in strength in the face of the perceived threat from the Tutsi and 
was reinforced through the sectarian policies and propaganda of the Hutu government. 
Among the Tutsi bonding social capital became reduced to micro groups based largely 
around family members as communication was made increasingly more difficult and the 
uncertainty as to who could be trusted ensured the cohesiveness of this group was 
diminished. 
With the end of the conflict in 1994 the mass exodus of Hutu refugees into 
neighbouring countries, and the return of Tutsi refugees into Rwanda, led to greater 
confusion in the country with bridging capital remaining absent and bonding social 
capital within each group becoming more and more complex. At the same time the 
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change in government further altered vertical social capital with most Hutu who 
remained in Rwanda being fearful and distrustful of the new Tutsi government, while 
much of the Tutsi held a position of apprehension due to the trauma they have 
experienced. At this point the situation in Rwanda was extremely precarious with the 
coalescence of a multitude of groups including returnees, refugees, IDP, genocide 
survivors and perpetrators, orphans, widows, chronically ill or disabled and ex-
combatants, among others, into an environment seething with hatred, distrust, fear and 
trauma. The GoR was faced with transforming a country almost unrecogni3able from 
its former self into one in which reconciliation may be possible. 
Since the end of the conflict both social capital and reconciliation have developed to 
astonishing levels considering the destructiveness of the conflict and subsequent 
genocide. Whilst there are undoubtedly still significant problems associated with the 
genocide and there is much remaining to be done, recognition must be given to the 
extraordinary efforts of the GoR and the Rwandan people in the reconstruction of a 
country so decimated by conflict and genocide. 
Due to the situation Rwanda found itself in at the end of the genocide, and the 
discriminatory policies of previous regimes, the restoration of non-discriminatory 
vertical social capital was perhaps one of the most urgent requirements of the country. 
However, it was also one of the most difficult to achieve. Distrust and apprehension 
levelled at the government effectively meant the renewal of vertical social capital was 
initially in the hands of the GoR and much depended on their actions. Through the 
policies of the GoR and the responsiveness of the Rwandan population vertical social 
capital gradually transformed so that the discriminatory vertical social capital so readily 
practiced by the previous regime does not define state-population relations in Rwanda 
today. Whilst there still exist problems, and the GoR can be criticised on several levels, 
the general contention is that this relationship has improved. 
In terms of bonding and bridging social capital transformations have also occurred. 
Initially bonding social capital was evident between small, close knit groups invariably 
based on kinship with bridging social capital being the links between these micro 
groups. As trust developed via proximity, familiarity and reciprocity that were part and 
parcel of the effort to survive, so too did the bridges between these groups strengthen. 
With the reconstruction of the country and the (re)integration of various different 
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identity groups bonding social capital is gradually becoming based on ties other than 
ethnicity and bridging social capital therefore occurs between groups other than just 
Hutu and Tutsi. Such a transformation in the three elements of social capital facilitates 
the establishment of social cohesion and enhances the probability of reconciliation. 
Reconciliation is a long and arduous process that cannot be forced. However, as social 
capital is restored through the reconstruction effort this has positive implications for 
reconciliation. The key tenets of social capital, those of communication, cooperation, 
coordination and trust, can only be realised in tandem with the establishment of co-
existence, indeed social capital and co-existence are mutually reinforcing. Co-existence 
is the prerequisite foundation for the development of reconciliation and in Rwanda has 
been achieved to a level such that genocide survivors can live in close proximity to 
genocide perpetrators. Whilst the killing and intimidation of Gacaca witnesses does 
occur, in the main there exists a relatively sustained level of peace. Given the time 
period between the end of the genocide and today it would be unreasonable for Rwanda 
to represent a reconciled country, however much has been done in this endeavour and 
the ability for Rwandans to co-exist has been achieved. The process of reconciliation 
that is ongoing is building on these gains made thus far in terms of co-existence and will 
take time. However, the development of trust through the renewal of social capital, and 
the subsequent effects on MBCA, serves to demonstrate to the Rwandan population the 
possibility, and benefits, of reconciliation. As members of communities engage 
together in activities that facilitate the physical development of the community so too do 
they cultivate the restoration of the social fabric so devastated throughout the conflict. 
Reconciliation in Rwanda is in its relative infancy when compared with other contexts; 
however, over the past 14 years it has made significant advancements when considering 
its starting point. The social reintegration of ex-combatants has made significant 
contributions to this advancement. 
In order to comprehend the ways in which the reintegration of ex-combatants 
contributed to social capital restoration and the reconciliation process it is first 
necessary to understand how such reintegration place. Therefore an appreciation of the 
situation of ex-combatants upon their return to the community is required. As 
previously identified, the environment in Rwanda at the end of the genocide was 
tenuous; however ex-combatants also face other problems in their reintegration. The 
starting position of ex-combatants is perhaps the most serious of these problems and 
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linked to this is the issue of lack of access to land and housing as previously detailed. 
Psychosocial issues and special groups also introduce further problems when 
considering social reintegration. These are problems that are inevitable for a proportion 
of ex-combatants regardless of country~ however they do affect those in Rwanda 
particularly acutely. Attempts to remedy these problems will involve the RDRC but 
must engage other actors in the process if they are to be overcome and social 
reintegration is to be achieved. 
In order for the social reintegration of ex-combatants to be successful there are a 
number of necessary conditions that must be met. The macro, meso and micro level 
elements introduced in chapter seven are crucial to the attainment of social reintegration 
and the interrelated nature of these elements means that they are mutually reinforcing. 
This can be seen in the diagram below. 
-
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From the diagram the complex interrelatedness of ex-combatant social reintegration is 
evident. The three levels of macro, meso and micro level elements each comprise a 
number of elements without which the social reintegration of ex-combatants would be 
made exceptionally more difficult or unattainable. The pyramid shape represents the 
positioning of each of the elements according to their political level rather than their 
relative importance. Therefore, the higher the level on the pyramid the higher the 
political level. Each level also has an effect on at least one other level. The thick black 
arrow to the right-hand side of the pyramid represents the overarching effect the macro 
level has on both the meso and micro level. Within the levels themselves we can see 
the effects that each element has on the other, with evidently a strong relationship 
between the meso and micro level. The relationships between the individual elements 
within the levels are either uni- or bi-relational in terms of the direction of influence; 
this is indicated by the arrows. The colouring of the arrows refers to the point of origin 
of the influence, that is, for example, the blue arrows indicate influence from ex-
combatant motivationlbehaviour on association membership and economic reintegration. 
The red arrows highlight the bi-relational nature of the two elements. 
Clearly~ as indicated in the above diagram and chapter seven, the social reintegration of 
ex-combatants is a difficult achievement and, in order for it to be successful, requires a 
number of actors to not only commit to it but to actively engage with the process. 
Despite the complexity involved in the achieving of social reintegration of ex-
combatants, when such social reintegration is achieved social capital renewal and 
reconciliation is facilitated, through both the process and its attainment. This is due to 
the fact that, as a process, it affects the community as a whole and can only be 
accomplished with the involvement of the whole community and government. In order 
for the social reintegration of ex-combatants to be successful the requisite commitment 
from the government from the endeavour helps restore vertical social capital, which in 
turn facilitates the renewal of bridging and bonding social capital. 
Upon their return to their community, or entry into a new community, the social 
reintegration of ex-combatants essentially depends on the undertaking of a trust building 
process that begins with their micro group. As trust is established within the immediate 
family, it gradually increases to include the neighbour network through sustained 
. . 
exchange that is necessary as a result of poverty-induced interdependence. This takes 
places over a period of time that on average lasts between five and six months during 
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which the trust that develops between ex-combatants and their families and neighbour 
networks expands further still as the community in general becomes used to their 
presence within the community as a whole and in the various associations and 
community activities they engage in, in particular. The mutually beneficial nature of 
exchange, economic reconstruction, community development endeavours, such as 
Umuganda, Ubudehe and Gacaca, and community events, such as Ubukwe, Kubatirisha, 
Gusohora Umwana and Kugabirana, serve to increase civic mindedness, collective 
responsibility, solidarity and interdependence between those who involve themselves in 
these activities. Therefore, the various interactions that occur within the process of ex-
combatant social reintegration combine to assist in the rebuilding of trust, 
communication, cooperation and coordination through the familiarity that develops as a 
result of the proximity between ex-combatants and civilians when ex-combatants 
engage in the community. 
The indication, therefore, is that the social reintegration of ex-combatants has a 
significant influence on social capital restoration. When ex-combatants successfully 
social reintegrate they facilitate the (re )establishment of trust, communication, 
cooperation and coordination in the community thereby acting as a driver for social 
capital restoration, in particular vertical and bridging social capital. If, however, ex-
combatants are unsuccessful in their social reintegration, the restoration of social capital 
cannot be said to be inclusive of all groups in society and, as such, bridging social 
capital will be weak, at least between the community and ex-combatants. This will 
effectively reduce social cohesion within the community and potentially could lead to 
instability and insecurity. 
If the social reintegration of ex-combatants is successful, how then does the ensuing 
promotion of social capital renewal implicate on reconciliation? As previously 
explained, the period of violent conflict in Rwanda, and the years preceding, developed 
an 'us and them' mentality between Hutu and Tutsi. Additionally to this, a similar position 
was held between combatant and civilian, and combatants of different groups. In the PCE 
these attitudes became more complex with the confluence of so many different groups with 
different needs and traumas. It was necessary, therefore, in post-conflict Rwanda to build 
bridges between such groups in order to enable them to cooperate; bridging social capital. 
As such bridging social capital was restored and strengthened, antagonisms between 
previously conflicting groups were reduced thus building the foundations for reconciliation 
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to take root and develop. This began with development of the ability for members of 
communities to co-exist and, through the acknowledgement of the interdependent nature of 
life in Rwanda, particularly in rural Rwanda, the process of reconciliation has developed. 
~e successful social reintegration of ex-combatants has had positive implications on 
political reconciliation as such success has been achieved in large part because of the 
political commitment of the GoR. Moreover, this s~ccess is enabled due to the active 
contribution of ex-combatants to the management and development of the community to 
which they return, which facilitates the generation of trust between the community and 
government as the government does not block ex-combatant involvement in these 
activities, thus demonstrating inclusiveness. Through the promotion of social capital we 
can also see the influence social reintegration has on social reconciliation, particularly at 
the grassroots level. The trust that is established between ex-combatants and the 
community during the process of their reintegration, enables the regeneration of 
bridging and bonding social capital and facilitates the gradual deepening of social 
reconciliation as such trust resonates through the community. The role m-odel status 
that is often attained by ex-combatants through their positive behaviour in the 
community enables ex-combatants to take a positive role in the reconciliation process, 
however such a role could only be taken if their social reintegration is successful. If the 
social reintegration of ex-combatants is not successful reconciliation is more difficult to 
achieve as this implies trust has not developed to the necessary or desired levels and the 
security and stability of the community is diminished. In tandem with this so too do we 
see a decline in social cohesion. The social reintegration of ex-combatants clearly, then, 
has important implications for reconciliation. 
In summary, the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants promotec; enhanced 
social capital through the trust, communication, cooperation and coordination that must 
be evident in order for ex -combatants to be successfully social reintegrated. As trust, 
communication, cooperation and coordination are (re )estab li shed, vertical social capital 
is restored between the community and government while the regeneration of bridging 
social capital occurs between previously disparate groups in the society. Bonding social 
capital during this time becomes based around geographical communities rather than 
ethnicity. Ex-combatants contribute to this enhancement of social capital through the 
commitment demonstrated by the government and their own actions in their 
communities. By actively engaging with the community, helping in its development 
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and taking on roles of responsibility, ex-combatants demonstrate not only 
trustworthiness, but also the fact that trust between previously conflicting groups is 
possible. The implications of this promotion of social capital for reconciliation derive 
from the trust that is developed that enables the coexistence of such conflicting groups 
and the development of an environment in which positive relations can be built and 
deepened. The social reintegration of ex-combatants has a significant role to play in the 
process not only through the beneficial contributions they can make to the community, 
but also by virtue of the fact that if ex-combatants are not successfully social 
reintegrated they can threaten this process. 
8.4 Thesis Outputs 
Leading on from the results and conclusions of this research, this chapter now makes a 
number of outputs based on these. This is important as these outputs provide part of the 
justification for this research; if we can learn from this research and apply the results to 
other areas then the research adds value other than the initial answering of the research 
question. The section is divided into three sub-sections in which methodological 
recommendations are made, theoretical advancements are delineated and policy 
recommendations are proffered. 
8.4.1 Thesis Output 1: Methodological Recommendations 
In terms of methodological recommendations, the issues encountered whilst conducting 
this research may serve to develop o,ur methodological ability to conduct such research 
in the future. 
As identified in section 4.6.1, there are a numb~r of issues faced by those conducting 
research in a peE. As such, the value of thorough preparation before one enters the 
field cannot be understated. Although one cannot be 100% knowledgeable of the 
environment in any given place at any given time and a great deal of flexibility is 
required in order for researchers to be able to effectively adapt to the environment, it is 
through detailed preparation that such flexibility can be maximised. By preparing one's 
field trip as thoroughly as possible, with the awareness that what is being planned, in 
particular, timetabling and lists of desired interviews, which will almost certainly not 
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occur in the way planned, researchers are able to be flexible in their approach. For first 
time researchers in particular a number of precautions can be made when planning 
research. 
In terms of logistics less is definitely not more. Plan for things to go wrong and, as far 
as the budget will allow, make sure return transport tickets are for a date well after the 
perceived end of the field period. This will provide a space in which to work should 
things take longer than planned and tickets can easily be altered if not, or a short holiday 
at the end is possible. When in the planning phase identify a key gatekeeper (or a 
number if several key organisations/institutions will be included) a number of months 
prior to departure and build up a relationship over email. This will enable more 
accurate planning as you can tap into their local knowledge and will ensure you have 
some assistance when you arrive. Additionally, it will reduce apprehension 
immediately prior to departure. Plan on doing very little in the first two weeks, other 
than orientating oneself to the environment and meeting key people in the area. This 
will ensure you are not rushed in the adaptation period and thus will be able to respond 
in a more flexible manner and have a better comprehension of the environment. 
If possible, conduct the fieldwork over two or more phases. This provides time to be 
reflexive regarding your research and to improve where necessary. The time away will 
also give you space to analyse your findings thus far and identify particular issues or 
themes that are emerging that can be tapped into. Additionally, when you return to the 
field after the first phase you will be more confident having already spent time there and 
this will enhance your working practices. When in the field, depending on the nature 
and location of the research, try to spend rest and recuperation (R & R) time with locals 
as well as expatriates and be open about meeting people, this will help in gaining access 
to areas and people that may have previously been difficult. Above all, be flexible as 
much as possible as this will help you get the most out of your experience. Be prepared 
for people turning up late for interviews or cancelling, factor in travel time and be aware 
that in many countries travel can take what seems to be an exceedingly amount of time. 
If you are prepared to stay in poor conditions (e.g. no running water or electricity) you 
can access a very large demographic not available in certain places and your willingness 
to live in such places will not be lost on such people. 
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Included in the preparation of fieldwork is the choosing of the methodological 
techniques that will result in the richest data. In tenns of assessing the success of ex-
combatant social reintegration, social capital restoration and the reconciliation process, 
life history interviews have proved to be very useful. By investigating individuals life 
trajectories one can identify the events and issues most meaningful to them through 
their experiences; indeed, it is the respondents themselves rather than the researcher 
who identifies these issues. By triangulating the life histories of a number of 
respondents within the same groups (e.g. ex-combatants) it is possible to gain a more 
detailed understanding of issues such as ex-combatant reintegration. Additionally, by 
comparing the perspective of ex-combatants with civilians it is possible to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of the same issue. When researching social dynamics, life 
history interviews demonstrate a particularly beneficial approach to these issues. 
A further way in which such issues can be examined with greater clarity is through the 
use of PRA techniques which, when used in conjunction with other methods, enable 
further triangUlation and comparison through offering an additional perspective from the 
same respondents. Through their participatory nature PRA techniques enable the 
creation of an environment in which contestation of perspective is encouraged and the 
debates that arise through the mapping of a village, for example, provide great insights 
into the power relations and social relationships within that village. By observing the 
playing out of these relationships in a cooperative endeavour one is privy to social 
dynamics that perhaps may not be forthcoming in individual interviews. Such 
techniques are therefore useful when time is short. In addition to the above benefits of 
PRA techniques, if used before any other technique they can facilitate the building of a 
relationship between the researcher and the researched through the relaxed nature of the 
process and the familiarisation of the research topic. 
8.4.2 Thesis Output 2: Theoretical Advancements 
Theoretical advancements that can be made as a result of this study can be ~ub-divided 
into the two main theoretical concepts that have been utilised in this research. The first 
to be examined will be advancements that will enhance our understanding of 
reconciliation followed by social capital. The issue of DDR will be considered in a 
separate, subsequent section. 
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Reconciliation Theoretical Advancements 
Similarly to social capital literature, the literature that exists on reconciliation is 
dominated by Western-centric, Christian based literature that understands reconciliation 
from a certain perspective and applies reconciliatory measures that are, in theory, 
appropriate to this understanding of reconciliation. However, the linking into this study 
of the concept of social capital helps to expand our understanding of reconciliation from 
a different perspective. Whilst much of the reconciliation literature prescribes solutions 
such as tribunals and TRCs, results from this research indicate that this is not 
necessarily the most suitable for the communitarian based societies in much of rural 
Africa. Reconciliation in these contexts is more about social reconciliation'than TRCs 
and Transitional Justice that Western-centric literature bases its discussion on and this is 
crucial for the way in which reconciliation is approached. 
In Rwanda reconciliation initiatives that engage the community at the grassroots and 
allow them ownership over their own progression are much more influential that the 
ICTR or other solutions proposed by the international community. . Reconciliation 
between neighbours within communities is a profoundly personal matter and although 
projects can be developed to promote and assist in this process, ultimately it cannot be 
forced and has to occur at the speed chosen by those reconciling. By recognising the 
immense significance of indigenous knowledge and incorporating this into 
reconciliation literature, the chances of an understanding of the reconciliation process 
that both reflects experience and has the potential to make a greater difference is 
increased. The way in which Catholics and Protestants may reconcile in Northern 
Ireland or the pro and anti Franco factions in Spain differ in themselves but also 
substantially with the African context; what works for one does not necessarily work for 
the other and if our true aim is to achieve reconciliation then it is necessary to 
understand that context and integrate not only indigenous knowledge, but also 
indigenous ownership into the design and implementation of reconciliation initiatives. 
This research brings some bearing onto this subject through its examination of 
community-based reconciliation endeavours. 
A further way in which this research augments literature on reconciliation is by its 
consideration of the different groups involved in the process. Within the review of 
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reconciliation literature ex-combatants were only referred to in two contexts: first, in a 
journal article by Van der Merwe (2003) who, during interviews, found an ex-
combatant who emphasised the importance of the localisation of reconcilia~ion efforts 
as, if this takes place at the national level, it misses individual cases, which reinforces 
the argument made in the previous paragraph. Second, in the writings of Lundin (1998) 
and Veale and Stavrou (2003) who talk about ex-combatants engaging in indigenous 
cleansing rituals which contribute to reconciliation in Mozambique and Uganda 
respectively. Although both these examples are important in their own right they 
demonstrate the lack of coverage of indigenous approaches to reconciliation and the 
impact particular groups can make in the reconciliation process. 
As much DDR literature recogmses that if ex-combatants are not effectively 
reintegrated they can be detrimental to the achievement of peace. Peace, as understood 
in terms of positive peace, includes reconciliation and as such, if ex-combatants are not 
successfully reintegrated the attainment of reconciliation is put under jeopardy. This 
gives a negative acknowledgement to the importance of ex-combatants to the 
reconciliation process; however it does not in any way recognise how they may 
positively contribute to it. The results of this study indicate that when ex-combatants 
engage in the rebuilding of the community both socially and physically they can have a 
significant positive influence in the reconciliation process. In terms of reconciliation 
literature this enhances our understanding of how reconciliation is achieved at the 
grassroots by acknowledging that those who are part of the problem need to be part of 
the solution if a solution is to be found. Rather than concentrating on ethnocentric, 
state-centric approaches to reconciliation; this research is beneficial by way of its 
contribution to academic understanding of the actors involved in grassroots 
reconciliation. 
This thesis develops our understanding of reconciliation through the following: 
1) Situating the process of reconciliation in the complexity of the post-conflict 
environment. 
2) Highlighting the shortcomings of current reconciliation thinking. 
3) Expanding on current understanding of indigenous reconciliation techniques 
through a consideration of community practices in Rwanda and their application 
to the reconciliation process. 
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4) Linking the concepts of social capital and reconciliation so as to develop a more 
elaborate understanding of how reconciliation is achieved, and how it can be, in 
a loose form, measured. 
5) Introducing a significant actor in the reconciliation process and delineating how 
the social reintegration of ex-combatants, through social capital renewal, can 
make important contributions to the reconciliation process and peace building. 
Social Capital Theoretical Advancements 
There are two main ways in which this research enhances our understanding of social 
capital and makes recommendations as to how such literature can be developed: through 
augmenting our comprehension of the link between violent conflict and social capital, 
and developing the use of the social capital concept in the developing world context 
through its application to social reintegration and cohesion. 
Expanding on the work of Colletta and Cullen (2000) and Nayaran (2000), as well as 
applying the writings of other authors, this research provides a detailed analysis as to 
how social capital can contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict and how such 
violent conflict impacts on social capital before examining ways in which social capital 
can be restored in the PCE. This is potentially a significant advancement in our 
understanding of conflict as it not only deepens our appreciation of what leads to violent 
conflict, which then enables the development of more effective conflict prevention 
strategies, but it also elucidates the dynamics of the conflict process which aids in our 
mapping and negotiation of the PCE, thus facilitating the design of more successful 
practices in post-conflict reconstruction. Additionally, the social capital concept could 
be used to explain other conflict related social phenomena such insurgency. Social 
capital is therefore a concept that can augment our understanding of the contlict context 
and should be utilised more when attempting to grasp the complexity of these 
environments. 
An increased understanding of conflict is not the only benefit of this research. As stated 
in chapter three, the concept of social capital was derived in the West in order to explain 
social organisation in countries such as Italy and the USA. However, due to the relative 
infancy of the concept its application to the context of the developing world has been 
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somewhat limited, although this has expanded over recent years with the creation of the 
Social Capital Initiative as part of the Social Development Department of the World 
Bank in 1996. This research adds to the application of social capital in the developing 
world in a number of ways: first, the use of social capital as a mechanism through which 
to better understand violent conflict and post-conflict reconstruction efforts implicitly 
adds to this, due to the fact that violent conflict of an intrastate nature predominately 
occurs within the developing world or in transitional countries. Second, although the 
application of social capital in this research is focused on the social reintegration of ex-
combatants, the very fact ex-combatants are reintegrating into a community implies the 
involvement of the community in such reintegration. Therefore, this research can 
develop our understanding of social capital within the context of community 
development as much of the mechanisms that aid ex-combatant reintegration also 
contribute to community development, post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. 
Third, by increasing our understanding of the use of social capit~l in these contexts it is 
possible to apply this understanding to specific areas such as lOP and refugee 
reintegration that are concerned with issues of community cohesion. Fourth, the results 
of this study proffer a number of indicators252 that enhance our understanding of social 
capital in these contexts yet are derived from the perspective of those from these 
contexts, thus increasing the validity of their use. In doing this, the study highlights the 
relevancy of the use of social capital in these contexts, thus increasing its applicability 
from contexts other than the West, and strengthens the methodology used to understand 
social capital. 
Specifically, this thesis develops social capital theory through the following: 
1) Establishing a framework for understanding how bonding, bridging and social 
capital interrelate to contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict. 
2) Developing our comprehension of the ways in which violent conflict impact on 
bonding, bridging and vertical social capital. 
3) Isolating ways in which the social reintegration of ex-combatants can contribute 
to the balancing and strengthening of vertical social capital 
4) Explicating the transformation of bridging and bonding social capital as a result 
of ex-combatant social reintegration. 
252 See appendices 2.1 t 2.2 and 2.3 
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5) Linking social capital with post-conflict reconstruction issues such as social 
reintegration and reconciliation, thus facilitating a deeper conceptualisation of 
post-conflict reconstruction. 
6) Contributing to development of a methodology for the measurement of social 
capital. 
8.4.3 Thesis Output 3: DDR Recommendations 
The results of this research have highlighted a number of issues that can develop further 
our understanding of DDR. The focus of this research in terms of DDR lies with that of 
social reintegration. As explained in the preface and chapter two, the issue of social 
reintegration is often neglected compared to economic reintegration due to its intangible 
nature. From this research it is evident that there are possibilities open to us as 
researchers to examine· social reintegration in greater depth. Essentially this research 
utilises the measurement of social capital as a proxy for determining social 
reintegration. Whilst this is, perhaps, contestable due to the fact the correct way to 
measure social capital is not universally agreed upon it does, nevertheless, provide an 
ideal starting point from which we can work towards designing a more accurate 
measure of social reintegration. As has been demonstrated by this study, social 
reintegration is an especially important component of the DD~ process as not only does 
its attainment signify that the reintegration stage is complete, but it also has a significant 
influence on other vital aspects of post-conflict reconstruction such as community 
development and reconciliation. This then demonstrates the need to understand more 
fully the process of social reintegration, what can facilitate it and what can retard it, 
which this research attempts to do. 
Specifically, this research offers a more comprehensive understanding of the process 
through which ex-combatants socially reintegrate, both in terms of obstacles to, and 
solutions for, such social reintegration. As a result not only it is possible to better 
understand how this process can be augmented, but by having an advanced 
understanding of this it is possible to analyse the impact ex-combatants' social 
reintegration has on other aspects of society, as this research does. The importance of 
this is that it illustrates the significance of DDR as more than just a process we must 
engage with in order to 'keep ex-combatants busy'. Whilst the economic reintegration 
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of ex-combatants is important as it has an impact on reducing insecurity, by taking a 
more holistic view of DDR we can see that the effective reintegration of ex-combatants 
has a significant influence on peacebuilding and reconciliation. 
Essentially, the thesis provides robust support for the maximalist perspective ofDDR by 
offering an elaborate mapping of the process of social reintegration and the way in 
which impacts on reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction. This is the key way in 
which this thesis advances DDR policy. At the initial planning stage of a DDR 
programme it is necessary to first situate it on the spectrum of a minimalist to 
maximalist programme; that is, DDR planners need to decide whether the purpose of 
the programme is purely to keep ex-combatants busy (minimalist) or whether it is 
conceived of as a significant part of the post-conflict reconstruction process that will 
contribute to reconciliation and development (maximalist), or at a point in between. By 
taking up a position at this stage it is then possible to plan the demobilisation and 
reintegration components in such as way that that they result in deliverables that meet 
the assigned position. As this research has demonstrated, the social reintegration of ex-
combatants has an important contribution to the reconciliation process and it is therefore 
arguable that a more maximalist position should be taken. By recognising the way in 
which social reintegration occurs, and its derivative effects on social capital and 
reconciliation, DDR programmes can be planned in coordination with the overall post-
I 
conflict reconstruction process. 
Once the importance of social reintegration is fully acknowledged as a fundamental 
aspect of DDR and its links to other, critical aspects of the post-conflict reconstruction 
process are appreciated, then the way in which we understand and approach DDR can 
develop. Just because something is hard to attain it does not mean we, as academics 
and practitioners, should not try. This research, if only in a small way, attempts to help 
bridge the gap between academic and practice by recognising the gaps in the literature 
and the ways in which programmes are implemented and evaluated. 
A major part of bridging this gap is the inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders than 
previously involved. Community members should be included in the planning stage; 
these can range from local leaders, religious leaders, teachers, or others with a voice in 
local communities who can put forward the concerns of the communities and assist in 
the development of effective community sensitisation measures. NGOs operating in the 
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community, as well as those who function within areas that are associated in some way 
with ex-combatant reintegration, should also be incorporated, as should national 
institutions concerned with social cohesion and reconciliation. The aim of doing this is 
three-fold: first, by including all relevant stakeholders and opening up the planning 
process, community ownership of, and participation in, the whole DDR process is 
enhanced. This is important in ensuring that it is not only successful, but also 
sustainable. Second, efficient synergy between ex-combatants, the community, the 
government and complementary organisations in the implementation stage is crucial as 
it is through such synergy that opportunities to enhance the social reintegration of ex-
combatants can be exploited and the absence of such synergy can result in missed 
opportunities or an unnecessary overlapping of functions. Third, the development of 
community ownership and participation and synergy at the planning stage enables the 
development and inclusion of appropriate sub-programmes into the overall programme 
that will support the renewal and strengthening of social capital; this could include CBR 
or association promotion, among others. 
Specifically it does this through the following in particular: 
1) Acknowledging the reintegration obstacles unique to ex-combatants 
a. The starting position of ex-combatants 
b. Access to land and housing 
c. Psychosocial issues 
d. Special groups 
2) Categorising the key factors contributing to the successful reintegration of ex-
combatants at the macro, meso and micro level. 
3) Highlighting the potentiat253 importance of demobilisation camps for preparing 
ex-combatants for their return to the community and sensitising communities for 
their return. 
4) Developing our understanding of the complementary nexus between economic 
and social reintegration 
5) Supporting the promotion of association membership and CBR for a more 
successful social reintegration process 
253 The results of this research cannot necessarily be generalised exactly to other cases, as they are 
relevant for the Rwanda case. However they do provide a basis for examination and consideration and 
should be treated as such. 
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6) Isolating potential 'spoilers' to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants and 
offering possible mitigation methods. 
7) Enhancing our ability to create meaningful links between social reintegration 
and other concepts, such as social capital, to augment our understanding. 
8) Identifying significant impacts social reintegration has on peacebuilding and 
reconciliation. 
8.5 Potential Future Research 
The results of this research and the recommendations made indicate a number of key 
areas in which there is a potential for future research. These are as follows: 
1) The benefits of CBR were examined as a component of this research; however 
they are deserving of a more thorough investigation in order to develop CBR as 
a concept, but also to expand our understanding of the connection it has with 
other concepts such as ex-combatant reintegration, reconciliation and others. 
2) As identified in the theoretical recommendation, current literature on 
reconciliation is somewhat limited and needs to be expanded. Therefore, 
research examining grassroots reconciliation practices within the DDR process 
would be beneficial, with a much greater focus on the stakeholders and their 
agendas in the reconciliation process. 
3) Due to the recognition that there exists a need to address those who joined as 
children but demobilised as adults it is also of paramount importance that further 
research is also conducted on the reintegration of this group. Essentially this 
may deliver better recommendations as to the challenges faced by this group and 
how they can be dealt with to better augment their reintegration. This would 
then contribute to our understanding of how child ex-combatants influence the 
reconciliation process. 
4) The final area in which a potential for further research is evident from this study 
is on the development of research methodologies that help expand our 
knowledge of social reintegration and social capital. Although this research 
makes good contributions to this methodology, they can always be developed 
and research into this would be particularly beneficial, not only for ex-combatant 
reintegration but also for refugees, IDPs, and other groups in the PCE. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: 
Table 5 - Indicators of Social Capital: Grootaert (1998: 15) 
6.3 Indicators of Social Capital 
The following indicators have all been used in empirical studies. Indicators of horizontal associatiom take a 
microperspective and typically have been collected for analysis within a country. The other sets of mdicators 
have been calculated at the national level and have been used in cross-country research. 
Horizontal associations 
Number and type of associations or local institutions 
Extent of membership 
Extent of participatory decisionmaking 
Extent of kin homogeneity within the association 
Extent of income and occupation homogeneity within 
the association 
Extent of trust in villaee members and households 
'" 
Extent of trust in government 
Civil and political socieo,1 
Index of civil liberties (Gastil, Freedom Hou.~e) 
Percentage of population facing political 
discrinlination 
Index of intensity of political discrimination 
Percentage of population facing economic 
discrimination 
Inde.x of intensity of economic discrimination 
Percentage of population involved in separatist 
movements 
Gastil's index of political rights 
Freedom House index of political freedoms 
Socia/Integration 
Indicator of social mobility 
Measure of strength of "soc131 tensions" 
EthnolingUlstic fragmentation 
Riots and protest demonstrations 
Strikes 
Honucide rates 
Suicide rates 
Legal and governance asp,cts 
Quality of bureaucracy 
Independtllce of court system 
Expropriation and nationalization risk 
Extent of trust in trade unions 
Perception of extent of community organization 
Reliance on networks of support 
Percentage of household income from remittances 
Percentage of household expenditure for gills and 
transfers 
Old-age dependency ratio 
Index of democracy 
Index of corruption 
Index of government inefficiency 
Strength of democratic lllstitutions 
Measure of "human liberty" 
Measure of political stability 
Degree of decentralization of government 
Voter tumout 
Political assassinations 
Constitutional government changes 
Coups 
Other cnme rates 
Prisoners per 100,000 people 
illegitimacy rates 
Percentage of single-parent homes 
Divorce rate 
Youth unemployment rate 
Repudiation of contracts by government 
Contract enforceability 
Contract-inttllsive money (currencyi' M2) 
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Appendix 2.0: 
Table 6 - Rwanda Social Capital Indicators (adapted from Colletta & Cullen, 2000) 
Proxy Variable 
Bonding & Brideine Social Capital 
Community Events Increased Feeling of Solidarity 
Improved Communication 
Promoted Civic Mindedness 
Informal Networks Informal Exchange of Information 
Informal Exchange of Resources 
Factors that Shape Exchange 
Trust & Social Cohesion Channels & mechanisms for exchange 
of information 
Existence & nature of associations & 
reason for creation 
Intermarriage & extended family 
relations 
Intercommunity relations & conflict 
resolution mechanisms 
Types, nature and organisation of 
exchange and interdependence 
Nature & organisation of assistance, 
mutual aid and cooperation 
Collective Responsibility 
Associations Structure, rules and roles of 
Associations 
Function: Nurture, self-help, solidarity 
& cooperation 
Vertical Social Capital (Syner!!Y) 
Village Leadership Types of Leadership 
Roles in Political, Social, Religious & 
Welfare activities 
How they shape networks within & 
between communities 
External Agencies Community links to Govt, NGOs and 
Private sector 
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Appendix 2.1: 
Table 7 - Eastern Province Social Capital Indicators: Author 
Commun!!y Events 
Ubukwe Wedding - Fellowship, sharing drinks, dancing, 
exchange cows, share news; 
Unites from all areas; 
Affects many 
Kubatirisha Baptism - Brings different communities 
together, share news, drink together, joy, 
fellowship, dancing; 
Affects many but not as many as a wedding 
Gusohora Umwana Baby Naming Ceremony 8m day after birth; 
Drinking, give feast to children, gather to eat, 
drink and celebrate; 
Medium affect 
Kugabirana Communal Feast & Drinking; 
Exchange of cow and continued eating at 
recipients abode 
Kuva Ku Kiriliyo Mourning stage after death (length dependent 
on age - Young = 7 days, old = 1 month); 
Support, collection of money to enable 
activities throughout the period; 
Affects whole community and beyond 
Umuganda Communal Cleaning programme on last 
Saturday of the month - everyone works 
together then drinks in the afternoon. 
Affects the whole community 
Informal Networks 
Forms of Exchange Weddings (exchange tools for wedding, beer, 
money, food, labour, wood) 
Agriculture (Exchange seeds, labour (when 
sick) and land) 
Death/sickness (gathering food, money, visits 
etc to support family 
Drivers/Shapers of Exchange Crucial to life - poverty would increase without 
it. 
Drivers - Assistance, sickness, mutual 
assistance/reciprocity, INTERDEPENDENCE 
Frequency - Everyday life, between 
neighbours, between Umuduzudu's. 
Associations 
AIDs Club Education on AIDs prevention; Nurturing: free 
HIV test, helps support networks, fights 
discrimination 
Football Teams Helps mental & physical strength, helps 
meetings between sectors (bridging) & 
solidarity within community due to supporting 
team. 
Unity & Reconciliation Reduces shame of talking, helps to meet those 
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Association opposed to U & R, increases cohesion and 
sharing, creates love in community, helps 
Gacaca work well, increases learning which 
goes around the country. 
Culture Troupe Cultural education to children, drama during 
April - reconciliation 
Trust & Social Cohesion 
Intermarriage & Extended Between families, between Hutu and Tutsi in 
Family Relations sector or different province - around 40% 
Help U & R, becoming more accepted 
Intercommunity Relations & Case between neighbourslhusband & wife - use 
Conflict Resolution friends from each side, when still not resolved 
Mechanisms Umudugudu leader calls others and decision is 
made, may include compensation. 
Promotes U & R (money used for feasting & 
drinking 
Husband & Wife - call neighbour then family, 
if not solved taken to municipality for solving 
or divorce 
Collective Responsibility Umudugudu, Gacaca, U & R meetings, child 
raising, social protection 
Villaee Leadership 
Types Umudugudu leader, cell coordinator, Cell E.S, 
Cell Informational Officer, Security Leader, 
Cell Secretary, Cell Education Leader, Cell 
Health Officer, Cell Social Affairs Officer, Cell 
Women's 
Pastor, Padre 
Shape networks - public meetings, talks in 
churches, surgeries, solve problems, seek 
assistance, ensure security and wellbeing 
Trust in Local Leadership Very trusted, elected by public, have powers of 
removal, removal happens at Umudugudu and 
cell 
External Linkages 
Community & National Nat Govt programmes - resources, housing, 
Government small projects, poverty alleviation, health, 
education. 
Very good links 
Very high trust - Funds work in Umudugudu 
level (Himo) tree planting scheme but debate 
over quality of tress used 
Community & NGOs Not many NGOs (national or international) 
Weak links 
Community & Private Sector Not good links, do not help only seek own 
benefit, little investment 
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Appendix 2.2: 
Table 8 - Southern Province Social Capital Indicators: Author 
Community Events 
Ubukwe Wedding - Fellowship, sharing drinks, dancing, 
exchange cows, share news; 
Unites from all areas; 
Affects many 
Kubatirisha Baptism - Brings different communities 
together, share news, drink together, joy, 
fellowship, dancing; 
Affects many but not as man"yas a wedding 
Gusohora Umwana Baby Naming Ceremony 8th day after birth; 
Drinking, give feast to children, gather to eat, 
drink and celebrate; 
Medium affect 
Guhingisha Time of drinking after working on others land; 
Develops unity, cooperation and efficient 
working; 
Affect is smaller but very strong within the 
~roup 
Gutabara Period of mourning (7 days); 
Support, collection of money to enable 
activities throughout the period; 
Affects whole communi!Y and beyond 
Gacaca Promotes Unity & Reconciliation, share 
information about the past (communication), 
forgiveness; 
Maximum affect, whole community and 
country. 
Informal Networks 
Forms of Exchange Water, eggs, beans, panga, knife, petrol, 
cooking utensils, matches, labour, money, 
livestock 
Drivers/Shapers of Exchange Crucial to life - poverty would increase without 
it. 
KUGABIRA - Exchange of cows (cultural-
because of love, return and with drinks. 
Drivers - Assistance, sickness, mutual 
assistance/reciprocity, INTERDEPENDENCE 
Frequency - Everyday life, between 
neighbours, between Umudu~du 'so 
Associations 
Abateranankuga Agricultural association founded 2002, 13 
members, aids self-help, mutual help and 
solidarity and cohesion 
Agaseka Association to collect and lend money founded 
2003, 130 members, aids self-help, mutual help 
and solidari~ and cohesion 
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Urubahbyingwe Honey production association founded 2000, 15 
members, aids self-help, mutual help and 
solidarity and cohesion 
Trust & Social Cohesion 
Intermarriage Between different areas, between Hutu and 
Tutsi doesn't matter as are mixed 
Intercommunity Relations Family problems (call for family members to 
resolve), Neighbours (call one relative each and 
neighbours - may go to municipality), Forgive, 
warning, compensation. 
Children fighting, crop destruction by livestock, 
bar fighting (resolve and drink together) 
Intercommunity relations very good 
Collective Responsibility Election attendance 100%, Gacaca 80%, 
Umudugudu 75%, .Municipality meetings 70% 
Villaee Leadership 
Types Executive Committee (Chief ofUmudugudu, 
security, social affairs, information, 
development) 
Headmaster - 2nd school, CFJ, primary. 
Trust in Local Leadership 100% (answered by Umudugudu leader, no-one 
said anything 
External Linkaees 
Community & National Provision of health insurance, poverty 
Government reduction, school fees. 
Very good linkages - Trust in National 
Government is very good (support for govt 
programmes) 
Community & NGOs AIDs help, provision to vulnerable 
Not very good linkages 
Community & Private Sector Employment provider 
Medium to good links 
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Appendix 2.3: 
Table 9 - Northern Province Social Capital Indicators: Author 
Community Events 
Ubukwe Wedding - Sharing food/drinks, gift giving, 
dancing, exchange cows; 
Affects around 300; 
Affects many 
Kubatirisha Baptism - From Church go home and have 
feast/drinking. God-parents give speech and 
offer gifts and rosary beadslhible, feast again. 
Around 50 attend 
Kwita Izina Baby Naming Ceremony 8th day after birth; 
Gather to eat, drink and celebrate, each write a 
name they wish for the child in a book and the 
parents chose. Involves everyone there 
Medium affect 
Kuvangiza Ikiliyo Closing of Mourning Period; 
Involves around 100; 
Giving of drinks/crop food, spend time chatting 
to give comfort, give speeches, may involve 
giving of cow/goat. 
Informal Networks 
Forms of Exchange Guhana Inka (Giving of cows) - Between 
relatives and close friends, given out of 
love/mutual interdependence, After cow is 
given return to house and share drinks/food. 
Ubudehe (Giving Labour) - Between 
neighbours and those dependant e.g. old 
age/disability, vulnerable; Prepare food/drink, 
group will come and work then share after 
Drivers/Shapers of Exchange 
Associations 
Tailor Association Formed 1997 - 50 members (XCs & Civs) 
Started through women, extended to teach 
others in community. Work together every day 
plus regular meetings; 
Self-help: Promoted job opportunity & can 
tailor own clothes. 
Mutual-help: Give training/teaching and enable 
those to then train others. 
Solidarity & Cooperation: Constantly working 
together, people from different areas, profit's 
given to a member on rotation for those who 
agree 
APPEP Association Environmental cleaning of centre, 6 months old, 
36 members (XCs and Civs - Pres of Demob) 
Does cleaning in centre & will build public 
toilets for market, meets each month and in 
special circumstances 
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Self-help: Potential for job opportunity/some 
paid 
Mutual-help: Cleaner environment, public 
toilets, bin 
Solidarity & Cooperation: Brings people 
together, commitment to community through 
environment, social re~onsibility 
Trust & Social Cohesion 
Intermarriage & Extended Mainly within community, between workers & 
family Relations students, people who have moved, between 
Hutu and Tutsi but not too much because of 
high proportion of Hutu. 
High extended family 
Intercommunity Relations & Husband & Wife - Call family to mediate, 
Conflict Resolution maybe to Umudugudu if family cannot resolve, 
Mechanisms at this level usually results in divorce. 
Land Dispute - Call neighbours to try and 
resolve, call local leaders if doesn't work: 
Abunzi (Umudugudu conciliator), Go to sector 
court (civil court). 
Financial Disputes - Debt repayment - go to 
Abunzi, robbery of crops/livestock 
Relations generally good but land/debt disputes 
b!ggest problem. 
Collective Responsibility Municipal meetings (Umudugudu to sector 
level) 
Umudugudu: 1 per month, 85% attendance rate 
Cell: 1 per 3 months, 70% attendance rate 
Sector: 3 per year, 70% attendance rate 
Umuganda - Environmental cleaning at sector 
level, 1 per month (3 rd Saturday), 85% attend, 
flowed by meetings at sector level. 
Villa~e Leadership 
Types Local Govt: Umudugudu: Umudugudu leader, 
information, security, health, development 
(elected positions) 
Cell: Cell coordinator, Cell E.S (nominated not 
elected), Cell secretary, development, security, 
gender, health, education, youth, culture and 
sport 
Pastor (Restoration Church)- Pastor will attend 
meetings and can contribute but not lead, 
meetings called to deal with specific issues 
Trust in Local Leadership Good 
External Linkages 
Community & National No precise linkages go through the cell. 
Government Ubudehe (microfinanceIMINALOC); Health 
Insurance; Govt intentions for each district. 
Good linkages 
V~ High trust in Nat Govt 
Community & NGOs One NGO providing access to water 
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In between good and bad linkages 
Water provision was seen as duty ofNGOs 
when offered choice between Govt, NGOs and 
Private sector 
Community & Private Sector Noprivate sector in cell 
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Appendix 3.0: 
Figure 9 - Eastern Province Sector Social Network Mapping: Author 
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Appendix 3.0a: 
Figure 10 - Eastern Province (Umudugudu 1) Social Network Mapping: Author 
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Appendix 3.0b: 
Figure 11 - Eastern Province (Umudugudu 2) Social Network Mapping: Author 
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Appendix 3.Oc: 
Figure 12 - Eastern Province (Umudugudu 3) Social Network Mapping: Author 
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Appendix 3.1: 
Figure 13 - Southern Province Cell Social Network Mapping: Author 
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Appendix 3.1: 
Figure 14 - Southern Province Cell Social Network Mapping: Author 
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Appendix 3.1a: 
Figure 15 - Southern Province (Umudugudu 1) Social Network Mapping: Author 
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Appendix 3.1 b: 
Figure 16 - Southern Province (Umudugudu 2) Social Network Mapping: Author 
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Appendix 3.2: 
Figure 17 - Northern Province Cell Social Network Mapping: Author 
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Appendix 4: 
Diagram 2 - Eastern Province Institutional Diagramming: Author 
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Appendix 4.1: 
Diagram 3 - Southern Province Institutional Diagramming: Author 
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1 Prirruuy & Secondary Schools People High Medium Low 
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3 Gacaca Development High Medium Low 
4 CF J - Apprentice School hnpad 
5 Beekeeping Association uonornic: High Medium Low 
6 Coopec - Microfm.ance Cooperative Benefit 
7 Adventist Church Employment High Medium Low 
8 AIDs Association Creation 
9 Pharmacy SuJtainahility High Medium Low 
External Institu1iom 
10 Police 
11 F ARG - Govt Association 
12 Red Cross 
13 SDAIRIBA (TW8lPoor) Association 
14 CARITAS 
15 Ministry of Local Government 
16 Champ (Association for PoorlOtphans) 
11 CSR (Governmental Social Cm) 
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Appendix 4.2: 
Diagram 4 - Northern Province Institutional Diagramming: Author 
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Appendix 5: 
Table 10 - Eastern Province Entry Survey (E.S Cell- 8th June 2007): Author 
1 Population: Under 16 1400 
11-35 400 
36-60 400 
61+ 350 
Total 2551 
2 MalelF emale Ratio (%) 46:54 
3 No. Unemployed (%t 8 
4 No Female-Headed Households (%) 20 
5 Ethnic Composition Cannot Tell 
6 Religious Composition RC 60%. Protestant/Adventist 38%~Muslim 2% 
1 Main Source ofIncome Business (shops. food-market)~ Agriculture (rice. 
beans. banana. maize) ~ Pasturing (cows. go ats. 
chicken) 
8 Infrastructure Provision & Effectiveness Majority access clean water (90%-5~.homes & 
rest through public tap (boil» ~ E1e ctricity (25~.-
others use petrollights)~ Dirt roads 
9 Crime Level Theft (cycles. tools. crop)~ No violent crime - 6 
cases per year) 
10 Distance & Time to Nearest City Kigali (10km:1 h20m by car)~ N ytnata 
(30km:45m) 
11 Distance & Time to Nearest Trading Centre Kigali 
12 School Enrolment (P I.~UQJ. Y :Secondary) 100:35 
13 Distance to Nearest School 400m:800m 
(Primary:Secondary) 
14 Main NGOs & AS9ociations Present Rice F actory~ 3 microfmance cooperatives ~ 
Caritas (development)~ JICA (Japanese 
devp )(Rice production) 
15 Oovt Presence Community Leaders ~ Parliament 
DeputyJMinisters (visits/meetmgs~ Education~ 
Agricultural trairUng~ Initiation of Coffee 
p1antations~ Security (military/policeINSS)' 
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Appendix 5.1: 
Table 11- Southern Province Entry Survey (E.S Cell- 17th June 2007): Author 
1 Population: Under 16 6nOO (4% Orphans) 
11-35 600 
36-60 650 
61+ 1501200 
Total 2000 
2 MalelF emale Ratio (%) 49151 
3 No. Unemployed (%) 4% (6% Formal, 90% InformaL including 
Subsistence Farming 
4 No Female-Headed Households (%) 30 
5 Ethnic Composition Twa 1 % - Cannot determine Hutu and Tutsi 
as no records 
6 Religious Composition RC 90%, Pentecostal 1%, Adventist 3% 
7 Main Source of Income A~u1ture &. Pasturing 
8 Infrastructure Provision &. Effectiveness Market ~ Municipal Offlces ~ Primary &. 
Secondary School~ No Electricity (Generators 
&. Petrol Lamps-Petrol sold in market)~ Water 
(U ndergmund-1 0 Public Taps) ~ Roads 
Unmade 
9 Crime Level Alcohol indue ed violence 3-4/month~ Theft of 
crops ~ Land disputes 1/month~ robbery 
6/month 
10 Distance &. Time to Nearest City Butare: 36krn, 1 hour in car 
11 Distance &. Time to Nearest TradmgCentre Butare 
12 School Enrolment (Primary:Secondary) (%) 90:2 
13 Distance to Nearest School 300m:lkm 
(Primary:Secondarv) 
14 Main NGOs &. AS9ociations Present Caritas~ World Vision~ SDAIRIBA~ 
ARDENYA (~culture &. cro]:) selection) 
15 Govt Presence UBUDEHE (MINAl.OC)~ FARG 
(MINAl.OC)~ RCCP (MINECOFIN)~ PPML 
(MINECOM) 
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Appendix 5.2: 
Table 12 - Western Province Entry Survey (Cell Coordinator - 25th June 2007): Author 
1 Population: Under 16 1017 (22% Orphans) 
17-35 714 
36-60 1124 
61+ 1907 
Total 4762 
2 MalelF emale Ratio (%) 35:65 
3 No. Unemployed (%) 80% (all subsistence fanners) 
4 No Female-Headed Households (%) 35% 
.5 Ethnic Composition H utu 87% ~ Tutsi 13%; Twa 0% 
6 Religious Composition RC 70%; Pentecostal 27% ; Muslim 3% 
7 Main Source of Income Agriculture & Pasturing 
8 Infrastructure Provision & Effectiveness Water (65%), Electricity (12%);Main Tarmac 
road (Gisenyi to Ruhuha) & unmade roads; 
No market; Schools (1 primary & 2 
secondary) 
9 Crime Level 3 cases rapel3 months; 15 robberyl3 month; '2 
hold-upsl3 month 
10 Distance & Time to Nearest City Gisenyi (12km:2h Foot:15m Car) 
11 Distance & Time to Nearest Tradmg Centre Mahoko (3km:20m F oot:3m Car) 
12 School Enrohnent (P '~1~ Y :Secondazy) 78:5 
13 Distance to Nearest School 1km:1km 
(P '~1~ Y :Secondary) 
14 Main NGOs & Associations Present Ouvroir (assoc of artisans); Economat 
General (assoc c arpenhy); Caritas; Care 
International: Red Cross; WFP; Baire (NGO) 
15 Govt Presence No Govt Presence. 
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Appendix 5.3: 
Table 13 - Northern Province Entry Survey (E.S Cell- 3rd July 2007): Author 
1 Population: Under 16 500 (7% Orphans) 
17-35 1762 (combined with 36-60) 
36-60 
61+ 2818 
Total 5070 
2 MalelF emale Ratio (%) 15:85 
3 No. Unemployed (%) 90% (all engaged in SF) 
4 No Female-Headed Households (%) 70% 
5 Ethnic Com~osition Twa 1.8%:Hutu 87-93%:Tutsi 5-11 % 
6 Religious Composition RC 72% :Protestant 23% M uslirn 5% 
7 Main Source ofIncome Agriculture & Public works (civil semnt) 
8 Infrastructure Provision & Effectiveness Electricity 25%:Water 7% access to public 
tap9, rest u;e rivers/rainwaters :petrol & 
candles (market):roads (unmade-l made 
separating cells) 
9 Crime Level Robbery 2/month:fJghting 
10 Distance & Time to Nearest City Ruhell[eri (5km :30m Car, 11130 m foot) 
11 Distance & Time to Nearest Trading Centre By o (lkm:30mFoot) 
12 School Emolment (Primary:Secondary) 95:60 
13 Distance to Nearest School 800m:1km 
(P '~LLQ.I, Y :Secondary) 
14 Main Noos & AS'Ilociations Present No NOOs - AS'Ilocs (12 - tailors, agriculture, 
pasturing. porters, businessmen) 
15 Oovt Presence Schools & MINALOC 
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Main Souree of Income 
IDf':rastructure Provision &. 
Effectiveness 
North West 
500 (7% Orphans) 1017 (22% Orphans) 
1762 (combined with 36- 714 
60) 1124 
2818 1907 
5070 4762 
15:85 35:65 
90% (all engaged in SF) 80% (all subsistence 
farmers) 
70% 35% 
Twa 1.8%:Hutu87- Hutu 87%~ Tutsi 13Yo~ 
93%:Tutsi 5-11 % TwaOYo 
RC 72% :Protestant RC 70% ~ Pentecostal 
23Yo :Muslim 5% 27%~ Muslim 3Yo 
Agriculture &. Public Agriculture &. Pasturing 
works (civil servant) 
Electric ity 25%:Water Water (65%). Electricity 
7% access to public tapg, (12Yo)~ Main T annac 
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rivers/rainwaters :petrol Ruhuha) &. unmade 
&. candles (market):roads roads" No market" , . 
(UlUl'I8de-l made Schoo1s (1 prinwy &. 2 
sepm.tillg cells) secondary) 
South East 
6nOO (4% Orphans) 1400 
600 400 
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1501200 350 
2000 2551 
49/51 46:54 
40/0 (6% Formal, 90% 8 
Informal, including 
Subsistence Fanning 
30 20 
Twa 1 % - Cannot Cannot Tell 
detemrine H utu and 
Tu1si as no records 
RC 90Yo. Pentecostal RC60%. 
7Yo, Adventist 3%, Protestant/Adventist 
38%~ Muslim 2% 
Agriculture &. Pasturing Business (shops, food-
market) ~ Agriculture 
(rice. beans. banana, 
maize) ~ Pasturing ( cows, 
goats, chicken) 
Market ~ M urricipal Majority access clean 
OfIkes ~ Prinwy &. water (90%-5%homes &. 
Secondary School~ No rest through public tap 
Electricity (Generators &. (boil» ~ Electric ity (25Yo-
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Appendix 6: 
Table 15 - Sample RDRC Pre Discharge Orientation Programme 
(PDOP) 
DAYIDATE Main speech Speaker 
Wed. 1111106 1. Official starting of demobilisation President of the 
process Commission 
Afternoon 2. National program of demobilisation Commissioner 
Thu.2/11106 3. Introduction to "Good Governance" Brig. Gen. Jack 
Afternoon 4. Culture of patriotism Nziza; J5 
5. Refugees and consequences 
. Fri. 3/11106 6. Role of population in keeping security District Police 
Commander 
Afternoon 7. Task and role of national police 
Mon. 6/11106 8. Rwanda security 2nd Division 
Afternoon 9. Reasons of war and consequences CO 
10. Wars in the Great Lakes 
Tue. 7/11/06 11. Justice as a source of security and Mme Batsinda 
development Aline; Procurer 
Afternoon 12. Laws in Rwanda and the new 
constitution 
Wed. 8/11106 13. Fighting against corruption, inequality Auditor General 
and robbery 
Afternoon 14. Decentralisation General 
secretary of 
MINALOC 
QAYIDATE Main speech Speaker 
Thu.9/11106 15. Rwanda's history before colonialism Mr. Tito 
Rutaremara; 
Afternoon 16. Rwanda's history during colonialism "Umuvunyi 
17. Rwanda's history after colonialism Mukuru"( the 
ombudsman) 
Fri. 10/11106 18. Nationality Vice-pres of 
human right 
Afternoon 19. Human Rights 
Mon. 20. History about the ideology of genocide Hon. 
13/11106 in Rwanda Munyurangabo 
Francois; (MP) 
Afternoon 21. Habitat, land problems and saving the State minister 
environment of land and 
environment; 
MINITERE 
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Tue. 14/11106 22. Government programmes: achievements State minister 
and planned tasks of commerce 
Afternoon 23. Poverty situation in Rwanda and and finance; 
government programme to fight against MINECOFIN 
poverty 
Wed. 24. Sources of genocide Hon. 
15/11106 Mpayimana 
Afternoon 25. Culture of tolerance in Rwanda after the Elie; senator 
horrible genocide. 
Thu. 16/11106 26. Gender and complementarily Mme Ingabire 
Afternoon 27. The role of Rwandan women in Marie 
developing our country immaculee 
28. Specific problems that female ex-
invaders encounter in reintegration 
DAYIDATE Main speech Speaker 
Fri. 17/11106 29. Unity and reconciliation Executive 
secretary of 
Afternoon NURC 
30. Personal hygiene and common hygiene Capt. Biseruka 
Richard; 
Directorate of 
. Medical 
ServiceslMOD 
Mon. 31. Impact of CDC in development in our Mr. Bazatoha 
20/11106 country Adolphe; 
coordinator of 
DC DPIMINAL 
Afternoon OC 
32. Programme of investment and tourism General director 
in Rwanda ofRIEPA 
Tue.21111106 33. Government programme on developing Directory of 
cooperatives cooperatives in 
MINICOM 
Afternoon 34. Entrepreneurship course Secretaire d'Etat 
charge du 
Developpement 
des 
Competences et 
du Travail 
Wed. 35. NEPAD and Regional Integration. Mr. Gatete 
22/11/06 Francis; 
NEPAD 
Advisor; Office 
of the President 
of the Republic 
of Rwanda 
Afternoon 36. Natural resources of Rwanda and the Rector of ISAE 
usefulness of natural resources in 
Rwanda's economy 
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Thu. 23/11106 37. Government programme for small Coordinator of 
industries and simple ones PPMER; 
Afternoon 38. Development project MINICOM 
Fri. 24/11106 39. Rural (country) development project Coordinator of 
RSSP; 
MINAGRI 
Afternoon 40. Taxes' politics in Rwanda, operating system General 
of Rwanda revenue authority (RRA), commissioner of 
achievements and planned actions RRA 
DAYIDATE Main speech Speaker 
Mon. 41. Relationship between families (l st part) Mr. Rutubuka 
27/11106 Emmanuel 
Afternoon 42. Relationship between families (2nd part) 
43. Relationship between families (3 rd part) 
Tue.28/11106 44. International law against racism of any Mr. Nkongori 
kind or form Laurent, 
Afternoon 45. international Law against genocide commISSIoner 
crime( crimes against human being) in the Rwanda 
human right 
commISSIOn 
Wed.29/11106 46. Education related to the nation President of 
election 
commISSIon 
Afternoon 47. Fight against malaria Coordinator of 
PNLP 
Thu.30/11106 48. Trauma and how to help those who are Service de 
affected Consultation 
PSYCHOSOCI 
AL 
Afternoon 49. Life Assurance General director 
of "life 
insurance in 
Rwanda" 
Fri. 01112/06 50. Programme of fighting against AIDS Executive 
coordinator of 
CNLS 
Afternoon 51. Operating of system of "Caisse social du Director 
Rwanda"(CSR) General of CSR 
Mon.4/12/06 52. AIDS testing and counselling NRLffRAC 
Tue. 5/12/06 53. Questions and answers on AIDS NRLffRAC 
DAYIDATE Main speech Speaker 
Wed. 6/12/06 54. Agriculture in Rwanda Minister of 
agricultural and 
Afternoon 55. Agriculture in Rwanda agro forestry 
Thu.7/12/06 56. The role of youth in our country's Minister of 
development youths, culture 
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Afternoon 57. The role of culture in developing our 
country 
and sports 
Fri. 8/12/06 58. Gacaca court Executive 
secretary in 
charge of 
GACACA court 
Afternoon 59. The role of other countries in our Minister of 
COUIgry'S problems foreign affairs 
Mon. 60. The role of journalism in Rwanda's Director of 
11/12/06 problems ORINFOR 
Afternoon 61. The role of journalism in Rwanda's 
problems 
Tue. 12/12/06 62. Government programme about teaching Minister of 
Education 
Nyuma ya saa 63. The government's educational policies 
sita 
Wed-Fri. 13- 64. Social economic survey, 10 DO, MISO 
15112106 photography 
65. Medical Screening MRU 
Mon. 66. function of banks especially UBPR Executive 
18/12/06 manager of 
UBPR (Union 
Nyuma.ya saa des Banques 
sita Populaire au 
Rwanda) 
67. the function of banks especially then Executive 
CSS manager of the 
Social Security 
Fund 
DAYIDATE Main speech Speaker 
Tue. 19112/06 68. the role of churches in tackling life Mr. Rutayisir~ 
issues Antoine, vice 
Nyuma ya saa The role of religion in the national president of the 
sita development National Unity 
and 
Reconciliation 
Commission 
Wed.20- 69. Entrepreneurship skills by CEFE 4 Resource 
24/12/06 Persons with 
CEFE skills 
Tue.26/12/06 70. The necessity of participating in 
goverments' policies 
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Wed. 71. conference with the ex-armed group Commissioner 
27112/06 David 
Munyurangabo 
Commissioner 
Maj. Gen Paul 
Rwarakabije in 
the RDRC 
Thu. 28112/06 72. Ceremony of demobilising and President of the 
reintegrating ex-armed group and commIssIon; 
delivering certificates commISSIoners, 
Nyuma ya saa coordinator 
sita . 
73. Delivering "Demobilization Id cards" TSlFinance 
financial support(BNK) Debts 
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